Overturning a 100 year legacy: the UN tax vote on the Tax Justice Network podcast, the Taxcast

Welcome to the latest episode of the Tax Justice Network’s monthly podcast, the Taxcast. You can subscribe either by emailing naomi [at] taxjustice.net or find us on your podcast app. All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. We’ll soon be launching our new podcast website, so look out for that!

In an extended Taxcast edition this month, a century of tax rule setting by the former imperial powers has been overturned: we look at the UN vote on global tax reform. Taxcast host Naomi Fowler follows events at the UN, the failed efforts to block it and explores what it all means with Alex Cobham of the Tax Justice Network.

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Transcript available here (some is automated)

~ #138 Overturning a 100 year legacy: the UN tax vote

If the time of crisis imposes the time of change, then it’s time for cooperation to take precedence over competition. It’s time for international solidarity to take precedence over particular and selfish interest in the short term. African people are tired of numbers about assistance for development. They do not request more assistance. They request every partner running business, the physical or digital, individuals and companies making profit should pay the right price, the fair and just percentage in terms of tax. Then we could keep our promise to transforming our world, to ensuring the world we want, the future we want is a reality.

~ UN Representative from Cameroon

It’s a century waiting to have a globally inclusive body to set tax rules to throw over the decisions made by the League of Nations in the 1920s and 30s that we’re all stuck with the consequences of today. We don’t actually need tax rules that were set by the imperial powers, honestly, we can do better.”

~ Alex Cobham, Tax Justice Network

Further reading:

Here’s a summary of the podcast:

Naomi: Hello and welcome to the Taxcast, the Tax Justice Network podcast. We’re all about fixing our economies so they work for all of us. I’m Naomi Fowler. On the Taxcast this month:

Clip 1: “African people are tired of poverty, they do not request more assistance. They request every companies making profit should pay the right price, the fair and just percentage in terms of tax.”
Clip 2: “The committee is now voting on draft resolution L18 Rev 1 entitled Promotion of Inclusive and Effective International Tax Cooperation at the United Nations.”

Naomi: It may not sound like it, but this is a historic vote at the United Nations on where the power lies for global tax rulemaking.

Clip 3: “The voting has been completed. Please lock the voting machine. The result of the vote is as follows: in favour 125, against 48, abstentions 9. Draft resolution A/C2/78/L18 REV1 is adopted.”

Naomi: Some nations tried their best to block it, but a landslide majority of nations voted to catapult the world into the next steps for fairer rulemaking on global tax. It’s all about who gets to decide, and how, and where.

UN representative from Nigeria: For developing nations this resolution represents a beacon of hope.

Naomi: This is the UN representative from Nigeria introducing the draft resolution before the vote on behalf of the Africa Group.

UN Representative from Nigeria: By standing together today, we commit not only to fairer tax systems, but also to a collective future where economic justice are not mere aspirations but achievable realities. The path is clear and the benefits are manifold.

Naomi: And here’s the South Africa representative.

UN representative from South Africa: For many Africans, fulfilling the UN Sustainable Development Goals is a matter of life and death. Unfortunately, their ability to meet these aims is hobbled by illicit and hidden movements of capital that amounts to vast billions each year. It is high time that the international community addresses this injustice in global taxing rights that is impoverishing millions, which goes back to the days of the League of Nations, when most member states were colonies and which has been perpetuated by the monopoly that rich country clubs have held over international tax rulemaking.

Naomi: We know that if we continue on our current trajectory where the ‘Club of Rich Nations’ at the OECD wields the power on tax rules in their own interests, countries are on course to lose 4.8 trillion US dollars to tax havens over the next decade. This vote aims to avoid those kind of astronomical losses by doing things differently through the United Nations and establishing a UN Tax Convention. Taxcast listeners will remember that in 2022 countries at the UN agreed by consensus to the preparations that have led up to this UN vote. So what have 125 nations just voted for? Alex Cobham of the Tax Justice Network:

Alex: So look, what’s happened, you know, last year there was agreement to move forward with intergovernmental discussions, so the real thing that it required was this report from the Secretary General to look at the options and then a debate in the General Assembly this year.
Naomi: Yes, and I covered that in the Taxcast. It’s the one called the day global power shifted. I’ll put that in the show notes. So the report was done, yeah.

Alex: Right, so that’s happened, and off the back of that a new resolution was brought forward by the Africa Group. And this resolution really does two things. So it sets the commitment to work towards a framework convention on tax. And in the immediate period, really from January to August, it says we will create, basically a committee of all of the UN member states in order to create the terms of reference for those negotiations. So it’s all of the countries of the world agreeing the terms of reference for the negotiation on a framework convention. And the idea is that will then be brought back to the General Assembly in September, and then the negotiations would go forward. So last year was kind of creating the context, saying this is what we’re looking at. And this year is, we’re kind of into the hard and fast steps, this really concrete committee to take it forward, to create the terms of reference. So we’re on the road, you know, we have a resolution now that commits absolutely and without equivocation to negotiating a framework convention, a legally binding outcome.

Naomi: Okay. We’re going to look at the no voters and their motivations in a minute. But why did nations agree by consensus last year, but this time it went to a vote?

Alex: Yeah, so, this is sort of UN technicality, last time they didn’t vote so it’s UN consensus, so nobody objected hard enough to say, let’s take this to the vote. So there were some objections, registered or reservations from some OECD countries but nobody wanted to resist enough to have a vote so it passes by consensus and that’s effectively as close as you get to unanimity. This year they wanted to stop it. And they fought really, really hard all the way through trying to stop it and only the almost complete unanimity of the G77 countries made sure that we had such an overwhelming result in favour.

Naomi: Right, and the G77, that’s a coalition of so-called ‘developing’ countries, so it was a landslide really, those 125 nations voting in favour of the resolution represent 80 percent of the world’s population. It’s a historic vote too, the last attempt to address global power imbalances through the United Nations was spearheaded by Jamaica in the 1970s, along with other newly decolonised nations. Back then, they passed the UN Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, and the aim of that was to reinforce the rights of all national governments to control multinational capital and specifically exercise democratic power over multinational corporations. The backlash against it from the most powerful nations dissuaded any similar attempts for nearly 50 years, until now. Here’s the representative from the Bahamas at the UN:

UN Representative from the Bahamas: This resolution is an important step towards an inclusive and equitable global tax system. For over six decades, the international tax policies formulated and dictated by the OECD neglected or failed to address the inherent challenges and the differences in development dynamics faced by the global south. Throughout these decades, developing countries have grappled with the disequilibrium of the international financial architecture, coupled with inconsistent contradictory tax and financial services policies, which have stifled economic growth.
Mr. Chair, this resolution envisions a future where services and trade benefit all countries fostering true inclusivity and cooperation. It will enable countries, particularly in the Global South, to actively participate in shaping international tax norms, while creating equity and development capacity where it did not exist before. It will also ensure the development of protocols to combat illicit tax related illicit financial flows, which cause the loss of hundreds of billions of dollars in tax revenue annually. By addressing this issue we are taking a significant step towards preserving the financial integrity of vulnerable countries while generating more revenue to finance development.
Mr. Chair, the overwhelming support for this resolution is a clarion call, indicating that the majority of the world recognises the inequalities of the current international tax regime and are victims of its arbitrary and inconsistent rules. In this vein, the Bahamas welcomes the passage of this resolution as an aspiration for equity, inclusivity, sustainable development and tax cooperation.

Naomi: The Bahamas co sponsored the draft resolution and we’ll talk a bit about their position later, which is interesting. Before the main vote happened on the draft resolution, Promotion of Inclusive and Effective International Tax Cooperation at the United Nations, the United Kingdom proposed an amendment to that draft resolution. Here’s the UK representative.

UN representative from the UK: During negotiations, the UK and others have sought to engage constructively to bridge the range of views and find a way forward that is in line with the ambition and which commands consensus. That is why we are now proposing an amendment to the resolution, which would change the text to just refer to a framework, rather than a framework convention.

Naomi: OK. So, what was the UK up to there? And why did they want to change the text to refer to a framework rather than a framework convention? What were they doing?

Alex: So, the UK brought forward this amendment. It’s not quite clear why it was the UK who brought it forward, because it was really the European Union’s position but I think just, you know, some OECD members trying to block things together. So the UK brought forward an amendment to strike out the word convention, basically from the resolution, in order to kind of get to a position where you have no legally binding outcome at all.
Naomi: Right, so in a way they were happy to talk shop, but not if it actually meant it was legally binding?!

Alex: I mean, that seems to have been the position, which is remarkable. Because bearing in mind, these are countries that sometimes complain that the UN is a talking shop, and they use that as an argument for why they shouldn’t do things at the UN. And in this case, they were demanding that the UN be a talking shop and have no possibility of being anything else so, yeah, it wasn’t, it wasn’t a very compelling position, I think, and certainly the Africa Group gave it very short shrift, and rightly so.
Naomi: Yeah, here’s the Nigerian representative’s response to that and there’s not much doubt what he thought about the UK’s intervention!
UN representative from Nigeria: Thank you very much, Chairman, and I would like to thank the UK delegation for its engagement and for its, uh, approach of trying to alter the resolution.
The position of the African Group is that the amendments being proposed by the UK delegation aim to, or would certainly preserve a restrictive status quo where developing countries remain marginalised in terms of international discourse. This approach denies us a voice in vital areas of agenda setting, norm creation, and decision making. The African Group, therefore, categorically rejects these amendments and strongly encourages all delegations to vote against them. We instead invite you to support and vote in favour of the draft resolution as it is, affirming our commitment to equity, inclusiveness and a global tax system where every member has an equal say.

Naomi: Well, that attempt by the UK to amend the draft resolution didn’t work. It was heavily defeated. Listen here to the results of the vote on their amendment.

UN representative: Delegations are kindly requested to indicate their votes. Those in favour of the proposed amendment contained in document A/C2/78/CRP 7, please signify. Those against and abstentions. The committee is now voting on the proposed amendment to draft resolution L 18 REV 1, as contained in document A C2 78 CRP 7.
Will all delegations confirm that their votes are correctly reflected on the screen? The voting has been completed. Please lock the voting machine.
The result of the vote is as follows in favour 55 against 107 abstentions 16. The proposed amendment contained in document CRP 7 is not adopted.

Naomi: So, that amendment got nowhere. Next, the United Nations voted on the Africa Group’s now unamended draft resolution. Just before that, the US representative gave a statement on why the US was going to vote against it. Let’s listen to a bit of that.

UN Representative from the US: The United States regrets that it cannot join consensus on this resolution and wishes to explain the reasons for this decision before the vote. The content of the resolution and the process followed over the course of negotiations have resulted in outcomes that are likely to duplicate and undermine existing intergovernmental negotiations on international tax cooperation.

Naomi: Duplicate and duplication are words you hear a lot from the no voting countries.

UN Representative from the US: The resolution has failed to achieve the consensus necessary to strengthen international tax cooperation for the benefit of all countries. Without broad consensus among countries, any process is unlikely to strengthen international tax cooperation or achieve meaningful results.

Naomi: Hmm, well, the United States has often opted out of international agreements on tax rules as they’re decided currently, so, yeah..! Next, the US representative went on to claim that tax rulemaking as it’s done now is all just fine. Nothing to see here!

UN Representative from the US: Negotiations of the Inclusive Framework occur in a setting in which 145 jurisdictions provide input and decisions are made by consensus. This approach affords every member a real voice in negotiations and decision making, which allows for the development of solutions with broad consensus that have a better chance of standing the test of time.

Naomi: So she’s sort of saying 145 jurisdictions agree tax rules together and it’s all great?!

Alex: So, you know, let me not call anyone a liar, you can only conclude from that that the U.S. delegate was exceptionally badly briefed, you know, the Inclusive Framework, and this is on the record by multiple participant countries, simply does not provide an effective voice to most of the Inclusive Framework members. In fact, a number of OECD country members, whatever that is, 38 or something members of the OECD, a number of them have expressed serious frustration at the failure of the process to be inclusive, even of their voices.
But apart from the practicalities, apart from all the people who’ve complained that this isn’t inclusive and highlighted – as ATAF, the African Tax Administrators Forum has done – highlighted that the processes for consensus is quite close to coercion, that sometimes they would be delivered documents at 10 o’clock at night, being told that if they had not raised an objection by first thing in the morning they would be assumed to be joining the consensus, right? Now, even for countries with very high capacity in their tax authorities and finance ministries, that’s a completely unreasonable ask and that doesn’t generate any genuine consensus at all. For countries which in many cases are seriously capacity constrained and operating in different time zones, that’s just outrageous, you know, and it’s clearly not consensus by anyone’s definition.
But look, even setting aside those questions about how the Inclusive Framework fails to work in practice, you only have to look at the governance to understand that what the US delegate said is completely wrong. There is no governance, no rules of procedure for the Inclusive Framework, so there is no basis on which the Secretariat legally is required or even can take the opinions and reflect them of the members of the inclusive framework. So if you look through the OECD’s governance, what you come to is the position stated that legally the secretariat is bound by, which says that they must prioritise the views of OECD members over any other country and that has to be the determinant of all the work that they carry out. And that’s equally true for the Inclusive Framework as for any other thing that the OECD does.
Now, if you wanted, you could think about changing the OECD’s governance, you know, you could create structures and rules of procedure where they could have transparent voting, where there could be decision making by the members of the Inclusive Framework, not by OECD members. But by the time you’ve done all that, you’d effectively have created a United Nations parallel. So there’s kind of a question, you know, why would you do that when we’ve already got the United Nations?! We’ve got the UN. We just need to give it a space to deal with tax.
Naomi: Ok. So, next, nations at the United Nations voted on the Africa Group’s unamended draft resolution. Here it is:

UN Representative and interpreter: The committee is now voting on draft resolution L18 Rev 1 entitled Promotion of Inclusive and Effective International Tax Cooperation at the United Nations.
The voting has been completed. Please lock the voting machine.
The result of the vote is as follows in favour, 125 against, 48 abstentions 9. Draft resolution A C2 78 L18 REV1 is adopted.

Naomi: Right, let’s take a look at the politics and the power relations behind all this. Let’s start with the nations which voted no, voted against the resolution. The first thing to say is that the 48 countries who voted no to the resolution are A) mainly OECD member countries, which represent only 15 percent of the global population and B) those no voting countries are responsible for three quarters of all countries’ losses to tax havens. That puts things in a different light, doesn’t it?! And that’s complicated by the fact that the tax benefits from reform would be good for all nations, not just the world’s poorest ones. And that’s because the wealthiest countries in the world actually lose the most tax revenue each year as a result of the way international tax rules currently work under the OECD. Poorer nations lose the biggest proportion of their potential tax revenues, so they’re hit very hard and they can weather that hit less than wealthier nations. So if wealthier nations also lose out, why did they vote no? Here’s Alex:
Alex: Well, a cynic might say that those countries actually don’t have an interest in fixing the problem. Although they are the biggest losers in terms of absolute revenues, they are also the home countries for the multinationals and professional services firms that are responsible for most of the cross border tax abuse in the world. I think that’s probably not fair.
Somebody even more cynical might say, these countries do kind of want to fix the problem, but not that much. Not enough to actually give up the disproportionate power that they have at the OECD. So they’d rather have this process at the OECD continue to fail to solve the problem, but it being their process and their organisation rather than a globally inclusive one. And again, you know, I think, or at least I hope, that that’s probably unfair to, at least for quite a few of those countries.
So I think maybe the fairer reflection would be to say there’s two things going wrong here. So one is that these countries governments are not under sufficient public pressure from their own citizens demanding that they do more about the problems of tax abuse. And that’s something that we, the tax justice movement should be thinking about and how do we, how do we change that dynamic when these losses are so huge and responsible for so much lost public services, so much excess inequality in these rich countries, as well as everywhere else? So that’s one part.
I think the other part is countries are afraid of what they don’t know. You know, it’s not countries, it’s people, it’s individuals, it’s, it’s government officials and the ministers that they brief, and they’re comfortable at the OECD, you know, they know it doesn’t work, and they know that when the US and France, the biggest member and the host country have a bilateral negotiation, everybody else pretty much has to accept the results because it’s the opposite of a democratic, uh, organisation, but they’re comfortable in it, it’s what they know. And they worry, particularly finance ministries who never engage at the United Nations, they worry that if they go somewhere else it might all be terribly different and scary. And so I think there is a process, you know, in the negotiations generally of people just getting kind of acclimatised, people from finance ministries and tax authorities who aren’t normally in UN spaces actually understanding that this is a place that’s got real possibilities, that the transparency isn’t something to be afraid of, actually it can help them get much better outcomes, and hold each other accountable, and allow their citizens to see that they are taking the positions that they say, outside of the meeting that they’re going to take. And I think, you know, genuinely, I think we’re going to get on a road where a lot of OECD countries really embrace this process. And we can kind of move forward to something much, much more effective, as well as much more inclusive than we’ve had at the OECD.
Naomi: Okay. Let’s look at the Yes voting countries. These efforts to move international tax rules setting to the United Nations have been led by the Africa Group and proposed by Nigeria. Co-sponsors of their draft resolution include Bahamas, Bolivia, Guyana, Russia, Thailand and Tonga. Russia’s interesting. Why Russia? Here’s the Russian Federation representative addressing the assembly before the vote:

UN Representative from the Russian Federation speaking through an interpreter: Mr. Chairman, dear colleagues, Russia is in favour of strengthening international cooperation in the area of tax matters and making it truly inclusive. We hear what the African Group is saying. The existing multilateral cooperation mechanisms within the OECD are neither inclusive nor effective. In this regard we support expanding the tax discussion in the UN and creating an intergovernmental platform with universal membership to discuss specific matters. The obstructive stance taken by most OECD countries, the position of developed countries is bewildering. Meeting the challenge of mobilising internal resources without establishing a fair and inclusive international tax system is not possible. Maintaining the status quo will not enable countries of the Global South to ensure self sufficiency or to decrease their dependency on external financial assistance.

Naomi: Here’s Alex.

