Pandora Papers: law firms must disclose clients’ names (like they’ve started doing in the US of all places)

This blog post contextualises the new Pandora Papers leak. It explains the need for public beneficial ownership registries, it opposes the latest opinion by the EU Data Protection Supervisor on the matter, and it shows how to use recent US case law to get the names of enabler’s clients, regardless of professional secrecy. It ends with a proposal suggesting that, just as banks are required to report their account holders to authorities and intermediaries are required to disclose schemes to hide beneficial owners, lawyers and corporate service providers should start reporting the identities of the clients for whom they set up offshore structures to authorities on an annual basis.

The Pandora Papers are yet another leak that exemplify the urgent need for public beneficial ownership registries around the world. Public beneficial ownership registries are official registries or databases (eg a commercial register) which collect information on the natural persons who ultimately own, control, or benefit from any legal vehicle (eg company, trust, etc). Having a record of the natural person (or beneficial owner) behind every legal entity serves to prevent the kind of financial secrecy that enables illicit activity. When public access to beneficial ownership information is not available, the public (and in some cases, the authorities) rely on leaks to access this information. In fact, as we’ve argued in a previous blog post, public access to beneficial ownership information would make leaks obsolete. Everyone would have access to beneficial ownership data without needing to depend on whistleblowers and journalists.

Undermining transparency: the EU Data Protection Supervisor

In an act of apparent hostility toward beneficial ownership transparency, which started gaining public support after the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers, the EU Data Protection Supervisor issued Opinion 12/2021 on 22 September 2021 in which they expressed opposition to the growing movement for public access to beneficial ownership information as enshrined in the EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD 5). (This non-binding opinion is about the “AML legislative package” adopted by the EU Commission on 20 July 2021, which among other items, reiterates the call for public access to beneficial ownership information as established in AMLD 5).

The EU Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) concluded the following:

As we have described in the UN High-Level FACTI Panel background paper on beneficial ownership transparency, disclosing information on beneficial owners is critical for tackling many types of illicit financial flows. Although money laundering and terrorist financing are important issues, so are tax abuse, corruption, unjustified enrichment, bid rigging, conflicts of interest, etc. In fact, the trend now is towards using data such as automatic exchange of banking information under the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard both for tax and money laundering cases (eg Punta del Este Declaration, page 6), rather than restricting access for just one purpose.

The worst part of Opinion 12/2021, however, is that, despite acknowledging the role of civil society organisations and the media in the fight against illicit financial flows and the fact that more EU countries are establishing public online registries of beneficial ownership, the Opinion still discourages public access until another study is done to assess proportionality and other issues. Creating a commission to discuss an issue and adding as many people as possible is a commonly-known disingenuous tactic for preventing further action.

In light of this opposition to public access to beneficial ownership information, it’s worth remembering, as explained here, that no one is obliged to create companies or other structures. If individuals do not wish for their identities to be disclosed or leaked from service providers, they could operate in the economy or hold assets under their own name. Agreeing to beneficial ownership transparency should be the least of the conditions under which individuals are permitted to set up legal vehicles which operate in the economy on their behalf, own assets, etc.

This transparency requirement is especially relevant if the individuals involved will also benefit from limited liability. What’s more, most companies have very simple structures (eg 85 per cent of UK companies are directly owned by individuals or by a company which in turn is directly owned by an individual). This means that in most cases, the shareholder (legal owner) and the beneficial owner are one and the same. In addition, most countries give public access to legal ownership information (after all, many commercial registries are called “public mercantile registries”) because this was considered necessary for trade. In other words, information on the individuals who own a business was made publicly available so that investors could know who they are dealing with.

Therefore, given that for most companies the beneficial owner and the legal owner coincide, beneficial ownership information has technically been publicly available in regular mercantile registries that disclose shareholder information. Beneficial ownership registries become relevant only when individuals set up complex ownership structures, including the integration of foreign entities (mostly from secrecy jurisdictions) into the ownership structure. These complex ownership structures make it impossible to determine the beneficial owner by looking at the local commercial register alone. An attempt to restrict public access to beneficial ownership information distorts the level playing field in local economies to benefit offshore investors/vehicles.

Moreover, contrary to this opinion which undermines the case for public access, it’s worth remembering that the Panama Papers, Paradise Papers – and most likely as will the Pandora Papers — have proven time and again the same fact: it’s not that “NGOs and the investigative journalism de facto contribute to drawing attention” to money laundering, but rather that they are indispensable to addressing illicit financial flows within our current framework. Sadly, media articles are sometimes the only real sanction that wrongdoers face and the only source of information on the users of secrecy jurisdictions.

Many authorities have had access to beneficial ownership information in (confidential) registries for years. They have also had access to data held by local financial institutions. The UK even has access to the beneficial ownership registries of some of the most problematic secrecy jurisdictions including the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands (both ranked among the worst offenders by the Financial Secrecy Index), because they happen to be UK dependencies. Yet, this data is rarely used proactively. Investigations by government authorities mostly happen after a leak and many times as a result of  the leak. These government actions in the aftermath of leaks may be because some governments (especially in lower income countries) didn’t have access to the data prior to the leak. In other cases, however, it may be that authorities only felt pressured to take action after the leaks became public.

Access to beneficial ownership information by the media and NGOs is so important because, other than some politicians resigning, the consequences of these leaks from law enforcement do not result in bankers, lawyers, or other enabler – let alone politicians – going to jail en masse. In other words, it’s not that Civil Society Organisations (who help the media understand and contextualise data) and investigative journalists simply help law enforcement by providing the information they need to administer consequences. It’s that their work alone may be the only type of “enforcement” that takes place (reputational risk as a result of negative press). Politicians and elites may be more discouraged from using secrecy jurisdiction because of leaks than for the fear of law enforcement.

Just as the Panama Papers led to the EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which required public access to beneficial ownership information, the Pandora Papers demonstrate the need for beneficial ownership information to be publicly accessible in all countries, starting with major secrecy jurisdictions and financial centres. This would enable these “NGOs and investigative journalists”, as well as authorities from all over the world, to conduct investigations year round rather than depending on leaks.

What is being done and what is missing

As our paper the State of Play of Beneficial Ownership describes, by April 2020 more than 80 jurisdictions had approved laws requiring beneficial ownership data to be disclosed to a government authority. Public access, albeit still limited, is now growing in Europe (not just in the EU, but also in British dependencies, Eastern Europe, and especially in the Western Balkans). To continue moving in the right direction, however, authorities need to invest more in developing verification mechanisms and closing loopholes. Beneficial ownership will not be useful if there are pathways for certain types of legal vehicles to avoid registration (eg most laws do not cover listed companies and investment funds) and if there are too many exceptions, as is the case in the US. Moreover, establishing beneficial ownership registries just for legal persons but not for trusts misses the point, given that trusts are weapons of mass injustice and have been documented again in Pandora Papers to be vehicles of choice for illicit financial activities.            

Apart from major loopholes to the scope, a big impairment to data accessibility is based on limited triggers. In other words, the parameteres for when beneficial ownership data must be registered and whose data must be registered are not inclusive enough. As explained in this brief (see page 18, proposal 4), most countries require only local legal vehicles (eg companies) to register their beneficial owners, but don’t demand this from foreign entities that may be operating in their territories or whose beneficial owners may be local residents. In other words, even a super advanced beneficial ownership register like Denmark’s would have no data on what was revealed by the Pandora Papers. The Danish register would know about Danish companies, but not about offshore companies set up by Danish residents in secrecy jurisdictions.

Until public beneficial ownership registries are available all around the world, each country should require beneficial ownership registration not just from locally incorporated legal vehicles, but also from any foreign legal vehicle with operations or assets in their territory, and from any legal vehicle that has a local participant, be it a beneficial owner, shareholder, director, etc. In other words, Denmark’s beneficial ownership register should collect beneficial ownership information on any Danish legal vehicle, as it does. But it should also collect information on any foreign legal vehicle with assets or operations in Denmark and any foreign legal vehicle in which a Danish resident participates as either a shareholder, director, beneficial owner, settlor, etc. (There are some disclosure regimes, either asset returns for public officials or asset and income returns for tax authorities, which already target offshore holdings, so expanding triggers of beneficial ownership registration is not that different to what already exists).

However, even though a country with such comprehensive scope and trigger criteria would in theory have all the relevant information (because the law would require it), the accuracy of the registered information as well as the enforcement of its registration is a completely different issue. For this reason, countries should undertake additional measures:

  1. Country of residence as a structured data to be searched for or exchanged

While many countries have established public online beneficial ownership registries, search mechanisms may be limited. A user may need to know the exact name of an entity, or may only do a (free) search by an entity’s name or ID. Some countries also allow users to search for information by the beneficial owner’s name or ID. What is needed, however, is the capacity to search by country(ies) of residence. This way, a countries could search for information on all their residents across every country’s public beneficial ownership registry, rather than trying to search for every individual taxpayer to see if they are mentioned as a beneficial owner. Countries without public access to information should engage in automatic or spontaneous exchanges of this information with the country of residence of the beneficial owner.

  1. Using offshore banking data to reveal offshore strategies

As proposed by our latest blog post on the leak from a bank in the Isle of Man, offshore banking data – especially what must be exchanged under the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard for automatic exchange of financial account information – could be a game changer for authorities. Data on offshore accounts, in addition to disclosing undeclared monies, could be used to reveal offshore secrecy strategies by determining the preferred secrecy jurisdiction used (or abused) by local taxpayers. Exchanged banking information could also reveal the types of structures typically chosen (a company, a trust, an Anstalt, etc) by residents of a particular country. For instance, based on a very small sample, the blog post described that 70 per cent of British beneficial owners used discretionary trusts from Cyprus to hold their bank accounts in the Isle of Man. A systematic analysis by authorities of the information received through automatic exchanges could reveal patterns that allow authorities to focus resources on obtaining data or establishing countermeasures in the secrecy jurisdictions favoured by their taxpayers.

  1. Obtain client information en masse directly from enablers

One of the conclusions of the Pandora Papers is that despite the many leaks, enablers such as lawyers and trust and company service providers (TCSPs) keep helping criminals and high net worth individuals hide behind secretive structures to engage in illicit financial flows including tax abuse and corruption. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in Recommendation 22 requires Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBP) such as lawyers, notaries, and accountants to conduct customer due diligence and be subject to anti-money laundering rule. However, not all countries require this from their service providers. Even for those that try to require it, lawyers are especially prone to resistance, often invoking professional secrecy based on attorney-client privilege, which can be abused to engage in illicit financial flows in general, as well as to avoid automatic exchange of banking information.

On the bright side, however, a recent US case law (Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC v. United States of America, Civil Action No. SA-18-1161-XR, 15 May 2019) that we blogged about gave access to the US tax authority, the IRS, to the identities of clients of a law firm that had engaged in creating offshore structures to enable abuse of US taxes. Importantly, the decision was also upheld by the US Court of Appeals in 2020. Here are some interesting remarks:

It’s ok to ask for client information from a law firm engaging in creating offshore structures to hide the beneficial owner:

The clients of [the Firm] are of interest to the [IRS] because of the [Firm’s] services directed at concealing its clients’ beneficial ownership of offshore assets”.

It’s also ok for the purpose of identifying unknown clients who have also obtained the services:

The IRS is pursuing an investigation to develop information about other unknown clients of [the Firm] who may have failed to comply with the internal revenue laws by availing themselves of similar services to those that [the Firm] provided to Taxpayer-1

This is the data that the IRS asked for:

“Documents “reflecting any U.S. clients at whose request or on whose behalf [the Firm] ha[s] acquired or formed any foreign entity, opened or maintained any foreign financial account, or assisted in the conduct of any foreign financial transaction”; “[a]ll books, papers, records, or other data . . . concerning the provision of services to U.S. clients relating to setting up offshore financial accounts”; and “[a]ll books, papers, records, or other data . . . concerning the provision of services to U.S. clients relating to the acquisition, establishment or maintenance of offshore entities or structures of entities.”

Given that the identity of the disclosed client would not necessarily incriminate them, attorney-client privilege does not apply:

“This broad request, seeking relevant information about any U.S. client who engaged in any one of a number of the Firm’s services, is not the same as the Government’s knowing whether any Does engaged in allegedly fraudulent conduct, or the content of any specific legal advice the Firm gave particular Does, and then requesting their identities.”