Alex: So, I mean, you would like to think that, you know, Russia being aware that it’s very seriously exposed to financial secrecy that drives not just significant tax abuse, but also, you know, the very obvious problem of corruption, that it’s seen the light. I don’t think that’s, certainly not what we’ve really heard, but it’s a calculation that, you know, the G77 countries have really, felt so oppressed, and have been oppressed really, are currently being oppressed by the way the international tax rules operate by their exclusion from any effective voice in that process and the continuing extraction of profits by companies from OECD countries, so Russia sees an opportunity to align itself with the G77 and say, you know, we are much better friends of yours than the United States or the European Union. And that’s, you know, that’s fairly cynical, but it’s not surprising. And, you know, if you’re on the other side of that, if you’re the United States or the EU or the UK, you know, you should really think about whether, let’s imagine that you actually think the OECD is delivering something good, even if you did, which, you know, nobody could, but let’s say you did, you’d still have to think quite hard about where the G77 very clearly doesn’t take seriously the claims of the West to be kind of defending human rights and to be on the good side you know, this is such an obvious opportunity to say, in effect, you know, you’re right. And we can see that we’ve done this wrong and that we’ve acted unfairly for decades now. And it’s time, you’re right. It’s time that you and everyone had a seat at the table and, you know, get on the right side of history, right? You know, this is a process that’s going to happen anyway so it wouldn’t actually have cost very much to say, you know what, we’re going to champion it, instead of being the people who are trying to spoil it at every step. So just even on a kind of, you know, a very narrow political pragmatism basis, you think this was a bad decision by most of the OECD countries who opposed.

Naomi: Hmm. And looking at some of the, the other Yes voters, Colombia and Chile, they resisted a lot of pressure as OECD members wanting them to vote against or abstain and that’s quite an interesting and quite a brave stand they took, I think.

Alex: Yeah, I think the support for this is really kind of quite telling. Thinking of Chile and Colombia, you know, what they’ve done is exceptionally brave and important. I’ve just been in Oslo, and you know, Norway abstained, right, as another OECD member. They were under enormous pressure to vote to vote against, and to stick with the OECD bloc, and so for them even to move to abstention, never mind voting in favour, you know, just to get to abstention was really politically, felt costly for them. And this is a country that’s been, you know, an absolute champion of this kind of inclusive international tax cooperation and work on financial transparency for, you know, at least the last 20 years, so, you know, you can only imagine the pressure that the newer OECD members like Chile and Colombia were under so it’s, you know, it’s all the more admirable that they took this stand.
I think if you then look at some of the other supporters, even the co-sponsors, you see some unusual names when you’re thinking about kind of international tax cooperation. So one of the co-sponsors was the Bahamas, and the Bahamas is a country that’s been you know, frequently on the non-cooperative jurisdiction lists of the European Union or other kind of tax haven blacklists, and they’re always painted as an opponent of progress by those institutions. It is true that, you know, from our perspective, the Bahamas isn’t sort of perfect, you know, it’s got some work to do to become a bit more transparent and make sure it’s not kind of facilitating profit shifting, but it’s far from alone in that, and of course the Bahamas role is much, much smaller than that of some of the big OECD members, whether that’s the Netherlands or Ireland on profit shifting or the United States on financial secrecy. And yet the Bahamas ends up on these lists when no OECD member ever does. So for them to co-sponsor this is a signal that I’m sure they can imagine this process will lead to some further constraints on how they can operate, but clearly they’ve decided it’s much better to be part of a global process in which their voice can be heard, even if the outcomes in some cases may be to require them to meet certain standards than to be outside of a process forever at the OECD or the European Union, wherever, where they’re only ever going to be painted as criminals, you know, and if you look across the Caribbean, actually, the support was really comprehensive, I mean, it was kind of impressive given that that’s a region that’s often felt like international tax co-operation is just another word for coming to attack us, right?
So I think you can see a shift in dynamics here. Countries at different income levels from different regions of the world coming together because genuinely there is a central demand in this which is for everyone’s voice to be heard, not just this this group of OECD members.

Naomi: And the countries that chose to abstain, again, interesting. There’s nine of them, so I’ll run through them quickly. Norway, Alex has talked about, then there’s Armenia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Iceland, Mexico, Peru, Turkiye, and the United Arab Emirates.
Let’s talk about some of the no voting countries, all of the EU countries voted as one block against the resolution. Here’s Spain’s representative at the UN speaking on behalf of the 27 EU countries after the vote. It’s that duplication word again, but they also seem to think that all that’s needed is to tweak the OECD rich countries club to make it more democratic. Have a listen. what you’re hearing is the UN interpreter interpreting from Spanish to English.
UN Representative from Spain, speaking through a UN interpreter: The EU and its member states recognise the important role played by the UN, including, but not limited to, its efforts to support developing countries in mobilising domestic revenues and to increase their ability to finance their development strategies. The EU and its member states are also committed to the ongoing work of the OECD and G20 inclusive framework, which strives to establish ambitious reforms to the international tax order, and its increasing number of members. We consider it is important to continue developing these global tax standards and avoid duplication of work or inconsistent outcomes, including agreements that have been built over the course of many years and that have global benefits, however imperfect they may seem.
However, we recognise that many UN member states have noted a lack of inclusivity in the existing international agreements, both in terms of their process and also in terms of establishing the agenda. We are resolute in terms of committing to improvements in this regard, both in terms of consultations and with member states and also respective international organisations, the EU and its member states support the efforts of the global framework to improve the inclusiveness of its membership.

Naomi: You’ve talked a bit about the EU already, voting as one bloc against the resolution. And you can see that there is some sympathy for the objections of many nations that they’re not getting a fair say in the making of global tax rules. So, they acknowledge there’s a lack of inclusivity, but still voted against as a bloc. It’s in theory, somebody is able to break out of that bloc and say, no, I’m going to vote for it? Or I’m not quite sure how the EU works in the UN for this kind of vote?

Alex: Yeah, so it doesn’t always, but it very often operates as a bloc, and, you know, at the second committee where this resolution came, that’s typically how it operates. What was different this time though is that the EU finance ministers had met in, I think, September and gave a recommendation that EU members should support option three, this non-binding framework without a convention. That was then interpreted by the lead EU member in the negotiations of this as an absolute outright position that couldn’t be changed. Now that EU member that led the negotiations was France, which of course is the host country of the OECD and always the most aggressive defender of the OECD. So I think the EU got themselves stuck into a position that they didn’t actually necessarily mean to take, but under a combination of pressure from the OECD itself and then from France, ended up tying everyone’s hands. I think there’s quite a bit of anger at France about that. And delegations understand how much geopolitically it’s kind of cost them to be on the wrong side of this and to fail to stop it anyway. So we’re already hearing that EU members will be actively participating in the, in the committee stage that will begin in January and February.
We’ll see if that’s an EU bloc position or if it’s much more open and positive members will be able to engage more positively. My guess is they’ll try and keep a bloc position, but there’s no way it’s going to be dictated by France next time, that’s the message that’s coming.
But one thing to say, you know, for the EU, I think what needs to happen really is a shift in understanding. You know, I heard the head of tax at the European Commission the other day saying he just didn’t know what the UN convention would include and that’s why it was difficult for them to take a position. I think, again, that suggests he simply hasn’t been briefed because there’s a lot of material out there on what could be included.
Actually, you know, the case you can make to the EU is very clear. Going back at least to 2000, the EU has been a leader in a whole set of areas, you know, it was the EU that took forward multilateral automatic exchange of information. The EU has really led on beneficial ownership, at least up to the European court ruling that’s put that in a bit of jeopardy. It’s leading now on public country by country reporting from July this year. That will be a requirement, not perfect, but you know, a big step on the road. And the European Union has led in efforts to try to get a type of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment within the European Union itself and that’s still something they’re still trying.
All of their work across each of those areas has been held up when they’ve tried to make it fully multilateral at the OECD or the related institutions, the Financial Action Task Force and the Global Forum. All of those things have been blocked by the biggest OECD member, the United States, and they’ve only ever moved when the United States moves, so when Obama requires automatic information provision to the US, it allows the EU to get the OECD to deliver a multilateral standard for automatic information exchange. When the US refuses to have public registers of beneficial ownership, then FATF the Financial Action Task Force can’t do it either and everybody else is stuck waiting for the international standard to approve.
If you’re the EU, you ask yourself, am I okay to get blocked every time by the United States, always and only ever able to go at the speed that whichever US administration is in power is willing to go? And you can see it in the current tax reform negotiations too, when, you know, under Trump one thing was possible, under Biden, another thing was possible, and it was almost irrelevant what the rest of the world thought. So everyone has spent all of this time doing what the U.S. has wanted them to do, with the net result that we will have nothing because the U.S. ultimately is going to say we can’t do it, and so no one else is doing it. The EU has to at some point think, is it possible that in a different setting, perhaps a more transparent and democratic one, we might actually be able to support the progressive things that we want to happen, happening multilaterally, that the US opposition could be set aside or overcome in that context in a way that it can’t be at the OECD? Because the OECD is so completely dominated by the US, you know, to the extent that the OECD cannot even say the United States is non-compliant with the Common Reporting Standard for automatic information exchange, even though the United States position is explicitly that they have not signed and will not sign ever, nor provide automatic information exchange, the OECD still can’t actually say that they’re non-compliant because that would be too controversial. Is this the institution for the European Union to set tax rules, to look for multilateral progress? I mean, I think a kind of a cold analytical view of things would suggest that this really is not the future for the EU’s hopes. And the UN convention creates exactly a space in which they could really move forward that agenda. The European Union has a lot to gain from this. It will be a way of opening the doors to the agenda that they’ve had for a very long time, but they need to get comfortable with it and stop feeling quite as afraid of the risks, as they would see it, of allowing countries in the G77 to have a voice as well.

Naomi: When it comes to the United Nations current role in tax governance at the moment I think it’s limited to an expert committee of 25 people who are nominated by member states, but they conduct business in their own capacity, I think. So what do you hope could happen now as a result of this vote to expand and develop its capacity?

Alex: I think it’s worth saying, actually there is quite a lot of tax capacity in the UN system. So the UN Tax Committee that you’ve mentioned, that’s one piece. And yeah, it’s an expert committee, so the experts are nominated by countries, but they are not supposed to be national representatives. Although very often when you see the OECD people blocking things, it feels very much that their role is representative. But you know, that committee, even as it stands, and even with relatively little resources, has actually done some really impressive work, particularly in the last few years.
You know, they’ve come up with treaty articles that really address the problems of digitalisation in a much quicker and more elegant way than anything that the OECD process is going to deliver. They’re working on things like wealth taxes now, so they’re kind of pushing the horizons of where things can go, so we shouldn’t downplay what they’ve already delivered, even with the constraints that have been put on them.
But then you have, you know, UNDP does a lot of work as part of Tax Inspectors Without Borders, collaborates with other institutions, supports national governments in their tax work. UNCTAD does a lot of work on the tax abuse of multinational companies. The UN regional economic commissions, especially the economic commission for Africa have really been, you know, among the biggest champions of tax work. And so they’re all these parts of the UN system where actually there is significant capacity and expertise.
And one, one possibility is just that you could bring together a lot of that into one place and, you know, and really without even any additional resources, you’d have a very powerful group, ready to go.
Look, what the convention offers the possibility of is really going to another level. So you’d have this, this real core of expertise sitting in one place now, rather than spread around the system with all of the data ideally coming in there and, you know, being responsible for generating public analysis of the scale of the problems. You’d have the UN saying, this is how bad the problems are, we’re tracking this, and this is where the real issues are and we need to deal with this and this and this, and doing it in such a way that, you know, instead of the OECD having all the information and publishing little bits of it for people like us to pick up and do what we can with, you could make all of the information at least at the national level, public through that process, so everyone has a common basis of knowledge to work from and to take into negotiations, you know, all of that. Again, it wouldn’t take a huge amount of resources, but having it centralised around this framework body would change the whole dynamic, and in particular for lower income countries outside the OECD who really lack access to information so much of the time, which just layers on top of the capacity constraints they have too, you know, creating a central resource would be extremely progressive because the benefits would be much bigger for the countries that are currently denied, denied information and currently lack capacity most.

Naomi: Right. And in terms of what they should focus on most, should it be a place that enables states with common cause to kind of form blocs together to resist the pressure more effectively than they can at the moment from the most powerful countries and that would help them implement region-wide things or even unilaterally, it gives them more power to implement things domestically that they want to enforce when it comes to multinationals? Or should it be taking an OECD type approach where they try to push tax rules as widely as possible everywhere, according to what they’ve agreed?

Alex: In a sense, this is the set of questions for the governments of the world, you know, and, and for the first time they will be able together to consider them. But we can say, look, here are kind of the relatively quick wins, things that we can, you know, really deliver within a couple of years of negotiations. And here is some more complicated stuff, which effectively will be the agenda for the framework body going forward.
What you can really do in the convention itself in the immediate protocols is more around transparency. You know, so you can take the OECD instrument for automatic information exchange and make it genuinely globally inclusive and address some of its significant shortcomings in terms of how easy it is to design income stream asset classes that are outside the reporting requirement, so you make it much better. And you make sure everyone’s included, and in particular, you allow lower income countries to receive information without immediately having to reciprocate, because you recognise, as the UN process, UN in general always does, that you have common but differentiated responsibilities, and you don’t expect everyone to do everything from moment zero. So it’s kind of, you know, significant wins there that will really generate additional revenues from the following year. We’ve also seen the injustice of, of cutting out most of the countries of the world from it so making that global and making it better will really deliver. So that’s A.
You know, B, you can imagine setting a beneficial ownership standard, which the United States might not like, but more or less everyone else would be happy to aim for of transparency of the ownership of companies, trusts, legal vehicles or other sorts. You know, you could really make significant progress quite quickly on that. Similarly, I think the tipping point is probably about on us getting to public country by country reporting. And if you did that in a multilateral convention, you solve the problem that we currently have that any government like the Australian one this year that tries to move ahead comes under enormous pressure because it’s only one government. You put that in a convention and you really kind of make it politically possible to do without countries getting picked off by the lobbyists. So that’s your ABC of transparency, potentially all there in the convention.
Then the question is on corporate tax, you know, we know what the ambitions are really, and this is true for OECD countries as well as others, we want multinationals profits to be declared and taxed in the places where their real economic activity takes place. So you could actually, even within the immediate convention, you could agree a shift to unitary taxation. There is a broad majority, I would say, in favour of a much more ambitious global minimum tax than this very complex and limited version that is the OECD’s pillar 2 version. So I think, we could move to a much broader and fairly shared global minimum tax at a rate of let’s say 25% rather than 15%. Now again, do you want to try and do that within the convention or you say that’s for the framework body to begin its work in a few years?
And then lastly, there’s a set of kind of governance and structure questions. How would the framework body work? What kind of regular are the meetings? What kind of rules for decision making? What kind of data will it collect? What will it publish? So, you know, this is a moment, a real possibility where things are going to start becoming clear literally within the next few months as the terms of reference for the negotiations are drafted. It’s exciting times, you know.

Naomi: Yeah, it is exciting. And what kind of timescale are we looking at to the day where we’re all celebrating because we’ve got a UN tax convention?

Alex: What the resolution has agreed is the creation of a committee of all UN members that will meet, probably four times for maybe five days a time in New York. It has to deliver a draft terms of reference in August. A key point within that is there’s a bureau to be created, which will be 20 members, 20 member states, and that’ll be divided four from each of the five UN regions. So at the moment, those regional blocks are working out who will be their members of the Bureau. And the Bureau will really steer the process and be, I think, responsible for a lot of the direction and the drafting, so that’s a key thing that will become clear in February, who’s going to be in there.
Then look, you know, that report in August goes to the General Assembly, there will be a debate in September, and then the next resolution will agree to take a final version of the terms of reference as the basis for negotiations to begin in 2025.

Naomi: And would it be, can it ever be legally binding because I’ve seen many UN conventions which are very commendable, and, you know, that are used for all sorts of research and reports to demonstrate where countries are not upholding their obligations, legal obligations under these conventions, but it doesn’t seem to go anywhere in terms of legal consequences, so to what extent are we talking legally binding with this convention?

Alex: You know, countries can always do what they want. Governments, governments can choose to break the law. I mean, you and I have lived through Brexit in the UK, we’ve seen our government repeatedly choose to break international agreements and laws that they are subject to. I suppose in the same way that individuals can break laws, you know, the fact that law is there doesn’t mean that nobody commits murder, but it does mean there is some accountability. And I think that’s the key thing, you know, if you look at the kind of human rights instruments that we’re often working on, you can feel frustrated that governments continually breach their human rights commitments, but there is at least a process when they’ve signed an instrument, there’s a process to hold them accountable for it. And some sense that this does over time strengthen behaviour. It reduces the degrees of violations. I think in the case of tax that the dynamic is probably significantly stronger than that. It’s more like, sort of two elements, you know. So one is things like the UN Convention Against Corruption, you know, another one in this kind of area, gives the basis for countries actually to pass a lot of domestic law and those are then held to, and perhaps held to much more clearly than, sadly, respecting the rights of people with disabilities, say, which, although people sign conventions, it’s very often breached day in day out, whereas on the corruption side you can see very specific legal changes put through by governments and then stuck to, so I think this is the kind of the immediate elements in the tax convention are of that sort. What matters, you know, yes, that it’s agreed and ratified, but actually the government then put it into domestic legislation as they do when there are successful OECD processes, though in this case everyone will have had a say, so this is already better.
And the other piece is, you know, as with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, it creates this framework body, and that creates the space for further negotiations and for governments to commit and deliver on further actions in years to come. You can say the climate case, you know, actually a lot of what you see is, if not backsliding, at least trying not to be ambitious, but think about, you know, if you want to see the glass half full, if there wasn’t a UN framework convention on climate change we probably wouldn’t even have that process of regular meetings where governments are at least called out for their opposition for their failure to be sufficiently ambitious. So, you know, having a tax convention doesn’t mean that everyone’s going to do the right thing on tax at all. But it creates the possibility that simply isn’t there at the OECD, that we can move forward on a whole set of things and that a group of the willing can really go further and faster than if they’re on their own and kind of exposed to being picked off by lobbyists and by the pressure of one or two powerful countries who don’t want progress. So it’s the basis for really sustained and significant progress, but it’s not a guarantee. That guarantee will only come from civil society, from people in the street and people like us demanding that once it’s in place, it’s really used by our governments and making sure our governments take ambitious positions and stick to what they end up agreeing.

Naomi: Ok, so 2025 is the year to be really hopeful about that we’re actually less than, well, what, two years away, less than two years away, possibly from a historic UN tax convention?

Alex: I think there’s a question over how quickly you can negotiate it. So, you know, the most ambitious possibility if you start the formal negotiations with a really good terms of reference in January 25, Spain will host the fourth Financing for Development Summit in 2025. Could you race to a convention text in time for the Financing for Development Summit and have global signatures then? I think it’s just about within the bounds of possibility, and more realistic I think it’s a staging point and you’re probably looking at signatures in 2026. So, you know, it’s not a matter of months, it’s definitely years, but it’s such a big shift. You know, it’s a century waiting to have a globally inclusive body to set these rules to throw over the decisions made by the League of Nations in the 1920s and 30s that we’re all stuck with the consequences of today, you know, to say, we don’t actually need tax rules that were set by the imperial powers, honestly, we can do better. So I want to be impatient, I want this today, but you know, if it takes a couple of years to get us past the legacy of the last hundred, we should probably be willing to take our time just a little bit.

Naomi: Yes, indeed. And you can really hear the desire for change from the representative from Cameroon who spoke after the vote to adopt the resolution. Again, what you can hear is the UN interpreter interpreting from French to English.

UN Representative from Cameroon: We are in crisis and the planet is in danger. At the current pace, we will be in an even more dramatic situation than currently. Although we are on the edge of the abyss, there is still time, it’s still possible to save the planet, to eradicate poverty, to ensure prosperity for all in a peaceful world.
If the time of crisis imposes the time of change, then it’s time for cooperation to take precedence over competition. It’s time for international solidarity to take precedence over particular and selfish interest in the short term. We must stand united with a very strong message to make sure there is no longer room for tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering, illicit financial flows.
We count on the support of every member state because one country is not in position to combat those cancers depriving developing countries from critical resources for sustainable development.
Mr. Chair, African people are tired of poverty, misery, hunger, tired of suffering from dramatic consequences of conflicts, natural disaster, tired of the narrative of corruption and that of local governance and corruption to explain the problem they are facing. African people are tired of numbers about assistance, assistance for development. They do not request more assistance. They request every partner running business, the physical or digital, individuals and companies making profit should pay the right price, the right price, the fair and just percentage in terms of tax. Then we could keep our promise to transforming our world, to ensuring the world we want, the future we want is a reality. Je vous remercie.

Naomi: That’s it for this month. Thanks for listening. Bye for now.

Fight tax abuse for a fighting chance on climate: Reflections on COP28

COP28 came to a close earlier this week. If COP is anything, it is a show, and this time, the show was exceptionally peculiar. The manicured roads of Dubai saw Bugattis and Porsches pass crowds of indigenous climate activists; there were panels on sustainable yachting next door to interventions on the climate damage inflicted by extreme wealth. Behind the Dubai skyline – a city that prides itself on its path to becoming carbon neutral – about 80 kilometers offshore, the Zakum oil field, the third largest in the middle east, extracts about 66 billion barrels oil. Like the climate crisis itself, Dubai is a place of extremes and of contradictions. Last month, Oxfam published research showing that the carbon emissions of the richest 1 percent of people are set to be 22 times greater than the level compatible with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement in 2030.

So what’s the plan?

Maybe you have shaken your head at the fact that leadership of the world’s most important climate conference was handed to the head of a petrostate in the first place — at the very least, a mildly controversial, at worst, a deliberately Machiavellian decision. You might have heard that countries, until the very last moment of the conference, were negotiating on whether to agree to phasing out fossil fuels, ultimately landing on murky language to “transition away” from them. You may have read that there was breakthrough when it comes to climate finance – the establishment of a Loss and Damage fund, a pot of money, the first of its kind, that pools resources it will dispense to lower income countries especially hard hit by the climate crisis, in order to recover from extreme climate events. The order of magnitude of needed Loss and Damage funding is in the hundreds or billion USD annually and rising – on par with the amount of tax lost every year to multinational corporations and wealthy individuals using tax havens.

Money is at the core of these and all climate policy negotiations: it is hugely expensive to finance the recovery from increasingly common extreme weather events, let alone the sustainable overhaul of a wide number of polluting sectors, and to do so quickly, across widely different contexts. In Germany, a fierce political fight over legislation to replace outdated and polluting heating systems with sustainable, but expensive, heat pumps has been raging. The shipping sector, which produces emissions on a par with countries like Germany or Japan, will likely be slapped with a levy to speed up the transition, but costs are expected to increase more for the poorest countries, which already often pay relatively higher shipping charges. For decades, the aviation industry – worth nearly US$840 billion – has successfully lobbied against a tax on aviation fuels, partly through its leverage over hiking consumer prices. Ahead of COP24 in Poland, Shell, BP, Total, Chevron and Exxon collectively spent US$1 billion on misleading publicity and lobbying ahead of the event. In 2022, floods in Pakistan caused more than US$30 billion in damage, and killed thousands.

Mosaic funding

Where money is at stake, so is tax. Large scale financial contributions from governments, corporations and individuals most responsible for causing the climate crisis is urgently needed, as existing climate finance pledges from historic rich emitters remain unmet, and by virtue of overwhelmingly being issued as loans, lock poorer countries into continued economic dependency.

Loss and damage, let alone adaptation and mitigation all cost huge sums of money – total estimates are in the order of magnitude of trillions of US dollars. The breakthrough Loss and Damage commitments made by some historic polluters at this COP represent a drop in the ocean of what will be needed, and willfully sideline the great need for expensive adaptation and mitigation finance. Overall, there is an increasing recognition that financially, a ‘mosaic’ approach is needed to contend with the order of magnitude of missing money, which no overseas development aid (ODA), government bonds or voluntary pledges alone can fill.

We are at a critical juncture – the role of taxation for climate justice, and the climate finance gap especially, is finally being recognised. It is now on us, as both climate and tax justice activists, to push for the most ambitious and equitable fiscal solutions on offer.

Replaying age old North-South dynamics

In a move that came as a surprise to no one, the IMF used COP28 to underscore the importance of carbon taxes to raise the price of carbon globally, raise revenue and accelerate investment in sustainable activities. This is an implicit admission that tax can in fact do a lot for the climate, but it is painfully unambitious and, when being hailed as a flagship climate policy, can have disastrous equity implications for poorer groups and countries.

The related Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism the EU passed into action this year results in declines in exports in developing countries in favour of developed countries, which tend to have less carbon intensive production processes. Such carbon taxes, pending their specifics, have been called ‘trade weapons’ by climate activists from the global south.

Meanwhile, rich countries also want to prioritise the further development of voluntary carbon markets, rapidly growing in economic value. But these markets remain self-regulated with little transparency, often resulting in the sale of phantom credits, and primarily benefit the brokers who act as middlemen in the purchase and sale of carbon credits, usually based in the global north, with a dubious record on actual carbon reductions. The market failures are such that in recent times, countries like Papua New Guinea and Honduras have been putting a moratorium on the licensing of new offset projects.

Realising the full potential of tax justice for climate justice

Once one starts thinking about tax and climate together, two things become clear. First, when we talk about the increasing awareness that tax should help fill the climate finance funding cap, we mostly mean measures that could, at least in theory, be implemented within current tax systems and frameworks. Policymakers know this, and this COP, remarkably, saw the launch of a new Global Tax taskforce. The taskforce will consider different tax policies to fund future climate action. Its objective is to identify by the time COP30 in 2025 rolls around what levies or taxes should be introduced at the global level to raise revenue. This is very welcome news, as the war in Ukraine and subsequent rise in energy prices has shown most recently, collecting tax at the corporate level from fossil fuel companies – through windfall and excess profit taxes – was relatively low hanging fruit considering the ease of implementation and high returns.

To quote some numbers, the EU Tax Observatory has found that taxing the January 2022 to September 2022 valuation gains of energy firms at a rate of 33 per cent would have generated around €80 billion in revenue. Other options the taskforce will consider are a tax on wealth. At the individual level, a progressive tax on extreme wealth – which has dire climate consequences – on those individuals with assets worth over US$100 million could generate an estimated US$295 billion annually according to the World Inequality Lab. It will further examine sectoral leives, knowing full well that if all 195 state signatories to the Paris Agreement imposed both a shipping and aviation levy, these levies could generate between US$132–392 billion annually. All proposals under discussion come at the ‘end point’ of any given economic activity – once fossil fuels have been extracted, once wealth has been amassed and container ships and budget airlines have reached their destinations.

But when we point out that the amount of tax lost every year to multinational corporations and wealthy individuals using tax havens is in the hundreds of billions, on par with the amount of money needed each year to cover the estimated cost of climate-induced loss and damage, we want to draw attention to the fact that the way the international tax governance system itself has been set up deprives countries of the revenue they are entitled to for public spending, including critical climate budgets. Curbing abusive profit shifting practices that shrink the amount of corporate tax payable, through the implementation of automatic exchange of financial information between countries, implementing beneficial ownership registers and country by country reporting for multinational companies and unitary taxation of income with a global minimum tax rate are all policies to end tax abuse that will fill domestic budgets.

Changing how we change tax rules

It is critical – and absolutely feasible, with some collective will – to use targeted taxes and levies to fill some of the climate finance gap. But beyond these measures, both movements should focus challenging the international tax order itself, which has limited countries’ abilities – particularly lower income countries – to exercise sovereignty over their tax rights. For the past sixty years, global tax policy development has been largely determined by the OECD, which represents only a minority of rich countries – and which has proven ineffective in curbing the significant tax abuses by multinational companies and high net worth individuals – money that is going missing when it could be spent on climate finance, and so much more. But the tide is turning – history was made last month at the UN when countries adopted by a landslide majority a resolution to begin the process of establishing a framework convention on tax and completely change how global tax rules are decided.

Giving all countries around the world a fighting chance to mitigate and deal with climate breakdown starts with adopting global tax rules that both eliminate tax abuse and fairly distribute tax revenues.

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast #72: الإستعمار الأخضر والإمبريالية البيئية

Welcome to the 72nd edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available on most podcast apps. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can follow the programme on Facebook, on Twitter and on our website. All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.

الإستعمار الأخضر والإمبريالية البيئية

في العدد #72 من بودكاست “الجباية ببساطة” نستضيف الباحث والناشط الجزائري د.حمزة حموشان في حوار مع وليد بن رحومة حول عدم تكافئ العلاقات الدولية في علاقة بالمنظومة البيئة والمناخية، مايؤدي الي إستعمار جديد مبني على أساس نهب الثروات. في الحوار شرح لكيفية كسر هذه المعادلة عبر إنتقال عادل لتحقيق العدالة المناخية.

In issue #72 of our Arabic podcast, we host Algerian researcher and activist Dr. Hamza Hamouchane in a dialogue with Walid Benrahouma about the unequal international relations in relation to the environmental and climate system, which leads to a new colonialism based on the plunder of wealth. The dialogue explains how to break this equation through a just transition to achieve climate justice.

الإستعمار الأخضر والإمبريالية البيئية

تابعونا على صفحتنا على الفايسبوك وتويتر  https://www.facebook.com/ TaxesSimply Tweets by taxes_simply

La victoria de Milei y su repercusión: December 2023 Spanish language tax justice podcast, Justicia ImPositiva

Welcome to our Spanish language podcast and radio programme Justicia ImPositiva with Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez, free to download and broadcast on radio networks across Latin America and Spain. ¡Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a nuestro podcast y programa radiofónico! Escuche por su app de podcast. (All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.)

En este programa con Marcelo Justo y Marta Nuñez:

INVITADOS 

~ La victoria de Milei y su repercusión

Just environmental taxation in Africa: how tax policy can curb environmental damage, far beyond just carbon taxes

How can environmental taxes increase the sustainability of economic growth in low-income countries?

Environmental taxes can be defined as any tax imposed on a base with a proven negative impact on the environment – examples include import tariffs on plastic material, charges on traffic congestion, or excises on fertiliser. They have been widely promoted as a way to reduce environmental damage while at the same time raising revenue from polluters. Because they are typically calculated on tangible commodities and volumes, they are also often seen as harder to evade than some other taxes that are based on more abstract concepts, making them attractive instruments for low-income countries. 

The environmental tax which has been discussed the most is undoubtedly the carbon tax, which is levied on the carbon content of different goods, strongly correlated with the amount of fossil fuels required in their production. Carbon taxes are seen as an essential tool to reduce greenhouse gases, and there is an almost universal support for their introduction across the globe. This includes Sub-Saharan Africa, with the United Nation, the International Monetary Fund, and the OECD all promoting their implementation in various countries in the region at different points in time.

Carbon taxation to the rescue: but is it really?

However, there is limited evidence that African governments see them as a domestic priority. According to the World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard, only Gabon and Senegal are currently considering their introduction, following the introduction on one in South Africa in 2019, which arguably has not achieved much to date. In itself, this is not surprising, as Africa has the lowest per capita emission in the world. Although sectoral emissions from energy and transportation have been on the rise, the majority originates from land use change and deforestation, which are usually outside the scope of carbon taxation. While one could argue that carbon taxes can still play a significant role in making investments in fossil fuel generation less attractive, renewable energy generation is already cheaper across most of the continent. What is holding back investments is a lack of financing solutions, high perceived risk and extensive fossil fuel subsidies. Indeed, finding a politically acceptable way to reduce fossil fuel subsidies and to increasing renewable energy deployment, which in Africa lags behind other regions, will be key to ensuring sustainable development across the continent.

This will require a combination of things, two of which stand out. First, high-income countries should finally meet their pledge to direct USD100 billion per year to climate finance, something they are still falling awfully short of. But they also need to operationalise the loss and damage fund which was agreed to at COP27, whose ground set-up is proving contentious. Both of these will be necessary to meet the current financing need of adaptation, mitigation and renewable energy generation across much of Sub-Saharan Africa. But just as importantly, this is also the only morally justifiable course of action given that the countries bearing the brunt of climate change damage are those which least contributed to it, as only South Africa appears as one of the top-20 historical emitters of greenhouse gases. Second, the revenue currently channelled towards fossil fuel subsidies, which predominantly favour richer household, must be redirected to increasing affordable access to modern energy for low-income households – something which might be renownedly hard, but also achievable. 

While carbon taxes might still play a role in the medium term in Sub-Saharan Africa, they do not contribute to addressing either of these obstacles, and African governments should not use the scarce political capital at their disposal for fiscal reform to pursue policies which lack immediate environmental or revenue benefits. This seems to have been implicitly recognised at the recent Africa Climate Summit in Nairobi, where the final declaration calls for a global carbon taxation – augmented by a financial transaction tax – rather than committing to introducing carbon taxes domestically. This is a far more logical approach, and is also why measures such as the carbon border adjustment mechanism recently introduced by the European Union should carefully consider their treatment of least developed countries.

While existing evidence is still scarce due to the novelty of the scheme, early analysis suggests that some low-income countries, such as Mozambique, while suffer significantly from its introduction. Furthermore, it is highly doubtful that this approach will create the particular goodwill across impacted countries required to push through reforms as complex as a carbon tax – it might in fact just do the opposite. If the European Union does not take action to exempt least developed countries, or decides to redirect the revenue collected from this group of countries to where the export originated, the carbon border adjustment mechanism will increase rather than reduce international inequalities.

So, is there nothing that environmental taxes can do?

This does not mean that fiscal policies cannot contribute to addressing developmental and environmental issues across Sub-Saharan Africa, but rather than the issues they can contribute to are not those currently receiving the most attention. For example, tax policies can be used to tackle urban pollution originating from poor waste management and ageing vehicle fleets, as well as being part of the policy mix used to address unsustainable forest management. These are all pressing issues across the continent. Air pollution is one of the major causes of premature death in the continent and it is strongly connected to the prevalence of biomasses in the energy mix of low-income households, in itself a cause of deforestation, while ageing vehicle fleet lead to frequent road fatalities. Similarly, poor waste management is connected to a variety of health issues in urban areas, with the roadside burning of waste, or animals consuming waste, both of which in turn potentially introduce waste back into the food system.

Indeed, recently completed work indicates that these are all areas in which African policymakers themselves think that fiscal policies could help. For example, remodulating import tariffs to disincentivise the acquisition of second hand vehicles could be relatively easy and will not likely be regressive in a region in which car ownership is still seen as a luxury good. This can be combined with vehicle ownership taxes, which remain virtually absent on the continent, whose revenue can be earmarked for the provision of public transport to the many urban poor.

Taxes have also been the main source of funding for waste disposal across high income countries, but remain incredibly scarce across the continent. When present, they tend to be flat-rate charges, which makes them inherently regressive, further exacerbating the impact on lower-income household which are already more likely to suffer the health consequences of poor disposal. A more progressive way to improve waste management would be to link them with the often-progressive rate of property taxation, or with surcharges on water and electricity bills, although low collection rates amongst African power utilities and issues with property tax systems coverage and equity must be kept into account.

The quest for the rationalisation of the fiscal treatment of forests in tropical areas has been long and not very successful, but new approaches are still being proposed. Available evidence indicates that reducing elite capacity to extract illegal rent from the sector will be a key component in this process, as well as the conceptualisation of forests as assets with a long term value, rather than a source of quick government revenue. However, expanding access to modern energy use and affordability of food staples for lower income households will be just as important as fixing forestry tax systems, considering how charcoal production and expansion of agricultural land remain key drivers of deforestation in the continent.

Just environmental taxation domestically and internationally

The tax system can and should be used to address environmental issues, but it is important to ensure that this is not done at the expense of its progressivity. Given the high reliance of lower-income households on natural resources, combined with the often-limited capacity of providing direct support of African governments, environmental and revenue considerations should be carefully balanced with socio-economic ones in the policy process. Some of the examples provided above demonstrates that there are various theoretical instances in which fiscal policies can play a role in reducing environmental damages ensuring that wealthier citizens shoulder the appropriate burden. This is for example the case with taxation of privately owned vehicles whose revenue is earmarked for funding public transport, or for waste-management taxes which increase progressively with property values or energy and water consumption. 

A similar approach should also be applied in the international arena. High-income countries will do well to remember that they are the cause of the climate crisis, and should not unfairly burden low-income countries with facing its consequences, including by forcing them to adopt policies not fit for their context.