Based on the success of this US case, all countries should not only follow and try similar lawsuits, but they should also establish by law that, just as banks and financial institutions are required to report the identities of their accounts holders and beneficial owners, law firms and corporate service providers in general should annually report the identities of all their clients for whom they set up (or help set up) legal vehicles. These regulations should focus especially on service providers who set up offshore structures (entities incorporated in a country different from the residence of the beneficial owner). In relation to this, the OECD already called on countries to obtain more beneficial ownership information by publishing Model Mandatory Disclosure Rules on Schemes to Hide the Beneficial Owner. Based on this framework, authorities trying to catch wrongdoers should be asking not just for the scheme details but also for the identities of those clients who may have used these schemes.

Establishing such a requirement by law may also undermine any attempt to invoke professional secrecy to oppose disclosing clients. Another US case, United States v. BDO Seidman, dealt with this subject matter. This case was based on US tax regulations requiring organisers of tax shelters to register tax shelters with the tax administration. The regulations also required organisers and sellers of such shelters to keep lists of their investors. (For background information on such rules, see indicator 13 in the Corporate Tax Haven Index which monitors such disclosure rules.) In the United States v. BDO Seidman case, the US tax administration (the IRS) requested the identities of the clients because “the IRS received information suggesting that BDO [the tax advice firm] was promoting potentially abusive tax shelters without complying with the registration and listing requirements for organizers and sellers of tax shelters”.

Although the clients (the “Does”) opposed the disclosure of their identities based on professional secrecy, the US Court of Appeals concluded:

“The Does have not established that a confidential communication will be disclosed if their identities are revealed… Disclosure of the identities of the Does will disclose to the IRS that the Does participated in one of the 20 types of tax shelters… It is less than clear, however, as to what motive, or other confidential communication of tax advice, can be inferred from that information alone”

This case shows why it is important to have a regulation requiring the disclosure of at least the schemes:

“At the time that the Does communicated their interest in participating in tax shelters that BDO organized or sold, the Does should have known that BDO was obligated to disclose the identity of clients engaging in such financial transactions. Because the Does cannot credibly argue that they expected that their participation in such transactions would not be disclosed, they cannot now establish that the documents responsive to the summonses, which do not contain any tax advice, reveal  confidential communication.”

Conclusion

As explained here, no one is obliged to create companies or other structures. If individuals do not wish for their identities to be disclosed or leaked from service providers, they could operate in the economy or hold assets under their own name. Beneficial ownership transparency should be the least of the conditions under which individuals are permitted to set up legal vehicles which operate in the economy on their behalf, own assets, etc. This transparency requirement is especially relevant if these individuals will also benefit from limited liability. After three major leaks, it’s high time for countries to speed up the establishment of public beneficial ownership registries. In the meantime, they must start using existing exchanges of information to obtain and verify data. These leaks, however, also prove that more is needed. Not only should schemes to hide beneficial owners be disclosed to authorities by intermediaries as proposed by the OECD and the EU, but the identities of the clients potentially using these schemes should also be part of corporate service providers’ annual reporting to authorities.

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast #46: ضريبة تثير جدلا لدى صانعي المحتوى الرقمي في مصر

Welcome to the 46th edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available on most podcast apps. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can follow the programme on Facebook, on Twitter and on our website.

ضريبة تثير جدلا لدى صانعي المحتوى الرقمي في مصر

فرض ضريبة على مداخيل الانفلونسرز وصانعي محتوى السوشيال ميديا على يوتيوب وفايسيوك وانستاغرام وتيكتوك هو موضوع الحلقة #46 من بودكاست “الجباية ببساطة” في حوار مع الباحث في مجال الحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية، إلهامي مرغني، حول الجدل الواسع الذي أثارته مصلحة الضرائب المصرية والتي تقدر مداخيل سنوية لهذا النشاط تفوق 500 ألف جنيه مصري للفرد.

كيف سيطبق هذا القرار؟ بأي آليات؟ وماهي تبعاته المتوقعة؟ أسئلة تجدون الإجابة عنها في البودكاست العربي “الجباية ببساطة “.

ضريبة تثير جدلا لدى صانعي المحتوى الرقمي في مصر

For this month’s episode #46 of Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة  we begin with the latest news relating to fiscal justice issues globally and in the Arab region. We then interview Elhamy Al Merghany, an Egyptian researcher and consultant on economic and social issues. Walid and Elhamy discuss the recent decision by the Egyptian government to impose taxes on social media content creators, also knows as “youtubers” or “vloggers”. Elhamy provides an analysis of the decision, the rationale behind it and how just it is when assessing fair taxation at large.

تابعونا على صفحتنا على الفايسبوك وتويتر https://www.facebook.com/ TaxesSimply Tweets by taxes_simply

The Tax Justice Network’s French podcast: Afrique: Plus de transparence entre administrations fiscales pour lutter contre les flux financiers illicites #32

Welcome to our monthly podcast in French, Impôts et Justice Sociale with Idriss Linge of the Tax Justice Network. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages every month in EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here and on most podcast apps. Here’s our latest episode:

Afrique : Plus de transparence entre administrations fiscales pour lutter contre les flux financiers illicites, edition 32

Pour cette édition de votre podcast en français sur la justice fiscale et sociale produit par the Tax Justice Network, nous revenons sur les échanges qui ont porté sur la manière dont l’Echange Automatique d’Informations fiscales peut aider les administrations fiscales africaines à lutter contre les flux financiers illicites. Les discussions ont été menées dans le cadre de la Conférence Internationale sur la Transparence fiscale et les Flux Financiers Illicites en Afrique. Vous pouvez lire la déclaration finale de l’événement sous le ce lien.

Interviennent dans ce podcast :

Afrique : Plus de transparence entre administrations fiscales pour lutter contre les flux financiers illicites #32

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Pandora Papers shows transparency failure is an accountability failure

The ICIJ has today revealed the biggest offshore leak since the Panama Papers in 2016. The Pandora Papers document 14 offshore professional service providers, and the way in which a mass of politicians, public officials and celebrities have utilised the offshore system to hide the true value of their wealth, and in some cases pay less tax than they owe.

These personal actions are shameful and will no doubt come under great scrutiny in the coming days, but it’s important that we don’t lose sight of one crucial fact: few of the individuals had any role in turning the global tax system into an ATM for the superrich. That honour goes to the professional enablers – banks, law firms and accountants – and the countries that facilitate them.

Every year, the world loses $427 billion in tax to tax havens – that’s a nurse’s yearly salary lost every second to the world’s wealthiest multinational corporations and individuals. It’s no coincidence that the small club of rich countries at the OECD who have held the pen on global tax rules for decades are the ones responsible for over two-thirds of the global tax abuse the world suffers every year.

A global tax system reprogrammed to prioritise the needs and wellbeing of people over the desires of the wealthiest can be our most powerful tool for tackling inequality, guaranteeing people’s human rights and protecting our democracies from the unchecked influence of the superrich. The first move towards a fairer global tax system is to take rule-setting out of the hands of a small club of rich countries and into the daylight of inclusive democracy at the UN.

Tax is about more than just money

The damage done by tax abuse goes well beyond the immediate loss of public revenues. Tax delivers the 4 Rs: revenue, redistribution, repricing and representation. When major companies and wealthy individuals cheat on their taxes, we all suffer from poorer public services. On top of that, governments are less able to redistribute and so we also suffer higher inequalities. When tax abuse defeats the repricing of public health threats such as tobacco consumption and carbon emission, we all suffer the result – and so will future generations.

But the fourth R may be the most important. The share of tax in government spending is one of very few things that is consistently associated with better governance and more effective political representation. Paying tax is a social act. When we pay tax it builds our stake in the decisions of government. That makes us more likely to hold government to account. When a government is more reliant financially on its own citizens, it functions better on our behalf. For example, when tax makes up a larger share of government spending overall, research shows that governments typically spend a higher share on public health; and that for a given level of spending on public health, the outcomes tend to be better and also more inclusive of the whole population.

So tax abuse by major companies and wealthy individuals doesn’t just leave governments with less money – it makes that money less likely to be well spent, for the benefit of all citizens. This is the real threat of tax havens from the Netherlands to Cayman and the rest of the UK spider’s web– that they rob us of effective states, and ultimately of our human rights.

Changing the way we change the rules

Ensuring that major companies and wealthy individuals pay their taxes is politically difficult – because of course these groups have disproportionate power. Major data leaks such as the Panama Papers have been crucial in raising public awareness of the scale of tax abuse, and the impunity of the perpetrators. That in turn has forced policy action, because ultimately politicians take steps not when they see the light, but when they feel the heat of public anger.

The public should not have to rely on leaks, though. We know who the major enablers of tax abuse are – from the major law firms, leading accountants and international banks who sell these services, to the OECD countries and their dependent territories that facilitate them. But we need consistent public data to ensure accountability. The High-Level FACTI Panel has adopted our proposal for a UN Centre for Monitoring Taxing Rights, which would collate, analyse and publish data on offshore financial accounts and on the country by country reporting of multinational companies. Our related proposals for indicators for the UN Sustainable Development Goals target to reduce illicit financial flows are also now being piloted by UN bodies in a range of countries around the world.

While the high-profile politicians and celebrities at the heart of Pandora Papers will be getting much of the spotlight over the coming days, it’s OECD member countries and their dependent territories that are responsible for the vast majority of the cross-border tax abuse that undermines human rights around the world.

Public outcry following the Panama Papers forced governments to adopt tax transparency measures but they stopped short of full transparency. The biggest blockers to transparency are the US, which the Pandora Papers confirms is the world’s biggest peddler of financial secrecy, and the UK, the leader of the world’s biggest tax haven network. We need full transparency so we can hold tax abusers accountable, especially when our politicians are among them.

US President Biden must match his own rhetoric on shutting down global illicit finance, and start with the biggest offender – his own country.

For far too long, the OECD itself has set the international tax rules that allow this. It’s time now to shift that role to a globally inclusive setting, and that’s why discussions about a UN Framework Convention on Tax are beginning to gather pace. That will be a key step to ensuring international tax rules and transparency that safeguard and promote human rights around the world.

Photo credit: Gage Skidmore from Surprise, AZ, United States of America, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Tax Justice Network Portuguese podcast #29: Fim à tributação que penaliza os mais pobres

Welcome to our monthly podcast in Portuguese, É da sua conta (it’s your business) produced by Grazielle DavidDaniela Stefano and Luciano Máximo. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages – EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. Here’s the latest episode:

Fim à tributação que penaliza os mais pobres #29

O episódio #29 do É da sua conta mostra que há uma disputa no mundo hoje: recuperar a economia ou reestruturará-la e torná-la mais justa e sustentável? Um sistema tributário justo é aquele em que os que têm mais contribuem proporcionalmente com mais. Mas não é bem isso que está acontecendo: governos mundo afora encaixam as peças erradas nos lugares errados; fazem com que quem tem menos contribua proporcionalmente com mais.

Em Angola, o recém-criado Imposto sobre Valor Acrescentado (IVA) amplia as desigualdades. Em Portugal, o IVA começa a ser sentido pelas pequenas empresas. Ou seja, esse imposto sobre por exemplo, a compra de um celular, acaba pesando muito mais sobre os mais pobres. O Brasil corre o risco de seguir caminho parecido, mas pode também se espelhar na Colômbia, onde o povo saiu às ruas e não aceitou a reforma fiscal. 

Ouça no É da sua conta #29:

Temos que mudar a composição da carga para ela se torne um pouco mais progressiva.”

~ Fernando Gaiger, pesquisador do Instituto de Pesquisa em Economia Aplicada (Ipea)

Nós perdemos muita receita fiscal para países com outras regras de tributação e portanto, uma das propostas que nós temos são os acordos de dominação de dupla tributação, reabilitando os impostos de retenção, ou seja, tributar rendimentos de capital.”

~ José Gusmão, eurodeputado

Eu acho que a nossa aposta tem que estar na tributação empresarial, particularmente de multinacionais e também na tributação dos grandes multimilionários.”

~ Âurea Mouzinho, economista angolona

Penso que os frutos dos protestos serão vistos no próximo governo porque graças aos protestos, só serão aceitos a redução de benefícios tributários e aumento da tributação dos muito ricos”.