#56 Finance Climat: Le Monde ne peut continuer de payer pour les riches! The Tax Justice Network French podcast

Welcome to our monthly podcast in French, Impôts et Justice Sociale with Idriss Linge of the Tax Justice Network. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages every month in EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here and on most podcast apps. Here’s our latest episode:

Dans cette 56ème édition de votre podcast en français sur la justice sociale et la justice fiscale, nous revenons sur un rapport publié par Oxfam, sur des données de l’Institut de Stockholm pour l’Environnement et qui aborde sous une approche originale, la question des inégalités climatiques dans le monde. Ce document est sorti en amont de la COP 28 qui se tenait à Dubaï aux Émirats Arabes Unis, et qui elle aussi à eu du mal à trouver un consensus sur la justice climatique. L’étude d’Oxfam évoque le rôle que la justice fiscale pourrait jouer dans ce contexte, et évoque des principes tels que la publication des comptes financiers des multinationales par pays, la transparence sur la propriété pour une responsabilité effective, et une meilleure répartition de l’impôt mondial. Pour en discuter, nous avons reçu la Directrice d’Oxfam en Afrique, qui nous rejoint en tant qu’invitée Fati N’Zi-Hassane : Directrice d’Oxfam en Afrique.

~ 56 Finance Climat: Le Monde ne peut continuer de payer pour les riches!

Vous pouvez suivre le Podcast sur:

Criminosos na Amazônia lavam dinheiro nos EUA: the Tax Justice Network Portuguese podcast #55

Welcome to our monthly podcast in Portuguese, É da sua conta (‘it’s your business’) produced and hosted by Grazielle David and Daniela Stefano. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages – EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. Here’s the latest episode:

Desmatamentos, exploração ilegal de minérios e de madeira: parte do dinheiro sujo dos crimes ambientais na Amazônia acabam em paraísos fiscais nos Estados Unidos. Quem são os responsáveis? Como parar com isso? Esse é o tema do episódio #55 do É da sua conta.

Participantes:

Transcrição do episódio 55

~ Criminosos na Amazônia lavam dinheiro nos EUA

“A gente não sabe quem é pior: se são os garimpeiros ou as mineradoras”. 
 ~ Alessandra Korap, liderança munduruku

“Me perguntaram uma vez sobre lavar dinheiro (das drogas) com ouro. Mas será que é lavagem? Porque se o ouro já é ilegal e contrabandeado, uma atividade ilegal não lava a outra atividade ilegal.”
 ~ Aiala Colares Couto, professor e pesquisador da Universidade Estadual do Pará

“Fraudes, corrupção e lavagem de dinheiro: três crimes essenciais para dar a aparência de legalidade. São fraudados documentos sobre esses bens florestais, ocultando as origens ilícitas e possibilitando que sejam comercializados, por exemplo.
 ~ Vivian Calderoni, Instituto Igarapé

“Precisamos saber quem são as pessoas que estão se beneficiando dessas transações e, portanto,  desses crimes ambientais. Para isso, é central que todos os países garantam transparência de empresas ou outras entidades legais sobre quem são os proprietários, proprietários legais, mas também beneficiários finais”
  ~ Florencia Lorenzo, Tax Justice Network

Saiba Mais:

Episódios Relacionados

É da sua conta é o podcast mensal em português da Tax Justice Network. Coordenação: Naomi Fowler. Dublagens: Cecília Figueiredo e Zema Ribeiro. Produção e apresentação: Daniela Stefano e Grazielle David. Download gratuito. Reprodução livre para rádios.

The People vs Microsoft: the Tax Justice Network podcast, the Taxcast

Welcome to the latest episode of the Tax Justice Network’s monthly podcast, the Taxcast. You can subscribe either by emailing naomi [at] taxjustice.net or find us on your podcast app. All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.

On the Taxcast this month, the story of what happened when the US tax authorities, the IRS, decided to crack down on Microsoft, one of the world’s biggest tech companies. Worthy of a thriller movie with its twists and turns, there are many lessons for governments worldwide. And it’s not over yet.

Featuring:

Transcript available here (some is automated)

The only ones who benefit here are the big four tax advisors, in this case, tax advisors at KPMG. All of that was very lucrative for them. The downside was suffered by everyone else”

~ Zorka Milin
~ The People vs Microsoft

Further reading:

Here’s a summary of the show:

Naomi Fowler: Hello and welcome to the Taxcast, the Tax Justice Network Podcast. We’re all about fixing our economies, so they work for all of us. I’m Naomi Fowler. On the Taxcast this month, the story of when the US tax authorities, the IRS, decided to crack down on Microsoft, one of the world’s biggest tech companies.

Zorka Milin: The only ones who benefit here are the big four tax advisors. In this case, tax advisors at KPMG. All of that was very lucrative for them. The downside was suffered by everyone else.

Naomi Fowler: And before that- titanic power clashes seem to be the order of the day. There’s been another historic vote at the United Nations, a landslide vote on how international tax rules are decided. This vote now pushes the world on to the next stage. Here’s Alex Cobham of the Tax Justice Network.

Alex Cobham: Last week’s vote at the United Nations was absolutely historic. The countries of the Global South came together and demanded that after a hundred years in which the imperial powers or their, their successors at the OECD, the rich countries, have set the rules, that there should actually be a process at the UN to negotiate a convention on tax, international tax cooperation in particular, in which every country in the world will have an equal say, the right to participate fully. So it allows us to look forward to a position where we finally have a global tax body in which every country is represented.

Now this is really important for the countries of the Global South, starting with the Africa group who’ve led this. These are the countries that lose the biggest share of their revenues, each year to international tax abuse. And that international tax abuse is primarily caused by and facilitated by the rich countries, the members of the OECD and their dependent territories.

But there’s also a win here for those OECD countries themselves. They’ve insisted for so long on keeping the power at the OECD. And it’s not just exclusionary there, it’s also become completely ineffective, so the OECD members themselves lose, and all of us who are citizens of OECD countries too of course, lose the greatest amount of revenues in absolute terms to that cross border tax abuse by their own multinationals by individuals hiding assets and income streams offshore. So for all of us, the negotiation of the UN convention that will soon begin is an awesome opportunity to hold our governments to account, instead of going behind the closed doors of the OECD. People said we’d never get anywhere at the United Nations, that we just had to deal with the fact the OECD was exclusionary and kind of structurally unjust and get the best that we could out of that. I think we’ve moved on, So let’s celebrate just a little, and then the hard work begins.

Naomi Fowler: Yeah, the last time the Global South countries tried to bring decision making on tax rules to the United Nations was back in the 1970s. Now, 50 years later, they’re mounting this existential challenge to global power. In next month’s episode, we’re going to bring you our analysis of the vote, the attempts by some nations to block it, and we’re going to look at what happens next.

Back to the largest audit in history. It’s kind of a United States taxpayers versus Microsoft. And the story doesn’t begin where you’d expect.

[Anthem of Humacao]

This is the anthem of Humacao. It’s an absolutely beautiful location in Puerto Rico, about an hour’s drive from the capital city of San Juan. It’s got a 3, 000 acre nature reserve, lots of beaches and a population of around 50,000 at the last count, not including all the tourists. It doesn’t have an obvious connection to one of the world’s biggest multinationals, Microsoft. But, since 1989, Microsoft had a little facility there, employing about 85 people to burn Office and Windows software onto CDs.

Microsoft had enjoyed a 15 year tax deal with Puerto Rico on this little factory, which guaranteed them a tax rate of zero to 2%. Over the years, it saved them nearly $200 million in taxes. It’s not a huge deal for such a big corporation, but it’s nice if you can get it. That nice little 15 year deal was due to end in 2005, but a much more lucrative opportunity came up. This is Business Reporter at ProPublica, Paul Kiel.

Paul Kiel: They were actually about to close the factory because there was no point in having it there anymore when essentially KPMG, you know, one of the big four consulting and auditing firms came to them with a proposal and said, you know, Puerto Rico is actually a great, great place to have a factory if, if you have some sort of IP transaction.

Naomi Fowler: IP is intellectual property.

Paul Kiel: The idea of like a company like Microsoft selling it’s IP, its most valuable product, particularly to a small company in Puerto Rico is ludicrous ! And, you know, these types of transactions are not unique to Microsoft by any means

Naomi Fowler: Indeed they’re not. Multinational companies use all sorts of tax strategies to shift their profits to tax havens, and they do it to the tune of an estimated one trillion dollars a year.

In Puerto Rico, 43 percent of the population lives in poverty. Not much benefit to be had for them with the Microsoft deal. Except for a few jobs maybe. Anyway, this story’s been running for a long time.

Paul Kiel: 20 years, it’s, that’s how old it is. It’s a long time. It’s like, a child born, you know, the same year as the transaction was being audited, you know, is maybe in college now!!

Naomi Fowler: Ha ha. Anyway, KPMG’s brilliant idea was for Microsoft to sell its intellectual property to this 85 person factory it owned in Humacao. This time, KPMG persuaded the Puerto Rican government to give Microsoft a tax rate of close to zero percent. Microsoft shifted at least 39 billion in U. S. profits there. The IRS auditors, the IRS auditors discovered what they believed was some mightily creative accounting, some laughable numbers, in fact. Fast forward to 2023, and Microsoft announced the IRS had notified them that they owe 28. 9 billion dollars in back taxes, plus Penalties and interest. Microsoft disputes that.

Paul Kiel: And they’re going to appeal and that’s going to take another good long time.

Naomi Fowler: A very long time. It’s a fascinating story. It should be made into a thriller movie someday. Honestly, the twists and turns, the arrogance of Microsoft, the determination of the attorneys working for the IRS. I mean, wow.

Anyway, tax authorities don’t often challenge multinationals in this way, even in the United States. So how did this even happen?

Paul Kiel: This is a time when the IRS was actually like relatively well funded around 2010. You know, Obama’s president, they have an IRS commissioner who says is going to make this a priority. And so they stand up this new unit that’s going to audit these sorts of transactions more capably. I think it’s fair to say there had been some audits before that point, but they had not been particularly I guess, aggressive in their, in their posture towards how they’re approaching the issue. And you know, clearly back footed, like reacting as opposed to making any sort of stand. And so they, they hired a guy named Sam Maruca, who actually had been a lawyer in private practice. And he was sort of outspoken about the fact that, you know, some of these transactions were, were clearly a kind of, he didn’t use the word tax shelter, but essentially he’s saying that’s what they are. And that, you know, the IRS had gotten into a little bit of a losing streak in auditing these transactions and he thought the reason for that was that they weren’t essentially going about the audits the right way. And he brought over another attorney from a firm he’d practiced at, named Eli Hoory. He was actually pretty young at that time, not that far out of law school, had done some work in the private sector. And, you know, he also bought into that sort of idea. And so they were canvassing when they got there, 2010, 2011 for cases that they thought would be good, sort of like, let’s stand our ground sort of cases.

Naomi Fowler: And so, I mean, they had this new unit. It was in the height of some serious money and political will directed at corporate tax abuse. So do you put all this kind of action, which was quite unusual in several different ways, down to political will? Was it public pressure? What do you think spurred that kind of, setting up the unit, going quite aggressively after one big multinational?

Paul Kiel: Right, as for why this happened back in 2010, yeah, I think it’s, it was seen as you know, having corporations pay their right amount of tax. I mean, these, these profit shifts, shifting like, you know, to Ireland and all these other tax havens, like, you know, that’s not popular, people don’t like that idea. There’s not a lot of defenders of the principle, like, why that’s good policy. There was a lot of corporations on Capitol Hill saying, you know, we, we follow the law as it’s written, sort of thing. But so yeah, you know, I don’t, I don’t know if public pressure is quite the word for it, but I think it was seen as, you know, politically a positive idea. And that was why the IRS had the capital to do that. But I think it also also comes down to the personalities of people who are put in charge of the unit and decided to do things a certain way. Obviously, there wasn’t like, you know, the public was not clamoring for them to use these, you know, highly obscure tools that the IRS has and nobody knows about that, it’s their choice to decide how to carry out the mandate of, you know, having corporations pay their, pay the appropriate amount of tax.

Naomi Fowler: Yeah, I have found before that just a small, quite surprisingly small group of individuals can make a big difference in cases like this and in how tax authorities, uh, take action.

 But, I mean, hiring a private corporate law firm to represent the agency, that, I don’t think that had happened before either, right?

Paul Kiel: No, it had never, it was kind of a creative idea they had, which comes back to them being from, in private practice. And basically like, I mean, frankly not, they were not very impressed with the litigators that the government had at their disposal. And basically like, we need, we need winners is kind of the idea and yes there was a big freakout on Capitol Hill about that and essentially they got into legislation that prevented it from happening going forward. I mean, obviously it’s not absolutely necessary for the IRS to have access to private litigators. What is necessary is for them to have capable litigators.

Naomi Fowler: Yeah, it’s fair to say as well that if an agency, a tax collection agency can pay well, then they can retain arguably some of the, the best people but I’ve found many times that you see a lot of people going to the other side, because they can earn a lot more money and they’re deploying those skills not for the public good, but for corporate good, I guess.

Paul Kiel: Right. Government salaries are not what you can earn in the private sector, so essentially you’re always, it’s not like they’re paid poverty wages, like you can get paid quite well by normal standards, but not by like, you know, working for a big four accounting firm standards. So the pitch is always like a public service sort of pitch. Or if you want to be less public service oriented, you know, there is value to have worked at the IRS. You want to go back into the private sector and, you know, maybe get paid a little more because of that experience, so they are trying to staff up. It’s going to take time.

Naomi Fowler: So the reaction of the big tech companies to this challenge from the IRS was really, really strong, and they actually managed to lobby enough to get a change in the law, restricting the ability of the IRS to use some of the same tactics in future. This reaction I mean, in lots of ways, it shows you how these very big corporations will act as one when it’s in their collective interest.

Paul Kiel: Right. Yeah. So, I mean the lobbyists argument on Capitol Hill is never, you know, we want to make sure that our big tech companies can send profits to tax havens, that’s not the way they frame their argument. It’s always, you know, taxpayer rights. You don’t want the IRS basically being unfair in how it audits people.

So you know, this, this unit, that was one of their cases and Microsoft was the big one. And so one of, one of the tools they have is called a designated summons. And essentially what it is is when a taxpayer is not being forthcoming with documents, they have not given them over in the typical process where the IRS asks for documents and they can stall or whatever. And then it’s up to the IRS to sort of take a stand. You know, it’s kind of more conventional to issue a normal summons, which would just be, you sue them in court and say, give me the documents, but the problem with that is the statute of limitations is still running. So you’re going to have the clock running out on you. It gives incentive to the taxpayer to, you know, drag their feet a little bit. Designated summons stops the clock. So that takes away the leverage that the taxpayer has in that situation, because instead of being able to run out the clock, they have to just sort of fight it out in court, however long it takes. And that’s essentially what happened in this case.

Naomi Fowler: There’s an internal appeals process where there’s an independent private check on audit findings. Some call the Office of Appeals the gift shop because complex transfer pricing audits looked at there end up reducing the amount of tax originally owed by about 81%. Microsoft was keen to move straight to that process for obvious reasons. The IRS tried to block that avenue and go straight to an open public court. No doubt they were cheered by frustrated IRS auditors everywhere who faced armies of corporate lawyers in other cases.

Paul Kiel: People who I spoke to are auditors often very frustrated with appeals, essentially giving cases away that took years to build on the appeal side they have, they have this idea of they have to weigh the litigation hazard, which is they’re saying, how, how likely is the IRS to lose in court? And they would come to the conclusion, we’re probably not going to win, maybe there’s a 20 percent chance to win, therefore we’ll mark down you know, the, the adjustment to 20 percent of what the IRS is wanting, like that sort of logic. And so they were particularly worried about doing all this work, building this great case, and then appeals is like, well, it’s a transfer pricing case. We don’t win, so we’ll just give it away. So they, they, they sought to skip appeals, and that was one of the big things they fought over.

Naomi Fowler: Microsoft won that particular boxing round and got its internal appeal. And from now on, new legislation will make it harder for the IRS on that front. That’s because this huge lobby of tech and business groups lobbied hard. And to cut a long story short, a bill was passed into law, meaning the IRS will have to follow a new process if they want to block appeals or designate summons. And when they do, they’ll have to report directly to Congress.

Paul Kiel: You know, lobbyists for the corporate world and for wealthy taxpayers are good at making arguments in a way that emphasize the taxpayer rights aspect of things. So you end up with bills that are like called the Taxpayer Rights Act or that sort of thing, when oftentimes they’re picking issues that really only affect like the largest corporate taxpayers, but oftentimes they’ll try to characterize them as hurting small business. So that’s what you’re up against if you’re supportive of, you know, more muscle behind tax administration.

Naomi Fowler: However, in one of the big victories so far for the IRS in this long running case, a judge agreed with the IRS’s view on Microsoft’s use of Puerto Rico. He wrote in his judgment, quote, ‘the court finds itself unable to escape the conclusion that a significant purpose, if not the sole purpose, of Microsoft’s transactions was to avoid or evade federal income tax,’ close quote. And he agreed with the IRS that documents from accountancy firm KPMG had to be turned over because they’d been promoting a tax shelter. And when you see these documents, you can see why Microsoft fought so hard to keep them confidential.

Paul Kiel: so there’s, there’s privilege similar to this attorney client privilege that, you know, an investigative agency can’t get to or, or a litigant. Same thing with tax advice. But in cases where, you know, a court decides it’s, there’s a tax shelter, those privileges get rolled back. And it’s, and it’s more, and essentially that’s what the, that’s what the IRS successfully argued in this case.

Zorka Milin: We know that these kinds of corporate tax schemes are zero sum. Actually, more than that, you know, this case shows they are a negative sum game, in which nobody really wins.

Naomi Fowler: This is Zorka Millin of the Financial Accountability and Corporate Transparency Coalition.

Zorka Milin: So in this case, you know, take the people of Puerto Rico, where Microsoft barely paid any taxes, and they didn’t even create a meaningful number of jobs. And Puerto Rico, you know, that it’s one of the poorest parts of the U. S., and it’s also increasingly hit by you know, climate impacts like the, like the tragic Hurricane Maria a few years ago. So, you know, in Puerto Rico disaster relief and other basic public services are desperately needed.

And let’s not forget the U.S. Treasury. I mean, you know, the U.S. obviously suffered a gigantic, maybe even record breaking revenue loss which they’re now trying to, to recover from Microsoft. And also, think about Microsoft’s investors, they stand to lose, certainly if the IRS is successful, that would be a huge hit to the company’s bottom line, even for a company that’s, you know, as huge as Microsoft.

And so really the only ones who benefit here are the big four tax advisors. In this case, that would be the Microsoft tax advisors at KPMG who came up with this plan and managed to convince Microsoft’s executives to go along with it. And they also negotiated the controversial tax holiday with Puerto Rico. All of that was very lucrative for them. There was no downside. You know, the downside was suffered by everyone else.