~Maria Fernanda Valdez, economista e coordenadora da Organização Não Governamental FES Colômbia

Participam desta edição:

Fim à tributação que penaliza os mais pobres #29

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 É da sua conta é o podcast mensal em português da Tax Justice Network. Coordenação: Naomi Fowler. Produção: Daniela Stefano, Grazielle David e Luciano Máximo. Dublagem: Vanessa Martina Silva

Download gratuito. Reprodução livre para rádios.

Isle of Man banking data leak reveals how sharing data can identify offshore strategies and improve beneficial ownership

Beneficial ownership transparency is a crucial strategy for tackling illicit financial flows. It involves identifying the individuals (natural persons) who ultimately own, control, or benefit from a legal vehicle like a company, trust or partnership. Individuals engaging in illegal or illegitimate activities, however, find it quite easy to hide themselves behind legal vehicles, which are set up in tax havens (or as we prefer to call them, secrecy jurisdictions).

Although many countries are approving laws to establish beneficial
ownership registries (our report on the State of play of play of beneficial
ownership registration
counted more than 80 countries by April 2020),
many challenges remain. Those challenges include difficulty in the
verification of registered ownership information as well as the
enforcement of registration requirements. Additionally, however, most
beneficial ownership registration laws are flawed from the onset by
requiring transparency just for local entities. This means that countries
have no guaranteed access to beneficial ownership information on
foreign entities operating in their territories nor on the foreign entities
operating abroad but controlled or owned by local individuals.

Given that banks must also collect beneficial ownership information as
part of their due diligence process whenever a customer opens an
account, they can help verify beneficial ownership information contained
in central registries. If a country has failed to establish a beneficial
ownership registry, banks may be the only source of beneficial
ownership data. However, authorities are usually able to ask for this
information from local banks only, not foreign ones.

The sharing of information held by foreign banks would be crucial, not
just for uncovering the location of money held offshore, but also for
identifying the offshore strategies used by local individuals to hold this
money. Authorities could then determine whether individuals are
holding their foreign assets in their own name or through offshore
entities. By identifying the most commonly used secrecy jurisdictions
and the preferred types of legal vehicles (eg company limited by shares,
discretionary trust, etc), authorities would have a better understanding
of where to focus their resources in order to find secret assets and
income held offshore.

Unfortunately, the current system for the automatic exchange of bank
account information, based on the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard
(CRS), provides limited data. We know, however, that this data is
already collected by banks. It could be disclosed for analysis, as we have
been calling for since 2017, in a template such as this.

Our template offers a theoretical explanation of how to analyse and
utilise shared international banking data, but at the time of publication
in 2017, we didn’t have any examples to demonstrate with. That all
changed when economist Matt Collin at the Brookings Institution
published a brilliant paper this year titled “What lies beneath: Evidence
from leaked account data on how elites use offshore banking”
. Collin
uses a leak from a private bank on the Isle of Man to analyse several
interesting patterns regarding offshore financial behaviour. One of these
patterns that caught our attention in relation to beneficial ownership
transparency is illustrated below in Figure 11, as it is labelled in the
paper.

Fig 11: Share of deposits that are obscured from BIS reporting due to the use of a company registered in a different jurisdiction than the beneficial owner(s)

This table shows that the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS)
statistics on foreign deposits by country of origin may be misleading due
to data being reported at the account holder level instead of the
beneficial ownership level. In other words, if Joanne from France set up a
shell company in the Cayman Islands (with no operations, no office, no
employees or equipment), and holds a bank account in Luxembourg
through this shell company, the Bank for International Settlements’ statistics will report the Luxembourg account as belonging to a party in
the Cayman Islands, even though it really belongs to Joanne in France.
(The Bank for International Settlements’ statistics for many countries
don’t even differentiate between accounts held by individuals or
entities– all are reported together).

While the issue of misleading statistics is very relevant, our interest was
to know more about the entities used to hold the bank accounts: where
they were incorporated (in which secrecy jurisdiction) and their type (a
company, trust, partnership, etc).

It was extremely helpful of Matt Collin to share statistical data from the
leak with us. No names or account numbers were shared, only the
number of accounts based on the residence of the beneficial owner and
other details.

Results

Before we go into the findings, some caveats must be mentioned. First,
this is a leaked database from a small private bank, which doesn’t
include all the details the bank may have on each customer, and which
may involve errors (eg if the bank recorded the information incorrectly
or if the customer declared wrong information). The data contained in
the leak is obviously not representative of the whole world. Our point,
however, is not to draw conclusions about global offshore strategies, but
to show what could be done – and how – if this analysis were conducted
across the whole of the banking data that is being exchanged under the
OECD’s automatic exchange system.

Second, our focus is on how the Isle of Man is used by beneficial owners
from elsewhere in the world in their offshore strategies, so first we
excluded all beneficial owners from the Isle of Man. In addition, we
excluded all accounts with a beneficial owner using an entity from their
country of residence to hold a bank account in the Isle of Man. In other
words if Joanne from the France held her bank account in the Isle of Man
through a French company, this was excluded because both Jane and
the company are from the same country: France (in this case, Joanne
didn’t go offshore to set up a company). Instead, if she held the bank
account in the Isle of Man through a company in Luxembourg, this was
considered. In essence, we removed from the sample cases where the
beneficial owner and the company are from the same country.

Third, given the potential bias for having a local entity in the same place
where you hold your offshore bank account (this may be a package
offered whenever you set up an offshore company), we excluded
entities from the Isle of Man, which represented 67 per cent of all the
offshore cases. If Joanne from France held the bank account in the Isle of
Man through an Isle of Man entity, this was excluded. The strong
assumption here is that if the bank account was not in the Isle of Man,
then we would expect a much lower percentage of Isle of Man entities.
We may be wrong, however. It may be case that the Isle of Man is
indeed the preferred secrecy jurisdiction of the world to set up an
offshore entity, regardless of where the money will be held, either in the island or anywhere else. In essence, we removed from the sample cases
where an entity from the Isle of Man was used to hold the account in the
Isle of Man.

Finally, we disregarded cases where the entity was “unknown” or had an
invalid value. To sum up, this is what we removed from the sample on
“offshore strategies”:

This is what we found:

If we had had a large enough sample, these could have been valid global conclusions. For example, it would be possible to conclude that Cyprus and the British Virgin Islands are the preferred secrecy jurisdictions in which to hold bank accounts. In turn ,country authorities would know to be especially wary of private companies from the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus and the UK, as well as discretionary trusts from Cyprus and St. Kitts and Nevis. Country authorities could also learn which secrecy jurisdictions and types of entities are most often utilised by their local taxpayers to hide their wealth.

This all goes to show the leap in tax transparency that can be achieved, and the better equipped country authorities can be to tackle global tax abuses, if the data collected under automatic exchange of bank account information was publicly disclosed and properly analysed using our template.

Here are some of the more detailed findings we obtained by applying our analysis template to the small data sample (the number in parenthesis refers to the number of beneficial owners in the database):

To stress the relevance of this data one last time, consider the following. If Indian authorities had access to this data regarding all of their residents’ offshore holdings (not just for the 4 Indians mentioned in the leaked database), they would know which secrecy jurisdictions to prioritise safeguarding against, either by signing agreements to exchange information, making requests for information, or including those jurisdictions in their secrecy jurisdiction list.

Conclusion

In conclusion, banking data can provide very useful insights, if properly analysed, to reveal offshore strategies. This in turn would indicate where authorities should focus their efforts towards financial transparency and curbing tax abuse. Based on the example of the Isle of Man banking leak, the OECD’s automatic exchange of information system could become a great source, provided it broadens the scope of information exchanged. For more background information on beneficial ownership and automatic exchange of information, and an explanation on how both systems can be improved to reveal offshore strategies, please see our brief via the button below.

Degrowth: liberation from ‘growthism’: the Tax Justice Network podcast, September 2021

Welcome to the latest episode of the Tax Justice Network’s monthly podcast, the Taxcast. You can subscribe either by emailing naomi [at] taxjustice.net or find us on your podcast app.

In this episode, Naomi Fowler explores degrowth and how we liberate ourselves from ‘growthism’ with economic anthropologist Jason Hickel. (You can listen to Part 2 of that conversation here.)

Plus: there can be no liberation without tackling monopoly power, or the role of finance sectors and States, investing in death and destruction across the world.

The transcript is available here (some is automated and may not be 100% accurate)

Guests:

Degrowth: liberation from ‘growthism’ #114

“We should seek to organise the economy around meeting human needs rather than around servicing elite consumption and capital accumulation. And that requires a pretty dramatic shift from sort of the status quo of our economic system.”

~ Jason Hickel

There’s no way we can build local resilience and sustainable economies when faced with monopoly players who can dominate markets and use their financial power to over-ride democracy through their lobbying.”

~ John Christensen

Further reading:

Here’s the Taxcast website with more Taxcasts: https://www.thetaxcast.com 

[Image: “Green Shoots” by velodenz is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0]

Tax Justice 101: Become a tax whizz with our new explainer series

Taxation is really easy to understand, right? Well, no, not really. In fact it can all seem a bit complicated. The way governments design and implement tax policies has a huge impact on how fair and equal our societies are, though, and just taxation can make the difference between success and failure when it comes to a whole range of issues, including climate crisis, sustainable development and tackling gender and racial inequalities. That’s why it’s so very important for everyone who cares about our world – and the people in it – to learn about tax justice.

Over the next few weeks the Tax Justice Network will be rolling out a new series of ‘Tax Justice 101’ videos, in which we’ll explain the ways fair taxation is linked to many of the most pressing issues of our time. The first of these – The 4 ‘R’s of Taxation – has just gone live, and sets out the four fundamental functions that make just taxation crucial to building a just society.

What’s tax for? The 4 ‘R’s of tax

Every Monday for the next ten weeks we’ll be sharing a new video, with each one taking on a key theme on the tax justice agenda and explaining it in an easily understandable way. Next week we’ll be looking at the ‘ABCs of Tax Transparency’, and after that we’ll get to grips with a host of other issues such as why taxation is crucial to human rights, the ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate taxation, and why tax is better than international aid or debt for developing countries. We’ll also be asking some thorny questions about who calls the shots in international taxation issues and whether ‘tax avoidance’ is actually legal (as so many tax avoiders claim!).

Join us! Every Monday you’ll be able to find a new video on our Facebook, Twitter and Youtube channels, and also on our website’s video page. You’ll be a tax justice guru in no time!

Afrique subsaharienne : Un système fiscal plus juste pour un meilleur accès à l’éducation et à la santé

La COVID-19 survenue en 2020 a plus que jamais rappelé l’impérieuse nécessité qu’il y a pour les pays, de garantir un accès à des systèmes de santé publique dotés de ressources suffisantes, et accessible de manière équitable pour tous. Aussi, elle a compromis la capacité des pays à poursuivre leurs efforts visant à assurer un accès pour tous à une éducation de qualité, sur un pied d’égalité, surtout pour ceux qui ont le moins de ressources financières. Toutefois, cette pandémie n’a fait qu’aggraver une situation qui nécessitait déjà des améliorations. On retrouve ainsi des structures économiques héritées de la colonisation, et qui profitent toujours aux anciennes métropoles, et surtout une pratique d’abus et d’évasions fiscales par des multinationales qui cherchent à maximiser leurs profits.

En Afrique subsaharienne où on compte 27 pays, la moyenne des dépenses publiques en éducation avant la pandémie était de 4,3% du Produit Intérieur Brut selon les statistiques disponibles sur le site internet de la Banque Mondiale. On pourrait penser que c’est presqu’autant dans l’Union Européenne, où les pays ont collectivement dépensé 4,7% de leurs Produit Intérieur Brut pour l’éducation. Mais en valeur absolue, les dépenses de l’UE pour le secteur éducatif représentaient jusqu’à 654 milliards €, contre seulement 62,3 milliards € pour les gouvernements de la région. Dans son édition 2020 des perspectives économiques pour l’Afrique la Banque Africaine de Développement revient sur ce qu’elle appelle l’inefficience de financement de l’éducation sur le continent. Dans certains des pays (Soudan, Ouganda, Libéria ou encore Sierra Leone), le nombre de personnes vivant avec peu de ressources financières est élevé. Pourtant, les ménages selon des récentes informations, y contribuent encore à plus de 60% des dépenses d’éducation. Or parfois, il faut entre 10 et 12 ans, pour qu’un enfant de 6 ans achève une formation de primaire et de secondaire, ce qui revient cher pour les familles.