Naomi Fowler: Indeed. Like tax authorities in many nations, the IRS was financially undermined for years. Soon after coming into office, President Biden injected huge amounts of money, and with the Inflation Reduction Act, the IRA, more investment was promised.

Samantha Jacoby: The funding is very important for the effort to overall for the effort to rebuild the IRS after over a decade of a budget cuts.

Naomi Fowler: This is Samantha Jacoby of the Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities.

Samantha Jacoby: The IRS budget, it’s sort of annual budget that that it gets every year is, is about 20 percent below what it was in 2010 after you adjust for inflation. So there was a, it’s sort of a deep hole that the IRS was in before the inflation reduction act passed and and kind of the, the whole idea behind it was, was to to get the, the IRS back to where it would have been without those cuts.

Naomi Fowler: the Biden administration was estimating that this new IRS investment should raise 400 billion over the next 10 years. you know if you look at what, what the IRS can do when it’s very, very determined and you’ve got a lot of political will and I’m just thinking about the Microsoft case at the moment and I know that they’re appealing but it just shows that with the right amount of funding that comes from very strong political will and belief in the tax authority as a public good, it can achieve a lot of things for the public, right?

Samantha Jacoby: Yeah, so it is it is it is clear that with with adequate funding that the, the IRS can can take on some of these large high impact cases and bring in a lot of revenue and you mentioned the Treasury estimate on raising 400 billion dollars in revenue but there’s there are some academics out there who think that that would be even higher. That return on investment would be even higher. There’s a study that found that for every dollar, the IRS spends on auditing very high income taxpayers, the, the government, the government gets back 12 dollars in revenue.

So that’s, that’s a huge return on investment. Whereas audits of low middle class households raise far less. And, you know, the, the, without that, that those resources, it’s, it’s clear that the IRS just doesn’t have the capacity to take on those kinds of cases.

The audit rates for millionaires and the largest corporations over the last 10 years fell by roughly 77 percent and 56 percent respectively from 2010 to 2017. The reason that that happens is tax returns of high income and high wealth people and large businesses are just they’re so complex auditing them is is labor and time intensive. And so without resources, without the sophisticated audit staff, the IRS just can’t do it. They’re, they’re, they’re just not equipped to, to sort of even identify those, those high impact cases, let alone pursue them and take on the, the, the, the corporations sophisticated tax advisors in court. But even, you know, even just a year into the inflation reduction act funding taking effect the IRS has already shown what it can do.

The Microsoft case of course, predated the the the IRA, but the, the IRS has has has has been very effective so far in using the new funding, both to improve the services that it provides taxpayers as well as, you know, it’s technology improvements and and even making investments in enforcement. So in terms of customer service, they, they made huge improvements over the last filing season in terms of improving the level of service that they’ve they’ve provided to taxpayers that people have been you know, getting their calls answered more, more quickly, they’ve the IRS has, has opened new taxpayer service centers to help people file their returns, they’ve made big improvements in digitizing the tax the tax return filing process on the enforcement side they’ve, they’ve announced a big new initiative to audit partnerships. Partnerships particularly large partnerships are really, really difficult to audit. And the IRS has historically almost never audited large partnerships. The audit rate was practically zero but they’ve announced that they’re going to start using AI tools to identify partnerships for audit. And, and those, those types of entities include hedge funds, large real estate firms that, that are really, they’re, they’re really sophisticated entities that are able to sort of structure their, their businesses so that it’s, it’s really difficult to unpack where their income is. And so that’s one area we’re seeing improving already just a year in. There there’s been efforts to pursue high income people who have not filed their taxes or failed to pay their their, their tax debts. Those efforts are already starting to pay returns as well.

Naomi Fowler: You’d think that’s something all politicians could get behind, but sadly that’s not the case. The Republicans are proposing to cut the vast majority of what remains of the 80 billion Inflation Reduction Act funding. Paul Kiel again.

Paul Kiel: I mean, it was pretty apparent to me from the beginning that that money would be under threat politically for the entirety of its life. And that’s, you know, what we’re seeing now. I mean, the Republicans have tried, it’s like a routine now, like every single bill they try to take away money from the IRS and you know, if we end up with an election where you have completely Republican controlled government, I think you have to expect them either gutting that pot of money or simply saying like the IRS gets no money in a normal, like it’s there are normal annual appropriations that are going out, they could just say, like, you just use that pot of money to do that, we’re not going to give any more. And that’ll be a threat for the, for the length of this, of this bill. So it’s, it’s unfortunately, the idea was to give the IRS this pot of money that couldn’t be touched and so that they could hire people with confidence. But it’s, it’s, given the political environment, it’s kind of impossible to entirely accomplish that so, it’s something that’s going to unfortunately have to be watched going forward.

Naomi Fowler: Samantha Jacoby.

Samantha Jacoby: It is very disappointing to see efforts to rescind that funding. for context, the IRS budget in 2023 was about 12 billion. So just that, that annual IRS budget would be cut by a significant amount. And then they would also rescind the vast majority of the long term. 80Billion dollars in funding that that Congress passed last year in the inflation reduction act.

So if that if those funding cuts were enacted that that would prevent the IRS from undertaking its planned rebuilding effort just sort of full stop it, it would cement in place the, the current depleted state of the IRS after a decade of cuts and the result would be continued dysfunction, understaffing, declines in the number of audits of the wealthy and corporations on top of what we’ve already seen.

it hasn’t been passed yet. And, and, you know, President Biden would of course have to approve it. So there, we’re still very optimistic that that, that IRS will retain most of its funding.

Naomi Fowler: Oh, I hope so. I mean, can he veto it then as President?

Samantha Jacoby: Yeah so the President can, has a veto, has veto power over it. And the Senate Democrats are in control and they’ve been supportive of IRS funding as well. But, yeah, but it’s unclear where we’ll end up, but there’s good reason to think that that the vast majority of the funding will stay in place.

Naomi Fowler: Let’s hope so. Meanwhile, pressure’s building on multinationals themselves from shareholders and investors who want to see much more transparency on tax. Zorka Milin again.

Zorka Milin: In the last couple of years, we’ve seen increasing demand for tax transparency in particular coming from investors, in a number of major companies, and that includes big oil companies. Exxon, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, in all of those companies, Oxfam America has filed shareholder resolutions, and it also includes big tech companies.

Notably, let me single out Microsoft itself, so at Microsoft, the shareholder resolution for country by country reporting will be put to a vote again at their upcoming AGM, which is taking place next month. When this happened last year at the AGM, this tax proposal was interesting, it actually had the greatest support out of any shareholder proposal that was put up for a vote last year.

And so, you know, it’s clear we’re seeing an upward trend. Here and at this point, I would say, really, it’s just a question of when and not if, and it’s also, you know, a question of whether it will come as a result of shareholder resolutions or maybe, eventually, we expect to see a more broadly applicable regulation that would come from the U. S. financial regulators, so the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Naomi Fowler: And like so many of these messes we report on on the Taxcast, things don’t have to be this way.

Zorka Milin: Okay, just imagine a world in which Microsoft had published all of its country by country tax information for all of the relevant years here. You know, maybe they did it voluntarily as, you know, some other companies have actually already been doing for many years, or maybe they did it because of a shareholder resolution that was successful, or maybe they were just following the law, you know, complying with a regulation that required all companies to provide this tax information. So if, whatever the reason, if that information was made public, then Microsoft’s investors would have spotted right away the incredibly striking mismatch that exists between Microsoft’s, you know, pretty insignificant operations in Puerto Rico versus the many billions of dollars in tax profits that the company had booked in Puerto Rico. And that would be a major red flag. And I think that would most likely deter a company like Microsoft from engaging in such very aggressive tax dodging. So in that sense, what I would say you know, tax transparency is like sunshine, as they say, it’s the best disinfectant.

Naomi Fowler: Currently, the situation is that under OECD rules, companies report the nature of some of the actual business they do country by country, But, that system’s really deficient in its current form, as Zorka Milin explains.

Zorka Milin: The OECD regime for country by country reporting, it is somewhat helpful. At least it’s helpful to those tax officials from those governments who can access it. And it’s important to note here that that doesn’t include most global South countries. So, you know, for them, it’s not really helpful at all.

Naomi Fowler: And many poorer nations need it the most because corporate tax is even more important to their tax base than in wealthy countries. And there’s another fundamental problem.

Zorka Milin: The larger point I would make here is that the OECD, it’s not really a transparency regime, I think that’s a misnomer because it’s not public. So, you know, I, I don’t think we can call something that’s not public, I don’t think that’s, that’s real transparency. And so it also means that this is of no use to investors. But, you know, while we’re waiting for regulatory action in the U. S. and maybe also the U. K., we actually already have some good news coming from Australia, we recently received a confirmation from a senior Australian government official from the Australian Treasury, Andrew Leigh:

Naomi Fowler: And here he is. Listen carefully, he’s talking about public country by country reporting. Very different.

Andrew Leigh: Australia is committed to public country by country reporting to hold large multinationals to account when it comes to their tax affairs. Country by country reporting is intended to shift behaviour in the way large multinationals disclose their tax information. It puts the onus on multinationals to be upfront about where they pay tax.

Australia plans to start our public country by country reporting regime on the 1st of July, 2024, aligning with the start date for the European Union’s regime. Our aim is to be world leading in country by country reporting, and we’ve consulted on it earlier this year. There’s broad stakeholder interest, and we’re considering feedback on compliance costs and alignment with other international standards.

We want Australia’s transparency commitments to be measured and targeted. It’s about encouraging a race to the top in business productivity, not a race to the bottom in tax compliance.

Naomi Fowler: This should be good news. We’re cautious because the Australian government was on the point of passing this legislation in its parliament earlier this year with a comfortable majority, but it faced a tidal wave of opposition and lobbying and they delayed it. The OECD, along with many others, lobbied strongly to stop this legislation that would have delivered the biggest breakthrough ever. Ever on the taxes of multinational corporations. That proposed Australian legislation would have affected at least one in five of them around the world and they’d have had to start publicly disclosing their profits and taxes. Zorka Milin again:.

Zorka Milin: Australia plans to start its public, so true transparency, public country or country reporting next year, 2024, and that day, that’s going to be a sea change in corporate tax transparency, and it will have major global impact that goes far beyond just Australia because the scope of the laws is such that it will cover many major multinationals and we also hope that it will cover all of their global operations. So that will be a major moment next year.

Naomi Fowler: It would make such a difference. So let’s hope Australia is now back on track with its commitment to public country by country reporting. I had one last question for journalist Paul Kiel of ProPublica who stuck with the Microsoft story for so long.

In my job where I’m trying to communicate these kind of long term battles that are going on, trying to explain to people some of the things that go on behind closed doors, some things which seem quite boring in some ways, and are not easy to explain or understand. I was just wondering what your take on it was, because you’ve been following this case and cases like this for a long time, such a long historical curve in a case like this. Just wondering about your thoughts on the capacity of media and journalists to reflect to people this type of very important case.

Paul Kiel: Right, right. I mean, it’s, it’s complex and not complex. It’s not complex in the sense that it’s apparent Microsoft did a somewhat ridiculous transaction just to save a lot of taxes. So people can people can get that. I mean, I made an effort, I mean, I was writing my story. I did this big story back in 2020 and that was for a general audience and well, first of all, I think the secrecy around tax administration is one thing that is sort of a hindrance like, it’s just really hard to write about this in a way that’s engaging at all because there’s so little public detail. And the only thing that made it possible for me to write that story was this fight that they had in court of these, of the summon and not only does that make a lot of stuff public that wouldn’t otherwise be public, but also the IRS and the Department of Justice are making arguments to a district court judge who is not a tax judge. And so they’re writing in a way that is geared towards a, you know, a smart lay person as opposed to a tax judge, like if you read pleadings in tax court, I mean, I’ve covered this stuff for a while now, I’m not a tax lawyer. It takes a while to get through, like, what are they even saying here? Right? Cause they’re just throwing statutes around and things like that. So it was only because this kind of rare case spilled into public view that I was able to write, you know, a story that people could follow.

A lot of times it just happens, you see the result. The only reason you see the result is if it’s a public company and they’ll just say like what had happened, but they’re allowed to keep those details quite secret. And that aspect has never really made a lot of sense to me is the public companies that are divulging all sorts of details to investors, but their taxes, they have a lot of leeway and their taxes are secret essentially, their tax return is like sanctified, you can’t know that, but here’s, here’s hundreds of pages of financials about this company. It’s like sort of ridiculous. So I think that is actually another aspect of it is there’s so few stories to tell because everything is secret. So, I mean, the idea is broadly popular of corporations paying more in tax, the rich paying more in tax, but the details are obscure to the point where it’s hard to sort of engage the public on it, I think is one big aspect of it.

Microsoft, it’s a big, complicated case. It’s going to be an appeal, it’s going to be private, it’s going to be outside of the public eye and then if they, if they don’t get, if Microsoft does not get the answer they want in appeals, then they will go to tax court, which is public. And that itself will take more time.

So so, you know, there’s always more to be done and you just have to fund the agency and have them hire capable people. You know, good things can happen.

Our response to the FATF’s consultation on Guidance on Recommendation 25 on beneficial ownership transparency for legal arrangements

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in charge of the Recommendations on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) has opened a consultation on the Guidance to Recommendation 25 on beneficial ownership transparency for legal arrangements (eg trusts). The Tax Justice Network has previously sent written submissions on the reform of Recommendation 25 and published a report showing the widespread use of trust registration around the world. Now, the FATF is inviting feedback on their proposed Guidance to Recommendation 25.

Our response addresses mostly the following questions (summary answers in bold, developed further in our response below):

ii. Are there other potential scenarios concerning beneficiaries that should be included in this Guidance?

Indirect beneficiaries (see more details in section 3.2.1 below).

iv. Are there other additional mechanisms available to ensure access to beneficial ownership information in the context of trusts?

Public access (see more details in section 4 below).

v. What are the suggested approaches to identify, assess, and mitigate the ML/TF risks linked with different types of legal arrangements (trusts governed under domestic law, foreign trusts administered in the country, and foreign trusts having sufficient links with the country)? What trends can be identified?

Demand registration as a precondition for trusts’ legal validity following the examples of Barbados (for purpose trusts), Czechia, France, Puerto Rico or St. Kitts (see more details in section 2 below).

vii. How can countries achieve the obligations on non-professional trustees more effectively?

Apply “constitutive effect registration”, suggesting that the trustee (as registered legal owner of the assets) will be the absolute owner and could defraud the settlor and beneficiaries, unless the trust and all details have been registered (see more details in section 2 of our response).

In conclusion, this Guidance is more comprehensive and ambitious than the actual text of Recommendation 25 which regrettably failed to implement a registry approach for trusts[1] (by requiring trusts to register their beneficial owners with a government authority). There are positive aspects mentioned by the Guidance that the Tax Justice Network has been warning[2] about for years, especially the risks of trusts’ asset protection, flexibility and lack of registration, or cases of trusts “declarative” registration (where lack of registration doesn’t affect the trust’s legal validity). The best solution in this regard is to consider as a “best practice” that trust registration should  have a “constitutive effect” (where rights and legal validity start only after registration). Many countries already require registration for the trust’s validity, including Barbados (for purpose trusts), Czechia, France, Puerto Rico or St. Kitts (see the legal sources here[3]).

As for needed improvements, the Guidance should reinforce Section 5.2 on the registry approach by including as “best practice” the findings[4] that more than 120 countries already have some type of trust registration, including 65 jurisdictions which require some trusts to register their beneficial owners. More importantly, the Guidance fails to mention public access, even though some countries already offer free online public access to trusts’ beneficial owners. The Guidance should also review its language for possibly unintended meanings, as it currently appears to condone or even promote tax abuse (“tax minimisation, estate planning”) or fraud relating to creditors (“asset protection”). The Guidance should also clarify that private foundations are always legal persons subject to Recommendation 24 (and thus must follow the registry approach), even if the beneficial ownership definition that applies to these foundations resembles that of trusts, so that all parties to the foundation are registered. Finally, the Guidance should adopt as “best practices” more effective measures against discretionary trusts, expand beneficiaries to cover indirect distributions, and finally discourage complex structures by requiring that beneficial ownership rules should not apply thresholds whenever a party to the trust is a legal person.

The Tax Justice Network’s response

1. Trust registration: describe number of countries with trust registration

The Guidance Section 5.2 refers to the option of implementing the registry approach (ie trust registration with a government authority). It is relevant to include in this section, as a “best practice” the findings of the Tax Justice Network’s report[5] on trust registration: more than 120 jurisdictions already require some trusts to register with a government authority, 65 of which also require beneficial ownership information to be disclosed. In addition, while the Guidance refers to the obligation of the trustee to report information (paragraph 125), countries like Argentina have imposed that obligation on all parties to the trust.[6]

We welcome that the Guidance acknowledges that the lack of registration has many negative effects, such as not knowing how many trusts exist or determining their beneficial owners. Countries are therefore able to export their secrecy, by allowing trusts to be created according to their laws, but having no information about these trusts. Another major risk that the Guidance should include, is the risk to falsify or backdate documents, eg the trust deed or distributions, as these don’t need to be registered (as described by Australia’s tax authority[7]).

In relation to foreign law trusts with a link to a country (paragraphs 71-74), the Guidance could mention as a “best practice” that countries could expand registration triggers beyond having a local trustee. The Guidance could mention  as a “best practice” the example of the EU, which requires registration when a trust acquires real estate or establishes business relations, although this should be expanded to cases where a trust has any interest in an entity or asset in the country. Another relevant example is Argentina[8], which requires trusts to be registered whenever any of its parties (not just the trustee) are located in Argentina.

The Guidance should describe as “best practice” all the countries that already have trust registration. Based on the Tax Justice Network’s Roadmap to Effective Beneficial Ownership Transparency (REBOT)[9], the Guidance should encourage countries as “best practice” to register trusts whenever they are created according to local laws, or when foreign trusts have assets, operations or parties located in the country in question.

2. Effect of registration: require constitutive effect where registration is a pre-condition for the trust’s legal validity

To make registration truly effective, especially in relation to local trusts that have foreign assets and parties, the Tax Justice Network has been advocating for a “constitutive effect”[10] for registration (where rights exist only after registration, while unregistered documents are legally worthless). The Guidance should propose as “best practice” to establish trust registration as a pre-condition for trust validity. Many countries already require registration for the trust’s validity, including Barbados (for purpose trusts), Czechia, France, Puerto Rico or St. Kitts (see the legal sources here[11]).