Des injustices sont aussi perceptibles en matière de santé, tant sur le plan de l’accès aux soins de santé, que de la disponibilité d’un cadre adéquat pour une bonne qualité de vie, comme l’accès l’eau potable, une bonne hygiène ou encore une nutrition saine et de bonne qualité. Avec la Covid-19, on a vu émerger le risque que représentent les pandémies mondiales pour les pays faibles, tant sur le plan économique, que social. Selon le Global Health Security Index, plusieurs pays africains se retrouvent dans la catégorie de ceux qui sont les moins préparés à faire face à d’éventuelles pandémies. Les données sur l’éducation et la santé, ne prennent pas en compte les disparités entre les zones urbaines et les zones rurales enclavées et reculées. Aussi, ces données ne reflètent pas suffisamment la plus grande vulnérabilité qui existe chez les femmes. Ces dernières sont les plus susceptibles de solliciter des soins de santé en raison de la maternité. Elles ont le plus besoin d’eau potable pour les enfants dont elles prennent soin, et sont aussi les moins privilégiées lorsqu’il faut choisir entre le financement des études du garçon ou de la fille.

Dans les discussions multilatérales, les gouvernements africains évoquent l’absence de moyens financiers pour faire face à leurs engagements en matière des droits de l’homme. Les capacités d’intervention des gouvernements demeurent assez modestes en Afrique subsaharienne et les attentes des populations sont grandes. En plus de la précarité, l’Afrique subsaharienne doit faire face à des défis de sécurité et de plus en plus des catastrophes naturelles comme des sécheresses, des inondations, ou des feux de brousses. Mais de nombreuses recherches ont aussi démontré que le continent laisse échapper des opportunités pour adresser ces défis, faute de résoudre le problème des pertes de ressources budgétaires. Dans une étude publiée en 2017, le Curtis Research a estimé sur la base de sa méthodologie, que les pertes de revenus pour les administrations africaines s’élevaient à 182 milliards $. A cette période-là, cela représentait 400% de l’aide international au développement et autant que les dépenses combinées de la région dans les secteurs de la santé publique et de l’éducation. Dans une autre étude disponible depuis en 2018, les chercheurs Léonce Ndikumana et James K. Boyce ont démontré, que 30 pays d’Afrique subsaharienne ont perdu un total de 1 400 milliards $ sur 45 ans, en raison de la fuite des capitaux. Ce montant permettrait de tripler les dépenses d’éducation sur une période de 10 ans.

Dans son premier rapport sur l’Etat de la justice fiscale dans le monde publié en octobre 2020, Tax Justice Network a estimé que l’Afrique dans son ensemble perdait l’équivalent de 23,24 milliards $ de revenus fiscaux par an du fait de l’évasion fiscale des entreprises, majoritairement des multinationales installées sur le continent. A cela s’ajoutent 2,5 milliards $ perdus du fait de la fraude fiscale par les personnes fortunées, pour un total de 25,7 milliards $US de pertes fiscales estimées dans la région. L’étude a évalué que cette somme représenterait le 52% des budgets consacrés à la santé publique par les pays de la Région. Cela aurait pu permettre de créer 10,13 millions de postes supplémentaires d’infirmières. Alternativement, ces sommes représentent jusqu’à 29% des budgets d’éducation des gouvernements africains.

« Le COVID-19 a dévoilé les terribles conséquences d’un système fiscal international programmé pour faire primer les intérêts des sociétés et individus les plus fortunés sur les besoins de l’ensemble de la société.  Il a mis au grand jour les multiples inégalités qui entachent nos sociétés et dans quelle mesure la destinée des personnes les plus marginalisées continue de dépendre de structures inéquitables, qui conservent un élitisme politique et l’héritage du passé colonial », on lire dans le document. 

Aussi, l’inefficience dans la collecte des ressources financières par les administrations fiscales en Afrique, renchéri le coût de la vie pour des personnes qui ont déjà des moyens financiers limités. Comme on l’a évoqué plus haut, la part des dépenses des ménages pour des questions de santé publique et d’éducation est plus élevé sur le continent que dans d’autres régions du monde, selon des indicateurs de la Banque Mondiale. Sur le faible revenu qui reste pour la consommation, les gouvernements de la région qui ne parviennent pas à collecter efficacement les impôts sur les profits des entreprises et riches individus, prélèvent encore des taxes sur la valeur ajoutée qui dans certains pays atteignent 20%. Enfin, les inégalités d’accès au travail rémunéré rendent les choses encore plus difficiles pour les femmes. Mais plus que la santé publique et l’éducation, ce sont des avancées en matière de justice sociale au sens large qui pourraient apporter le plus de changements en Afrique. Des recherches menées en 2013 sur 31 pays africains par les professeurs Arne Bigsten et Thushaynthan Baskaran concluait déjà qu’il existait une corrélation entre la capacité des gouvernements africains à mobiliser des ressources fiscales et l’atteinte des objectifs de réduction de la corruption et d’amélioration du fonctionnement du système démocratique. Mais il y a aussi une responsabilité des pays dits développés. Dans le cadre du processus de décolonisation, ces pays ont mis en place un cadre économique extractif, qui leur permettait de tirer profits des pays nouvellement devenus indépendants. Aujourd’hui, Ils abritent l’essentiel des juridictions opaques, qui permettent aux multinationales d’y dissimuler des revenus imposables, dont ceux en provenance d’Afrique. En même temps, ces pays compromettent les chances d’une véritable fiscalité internationale qui soit équitable et juste pour tout le monde, en assurant le contrôle des organisations les plus influentes en matière de politique économique et fiscale, comme le G20 ou l’OCDE

Les critiques à la justice fiscale ne manquent pas de dire que mobiliser des ressources ne suffit pas à faire reculer l’injustice sociale. Liz Nelson, experte sur les questions de justice fiscale et droits de l’homme chez Tax Justice Network et auteur d’un important rapport sur la justice fiscale et les droits de l’homme, a une réponse appropriée à cette manière de voir. « L’utilisation des ressources est une chose très importante et non-négligeable. Sans vouloir donner de leçons à qui que ce soit, nous pensons, qu’aucun gouvernement dans le monde qu’il soit d’un pays riche ou d’un pays pauvre, ne doit manquer l’opportunité de se donner les moyens de répondre aux attentes sociales de ses populations, et le Covid est venu montrer que personne n’est à l’abri. Aussi il y a de la part des gouvernements du monde un engagement presque catégorique et obligatoire, pour honorer aux promesses des objectifs de développement durable et il faut pouvoir financer leurs atteintes, pour toutes les catégories de citoyen », a-t-elle fait savoir. Il est urgent d’intervenir aujourd’hui. Aux défis historiques en matière de droits de l’homme, se superposent de nouveaux enjeux qui prennent la forme des changements climatiques et d’épuisement des ressources essentielles à la survie.

Plus que jamais, les trois piliers d’une meilleure justice fiscale internationale défendues par Tax Justice Network s’imposent, pour réduire l’opacité générale qui favorise les inégalités et l’iniquité des opportunités dans le monde. Il s’agit de l’échange automatique d’informations, des registres des bénéficiaires effectifs et de la déclaration publique des comptes financiers pays par pays pour les multinationales. Bien au-delà de l’Afrique, les inégalités sociales dont la fraude, l’évasion et l’évitement des impôts constituent des causes majeures entre autres, continuent de gagner du terrain. Cela justifie de se mobiliser toujours d’avantage au niveau international, pour une plus grande justice fiscale, mais aussi pour un meilleur accès à l’éducation pour de millions de personnes, et pour une protection sanitaire plus efficace.

The Tax Justice Network September 2021 Spanish language podcast, Justicia ImPositiva: Los litigios entre multinacionales y los estados, tráfico de drogas, litio #63

Welcome to our Spanish language podcast and radio programme Justicia ImPositiva with Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez, free to download and broadcast on radio networks across Latin America and Spain. ¡Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a nuestro podcast y programa radiofónico! Escuche por su app de podcast favorita.

En este programa:

INVITADOS:

Los litigios entre multinacionales y los estados, tráfico de drogas, litio #63

MÁS INFORMACIÓN:

Enlace de descarga para las emisoras: https://traffic.libsyn.com/secure/j-impositiva/JI_Sept_21.mp3

Subscribase a nuestro RSS feed: http://j_impositiva.libsyn.com/rss

O envien un correo electronico a Naomi [@] taxjustice.net para ser
incorporado a nuestra lista de suscriptores.

Sigannos por twitter en http://www.twitter.com/J_ImPositiva

Estamos tambien en facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Justicia-ImPositiva-1464800660510982/

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast: الجباية ببساطة #45 – لبنان ما بعد الإفلاس

Welcome to the 45th edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available on most podcast apps. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can follow the programme on Facebook, on Twitter and on our website.

الجباية ببساطة #45 – لبنان ما بعد الإفلاس

في حلقة هذا الشهر من الجباية ببساطة كان لنا حوار مع الناشط السياسي اللبناني سامر عبد الله، سلطنا من خلاله الضوء على الوضع الصعب الذي يعيشه لبنان على إمتداد سنتين من الإحتجاجات في ظل فوضى سياسية واقتصادية وصلت بالبلاد إلى “إنفجار” إجتماعي مع إنهيار سعر صرف الليرة ومعه انهارت قطاعات أساسية كالدواء والكهرباء، زيادة على إرتفاع نسب الفقر والبطالة والدين العام مع تضخم خانق ألهب الأسعار كالغذاء مثلا الذي عرف زيادةةبأكثر من 400%.

 في أخبارنا المتفرقة تناولنا خفض الإنفاق في الكويت والعودة القسرية لليمنيين من السعودية زيادة على إصدار مصر لأول صكوك سيادية مرورا بتعقيدات النظام المصرفي الجزائري والتي تحد من تحويلات المغتربين بالخارج.

In edition #45 of Taxes Simply, we begin with the latest news relating to fiscal justice issues globally and in the Arab region. We then speak with Samer Abdalla, a Lebanese political activist about the latest economic and political developments taking place in Lebanon, looking in particular at the role of corruption in shaping the country.

الجباية ببساطة #45 – لبنان ما بعد الإفلاس

تابعونا على صفحتنا على الفايسبوك وتويتر https://www.facebook.com/ TaxesSimply Tweets by taxes_simply

The Tax Justice Network’s French podcast: Accord fiscal international G20/OCDE : L’Afrique a été peu entendue #31

Welcome to our monthly podcast in French, Impôts et Justice Sociale with Idriss Linge of the Tax Justice Network. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages every month in EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here and on most podcast apps. Here’s our latest episode:

Accord fiscal international G20/OCDE : L’Afrique a été peu entendue, Edition 31

Dans cette édition de votre podcast francophone produit par Tax Justice Network, nous revenons sur l’accord fiscal international, récemment présenté par le groupe des vingt pays les plus riches de la planète (G20) et l’Organisation pour la Coopération et le Développement Economique (OCDE). Pour certains experts, les négociations ont pris la forme d’une table déjà servie, et dont le menu n’a pas du tout varié, malgré l’arrivée de nouveaux invités. Pour d’autres, les négociations se poursuivront pour avoir des seuils d’application plus réaliste, et une meilleure redistribution.

Interviennent dans ce podcast:

Accord fiscal international G20/OCDE : L’Afrique a été peu entendue #31

Vous pouvez suivre le Podcast sur:

Tax Justice Network Portuguese podcast #28: O PRIVILÉGIO TRIBUTÁRIO É BRANCO

Welcome to our monthly podcast in Portuguese, É da sua conta (it’s your business) produced by Grazielle DavidDaniela Stefano and Luciano Máximo. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages – EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. Here’s the latest episode:

O racismo estrutural característico do Brasil se reflete também no sistema tributário, o que reforça a desigualdade e privilegia os brancos em outr. O mesmo ocorre em outras parte do mundo.

No episódio #28 do É da sua conta, entrevistados trazem fatos históricos para explicar como a população negra é afetada por um sistema econômico e social excludente e mostram que mais impostos sobre consumo do que sobre renda, riqueza e patrimônio, ampliam desigualdades e o racismo. Mas é possível ter um sistema tributário antirracista. Ouça nosso podcast para descobrir!

Ouça no É da sua conta #28:

Participam desta edição:

“Os impostos consolidados pelo desenho do sistema tributário funcionou como uma espécie de ferramenta de opressão sem sangue e que manteve a supremacia branca do ponto de vista da economia, do poder político, do ponto de vista social.”
Flávio Batista, professor e doutorando em direitos humanos

“A despeito de termos 60% da população em situação de insegurança alimentar, a reforma do imposto de renda que se está desenhando é uma reforma de ampla desoneração da classe média combinada com uma ampla desoneração das empresas.”
Clara Marinho, conselheira da Associação Nacional dos Servidores da Carreira de Planejamento e Orçamento (Assecor)

“A comissão de juristas que está fazendo a revisão das normas antirracistas no Brasil apontou que no orçamento, o pensamento da política econômica no Brasil é branca e é masculina.”
Waleska Miguel, doutoranda em direito político e econômico

“Eu vejo o orçamento público como principal instrumento de equidade e garantia dos direitos. Está no orçamento público um desenho do que aquela sociedade é e do que ela pretende ser.”
Roseli Faria, vice-presidente daAssociação Nacional dos Servidores da Carreira de Planejamento e Orçamento (Assecor)

“Se queremos realmente construir um programa fiscal anti-racista temos de olhar através das lentes da tradição dos radicais negros, dos marxistas negros, dos escritores anti-imperialistas ocidentais.”
Keval Bharadia, economista

O PRIVILÉGIO TRIBUTÁRIO É BRANCO #28

Mais informações:

Artigo de Flávio Batista e Philipe Anatole Gonçalves Tolentino: Por uma abordagem interdisciplinar do contrato social moderno: Políticas Fiscais, Desigualdades Raciais e os Direitos Humanos

Conferência Tax Rights and Racism (em inglês): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=83lrzFUkXtk

Conecte-se com a gente!

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Download do podcast em MP3: https://traffic.libsyn.com/secure/force-cdn/highwinds/edasuaconta/28_pp.mp3

Artigo de Silvio Almeida, Waleska Miguel Batista e Pedro Rossi: “Racismo na economia e na austeridade fiscal”, capítulo 10 do livro “Economia no pós-pandemia”.

Instagram de Clara Marinho com conteúdo sobre orçamento público e racismo

É da sua conta é o podcast mensal em português da Tax Justice Network. Coordenação: Naomi Fowler. Produção: Daniela StefanoGrazielle David e Luciano Máximo. Dublagem: Luiz SobrinhoDownload gratuito. Reprodução livre para rádios.

Tax havens meet monopoly power: why national competitiveness harms competition

This article is cross-posted from The Counterbalance, the newsletter of the Balanced Economy Project, a new organisation dedicated to tackling monopolies and excessive market power. It has been slightly adapted for the Tax Justice Network’s blog.


Today we focus on the strange concept of national competitiveness – the ‘competitiveness’ of countries or states (rather than of companies in a market.) “Our nation must be competitive!” politicians and pundits love to cry. “We need a competitive tax system!” It sounds wonderful. Who would want to be uncompetitive?

But what does this concept mean? Is a competitive tax system really a good thing? What about competitive financial regulations, or competitive labour laws? Or, oddest of all, what might “competitive” competition policy look like? 

There is more than one possible answer, but in many countries a “Competitiveness Agenda” holds sway. The idea here is that money flits easily across borders, so states must lure it with shiny baubles such as low taxes, financial secrecy, slack financial regulations, low wages, subsidies & incentives, merger- and monopoly-friendliness – and generally weak enforcement. Tax havens are where this agenda has been followed to the maximum.

Yet any well-trained economist will tell you that the agenda rests on elementary fallacies and woolly thinking.  If taxpayers must hand out sugar-coated subsidies to attract investors, is the trade-off worth it, what kinds of investors will come, and will other states respond, engaging in a race to the bottom to bring us back to square one? (Today’s Counterbalance author, Nicholas Shaxson, who also works part-time for the Tax Justice Network, has just written an article for Foreign Affairs looking at the international tax dimensions of this, and at a clear-headed new approach from the Biden administration.)

The competitiveness agenda looms largest for countries outside the US, because in smaller economies, cross-border trade tends to form a larger share of the economy, thus making international “competitiveness” more relevant for them.  

We’ll focus quite heavily on Britain, where this agenda has long had influence and seems in the ascendancy again after Brexit. We’ll take some detours into tax, tax havens and finance to unpack basic principles, before honing into ‘our’ area – monopoly power and competition.  Here, our conclusion will be simple: the dominant vision of “national competitiveness” reduces (and corrupts) competition.  

A brief historical aside. The Balanced Economy Project was sparked in 2020 after Michelle Meagher, a competition lawyer, read a long 2019 article I wrote for the Tax Justice Network about the links between tax havens and monopoly power, and asking why there was no coherent anti-monopoly movement outside the United States. We agreed to work together to try and catalyse something: this newsletter, among other things, is the result.

Competitiveness against competition

Last December the Tax Justice Network commented on a Britain’s Times newspaper article about inaccuracies in the popular Netflix series The Crown, leading some royal-obsessed Brits to call for tighter regulation.

Netflix is covered by a EU-wide regime that allows companies to go ‘forum-shopping’ to find the friendliest regulator (or “lead supervisory authority”). Inevitably, some EU countries, in turn, seek to lure the giants to set up their regional headquarters locally by giving them an easy ride on supervision, in the name of . . . “competitiveness.”  Netflix chose the Netherlands, whose regulator, at the time the Times article came out, had “not investigated a single complaint from a British viewer” about it, and a prominent Conservative, Julian Knight, accused Netflix of using the Netherlands as a “flag of convenience” to escape regulation.

The Netherlands isn’t alone, as the digital watchdog Access Now noted:

Why Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg? A 2017 presentation about tax havens, by the French economist Gabriel Zucman, suggests an answer:

Our emphasis added. Those three countries are major corporate tax havens: each competes on offering multinational firms an easy ride not just on tax, but also on privacy rules, enforcement, and other lures to encourage multinationals to locate business activity there. In small countries it is relatively easier to capture and influence the legislature, the politicians, the media, and the zeitgeist. A race to the bottom on standards ensues.   

These “competitive” processes undermine the very foundations of globalisation theory. Capital and investment was supposed to flow to where it is most productive, but instead, it gets redirected to where it can obtain the greatest subsidies, thus discrediting capitalism and globalisation.   

To those of us familiar with tax havens, this “competitive” game is offshore business.

The offshore tax haven connection

Nobody agrees what a tax haven is, but their national economic strategies go far beyond tax. In my 2011 book Treasure Islands I define tax havens using two words, ‘escape’ and ‘elsewhere.’ You shift your money or business elsewhere – offshore – to escape rules and taxes you don’t like. Countries compete to attract it.  That broad definition encompasses many fields: tax (of course); secrecy (here’s a ranking;) tolerance of financial crime (here’s the Financial Times calling Luxembourg “a criminal enterprise with a country attached”); data use (there’s a term for this: data havens;) escape from creditors; or financial regulation. Countries compete, too, by offering pro-monopoly policies, as we’ll see.  

The end result is one set of light rules for wealthy individuals and large corporations that can afford to escape offshore, and another set of harder rules and higher taxes for lower-income people and more domestically focused small businesses, who can’t.

Brooke Harrington, a sociologist who took a wealth management qualification to study the super-rich, remembers a wealth manager telling her how she had once traveled with her CEO to meet a client outside Europe. At Zurich airport she realised she’d forgotten her passport, but the CEO told her not to worry: indeed, nobody checked their documents, either in Switzerland or at the other end. “The CEO was right,” the wealth manager said. “These people, our wealthiest clients, are above the law.”   This deference to wealth, an aspect of Swiss ‘competitiveness,’ is a worldwide phenomenon.  Should we be surprised at the recent outpourings of public rage?

The damage to democracy is unmeasurable.  But what of the economic costs? Who wins, who loses?

It helps to separate this into two questions.  First, what are the costs to the world as a whole, if lots of countries ‘compete’ in this way, offering tax cuts, subsidies, lax rules and other goodies to lure mobile capital to their shores, and stay ahead in a race to the bottom? Second, more selfishly: forget what happens to other countries – will it help my own country to ‘compete’ in this way? 

The answer to the first is pretty widely recognised: this race to the bottom is a collective-action problem to be tackled with international collaboration and co-operation.  From an OECD’s project to shore up international corporate tax, to the Basel rules on bank safety, such collaborative schemes abound. Yet they only get us so far – countries cheat, and it is also hard to mobilise domestic coalitions to support complex global projects.

The second question is more interesting. If we don’t offer subsidies to mobile capital, will the money run away to Geneva or Hong Kong, making us all poorer? If the answer is ‘yes,’ we are pretty doomed.

If the answer is ‘no,’ though, a world of possibility opens up.

The tax competitiveness puzzle

To clarify how this ‘competitiveness’ works we will first take a detour into the corporate income tax.  It is a decent analogy for anti-monopoly policy because (for instance) monopoly-friendly legislation resembles a corporate tax cut: each entails a transfer of wealth from stakeholders in the relevant country to the shareholders of mostly large, profitable, foreign corporations. And instead of receiving public tax subsidies, monopolists use market power to impose private taxes on workers, citizens and consumers. 

Take Britain, a poster child for the competitiveness agenda, as this official document in 2013 showed.

Did these ‘competitive’ tax cuts (which went down to 19 percent) subsequently make Britain better off? Was the trade-off — the tax costs, against extra investment, worth it?

The evidence is now in, and the answer is a clear ‘no.’ Indeed, the tax cuts may not have stimulated any useful net investment at all. Britain’s own Chancellor Rishi Sunak shocked many in his party when he admitted in March that:

“Over the last few years we haven’t seen that step change in the level of capital investment that businesses are doing as a result of those corporation tax reductions.”

Why did the corporate tax cuts fail Britain? For several reasons, in fact.

First, a corporate tax is not a cost to an economy, but more like a transfer within it, from corporations to the public. The nine percentage point cut in the corporate tax rate from 2013-2020 now costs the UK over £30bn ($42bn) in lost taxes a year, on official UK estimates, enough to double UK public spending on research and development, with billions left over.

Second, tax is usually a low priority for firms as they decide where to invest. Survey after survey finds that good investors seek good infrastructure, the rule of law, healthy and educated workforces, and access to vibrant local markets – most of which need tax anyway.

Mostly, investors decide where they want to invest, long before they consider the tax rate. For example, Amazon recently encouraged a bidding war among U.S. states seeking to attract its second headquarters, suggesting that the biggest subsidy package would win. Veteran Amazon-watcher Scott Galloway saw through the spin:

“Over the last few years we haven’t seen that step change in the level of capital investment that businesses are doing as a result of those corporation tax reductions.”

He predicted that whatever other states offered, the HQ would end up in the orbit of “the metro area of New York or DC” – which is just what happened.

Paul O’Neill,  former boss of Alcoa (and US Treasury Secretary under George W. Bush), gave a business perspective:

“As a businessman I never made an investment decision based on the tax code… if you are giving money away I will take it. If you want to give me inducements for something I am going to do anyway, I will take it. But good business people do not do things because of inducements.”

As we saw in a recent edition of The Counterbalance, large ‘superstar’ corporations have big markups and make the big profits, so pay the most corporate income tax. So ‘competitive’ corporate tax cuts benefit large, dominant firms the most. (That’s another glimpse of the pro-monopoly bias of the competitiveness agenda.)

Furthermore, corporate tax cuts also flow mostly to shareholders, typically overseas (for example, over 55 percent of UK-quoted shares are owned overseas.)  So such tax cuts both leak wealth upwards, from small businesses and individuals to large corporations: but also outwards, overseas. From a national self-interest perspective, that’s bad.

And the competitiveness agenda — which implies hanging up a sign in the global marketplace, saying ‘Come Exploit Me’ — will tend to attract predatory players, while the more productive ones would come anyway. As a recent book explained:

“Countries need investment that’s embedded in the local economy, bringing jobs, skills and long-term engagement, where managers send their kids to local schools and the business supports an ecosystem of local supply chains. This is the golden stuff, and if it’s nicely embedded, then a whiff of tax [or public-interest regulation] won’t scare it away. If an investor is more sensitive to tax, then almost by definition it has shallower roots; tax will tend to frighten away the less useful, more predatory stuff.”