This way the country providing the source of law would be able to identify all its local trusts, even if all parties and assets are held abroad. In fact, many countries[12] already require all of their local trusts to be registered.

We welcome the Guidance recognising that enforcement may be impossible unless registration is a pre-condition for the trust’s validity:

In the absence of registration requirements for express trusts and similar legal arrangements governed under a country’s law and where failure to comply with such registration requirements would lead to the failure of the trust, a country may find it difficult to establish the extent to which there is foreign use of trusts governed under its law.” (paragraph 78).

A “constitutive effect” approach would also incentivise accuracy and updating of information (addressed by the Guidance’s section 4.3 and 4.4). The effect would be that beneficiaries wouldn’t be entitled to receive a distribution, unless they are pre-registered. Likewise, an unregistered protector or trustee would be unable to make decisions, or veto measures.

This “constitutive effect” would also work to incentivise registration of non-professional trustees. The “constitutive effect” not only encourages trustees or protectors to register for them to be able to make valid decisions (such as investing in securities or purchasing assets on behalf of the trust.) It does more than that: settlors (the original owners of the assets settled into the trust) will also have the incentive to ensure that the trustee registers as “trustee” (disclosing their status as trustee, meaning as a mere “legal owner” of the trust assets).

When the trustee registers “as trustee”, the constitutive effect will have the effect of allowing the trustee to administer the trust’s assets, but also to prevent the trustee from stealing the assets (eg by disposing of them for their own benefit, against the settlor’s wishes). This protection would take place if the trustee disclosed: “I’m John Smith, I’m the trustee of trust X. I’m the legal owner of this house but as trustee of trust X. In reality this house belongs to the trust”. By contrast, if the settlor doesn’t demand that the trustee registers as “trustee”, and instead the trustee is registered as the owner of the assets without any reference to a trust (eg “I’m John Smith, the owner of this house”), then the constitutive effect would result in the law regarding the trustee as the real and absolute owner of the assets settled into the trust – allowing the trustee to keep the assets for themselves, and thus defrauding the settlor and beneficiaries. In this example, the trust deed, being unregistered, would have no legal validity. In conclusion, the constitutive effect encourages all parties to tell the truth to obtain protection of the law. The Guidance should mention as “best practice” that countries could establish “constitutive effect” for the registration of trusts.

3.1 Trust parties to be registered

3.1 Settlors

We welcome that the Guidance (paragraph 25) distinguishes between the legal settlor (a nominee) who appears on the trust deed and the economic settlor (the real but hidden settlor). As ways to identify the economic settlor the Guidance should propose as “best practice” the following. First, whenever authorities become aware of a settlor being just a nominee (legal settlor), they should ask them to reveal the identity of the real economic settlor. Second, authorities should use information on any identified nominee settlor to look for other trusts that this person may be associated with. This could reveal all other trusts where a nominee is potentially being used to hide the real settlor. Third, to detect legal settlors (nominees), the Guidance should require authorities/obliged entities to always obtain information on the transfer of assets to the trust, such as the originating account holder who transferred money to the trust, or details of the previous registered owner of any real estate settled into the trust.

3.2 Beneficiaries

3.2.1 Indirect beneficiaries

Indirect beneficiaries involve schemes where persons can avoid being identified as beneficiaries of a trust but still receive distributions, by masking these distributions as trust expenses (eg paying a person’s credit card or tuition fees as if they were real trust expenses). The Guidance fails to include the requirement to identify “indirect beneficiaries” as beneficial owners, meaning those persons who received disguised indirect distributions. The Guidance could directly refer as “best practice” to the 2022 amendments[13] to the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) on automatic exchange of information, which incorporated indirect beneficiaries:

Indirect distributions by a trust may arise when the trust makes payments to a third party for the benefit of another person. For example, instances where a trust pays the tuition fees or repays a loan taken up by another person are to be considered indirect distributions by the trust. Indirect distributions also include cases where the trust grants a loan free of interest or at an interest rate lower than the market interest rate or at other non-arm’s length conditions. In addition, the write-off of a loan granted by a trust to its beneficiary constitutes an indirect distribution in the year the loan is written-off. In all of the above cases the Reportable Person will be person that is the beneficiary of the trust receiving the indirect distribution” (p. 94)

The Guidance could include as “best practice” that indirect beneficiaries should also include any individual with a right to, or who actively uses or enjoys, the trust assets, such as a house, yacht or private jet that is settled into the trust.

3.2.2 Discretionary beneficiaries (“Object of power”)

The Guidance effectively rewards complexity by allowing beneficiaries of discretionary trusts not to be registered or identified until the time when they receive a distribution (paragraphs 46, 90). This benefit can be exploited to prevent any registration, given that it may be impossible to find out that a distribution has taken place, especially if it refers to an indirect distribution (see above). It would make more sense to mitigate the risks associated with the complexity of discretionary trusts by requiring as “best practice” that all potential beneficiaries to be pre-identified and registered, both as a way to hold information on all potential beneficiaries and to discourage discretionary trusts altogether.

By discouraging, or directly prohibiting the existence of discretionary trusts, trusts would be treated similar to companies. Companies allow shareholders, directors and other parties to change, but these changes must be registered. As “best practice”, the same should apply to trusts to ensure authorities will always hold information on trusts’ beneficiaries. To enforce this, as proposed above, registration should be considered to have constitutive effect (meaning that rights, eg to receive a distribution) only exist upon registration. As “best practice”, any distribution to an unregistered beneficiary would be considered as a breach of the trust, somewhat equivalent to a company paying dividends to individuals who aren’t shareholders.

By the same token, another best practice is that letters of wishes or any other trust documents with instructions for the trustee should be considered as having no legal validity (and therefore being unenforceable) unless they have been registered with authorities.

3.2.3 Complex structures: legal persons as parties to a trust result in increased secrecy

The Guidance refers to cases where a legal person acts as a party to the trust, eg a corporate trustee or beneficiary (eg paragraphs 23, 89). In such cases, the Guidance (paragraph 84) merely suggests applying the corresponding beneficial ownership rules that apply to legal persons.

As described in our paper on complex ownership structures[14], while beneficial ownership rules for trusts don’t apply thresholds, by adding an entity as a party to the trust and applying the corresponding rules for legal persons, thresholds can de facto be applied in trusts. As we had warned (and as illustrated in the next figure), this could allow the real parties to a trust (or a similar structure, like a private-interest foundation) to avoid registration.

Figure. De facto application of thresholds to trusts’ beneficial owners

This is precisely what happened in an investigation on Russian oligarchs, as described by the BBC[15]:

The ownership of Biniatta could be structured using a Seychelles foundation with five nominee councillors ‘so as to not declare a controlling person’. This would give the appearance that no one person had control over 25% of the company, the threshold under UK law for the requirement to name a person of significant control. Biniatta followed the advice and no person of significant control was declared.”

For this reason, in case a party to the trust is a legal person, the Guidance should mention as “best practice” that beneficial owners of that legal person should be identified without applying thresholds (anyone with at least one share, voting right or right to dividends should be identified as a beneficial owner of the corporate-trust-party).

3.2.4 Same beneficial ownership definition for foundations.

We welcome that the Guidance refers to the similarities between foundations and trusts (paragraph 21). However, the Guidance should also clarify that private foundations are always legal persons subject to Recommendation 24 (and thus must follow the registry approach), even if the beneficial ownership definition that applies to these foundations resembles that of trusts, so that all parties to the foundation are registered. The Guidance should mention as “best practice” the EU anti-money laundering Directive which establishes precisely this: legal persons (including foundations) are subject to beneficial ownership registration, but the beneficial ownership definition of trusts applies to foundations..

4. Access to information

The Guidance’s section on access to information (Section 5.5) refers only to access by competent authorities and by obliged entities (eg financial institutions). However, the Guidance should mention as “best practice”, or at least as an option, that there is widespread legal practice going beyond this level of access. Many countries allow direct public access to full beneficial ownership (Denmark or Ecuador), access to the parties to the trust when the trust is involved in real estate (eg Panama) or to some trust information (eg Singapore)[16]. Another option the Guidance should mention is to enable public access based on legitimate interest (eg the EU anti-money laundering directive of 2018, known as AMLD 5).

Figure. Denmark’s public registry

Figure. Ecuador’s public registry

It is not clear why the Guidance fails to mention those cases. It should include these other examples of public access alongside the current reference to more restricted access.

5. Acknowledgement of trusts’ risks

5.1 The privacy nature of trusts (ie their secrecy) makes them vulnerable to misuse.

We welcome the fact that the Guidance describes that the secrecy surrounding trusts makes them vulnerable to misuse (paragraph 52).

5.2 Trusts’ flexibility and asset protection are abused in many money laundering cases.

We welcome the fact that the Guidance acknowledges (paragraphs 57-58) that trusts’ flexibility and asset protection can be abused for money laundering and other cases. The Guidance explicitly mentions the ability to shield assets from creditors (what we call the “ownerless limbo”[17]), the possibility to change names of beneficiaries, or for the settlor to retain control. However, the Guidance should also mention the worst risks of all: the possibility of the trustee to have “discretion”. After all, all legal vehicles allow changes. The shareholders and directors of a company can also change over time. The main difference is that in a discretionary trust the change can happen based purely at the trustee’s discretion without anyone being alerted (without even needing to amend the trust deed).

For this reason, the Guidance could propose as “best practice” that discretionary trusts should be outlawed (see section 3.2.2 above). Changes should only become enforceable and legally valid only upon registering the new beneficiaries or trustees with government authorities.

5.3 Abusive trust regimes

We welcome that the Guidance (paragraphs 61-62) also describes other abusive features that we have written about in our review of some of the most abusive trust jurisdictions[18]. For instance, the limitation of the time to initiate anti-fraud actions, the application of criminal burden of proof (“beyond reasonable doubt”), as well as the non-recognition of foreign laws and judgements. In addition to warning about these features, the Guidance could propose as “best practice” that these jurisdictions offering abusive legal frameworks should be considered high-risk by countries (eg add them to the national tax haven list). Alternatively, countries could disregard or invalidate any trust created according to the laws of these jurisdictions.

6. Understatement of trusts’ abusive purposes

The terminology used in the Guidance (eg page 3 and Annex) often appears to resemble that of enablers rather than an international organisation fighting anti-money laundering, especially the euphemisms for tax abuse practices (some of which would constitute a predicate offense for money laundering). The most acute cases of these are discussed below.

6.1 Describing trusts as a mere “relationship” (as opposed to an “entity”) supports trusts’ secrecy

The Guidance reads “[i]t is important to bear in mind that trusts are not a type of legal entity or corporate vehicle but a relationship between the principal parties to such arrangement.” (p. 3). However, unlike the relationships between parents and children, or parties to a commercial contract, eg to paint a house, this “trust relationship” has effects identical to a legal entity – which the Guidance acknowledges. Trusts are usually assigned a tax identification number for the trust (like any company) to pay taxes, and trusts (as an entity) can open bank accounts. Very importantly from a justice perspective, the assets held in the trust are separate from the parties to the trust (settlor, trustee, beneficiary) and in principle cannot be reached by their creditors, even if they are held under the trustee’s name. This is similar to a company benefiting from separation of assets and the shareholder benefitting from limited liability. Even an EU Court of Justice ruling in 2017 described that trusts are in essence an “entity”.[19]

For this reason, the Guidance should warn that although trusts are often viewed as relationships or legal arrangements (as opposed to legal persons), the legal effects of their creation (eg separation of assets, and their complex control and benefit structures) can be similar to, or even riskier than those of, legal persons.

6.2 “Asset protection”, “tax planning and optimisation”, “estate planning”

The Guidance describes as “purposes” for trusts (page 4 and Annex) a mix of legitimate and illegitimate goals. It could be true that most trusts engage in legal and legitimate endeavours, although the lack of registration prevents us from knowing how many trusts exist in the world and to assess their legitimacy. Trusts have been abused[20] many times to engage in tax evasion[21] and avoidance as well as to defraud creditors[22] or circumvent sanctions[23] and prevent asset recovery (using the “asset protection” features of trusts). However, the Guidance uses terminology used by professional enablers[24], such as “tax planning, estate planning”, that have served as euphemisms for tax abuses and fraud. “Asset protection” is defended by the Guidance as a way to protect assets against outsiders, although many times it is abused to defraud creditors (including former spouses in divorce proceedings) because trusts’ asset protection can shield assets beyond the protection of private property or even beyond the protection of limited liability that applies to most legal persons.

For this reason, instead of referring to “tax and estate planning” or “asset protection”, the Guidance should refer to, or at least also mention, the risks of tax evasion, tax avoidance and fraud against legitimate creditors.

6.3 Charitable trusts

We welcome the Guidance’s Box 2.1 on charitable trusts that warns that,

while pursuing public good objectives sets charitable trusts (and similar legal arrangements such as Waqf) apart from other types of trusts, it is not possible to conclude in absolute terms that they present a lower risk. Indeed, some of their features may create an enhanced risk of misuse for ML/TF.”

We believe that this is the right approach, rather than to follow positions mentioned in the public call of November 27 which suggested that charitable trusts present less risks or that there should be different registration requirements based on the types of trusts. We welcome the Guidance’s warning that charitable trusts can also be abused and should not be subject to any less transparency requirements.

To support this box, there are two warnings that the Guidance could add. For instance, the largest tax evasion case against an individual in the US involved the tax evader renaming his trusts as “charitable” to confuse authorities on the real purpose of those trusts[25]. In other cases, charitable trusts or foundations may include many legitimate beneficiaries (eg the Red Cross or Unicef) to prove that they are “charitable” although no distribution in favour of these legitimate beneficiaries actually takes place, as happened in the case of Northern Rock bank’s trust in favour of Down Syndrome North East[26]. Instead, the capital is concentrated in the trust, undistributed, or de facto distributions are made in form of indirect distributions or salaries.



[1] https://taxjustice.net/2022/07/28/reforms-to-fatf-recommendation-25-should-reflect-fact-not-fiction/

[2] https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Trusts-Weapons-of-Mass-Injustice-Final-12-FEB-2017.pdf

[3] See page 7 in: https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Trusts-FATF-R-25-1.pdf

[4] https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Trusts-FATF-R-25-1.pdf

[5] https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Trusts-FATF-R-25-1.pdf

[6] Art. 1.c of Resolution AFIP 3312/2012 as amended: https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/195000-199999/196461/texact.htm

[7] https://www.ato.gov.au/about-ato/research-and-statistics/in-detail/general-research/current-issues-with-trusts-and-the-tax-system/

[8] Art. 1.c of Resolution AFIP 3312/2012 as amended: https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/195000-199999/196461/texact.htm

[9] https://taxjustice.net/2023/02/07/roadmap-to-effective-beneficial-ownership-transparency-rebot/

[10] https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Trusts-Weapons-of-Mass-Injustice-Final-12-FEB-2017.pdf

[11] See page 7 in: https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Trusts-FATF-R-25-1.pdf

[12] https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Trusts-FATF-R-25-1.pdf

[13] https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/crypto-asset-reporting-framework-and-amendments-to-the-common-reporting-standard.pdf

[14] https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Complex-ownership-chains-Reduced-Andres-Knobel-MB-AK.pdf

[15] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67276289

[16] See more details on pages 25-31 here: https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Trusts-FATF-R-25-1.pdf

[17] https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Trusts-Weapons-of-Mass-Injustice-Final-12-FEB-2017.pdf

[18] https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Trusts-Weapons-of-Mass-Injustice-Final-12-FEB-2017.pdf

[19] ECJ 646-15, where the ruling described: “That concept of ‘other legal persons’ extends to an entity which, under national law, possesses rights and obligations that enable it to act in its own right within the legal order concerned, notwithstanding the absence of a particular legal form, and which is profit-making. In this case… under the national law concerned, the assets placed in trust form a separate fund of property, distinct from the property of the trustees, and that the trustees have the right and the obligation to manage those assets and to dispose of them in accordance with the conditions laid down in the trust instrument and in national law. (…) That being the case, such a trust should be considered to be an entity which, under national law, possesses rights and obligations that enable it to act as such within the legal order concerned.”

[20] https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Trusts-Weapons-of-Mass-Injustice-Final-12-FEB-2017.pdf

[21] https://taxjustice.net/2020/08/13/judge-ruling-you-are-no-mother-teresa-and-no-one-goes-to-cayman-for-philanthropic-reasons/

[22] https://taxjustice.net/2017/11/08/enough-evidence-trusts-states-actions/

[23] https://taxjustice.net/2022/03/31/no-trusts-are-not-impenetrable-shields-for-oligarchs-assets-here-is-how-to-pierce-them/

[24] https://www.oecd.org/tax/crime/ending-the-shell-game-cracking-down-on-the-professionals-who-enable-tax-and-white-collar-crime.pdf

[25] https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1327921/download

[26] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/nov/28/northernrock.subprimecrisis

How might today’s vote on the UN tax resolution go?

Today sees the vote by countries of the world on a resolution to move ahead towards a UN tax convention. Amongst the global media coverage, one article stood out. More or less all coverage reflects on the continuing opposition of some major OECD countries including the EU, UK and US, and focuses on the potential for a majority vote if the resolution is broadly supported by G77 members. The Guardian article instead claims that the resolution “is expected to fall at the last hurdle in a vote in New York on Wednesday”, because, it says, it “would need widespread agreement, including by the US and rich nations in Europe.”

This is not factually the case. A majority vote for the resolution could be delivered from G77 members alone, regardless of the stance of OECD members. However, it is true that OECD members have been successful in past cases (eg on debt negotiations) in preventing any movement simply by boycotting a process agreed by majority rather than by consensus. And it is notable that last year’s resolution  on “Promotion of Inclusive and Effective Tax Cooperation at the United Nations” (A/RES/77/244) passed by consensus, with all countries agreeing not to require a vote.

But the precedent of OECD country boycotts does not imply, in this case, that the process would end – far from it. There are also precedents, such as on a recent digital governance resolution, of OECD countries opposing a resolution but then joining a process. In the case of the negotiations of a UN tax convention, there are three reasons to expect progress to follow from a majority vote.

First, the broad exclusion of most G77 countries from OECD processes means that there are multiple areas of tax cooperation that can be fruitfully negotiated among these UN member states alone. This includes, for example, possible agreement on automatic information exchange about financial accounts; on higher standards of beneficial ownership transparency, and on requiring public country by country reporting from multinational corporations operating in their jurisdictions.