Tax, or robust public-interest competition policy, preserves the healthy and deters the harmful.

Worse still, the race to the bottom means that any country that tries to get ahead in this race may soon be back to square one relative to other states – but with a greater commitment to subsidise investors. And that downwards race does not stop at zero, as Amazon’s Hunger Games competition shows: the subsidies just keep piling up.

What goes for tax, goes for finance

We can generalise these tax lessons to other areas. For instance, see this from Britain’s satirical / investigative magazine Private Eye:

In the London Loophole chapter of my book The Finance Curse, I show how this ‘competition’ between financial centres, principally between New York and London, was a core driver of the global financial crisis.  Britain handed out vast regulatory goodies to attract risky financiers – and in the end they kept their winnings, while the British people paid the costs. 

After the crisis the word ‘competitiveness’ was mostly expunged from the British policy lexicon, but it never disappeared, just went underground. Sunak’s July speech, with plans to “sharpen our competitive advantage” in finance, was just one post-Brexit sign of a wider comeback, across many sectors.

So what is “competitive” competition policy?

Since the 1990s, many politicians fell under the spell of “Third Way” economic policies espoused by US President Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. They embraced the Competitiveness Agenda, including an idea that, as Clinton put it, each nation is “like a big corporation competing in the global marketplace.”  European policy makers, who had once fretted about how monopolisation had spurred Nazism in Germany (watch out for a future edition of The Counterbalance on this,) slowly lost their aversion to corporate size, and instead imbibed a new story. The new ideas, which emerged in Chicago from the 1970s, ignored questions of power, the structure of markets, or the public interest, and instead narrowed the focus down to the question of whether consumers were getting a good deal. Mergers and bigness were efficient: if workers or the environment or even the tax authorities could be exploited and the ‘savings’ channelled into lower prices, then all was good.

This Chicago agenda was also seen as ‘competitive’ its ‘exploit me’ message would, it was hoped, attract capital and investment. “This merger tsunami is a good sign [and supports] “Europe’s competitiveness,” gushed Europe’s Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes in 2007. (Not much has improved since: European authorities almost never block big mergers.)

These ideas have spread further afield. As a south Asian competition expert, who wished to remain anonymous, told us:

“a lot of countries are recipients not originators of competition models . . the economic imagination has been global, not domestic . . the idea was, to put in this competition law, and it will attract foreign direct investment (FDI).”

Similarly, a South African competition expert told us:

“FDI has been the main focus why the public interest should not be in competition law.”

(Though as we recently noted, South Africa has started to go against the grain, blocking a Burger King merger on public interest grounds.)

The perils of national champions

Another strand of this way of thinking involves “national champions” (more on them, in future editions of The Counterbalance.)  From British politicians looking for “ways we can build trillion-dollar tech companies” to French presidents mulling how to build globe-striding French energy giants, the idea is that countries should soft-pedal on reining in their dominant firms, so that they can become powerful enough to go head to head with (for instance) Americans or Chinese firms in the global marketplace, and that this, in turn, will benefit the nation.

This is an old idea, sarcastically skewered in 1904 by the Norwegian-American economist Thorstein Veblen, (hat tip: Matthew Watson)

“In this international competition the machinery and policy of the state are in a peculiar degree drawn into the service of the larger business interests; so that, both in commerce and industrial enterprise, the business men of one nation are pitted against those of another and swing the forces of the state, legislative, diplomatic, and military, against one another in the strategic game of pecuniary advantage.

. . .

the common man pays the cost and swells with pride.”

Or, as the FT writer Rana Foroohar put it more recently:

“It is easier to capitulate to populism by supporting national champions than it is to craft and pass smart national growth strategies.

The national champions argument boils down to an idea that we must boost our ‘competitiveness’ by sabotaging healthy market competition, so as to let ‘our champions’ grow powerful. The evident confusion here — improve competitiveness by reducing competition — underlines the idea’s intellectual bankruptcy, and indeed that of the entire competitiveness agenda. (Has Facebook’s existence really benefited the United States? The damage it has inflicted is incalculable.)

There has to be a better way. Fortunately, there is – and it is starting to catch on.

From downgrading to upgrading

One can imagine two main routes to something you might call ‘national competitiveness.’ One is the low-tax, low-regulation, low-enforcement, pro-monopoly race to the bottom that I’ve described: in a word, ‘downgrading.’ We’ve tried this since the 1980s, and the results are clear: the massacre of small businesses, soaring inequality, environmental harm, security risks, and popular fury.  

The economist Paul Krugman warned about this agenda in 1994, in a now-famous article entitled “Competitiveness: a Dangerous Obsession.” In it, he wrote:

“The growing obsession in most advanced nations with international competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. And yet it is a view that people very much want to hold.”   

A more sensible alternative approach could be called “upgrading.” Here, governments invest in good things that businesses need – infrastructure, education and health, research and development, and so on. Regulation or tax policy does not seek to attract FDI through giving it an easy ride, but instead shepherds businesses to compete in markets regulated in the public interest, liberated from the monopolising predations of dominant giants. Instead of chasing dominant ‘national champions’ we pursue ideas promoted over a century ago by the U.S. Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis: a distributed infrastructure of supply, with many competing players all down the supply chains, each regulated in a level playing field and the public interest.

Take, for example, Britain’s music industry. The “downgrading” strategy favours letting streaming services and other music behemoths exploit British musicians, in the hope that the giants will invest more in Britain. But, as campaigner Tom Gray put it:

“The British political class have been convinced by the major labels – let’s be clear: foreign-based multinational companies – that they are the great driver of British music. When in fact British musicians are the driver of British music.”

‘Upgrading’ to stop the giants preying on musicians would unleash an explosion of creativity and, yes, an export surge of wonderful British music, spreading good vibrations globally.

There’s no need think about upgrading in terms of ‘competitiveness’ relative to other nations. If Germany improves its education, upgrades its financial regulations to protect its taxpayers better from risky speculation, or invests in vaccine research and development, French people won’t lose out. On the contrary, these improvements will make French employees and taxpayers more productive and richer, as better-off German consumers buy more French goods. Better vaccines help everyone. Competitiveness, Krugman said, often turns out to be “a funny way of saying ‘productivity’ ” – not relative to other nations, just on its own.

The good news here is that we don’t need to bow down to mobile capital and ‘downgrade to compete’ – we can just do what our voters want. There is no trade-off: we will have both a stronger democracy, and greater prosperity.

The other good news is that – while the agenda may be making a comeback in the U.K. after Brexit, the Biden Administration in the U.S. is deliberately stepping away from it. In April, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen made the clearest policy statement repudiating the agenda, favouring the upgrading route over the downgrading.

“The US will compete on our ability to produce talented workers, cutting edge research & state-of-the-art infrastructure, not on whether we have lower tax rates than Bermuda or Switzerland. It’s a self-defeating competition, and neither President Biden nor I are interested in participating in it anymore.”

This attitude goes far beyond tax too. The appointments of Lina Khan and Jonathan Kanter to head the U.S.’ two main antitrust agencies, respectively the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust division, signal a potentially dramatic policy shift in favour of small businesses and ordinary folk, at the expense of dominant (and mobile) multinationals.  They represent a stunningly successful anti-monopoly movement in the United States (sometimes known as the New Brandeis Movement) which has heavily influenced our thinking. A presidential Executive Order has backed this up recently with a wide set of curbs on monopoly power. This is a ground-breaking, world-changing shift in approach that potentially leaves other countries far behind.

This, at last, is the sort of global race where it’s good to lead the pack. Who will follow?

The Tax Justice Network August 2021 Spanish language podcast, Justicia ImPositiva: Nuevo impuesto corporativo: estrategia de los países en desarrollo #62

Welcome to our Spanish language podcast and radio programme  Justicia ImPositiva with Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez, free to download and broadcast on radio networks across Latin America and Spain. ¡Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a nuestro podcast y programa radiofónico! Escuche por su app de podcast favorita.

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The Tax Justice Network’s French podcast: Pour une dette responsable et une meilleure gestion des fonds Covid en Afrique: Edition 30

Pour cette édition de votre podcast en français produit par Tax Justice Net nous revenons sur l’endettement de l’Afrique. Elle est jugée importante, mais elle est surtout perçue comme étant irresponsable. Aujourd’hui, le remboursement de la dette occupe une part non négligeable des dépenses dans les budgets publics, c’est-à-dire des impôts payés par les citoyens.

L’actualité aura aussi été marquée par l’utilisation des fonds covid au Cameroun. La société civile est inquiète des dérives et des détournements présumés, malgré les explications du gouvernement.

Interviennent dans ce podcast:

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Statement on resignation of Tax Justice Network founder

We are disappointed to see recent attempts by some of Tax Justice Network’s 2003 founders to subvert our current strategy process. “Founder’s syndrome” is a well-known problem that has faced many organisations as they grow and professionalise. The behaviour here goes beyond what might be considered normal even in that context, however, creating a false impression of our work and violating the trust and right to a safe working environment of our staff and members.

We condemn any attempt to misrepresent and coerce discussion within the Tax Justice Network, to bully opposing views or to claim sole ownership of the tax justice movement. These behaviours are fundamentally in opposition to the spirit of mutual respect and solidarity to which we and the wider movement are committed.

Over the past strategy period 2016-2021, during which John Christensen remained involved in strategic decision making at the Tax Justice Network as an executive director until May 2021 and Chair of the Board until yesterday, the Tax Justice Network recovered from the financial brink and began to repair relationships that had broken down, grew sustainably and achieved unprecedented campaigning success.

As the global tax justice movement continues to expand and the global policy landscape to develop, the Tax Justice Network continues to work closely with the Global Alliance for Tax Justice and other partners, evolving our approach to provide strategic support nationally and regionally and to help secure key policy solutions at the international level.

We strive to be inclusive of all voices and are deeply disappointed by actions taken by some to drown out others, and to claim sole ownership over the tax justice movement for themselves. The fight for tax justice would not have marked up its extraordinary successes in policy change and narrative shift without the contribution and endeavours of our founders; but the tax justice movement belongs to people everywhere – those who fight for it and those who stand to benefit from it. While we respect differing views – and precisely because we do – we reject the idea that only the founders, “the true visionaries”, can legitimately set strategy on tax justice.

We thank the many people and organisations across the tax justice movement who have already privately contacted us to express their support. We apologise to our peers and all those we work with for the personal and professional distress today’s developments may have caused. We note with sadness John Christensen’s resignation from the Board of Directors. We warmly acknowledge his important contribution to tax justice, and wish him the very best in his retirement.

The Tax Justice Network will continue to develop our strategy, consulting across the global tax justice movement and beyond for input, and share public updates on our strategy as planned. We look forward to achieving further historic successes together in the coming years, and supporting everyone’s right to tax justice. Tax justice is yours.

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast, edition #44: تونس: مقايضة الصحة بالإقتصاد

Welcome to the 43rd edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available for listeners to download. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can join the programme on Facebook and on Twitter.

في حلقة هذا الشهر من “الجباية ببساطة” كانت لنا جولة في الأخبار المتفرقة بين ليبيا، لبنان وتطور الوضع السياسي في تونس قبل أن يجمعنا حوار مع الباحثة في السياسات العامة والشؤون الدولية، سرين الغنوشي حول ورقة أصدرها المنتدى التونسي للحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية بخصوص تعامل الحكومات التونسية مع جائحة كوفيد 19 ومدى مساهمته في تأزم وضع الفئات الهشة والجهات الداخلية للبلاد في ظل ضعف البنية  التحتية و إارتفاع كلفة العلاج نتيجة تراجع الإنفاق الحكومي في قطاع الصحة.

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The past, present and future of Tax Justice Network

It’s strange to write this down, but Tax Justice Network nearly ceased to exist a few years ago. Now we’re coming to the end of the strategy period that began from that position of frailty, and it’s a whole new world. For good – from the strengthening of Tax Justice Network itself, to a series of powerful achievements for the worldwide movement. And for ill – literally, in the case of the pandemic and figuratively, in the apparent deepening of rich countries’ opposition to a fairer global distribution of taxing rights.