In addition, G77 countries could move ahead with the creation of a framework for future negotiation of tax rules. And this is the second reason why OECD members are unlikely to boycott in practice. It was the simple threat of a few countries introducing digital sales taxes that led the affected, small group of US multinationals to force the US Treasury back to the negotiating table at the OECD, and produced the ‘BEPS 2.0’ process which has been running for 5 years now. If G77 countries were to begin negotiating a version of the G-24 proposal to abandon arm’s length pricing and move to a unitary taxation approach, with dramatic effects for the scale of profit shifting that could be achieved, the collective multinationals of the OECD would surely demand that their headquarters countries take a full part in the discussions.

Lastly, it is notable that the Africa Group resolution is carefully designed in this regard. Rather than launch straight into formal negotiations, the resolution envisages the creation of an inclusive, intergovernmental committee to set the terms of reference by August 2024. That process allows any country that opposed the resolution the opportunity to understand better what is on potentially on the table, and to assess whether their interests are better served by participating or boycotting. Given that OECD members suffer the great majority of the global revenue losses due to corporate tax abuse, the value of joining constructively at the outset may well be clear – both to OECD governments and their electorates.

What can we expect in the vote? First, there will be a number of amendments to vote upon before the final resolution.

It is now known that the UK has tabled amendments to remove all reference to a framework convention. Were these adopted, the UN membership would be agreeing to begin negotiations on establishing a non-binding framework for future discussions on tax. The UK and EU have pushed this option insistently throughout the current process. Neither has been able to countenance entering into negotiations with the possibility of a legally-binding outcome on the table – that is, to make the question of whether the instrument being negotiated is a framework or a framework convention, a part of the negotiations itself. Leaving the exact instrument being negotiated to be part of the negotiations is not at all uncommon, and this blinkered refusal from the UK and EU has been a major obstacle to consensus.

There may be additional amendments at the last minute, from the EU or others. Last year for example, the US tabled a wrecking amendment that would have removed almost all substantive content from the Africa Group’s proposal – but when it was roundly defeated, the US and all others joined the consensus on the original resolution.

This year, it is rumoured that the US will insist on putting the whole resolution to a vote (with or without any agreed amendments). At this stage, it is of course difficult to predict the outcome. We cannot know how much pressure the US, EU and UK are putting on G77 members to abandon their support for the Africa Group – although it is known to be substantial. In addition, the OECD has been lobbying intensely both for the blockers to stand firm in opposition, and for newer members that are also G77 members – including Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico – to distance themselves.

Nonetheless, there is quiet confidence that the G77 will bring broad support to bear. While there are likely to be evident exceptions such as Singapore (ranked in the top ten of the Corporate Tax Haven Index), the indications of support from across the world are growing. The desire of countries to have their voice heard on these issues is increasingly clear. The African Union has issued an explicit call for countries to vote with it.

And so the most likely outcome, at this point, seems to be the rejection of amendments to water down the Africa Group’s resolution; followed by a majority vote in favour, with a number of OECD countries in opposition.

That would leave the non-trivial matter of agreeing a budget at the UNGA 5th Committee in December – where the blockers might try again, by aiming to starve the process of funds. But the budget required for the next stage is set at less than $US2m, and at that point will surely be found in one way or another.

And so a majority vote later today will be enough for the world to enter into the entirely unprecedented process of genuinely, globally inclusive decision-making over international tax rules.

New Tax Justice Policy Tracker makes it easy to monitor progress towards a UN Tax Convention and beyond

This year marks 20 years of research and investigation by the Tax Justice Network into all things tax havens and financial secrecy. Providing reliable, consistent research on these issues has always been a core part of our mission and that research has empowered us, as well as others, to uncover and tell powerful stories that drive social change.  

As explained in our new strategic framework launched this year, we believe there are 9 key policies that can be used to reprogramme our tax systems to work for everyone, not just the superrich. These policies include automatic exchange of information between countries; transparency of beneficial ownership information; public country by country reporting; disclosure of sufficient public data; enforcement by well-resourced and operationally independent tax authorities; good taxes encompassing a progressive and effective overall tax system; a global asset register; unitary tax – and a global tax convention under auspices of the UN.  

Our new Policy Tracker is a long-term project that makes it possible to explore which countries are leading the way, and which are blocking change for the 9 policies mentioned above. It is a tool whose power lies in collaboration, as it aims to become a mechanism for gathering information that would otherwise remain dispersed among many actors. We are kicking off the beta-version of the tracker with one live-tracked policy, a UN tax convention, because this is the critical question facing policymakers internationally today. The next modules will be incorporated gradually in the coming years.  

Data as a strategic asset for change 

We believe that data is a strategic asset. But for it to be optimally useful, it needs to be available in a format that makes it easy to digest and understand.  

It is against this background that the Policy Tracker has been developed, making data and insights more accessible to researchers and campaigners across the globe.  

The tracker includes tools such as insight cards, country maps and global progress calendars, which offer user-friendly ways to keep up to date with developments in these key policies. 

It can be easy to feel overwhelmed when we are faced with topics that are important, complex and fast-moving – and all of this at a global scale. The Tax Justice Policy Tracker aims to change that.  

What the Policy Tracker does 

http://policytracker.taxjustice.net/The Tax Justice Policy Tracker monitors and promotes progress on nine key policies that can reprogramme our tax systems to treat the needs of all members of society as equally important. The tracker will grade each country’s laws on how well the country is implementing each of the nine policies, helping governments spot where they can improve. Just like in school, grades go from A to F, where A+ means a country is fully and effectively implementing the policy and F means it’s failed it. The tracker also reports each country’s public position on each policy. Positions go from Leader, Supporter, Partial Supporter, Opposer to Blocker. 

We know that scoring methodologies to track these policies involve complex decisions. Some of them will require dynamic assessments that change over time as they move towards universal acceptance and progressive implementation. That is why we want to co-design these methodologies together with the tax justice movement and other interested partners. As the tracker develops, ex ante and ex post mechanisms to provide feedback on these methodologies will be made available on the Policy Tracker’s website. 

Over time, the Policy Tracker will include updates on developments in respect of public country by country reporting (potentially in the first quarter of 2024); the automatic exchange of information by the fourth quarter of 2024; beneficial ownership transparency in 2025; and for the other policies covered by our strategic framework some time thereafter.  

Where the data comes from

The Tax Justice Policy Tracker will use a set of questions to evaluate over 200 countries and territories on the tracked policies. Answers to the questions determine countries’ grades and positions. Answers are based on data that is regularly collected and verified by researchers and experts from the wider global tax justice movement, including the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index and Corporate Tax Haven Index. 
 
Crowdsourcing support from the public helps us respond faster to regulatory changes. If you think an answer to a question on the tracker should be updated with new data, please contact us

Using the Policy Tracker for status updates on the UN tax convention 

Importantly, this first iteration of the Policy Tracker allows you to easily track the status of the proposed UN tax convention: it tracks which countries are blocking the proposal, and who supports it; how this differs across regions; and what you need to know about the most recent and upcoming events. And perhaps most importantly: it is tracked and updated live. 

This is important: One of the major policies the Tax Justice Network has long advocated for, is moving global tax policy development and oversight to the United Nations. It’s advocacy work that has paid off: there was full consensus at last year’s United Nations General Assembly to begin intergovernmental discussions on a new framework for international tax cooperation. The resolution also mandated the UN Secretary-General to produce a report identifying the main options for member states. The report was the subject of a high-level debate at the General Assembly last month, where strong support for progress was expressed, and emerging consensus points towards a legally-binding framework convention on tax.  

While the Tax Justice Network has been engaged with the need for a UN-driven tax convention for many years, we know that the topic may be new to many. For this reason, the Policy Tracker also includes a high-level timeline, that explains how the conversation has progressed since 2001, when a UN panel first called for the creation of an international tax organisation. 

This week, countries will be voting at the UN on what may be the biggest shakeup of international tax rules in history (you can follow the latest developments on our live blog). It’s important: a framework convention on tax can deliver binding protocols on key policy areas to curb tax abuse, and also establish a globally inclusive body under UN auspices to set rules in future. On the line is nearly $5 trillion of public money that countries are expected to lose to tax havens over the next 10 years. (You can read more about this in our blog on why the world needs UN leadership on global tax policy.) 

The Policy Tracker reports countries’ positions based on public statements and public actions they make. The policy evaluation framework is available here. According to this framework, the majority of countries (60%) have publicly voiced their support in favour of a UN-led tax convention (116 out of 193 UN Members). Only 56 of the world’s nations (so, 23 per cent) are opposing the move; while 22 have not yet publicly expressed a position. The Policy Tracker makes it easy to identify which countries our respective advocacy efforts should be focusing on: by engaging with the governments of those countries who are blocking the move, along with those countries who have not yet expressed a public opinion (see the full country database here). 

Since the Tax Justice Policy Tracker basis its assessment of countries’ positions on statements and actions that are public, the positions taken in private negotiations are not reflected. However, the latest information available from these negotiations suggests that the number of opposing voices is shrinking. 

Over time, once the vote at the UN has been finalised, the Policy Tracker will continue to track progress with the convention itself. We encourage all interested parties to provide their suggestions and feedback on how to continue the tracking process in a possible new phase of negotiations. 

How will you use the tracker? 

The Tax Justice Policy Tracker complements the Tax Justice Network’s other tools for reprogramming the tax system, which include the Illicit Financial Flows Vulnerability Tracker, the Financial Secrecy Index, the Corporate Tax Haven Index, and our Data Portal. 

We know that there are a multitude of insights and compelling narratives that can be developed using our new Policy Tracker. Moreover, we are encouraged to see how in this short period of time the tracker is starting to be used for advancing evidence-led advocacy strategies. Just as with our new Data Portal, we’d love to hear what you learn from the Policy Tracker, and what you’ve done with it!  

You can access the Policy Tracker here.  

#55 Tous pour une Convention Fiscale Internationale des Nations Unies

Welcome to our monthly podcast in French, Impôts et Justice Sociale with Idriss Linge of the Tax Justice Network. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages every month in EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here and on most podcast apps. Here’s our latest episode:

Dans ce 55ème épisode de votre podcast francophone sur la justice fiscale en Afrique et dans le monde, nous revenons sur le processus en cours pour l’adoption d’une Convention Fiscale Internationale sous l’égide des Nations Unies. Nous explorons également la connexion entre la justice fiscale et la finance climatique, en s’appuyant sur l’expérience de Tax Justice Network – Africa, en collaboration avec Tax Justice Network, et sur un projet de la Fondation Africaine pour le Climat. Ce projet a permis d’examiner la problématique à travers le prisme de deux pays africains : la Tanzanie et le Mozambique.

Comme invité de ce podcast, nous accueillons :

Jean Mballa Mballa, Directeur exécutif du CRADEC et membre du Conseil de TJN-A.

55 Tous pour une Convention Fiscale Internationale des Nations Unies

Vous pouvez suivre le Podcast sur:

30 uses for beneficial ownership (beyond anti-money laundering)

The EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) amended in 2018, known as AMLD 5, required EU members to establish public access to beneficial ownership information for legal persons incorporated in the EU. However, on 22 November 2022 the European Court of Justice invalidated public access to beneficial ownership information of local legal persons. The court ruled it was not proven that any member of the public needs access to information for the purposes of combatting money laundering. 

To show that beneficial ownership information is relevant beyond the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and to support many EU countries that have rightly kept their beneficial ownership registries open to the public despite the infamous ruling, we’ve prepared a briefing on more than 30 different uses that government authorities, businesses, consumers, CSOs, journalists and other stakeholders can have for beneficial ownership information. 

This document explains each of the uses and offers a real-life example of when beneficial ownership information was, or would have been relevant, to address each of the uses. 

The document covers:  

If you can think of more uses for beneficial ownership information to support a whole-government approach (where all authorities and stakeholders use and access beneficial ownership information) please contact Andres at [email protected]  

20 años de la red de justicia fiscal: November 2023 Spanish language tax justice podcast, Justicia ImPositiva

Welcome to our Spanish language podcast and radio programme Justicia ImPositiva with Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez, free to download and broadcast on radio networks across Latin America and Spain. ¡Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a nuestro podcast y programa radiofónico! Escuche por su app de podcast. (All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.)

En este programa con Marcelo Justo y Marta Nuñez:

INVITADXS

~ 20 años de la red de justicia fiscal

Enlace de descarga para las emisoras: https://traffic.libsyn.com/j-impositiva/JUSTICIA_IMPOSITIVA_NOVIEMBRE_23_para_NAOMI.mp3

Subscribase a nuestro RSS feed: http://j_impositiva.libsyn.com/rss

O envien un correo electronico a Naomi [@] taxjustice.net para ser
incorporado a nuestra lista de suscriptores.

Sigannos por twitter en http://www.twitter.com/J_ImPositiva

Estamos en facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Justicia-ImPositiva-1464800660510982/

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast #71: نحو ميثاق ضريبي ملزم تقوده الأمم المتحدة

Welcome to the 71st edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available on most podcast apps. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can follow the programme on Facebook, on Twitter and on our website. All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.

في العدد #71 من بودكاست الجباية ببساطة يناقش وليد بن رحومة ومعدة البودكاست نورهان شريف آخر التطورات في إتفاقية الأمم المتحدة الضريبية على ضوء مشروع القرار المنشور حديثا.


In issue #71 of the “Taxes Simply” podcast, Walid Ben Rhouma and Nourhan Sharif discuss the latest developments in the United Nations Tax Convention in light of the recently published draft resolution.

تابعونا على صفحتنا على الفايسبوك وتويتر  https://www.facebook.com/ TaxesSimply Tweets by taxes_simply

Como impostos podem promover reparação: the Tax Justice Network Portuguese podcast #54

Welcome to our monthly podcast in Portuguese, É da sua conta (‘it’s your business’) produced and hosted by Grazielle David and Daniela Stefano. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages – EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. Here’s the latest episode:

Diversas gerações de mulheres, homens e crianças que deveriam ser livres foram ilegalmente escravizadas. Os sistemas financeiro e tributário brasileiros foram alguns dos que se beneficiaram deste crime contra a humanidade.

O tráfico ilegal de pessoas no século 19 segue presente na forma de consequências nas vida das pessoas descendentes daquelas que foram escravizadas.

Como os sistema financeiro e tributário podem contribuir para a fundamental reparação? Este é o tema do episódio #54 do É da Sua Conta.

“ Da mesma maneira que a gente fala que o Banco do Brasil teve acionistas e diretores traficantes, a gente pode falar de famílias envolvidas na política, que são famílias de fazendeiros e detentores de pessoas escravizadas e não só fazendeiros, mas também traficantes: os maiores eram fazendeiros e traficantes. A ideia é pensar a escravização como algo que não acabou; está na estrutura do sistema”.
~ Beatriz Mamigonian, professora da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

“É importante criar uma situação em que haja um conjunto de reparações que possam ser consideradas justas do ponto de vista simbólico, de memória e de verdade, mas também do ponto de vista da compensação monetária e financeira sobre esse tema.”
~ Júlio Araújo, procurador da República

“Remediar, especialmente quando se trata da forma como a economia mundial está configurada, da sua governança e dos seus mecanismos de elaboração de regras, deveria significar que os ex-países colonizados, que são também os países que estão lutando com o próprio desenvolvimento, teriam mais controle sobre como desenvolver e gerenciar os mecanismos que cercam suas economias.
~ Priya Lukka, macroeconomista

“A  primeira coisa que precisamos fazer é impedir que a escala da riqueza extraída do Sul para o Norte aumente ainda mais. Parar com isso agora parece cumprir o tipo de agenda de justiça fiscal com a tributação unitária e todas as diferentes medidas em torno da transparência.”
~ Alex Cobham, Tax Justice Network

Participantes:

Como impostos podem promover reparação

Saiba mais:

Episódios Relacionados

É da sua conta é o podcast mensal em português da Tax Justice Network. Coordenação: Naomi Fowler. Dublagens: Cecília Figueiredo e Zema Ribeiro. Produção e apresentação: Daniela Stefano e Grazielle David. Download gratuito. Reprodução livre para rádios.

Drug War Myths, part 2: the Tax Justice Network podcast, the Taxcast

Welcome to the latest episode of the Tax Justice Network’s monthly podcast, the Taxcast. You can subscribe either by emailing naomi [at] taxjustice.net or find us on your podcast app. All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. In this edition of the Taxcast:

The US government has spent an estimated $1 trillion on their ‘war on drugs.’ But, over 50 years later, the cross-border flows of illegal drugs, arms and money have increased. In the second part of a two part series (part 1 available here) we look at the failed ‘war on drugs,’ the movement to decriminalise, regulate and tax, opportunities and challenges for lower income nations, and the role of tax justice.

Featuring:

A transcript of the show available here: (some is automated)

“In terms of a percentage of global GDP, the tax that’s currently being lost by not taxing the drug market is about $232 billion per year. So to put that into context, that’s more than twice the annual spend prosecuting the war on drugs. And it’s way, way above the combined global aid budget.” ~ Martin Drewry 

~ Drug War Myths, part 2

Resources:

Here’s a summary of the show:

Naomi: “On the Taxcast this month, we continue with part two of drug war myths. In Part 1 we challenged the idea of the supposed ‘goodies’ and the ‘baddies’. And in Part 2 we’re going to shine the spotlight on the less visible professional enablers, and we’re going to talk about how to fix the mess of the war on drugs – tax is an important part of it.”

Dr Mary Young: “We need to be looking at white collar criminals.”

Naomi: “This is Associate Professor of International and Organised Crime at Bristol Law School Dr Mary Young.”

Dr Mary Young: “I now use the term ‘money managers,’ you know, the people who manage money. The people who manage money for us, manage money for criminals. And they manage it in exactly the same way, but we need to be focusing on these groups of people. And these groups of people are usually embedded within policymaking and they feed into
the vested interests of the US government and the UK to keep those financial services industries very tight, ticking and wealthy in financial secrecy centers. We only need to look at the scandals which are coming out, where we see different levels of tax abuse and I think that we, we shouldn’t differentiate between legal and illegal, I would blanket it all as a tax
abuse. And we see wealthy government officials, politicians, those of a high social status using these foreign tax havens and financial secrecy jurisdictions to maximize personal wealth, circumvent domestic tax laws, and where possible, hide dirty money.