Our annual conference earlier this month brought together leading global voices on tax justice and human rights, exploring powerful opportunities for national and international policy changes and narrative shifts. It also challenged us over the ways that we work with partners globally, and how we marry expertise and activism.

Our current strategy, designed in 2016-17, runs to the end of this year. It’s a good moment to catch a breath and think a little about the next phase of tax justice. Without prejudging the full review, we can look back at some of the key changes over that period, and then forwards to some of the decisions and opportunities ahead.

Looking back…

After taking up the role of Tax Justice Network’s director of research in 2015 (I had turned down the initial offer to become chief executive), it quickly became apparent that we were financially close to failure. Over a period of months, there were repeated discussions about how much of our salaries the directors could afford to suspend, in order for the whole team to be paid. And so in 2016, some five years ago now, I accepted the role of chief executive.

Lest this sound like a complaint, the first thing to say about those five years is that they have been a time of extraordinary recovery and growth. Tax Justice Network did not go bust. Instead, we flourished. It’s been an absolute privilege to work with a quite brilliant team of people, from communications and advocacy to legal and quantitative analysis, and crucially also of operations experts as we’ve moved from start-up phase into a period of rapid professionalisation.

I’d been in and around the wider tax justice movement since the turn of the millennium. Working as a junior researcher at Oxford with Prof Valpy FitzGerald (now a commissioner at ICRICT), I’d had the eminent good fortune to be involved in the background work behind a couple of the moments that seem somewhat pivotal in hindsight. We had a small hand in contributing to and reviewing the famous Oxfam report of 2000 on tax havens, in which John Christensen, Sol Picciotto and others had been centrally involved. And we were privileged to hold the pen for enough of the process to ensure that the UK government’s 2000 white paper on globalisation included what was then quite ground-breaking recognition of international tax issues:

“Taxation of the profits of transnational corporations operating in developing countries provides an important mechanism for sharing the gains from globalisation between rich and poor countries, and for reducing poverty through generating adequate revenue for investment in health and education… There is a need for greater international co-operation to avoid [a] ‘race to the bottom’.”

From the perspective of an engaged outsider, the early years of Tax Justice Network seemed to fly.  By the 2007 launch of Tax Justice Network – Africa at the World Social Forum in Nairobi, the continuing progress of the movement seemed almost inevitable. The expertise and commitment of activists worldwide would surely build to global impact?

But five years later, lines were being drawn. Our co-founders John Christensen and Richard Murphy wrote a paper on ‘The Next Ten Years of Tax Justice’, proposing a division between a ‘non-campaigning’ Tax Justice Network to lead on research, and a separate global body to lead on activism. The latter spun out as the Global Alliance for Tax Justice in 2013, the umbrella body for mass mobilisation worldwide.

Two things that I’d never appreciated from outside, while working on tax justice at international NGOs and research organisations, were the organisational fragility of Tax Justice Network; and the relationship damage caused by the organisational separation.  By 2015, it turned out, both were at something of a low point.

Organisational recovery and flourishing

The financial and organisational issues were the more obvious ones, from the inside – but also, as it turned out, the easier ones to address.

From that low point, we have built a diverse funding base including a range of foundations and national governments. Reflecting the growing faith of funders, we doubled our annual expenditure from 2015 to 2019 alone, and have built up committed income and reserves with a view to ensuring our future sustainability.

As important, we have professionalised fully, putting in place the set of policies necessary for a responsible employer operating in multiple countries and regions of the world. We’ve added the tech platform to make this global remote working really fly, and ways of working across timezones and cultures. And we have put in place a governance structure that maintains the cooperative ethos long held dear, with members retaining the ultimate power to determine the organisational direction, but also ensures independent accountability through non-executive directors – with the latter, for example, responsible for agreeing changes to compensation and benefits. Following team consultation, expert advice and a thorough benchmarking exercise, we moved from the previous somewhat unstructured and unfair distribution that had emerged from our ‘start-up’ phase, to establish a payscale based on transparent and explicit criteria. The ratio of the highest and lowest salaries is currently 2.7.  

Introducing team retreats during the year, to allow in-person interactions among the global team, had strengthened bonds in important ways. So when the pandemic struck, we had the advantage of being fully remote already, and as good a base of personal relationships as we could hope for in a dispersed global team. It has been hard, and it continues to be hard. But we are committed to a practice of caring for each other within the team, and the conversations are always ongoing about how we can strengthen that in different ways.

An important underpinning of this whole organisational strengthening was a five-year commitment from the Ford Foundation. Two elements were crucial. First, the engagement of Rakesh Rajani, leading the Foundation into an understanding of tax justice and a decision to support it – and encouraging us to lay out a strategy for systemic change (‘build it and they will come!’), rather than look to address funders’ immediate interests. And second, the Foundation’s BUILD program designed specifically to support ‘organisational resilience’ – everything from the provision of expert consultants with understanding of issues like founder’s syndrome, through to a positive encouragement to commit their funds to building our reserves.

It’s a great sadness that Ford switched focus within a couple of years, but to their credit that they maintained this support anyway. We would not be the organisation we are today without it, and much of what has been achieved would instead have been lost. Coupled with the consistent policy-led engagement of key funders like Norad, this support has been transformative.

Thematic priorities

In terms of activities, each of the four workstreams in the strategy we laid out has delivered substantial progress. Perhaps the deepest work has been that of the workstream on tax justice and human rights, led by Liz Nelson (who is also a Senior Atlantic Fellow for Social and Economic Equity). This has developed with a range of partners including the Global Alliance for Tax Justice and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights, and valuable funding from the Wallace Global Fund, a powerful analysis that is increasingly recognised in both the human rights discourse and across the tax justice movement. Tax justice perspectives are increasingly reflected in country assessments under a range of UN human rights instruments; and human rights arguments are increasingly central to advocacy for tax justice in national policy debates.

Our annual conference earlier this month focused on this workstream and saw the launch of a major new report, Tax Justice and human rights: The 4 Rs and the realisation of rights. A stellar global cast was testimony to the platform that Tax Justice Network has built, and the strength of partnerships in this area in particular. Speakers and discussants included Andres Arauz, Ecuadorian presidential candidate; Attiya Waris, Associate Professor of Fiscal Law and Policy at University of Nairobi, and the newly appointed UN Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights; Dorothy Brown, Professor of Law at Emory University and author of The Whiteness of Wealth: How the Tax System Impoverishes Black Americans- and How We Can Fix It; Irene Ovonji-Odida, women’s rights activist and member of both the UN FACTI Panel and ICRICT; Logan Wort, Executive Secretary at the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF); Paul Caruana Galizia, on behalf of the family and foundation of Daphne Caruana Galizia; and Philip Alston, Professor of Law at NYU and recently UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights.

The workstream on financial secrecy led by Dr Markus Meinzer has consistently delivered our flagship Financial Secrecy Index, and has successfully introduced the complementary Corporate Tax Haven Index. Together, these have been recognised in policy spheres and in research as unique and technically excellent contributions. At a campaigning level, they have supported a powerful shift in public narratives towards the understanding that financial secrecy and corporate tax abuse are largely driven by rich countries, promoting illicit financial flows and corruption around the world.

The index teams have also been consistently innovative. Where the human rights workstream has contributed to establish tax justice within a much wider discourse and international political canvas than could have been imagined ten years ago, the secrecy workstream has gone far beyond the initial ambitions of challenging weak ‘blacklists’, and overturning the narrative of corruption as a problem of lower-income countries, and has developed a whole series of analyses and tools that are increasingly being used by national authorities to strengthen their responses to tax abuse, of which the Illicit Financial Flows Vulnerability Tracker has been especially important. In addition, detailed policy work on aspects of the ABC (automatic exchange of information; beneficial ownership transparency and country by country reporting) has taken each far beyond the original ideas set down by the Tax Justice Network in the early years.

The workstream on the race to the bottom has also contributed to progress in shifting narratives, building the view that tax (and regulatory) competition damages the ‘winners’ and the losers alike. Major outputs include the Balanced Economy Project, which has been incubated and fledged as an independent organisation to lead analysis and campaigning on the threats of monopoly power; the continued strengthening of the ‘finance curse’ argument (that too much finance is damaging for economies and societies), including through Nicholas Shaxson’s book of the same title; and John Christensen’s forthcoming film that will address these issues.

The workstream on the scale of tax injustice has focused on strengthening the evidence of the damage of tax abuse and its profile, and on embedding that analysis – including of the disproportionate losses suffered by lower-income countries – in public narratives and policy processes alike. Outputs include a range of peer-reviewed journal articles, and two books – a more academic volume published by Oxford University Press, and a lighter piece, The Uncounted. These outputs have provided the basis for Tax Justice Network to play a leading role in a range of policy processes, including work on defining the indicators of illicit financial flows for the UN Sustainable Development Goals target, in driving an agenda for global architectural reform, and both technical and political engagement in the OECD tax reform process that is still ongoing.

The work has culminated in our new annual flagship report, the State of Tax Justice, which provides for the first time a country-level estimate of revenue losses due to cross-border tax abuse by multinational companies and by individuals. Published in conjunction with the Global Alliance for Tax Justice (the umbrella body for mass mobilisation organisations worldwide), Public Services International (the tax lead of the seven global union federations) and the German foundation FES, the State of Tax Justice offers a platform for national and regional tax justice activists to raise the profile of their demands each year.

Impact and communications

The much greater depth of expertise in the team has been coupled with an expansion of the longstanding strength in communications. The Taxcast series of podcasts, led by Naomi Fowler, has been expanded from the original English to include monthly Spanish, Portuguese, French and Arabic language versions also, focusing variously on Latin America, Francophone Africa and the Middle East.

Alongside social media improvements, the Tax Justice Network doubled the volume of traffic to its website from 281,379 total sessions in 2015 (an average of 23,448 sessions per month) to a record total of 588,205 sessions in 2020 (an average of 49,017 sessions per month).

In external media, Tax Justice Network doubled the volume of coverage gained on a monthly basis from the period 2009-2015 to the strategy period 2016-2021. We gained an average of 223 media hits per month in 2009-2015 and an average of 467 media hits per month in 2016-2021. This increase in media coverage was matched by a proportional increase in coverage from high profile media sources.  We gained an average of 14 media hits per month from high profile media sources like the Financial Times and the Washington Post in 2009-2015, and an average of 28 media hits per month from high profile media sources in 2016-2021.

A core part of this growth in media coverage has been the continuing strengthening of the indices, and the introduction of the State of Tax Justice report. In recent years we have built up the global media reach of the Financial Secrecy Index and the Corporate Tax Haven Index, so that their launch weeks obtained media coverage with a combined circulation reach of 0.4 billion (Financial Secrecy Index 2018) and 0.73 billion (Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019); then 2 billion (Financial Secrecy Index 2020) and more recently 4 billion (Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021).

The State of Tax Justice eclipsed even this, with a launch week reach of 8 billion, and has continued to be widely cited in policy documents, including in various United Nations outputs – not least, the FACTI Panel report. EU MEPs adopted a resolution to improve the EU blacklist of ‘non-cooperative jurisdictions’ just a few weeks after the launch of the State of Tax Justice, directly quoting our analysis that the blacklist covers “less than 2% of tax abuse”. The State of Tax Justice has also provided key reference figures for the scale of tax injustice in less politically ‘natural’ publications such as the report of the advisory group of the G7 countries prepared for their UK summit, and a report of the World Economic Forum’s Global Futures Council.

Importantly, this is not profile for its own sake. As the Tax Justice Network has become increasingly established as a credible and legitimate voice on international tax issues, so too have we been able to achieve normalisation of a range of tax justice proposals once considered too radical to mention.

Our framing of the G7 agreement on the G20/OECD global tax deal was widely adopted in media and press. The Tax Justice Network was referenced in 4% of all articles published around the world on Monday 7 June 2021 about the G7 tax deal agreed over the preceding weekend. These articles accounted for 11.5% of all global media reach gained by all the articles published on the G7 tax deal on Monday 7 June 2021. In other words, over 1 in 10 articles read on Monday 7 June 2021 around the world about the G7 tax deal quoted the Tax Justice Network.

A core element of our narrative – that the global minimum tax rate is potentially a great step forward, but that the specific deal in prospect disproportionately favours the G7 and other high-income countries, while exacerbating the global inequalities in taxing rights facing lower-income countries – has been carried far and wide. This has allowed us to raise up voices of lower-income countries in a way that has no precedent in any previous OECD process. (Not unrelatedly, we have been targeted repeatedly by the OECD secretariat to negotiators, ambassadors, at the UN, and to media – but sadly for them, this has served only to strengthen our profile.)

Or consider another example with genuinely transformative potential for the global tax architecture: with our partners in the State of Tax Justice 2020 report, we have put the proposal for a UN tax convention on the map. In the seven months before the launch of the State of Tax Justice 2020, the term “UN tax convention” had an average monthly media reach of 348,000. In the launch month of November 2020, the term gained a reach of 1.7 billion. 83 per cent of stories published with the term “UN tax convention” in November 2020 reference the Tax Justice Network, almost all of which were about the State of Tax Justice 2020. From April 2020 to date, half of all media reach for the term “UN tax convention” included reference to the Tax Justice Network.

Our ability to drive previously unthinkable narrative shifts and policy consideration stems from the combination of our deeper research capacity and the technical strength of our outputs; with the growing power of our communications work, based on the comprehensive professionalisation of the organisation.

Relationship building

In contrast to the success of that transformation, the harder issue – of relationships within the tax justice movement – is one where I have to hold my hands up to having failed to identify the extent of the issue at the outset, and having failed to act with the necessary speed.

In this year’s annual tax justice lecture, we invited Dr Dereje Alemayehu, the executive coordinator of the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, to reflect on the challenges of the movement. He pulled no punches. Laying out a history of paternalistic and dismissive behaviour from ‘experts’ in the global North to their ‘activist’ counterparts in the South, he set out a key challenge: to bring expert and activist approaches together, in mutual respect and solidarity.

This is crucial, if tax justice is to move forward together with the impact that we wish to have, and in the spirit of care for one another and an understanding of the inequalities and discrimination embedded in our world by the unfair economic practices we seek to challenge – and without which, ‘tax justice’ seems little more than a slogan.

Looking forwards…

As our existing strategy comes to a close and we review while developing the new one, there will be time and opportunity to consider each element in more detail.

Many of the central pieces of our approach are already clear though, among them: global campaigning, in partnership; global communications and media reach; technical excellence; high-level advocacy; built upon financial resilience and robust governance.

Thematically, we will continue to build upon the outline of issues that John Christensen and colleagues began expertly to develop in the early 2000s, and of which we have since solidified key elements and increasingly taken them further.

On the corporate tax side, we now have a clear position towards unitary taxation with formulary apportionment, backed by a fair global minimum effective tax rate. The tax transparency umbrella is formed by what we have coined as the ABC: automatic exchange of tax information, beneficial ownership transparency, and public country by country reporting. The global architectural requirements include a UN tax convention, setting the basis for intergovernmental negotiations under UN auspices, and a UN centre for monitoring taxing rights; and the continuing development, with our partners at ICRICT, of the arguments and technical basis for a global asset register, in turn supporting the case for wealth taxes.

We will continue to extend the analysis of tax justice in a range of areas. We’re likely to pay greater attention to the pressing threat of the climate crisis, to the extent that we can make clear contributions without duplicating the efforts of others. We may put more emphasis on the role of tax collection, recognising the political threats to tax authorities and the regressive impact of cuts; and on the continuing scale, opacity and ineffectiveness of tax expenditures. And we’re likely to address some important questions of race and reparations, from a tax perspective.

Perhaps more important than individual areas is the overarching aim – which will be to approach tax justice as a feminist issue. Adding specificity to this, to ensure it too is more than a slogan, will be key. We are now clear that we must take a rights-based approach in all our work, and one that challenges intersectional inequalities head-on. That includes reflecting on the many processes of racialisation and minoritisation embedded in the legacies of imperial capitalism on which so much of our current inequalities rest – and without an understanding of which, any tax ‘justice’ can be superficial at best.

This understanding must continue to lead our own behaviours and operations, not only to inform our analyses – from Tax Justice Network’s engagements in the wider movement, to our internal processes and interaction.

Feminist leadership isn’t built on rigid hierarchies, or dictating plans. Caring for others, dismantling bias and the sharing of power are among the central principles that Tax Justice Network will strive to meet.  And tax justice itself? Well, that definitely isn’t mine, or even ours – it’s yours.  

Together, we can change the weather. We must. Let’s do it.

John Christensen steps down as Tax Justice Network chair

John Christensen, founding director of Tax Justice Network and former economic adviser to the British Crown Dependency of Jersey, stepped down today as the chair of the board of Tax Justice Network.

John retired as an executive director at the end of May this year. When he passed on the chief executive role in 2016, his successor and our current chief executive, Alex Cobham, wrote of John’s successes: “In changing the political weather on these issues, those achievements are nothing short of extraordinary.”

In a message, John told us: “I will continue with my activist role with the Balanced Economy Project and the Corporate Accountability Network.  I will also remain on the governance board of the OECD/UNDP Tax Inspectors Without Borders programme.  In addition, I am very actively involved with the conservation work of the Chiltern Society.”

We record our thanks to John for his powerful contribution to tax justice, and wish him all the best.

Public inquiry says Maltese State is ‘responsible for Daphne Caruana Galizia’s death’

After a long fight by the family of murdered journalist and anti-corruption champion Daphne Caruana Galizia, their lawyers and supporters, the public inquiry the Maltese government never wanted has now reported on its findings and has made recommendations. As the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation explains:

The Maltese Government only agreed to establish the public inquiry, over two years after the assassination, under threat of legal proceedings from the family and in the face of international pressure.

The Foundation has made the following statement:

The inquiry’s findings confirm the conviction our family held from the moment Daphne was assassinated: that her assassination was a direct result of the collapse of the rule of law and the impunity that the State provided to the corrupt network she was reporting on. We hope that its findings will lead to the restoration of the rule of law in Malta, effective protection for journalists, and an end to the impunity that the corrupt officials Daphne investigated continue to enjoy. Daphne and her work will live on in ensuring that the recommendations of this Inquiry effect lasting change.”

The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation has prepared an informal translation of part of the report, available here.

The report makes many recommendations, on the urgent need to transform the relationship between business and government, the police force, and to protect journalists. Here are a few of the reactions:

Malta has long displayed all the marks of a nation suffering from the finance curse – state capture and corruption of democracy through an aggressive, over-sized finance sector model, with financial secrecy at its heart. According to retired judge Michael Mallia, former chief justice Joseph Said Pullicino and Madam Justice Abigail Lofaro in their public inquiry report:

The state should shoulder responsibility for the assassination,…[there was] an atmosphere of impunity, generated from the highest echelons of the administration inside Castille, the tentacles of which then spread to other institutions, such as the police and regulatory authorities, leading to a collapse in the rule of law”.

As the Times of Malta reports,

while the inquiry did not find proof of government involvement in the assassination, it created a “favourable climate” for anyone seeking to eliminate her to do so with the minimum of consequences.”

We interviewed one of Daphne’s sons Paul Caruana Galizia on our podcast the Taxcast this month, where he spoke about the capture of Malta and the fight for justice. You can read a transcript of the full interview here, but here’s an excerpt:

Believe me when I say there aren’t many areas where the two major parties in Malta come to an agreement, but they agreed on this one thing – do not threaten the stability of the financial sector. And so it almost became beyond criticism, you know, whatever you do, you just don’t threaten finance. And that only became more of a thing as the financial sector took up an increasingly larger share of the economy.

I’d say for my mother…the really big problems became apparent, say 2013, around that point when there was a step change, when there was a change in government, and there was this radical liberalisation and deregulation of the financial sector…the country just went down this very aggressive, hyperfinancialisation, hyper-development route, with an aim to one day become like Dubai, you know, like a hyper-financialised, hyper-globalised city state

The amazing thing about my mother’s career is that she went from reporting on domestic corruption, which at the time was say, a corrupt judge, a corrupt MP, corrupt prime minister, to almost imperceptibly reporting on globalised corruption, you know, from reporting on bribery at a level of say 20,000 euros to reporting on bribery of tens of millions of euros,..ultimately because of secret companies, because anonymous shell companies are really the key.

The Panama Papers leak, that kind of cracked this wall of secrecy that she kept hitting at, hitting at, hitting at until the crack opened up letting in more light, say, that she could suddenly see what was happening behind the wall. And the moment, it’s amazing, that the moment she got there, right, she got to the final company and she said, ‘this is it. I just need to find the name’, she was murdered. And, you know, the person who murdered her made the calculation that there was only one person who could have got the name of the company, ‘and now she’s dead, I had her murdered, so I’m safe.’ But through another series of accidents, he was, he was found out. But that, you know, the murder was to protect a secret, the shell company, so to protect the secrets of massive corruption.

My view is really straightforward, that the privacy arguments for anonymous shell companies are far outweighed by the public interest argument against them. And I just don’t think they should exist anywhere in any form. But before we get there, I think there are serious reforms that need to be made of the sectors that we call enablers, the accountants, the lawyers, the fixers, I think, I think it’s crazy that they can open up shell companies for politicians and oligarchs in this way, and we’re somehow meant to say, ‘hey, that’s their job.’ I just think that’s unacceptable.”

(You can find our podcast the Taxcast on your podcast app and the website is here.)

We were honoured that the Caruana Gailizia family accepted the Anderson-Lucas-Norman Award for Tax Justice Heroism at our recent virtual annual conference on tax justice and human rights, which you can view and read about here.

Our award is named after Jean Anderson, Pat Lucas and Frank Norman, three Jersey islanders who were among the first to challenge the financial sector’s state capture of Jersey, sparking the global tax justice movement. This award honours the people or person we believe has made the most significant contribution to tax justice and financial transparency. It seeks to recognise heroic work in the fight for tax justice. We presented that award to the Caruana Galizia family, which was accepted here by Daphne’s son Paul Caruana Galizia:

The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation speaks of ‘light after darkness.’ Paul Caruana Galizia told us in our podcast:

In Malta’s case the story is far from over. A lot of the changes that need to happen in the country have yet to happen. My mother’s case is still ongoing, journalists still operate in a highly threatening environment. But the country, if we grow out of this, rather than end up suffering even more from it, will, we hope provide an example to a lot of other jurisdictions around the world that find themselves stuck in this trap where they think corruption will always be with them, that they will never grow out of this financial sector dominance. I hope that will emerge from this as a positive example against those issues.”

Tax Justice Network Portuguese podcast #27: Imposto de renda

Welcome to our monthly podcast in Portuguese, É da sua conta (it’s your business) produced by Grazielle DavidDaniela Stefano and Luciano Máximo. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages – EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. Here’s the latest episode:

#27 Imposto de renda: empresas e ricos devem contribuir mais

Enquanto o mundo retoma o debate sobre a necessidade de taxar mais grandes empresas, e já tributa há anos a distribuição de lucros e dividendos, para distribuir a renda de uma forma mais justa, o Brasil segue na contramão, mesmo na recente proposta de reforma do imposto de renda. 

“O local por excelência para lidar com a questão da desigualdade é a tributação de renda e patrimônio, em particular a tributação de renda.”
– Rodrigo  Orair, pesquisador e especialista em política fiscal, tributação e desigualdade

“Falar em queda de arrecadação no Brasil é muito complicado, porque vivemos uma crise fiscal expressiva e ao mesmo tempo precisamos garantir bens e serviços públicos e principalmente a proteção social para lidar com os efeitos da pandemia. Então, eu não vejo espaço fiscal para reduzir carga tributária no momento.”
Débora Freire, professora de economia da UFMG

“As grandes reformas da tributação não são feitas em momentos de paz e tranquilidade, mas  em momentos de crise aguda. Nós temos uma janela de oportunidade histórica pra avançar efetivamente”
Paulo Gil Introini, diretor do Instituto de Justiça Fiscal.

Especialistas entrevistados no episódio #27 do É da sua conta defendemque grandes corporações e as pessoas mais ricas contribuam mais para que o país possa proteger sua economia, garantir direitos e reduzir desigualdades. Esses são também os objetivos  de uma reforma tributária baseada em justiça fiscal.

Ouça no É da sua conta #27:

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É da sua conta é o podcast mensal em português da Tax Justice Network. Produção de Daniela Stefano, Grazielle David e Luciano Máximo. Coordenação: Naomi Fowler.

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