You know, you have an amazing symmetry between organised crime and the upper world. Organised crime is just an economic enterprise. There are symmetries between legitimate organisations and organised crime bodies and upper world business ventures and they all have profit at their core. So, organised crime groups, legitimate businesses, the government,
massive NGOs even, huge organisations, business operations, they use bankers, they will need lawyers, they will need accountants.

One financial intermediary told me, ‘I’ve done very well out of it, thank you very much. My children have a brilliant life and I’m really wealthy.’ And he was very happy to tell me and boast about the amount of money he makes from being a private banker. And he was also rejecting any type of criticism about the overseas territories. So, financial intermediaries, they either know something is going on, but they will also embrace criminal organisations. Why wouldn’t you? You just do your job, you bring the money through, you keep your eyes on the numbers and you don’t ask any questions. Those financial intermediaries, those excellent mathematicians, numbers guys that criminal organisations use will be happy to
look the other way, it’s simply a job. You’re just part of a corporation, another type of corporation. This one just happens to be a bad business. So on that spectrum of illegality, you have your big corporations, your big multinational trading companies, the ones we see everywhere, you know, delivering our goods, for example, or inventing our phones. And then
you have other types of corporations which just happen to be operating at the illicit end of the spectrum, but they mirror, in so many ways, our huge organisations, and that’s when I feel a little bit like, hang on, maybe we shouldn’t be demonising criminal organisations quite so much as we should be investigating and focusing on the politicians, on the bankers, on
the accountants.

And that means stepping away from the obvious criminals. Step away from the drug traffickers and focus on what’s in front of you now, organised crime walks with us everywhere, it’s everywhere. Once you get used to identifying criminal outfits, even in the town you live in, you realize organised crime is a part of our life and we can’t really deny
that. So think of it as a circle. So you have your tiny circle in the middle, which might be those that we demonise already, the criminals. And then we branch out, and we have this network of white collar workers leading up to the top, leading up to politicians and governments. But conversely, if you talk to them, they don’t like to be called criminals. They don’t like to be associated with the criminality that we see reported about in the paper. Oh
no, they’re not as bad as drug traffickers. They’re not as bad as those who illicitly traffic wildlife goods, floras, faunas, ivory, rhino horn powder. No, they’re not part of that world, they don’t believe themselves to be part of that world, they are part of a different dynamic. They are somehow better. They’ve been to university, they’ve got degrees. So quite often
when you speak to some of these people, you speak to people who’ve investigated them, the white collar criminals reject the term criminality in some cases because they see themselves within a different sphere and let’s remember that offshore financial centres do not say they have secrecy laws.”

Naomi: “Oh of course not!”

Dr Mary Young: “They reject that term. I’ve been heckled for using the term secrecy. They call it ‘strong confidentiality.’ So you have these strong confidentiality laws and then you have another body of laws where there are really decent people who want to recover the proceeds of crime find it incredibly difficult to do so because of the criminal penalties set up
around releasing information. So, throughout the decades since the Organised Crime Control Act of 1971, we’ve had a raft of anti money laundering laws created by Western countries. which show they’re doing something, which tick the right boxes on paper, which say they’re
disrupting major criminal organisations engaged in narcotics and money laundering. But we would see huge amounts of money being recovered, we would see corrupt government officials being removed from office, and it just does not happen.”

Naomi: “It doesn’t. And throughout these decades of prohibition, the money flows from the illegal drug trade are only deepening inequalities and insecurity between the global south – where the ‘producer’ countries often are, and the world’s wealthiest and most powerful countries, which tend to be the main ‘consumer’ countries. Zara Snapp from the Instituto
RIA explains in this recent online event:”

Zara Snapp: “In Colombia they produce, you know, 95 percent of the cocaine in the world which is for export and less than 1  percent of the revenue gains stay in Colombia. And so this is something that’s important of then how are even revenue gains being distributed along the production chain? Whereas 68 percent of those revenues stay in the countries of
consumption, which is primarily the United States for that market, and some in Europe.”

Gustavo Petro speech (voiced by Marcelo Justo): ”Our silence in these 50 years has been complicit with a genocide in our countries because that is what the official war policy against drugs has caused in our Latin America, a genocide. The so-called ‘war on drugs’ policy has failed. It doesn’t work. If we continue, we are going to add another million deaths in Latin
America and we are going to have more failed states and we are going to have perhaps the death of democracy on our continent.”

Naomi: “That was Colombian president Gustavo Petro speaking recently at a Latin American and Caribbean conference on drugs. And there are important shifts happening in many countries. Some nations are turning away from prohibition to decriminalisation and regulation, in some cases legalisation.”

Music clip: Legalise it, Bob Marley live

Naomi: “ In 2015 Jamaica passed its Dangerous Drugs Amendment Act which did various things – it decriminalised personal possession of up to two ounces (or 56 grams) of cannabis, cultivation of up to five cannabis plants per household and also legalised and regulated  commercial cultivation and sale of cannabis for medicinal use.”

TV Presenter: “The passing of the bill comes as good news for the country’s Rastafarian community, which uses the herb for religious purposes. While marijuana would be legal, the bill makes provisions for it to be banned from public places. Plus, a licensing authority would have to be established in order to monitor cultivation, sale and distribution of marijuana for
medical and therapeutic purposes.

The bill was passed even as South American countries grapple with the impact of drug use and struggle to put an end to drug trafficking. In Mexico, Colombia and Argentina, marijuana possession in small amounts was decriminalised. Argentina is drafting a set of proposals to loosen restrictions on possession. Also in Guatemala, President Otto Perez Molina is proposing moves to push for the legalisation of marijuana. Chile and Costa Rica are also debating the introduction of medical marijuana policies. Uruguay last year became the first country in the world to approve the growth, sale and distribution of marijuana.”

Naomi: “ Jamaica’s just one of a number of nations that’s taken steps to decriminalise and regulate in place of punitive policies. Before they passed that bill, 15,000 people were being arrested every year for cannabis possession. A quarter of all Jamaica’s court cases were dealing with cannabis-related offences, their prisons were overcrowded and it was costing an estimated $US64 million a year in arrest and prosecution costs. It was a transformative step, putting public health and wellbeing first. It meant they were able to massively increase their health budget expenditure the following year. It all ran contrary to the perceptions of
outsiders. Dr Mary Young again:”

Dr Mary Young: “I’ve spent a lot of time in Jamaica over the years since 2012 and the people I’ve worked with in Jamaica are absolutely dedicated to undermining organised crime and actually are frustrated by the external elements which do not assist them in a positive manner. Drugs was traditionally seen as an issue for the U. S. as emanating from Jamaica. So,
there was a lot of focus on U. S. assumptions on what Jamaica was and how Jamaica operated. we carried out interviews actually with a number of people on the issue of drug trafficking and crime in Jamaica, and we were repeatedly told that drug trafficking as a main security threat is not relevant to Jamaica. It’s the firearms threat from the U. S. which is
relevant to Jamaica. But it was these historical U. S. assumptions and policies about drugs and organised crime which has kept Jamaica and other countries held down, especially if they’re countries which are indebted to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

So you have Jamaica an hour away from the Cayman Islands. One of them is hugely wealthy, highly developed and supported by Western governments, not just Western countries, many countries all over the world and the people within them will use financial secrecy centres, offshore financial centres, tax havens, whatever you want to call them. And next to it, an
hour away, you have Jamaica, which is indebted to the World Bank, the IMF, which is struggling against the massive tide of firearms which repeatedly come into its jurisdiction every single day. And when you start to look and see how much has been confiscated, it’s overwhelming to view.

But Jamaica is saying, hang on, actually, the biggest issue is firearms trafficking, and the multiple homicides that happen every year. What are you going to do about it? So when I’ve worked with peers and colleagues in Jamaica, we talk about the US needs to be checking its own borders, why are firearms coming out of the US? Why are they leaving Miami? Why is it
so easy for them to leave Miami and end up in Jamaica? And they’re all US manufactured. They can check the codes on the guns. They can check the brands on the firearms. Yet, the US doesn’t do anything at its end. And it comes back to that historical war on drugs.”

Naomi: “That ‘war on drugs’ has served organised crime groups, multinationals and financial secrecy centre self-interest all the more easily because of colonial attitudes and beliefs. Sergio Chaparro Hernandez of the Tax Justice Network:”

Sergio Chaparro Hernandez: “The world is increasingly realising that bad drug policies can cause more harm than drugs themselves. The painful history of bloodshed and corruption in a country like Colombia where I am from has a lot to do with bad drug policy. If we had opted for regulating drugs in a responsible manner rather than prohibition, we would have
prevented institutional destabilisation and violence with the thousands of deaths and all the harms they have caused.

The alternative will be a responsible model to legalise drugs, which recognises that instead of prohibiting drugs, they should be treated as a public health problem which builds upon the lessons learned from regulating industries such as tobacco or alcohol.

The United States has been the big driver of the war on drugs. And if a just international policy is to be advanced, any undue interference that prevents producer countries from choosing their own regulatory models should be eliminated, and countries that have driven the war on drugs should implement policies of reparation for the harms caused by
prohibition.”

Martin Drewry: ”We believe that prohibition is one of the things that creates and sustains extreme disparities of wealth within the countries of the global south that have kept them economically poor. And tax justice is an essential part of correcting that.”

Naomi: “This is Martin Drewry of Health Poverty Action speaking at a recent event:”

Martin Drewry: “So what do we mean by tax justice in the context of a legally regulated drug market? What is the role of tax for that, thinking especially of countries in the global south? First point I want to make is something about just the scale that we’re talking about. So the size of the global drug market, estimates vary from 0. 5 percent of global GDP to about 1 percent of global GDP. Some people think it’s a bit higher, certainly will probably become higher as the cannabis market grows, for example. But if we take that figure of 1 percent, the global average tax rate per, for the world is 29%. But what that would work out as in terms of a percentage of global GDP, the tax that’s currently being lost by not taxing the drug
market is about $232 billion per year, based on those estimates. So to put that into context, that’s more than twice the annual spend prosecuting the war on drugs. And it’s way, way above the global aid budget, the combined global aid budget. So, these aren’t small amounts, but for the poorest countries, it’s much, much more significant than that. So these numbers, in a country like the US or the UK, sure, you know, we did a report on legalising cannabis and it could have offered another billion pounds a year to the National Health Service. So it’s not insignificant, but you know, it’s not going to fund our health systems. But in the U. S., for example, per capita per year, the spend on health per person per year in the U. S. is $9,536. In Ethiopia, it’s 24. In Ghana, it’s 80. In the DRC, it’s 20. Across the lowest
income countries as a whole, it’s 41. So this is why tax is important. There are lots of things we can do with tax. Tax doesn’t just come, this is one of the key points, it doesn’t just come from a product-specific tax. So we have an alcohol tax, for example, and we can have a cannabis tax, and that’s important. But bringing the drugs market into the licit economy also
enables income tax, we want progressive corporation taxes, we want tariffs. One of the things in trade justice is that to address the disparities of wealth between the global south and the global north it requires building up the economies of the global south.

Now, Africa has a supreme comparative advantage for cannabis growing, for example. Most of the profits won’t come from the raw cannabis, they’ll come from the processed stuff, and they’ll come from derivatives, and they’ll come from other kinds of products associated with the use of cannabis. It’s important to build those industries in poorer countries. So one of the ways that you can do that is to prevent, and that’s another role of tax, preventing corporate capture because you disproportionately tax the rich corporations and their exports into the country, you put tariffs on those in order to protect the infant industry. So there’s a lot of things that can be done using tax as an instrument and we need to become experts in these because if we don’t design the proposals, the corporations will!”

Naomi: “And not only corporations, but the nations they’re headquartered in. Sergio Chaparro Hernandez worries that while decriminalised, regulated drug industry policies would indeed knock a lot of organised crime out of the equation, which is great, raise tax revenues and help improve things like healthcare, which is also great, but the benefits
economically could end up being dominated by – you guessed it, global north nations and their multinationals.”

Sergio Chaparro Hernandez: “What is paradoxical and grossly unfair is that producer countries will end up being late to the regulation game after decades of suffering the perverse consequences of prohibition, while the benefits will be reaped by countries that are consolidating a legal industry first, such as the United States and Canada.”

Naomi: “And those countries are moving fast now on decriminalising and regulating cannabis. It’s also kind of ironic that a number of tax havens or financial secrecy jurisdictions are developing regulated cannabis industries partly to move themselves away from overdependence on their finance sectors, just as the financial secrecy market’s getting slowly squeezed by transparency initiatives – pushed by people like us!

At the moment the global legal cannabis market alone is estimated at over US$24 billion and that’s expected to quadruple in the next ten years. So it’s easy to see why developing a decriminalised, regulated and taxed cannabis industry is attractive. But it depends on which country’s doing it: there are richer world producer nations and markets, and poorer producer nations and markets, serving different clientele and facing different realities and
economic power imbalances globally. All this enthusiasm for new revenues from regulated cannabis industries could end up with lower income nations dealing with yet more of the same domination by big players and global trade inequities that they already face. But, first things first:

Should lower income countries be focusing their land use on sustainable food production for domestic use, especially given the climate crisis? I mean, we know there’s this increased chance of crop failure that drives up food prices. Should they be thinking about developing a cannabis industry in that context?”

Max Gallien: “I think that’s an excellent question and I think looking at cannabis in the wider context of agricultural policy is, is really important.”

Naomi: “I’m talking to Max Gallien of the International Centre for Tax and Development and the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex:”

Max Gallien: “Obviously countries’ policy regarding cannabis cultivation will have to be placed within their wider kind of country-specific agricultural and industrial strategy. I think for many countries, dramatically expanding production is certainly risky, both given the young and uncertain global market, but also other priorities they may have in agriculture. The important thing to highlight, though, is that I think for many countries, cannabis production is already a reality. Many countries, including in Africa, are already producing cannabis, already have producers that have been used to producing this for a very long time,
that have been relying on and specialising in these crops for a very long time, that have regions that are particularly specialised in this, for example, if we think about the Reef Mountains in Morocco. So especially for these regions, thinking about the future of that crop and the future of its taxation and marketing is really important, even if we’re not necessarily
advocating for new large scale cannabis development.”

Naomi: “Right, right. it depends on the country and their own context. And because the decriminalized cannabis industry at least globally, is in its infancy, really, do you have hopes that this kind of newness represents an opportunity for lower income nation governments at least to try to do things differently in terms of the way they manage their economies? I know
you’ve written about some really interesting legalisation models, focused on incentivising smaller scale production for example.”

Max Gallien: “I think, yes and no. So, so on the one hand the market is still developing, and this is still a young global market, it’s a market that, you know, is more legalised in some areas than others, is more legalised with respect to certain types of products than to others. So, a lot is still in flux, and this is partly what makes this entire policies area so exciting. There
are very few opportunities where we get to see a new legal market develop, where we get to see policymakers shape the context for this market and what is furthermore really exciting is that we do see new models coming up, and we see really, really interesting ones. We see some countries opt for a less overtly commercialised cannabis market than the U. S. and
Canada has. Malta has been a good example of that, but especially Germany, a very, very large market, not opting for an openly commercialised model, but looking more at kind of smaller cannabis clubs and private production, is really, really interesting and makes this a really, really exciting market to watch.

However, while the market’s still developing and is still young, it’s also not in its complete infancy anymore. And I think that is really important for especially lower income and lower middle income country developers to, to keep in mind that yes, they have an opportunity to shape policy in a new way and to do things differently, but they’re doing that in a context of
a global market that is already developing, where they’re not the first movers.

If they’re focusing on their domestic consumption, there’s wide open spaces still, if they’re focusing on regional consumption. But if they’re looking at global markets, they will have to reckon with the existence of, especially the North American market, which is large and highly capitalised and highly commercialised. So in some ways, there’s wide new areas for
policymakers, but in other areas, there’s already the realities of kind of global competition that are already being developed.

One further point that I think is, is important to remember as well, is that there’s another market that already exists, which is the illegal market. So, obviously, the legal market is, is still in its infancy and is still being developed, but the illegal market has been around for a very long time. And despite some more optimistic projections, it’s not necessarily going to
go away by itself. So policymaking for the legal market will also have to keep in mind the effect of this new legal market on the already existing illegal market.”

Naomi: “Right, and what’s quite interesting is if you contrast the experience in Malta, for example, where I think they were running a non profit legalised market, where in Malta, they don’t necessarily have the same need or desire for a foreign currency to come in, and to trade internationally. Whereas if you look at Malawi, maybe they do, so that kind of nonprofit market, why would that work somewhere like Malawi?”

Max Gallien: “Exactly! So exactly the question for policy makers and countries that are thinking about legalisation is, are we thinking about a domestic market only, or are we thinking about export? And if you’re thinking about export, the policies around that will have to look quite differently than if you’re just thinking about satisfying a domestic market or
domestic interest. And that is particularly important for countries that are already de facto dependent on cannabis export. Morocco is a classic example of this, this is a country that is, although currently largely illegally, already dependent on cannabis export that has large numbers of farmers and entire regions that are quite dependent on this crop. And these
export structures so far have largely been illegal. They’ve been providing most of the European market for quite a long time. But they’re now competing with the new legalised market and are now having to situate themselves in relationship to new legalised market, to new products coming in from other places, being produced in other places. And
consequently, the policy choices look quite different than a country like Malta that can primarily think about its domestic market.

Naomi: “We’ve got to keep in mind here that of course, decriminalising and regulating these industries are about way more than revenue raising and development, they’re also about taking a different approach to prohibition that’s only enriched and empowered organised criminal groups and the professional enabler industry that’s there to serve them. Back to
Max again.

You say there are important lessons to be learned from the tobacco industry in terms of how nations can better design tax systems. I know that over 10 percent of the global tobacco market is still illicit, which is really interesting.”

Max Gallien: “It is. It’s, it’s a really, really important thing about the global tobacco market that we don’t talk about often enough is how much of it is illicit. Cannabis is interesting here, it’s one of those cases where, you know, we often say policies shape markets and markets shape policies. The tobacco industry has been highly concentrated around what we often
refer to as ‘big tobacco’, around these large multinational organisations that have certainly had their influence on how policy on tobacco taxation has developed, especially in lower income countries, especially in Africa. And there’s extensive documentation of the tobacco industry seeking to influence policymaking in this area, and especially lobbying for lower
taxes and pointing to the illegal markets as a reason for why taxes should be lower, arguing that if taxes on tobacco are increased, then smuggling will become more of a risk and this fraction of the market that is already illicit will grow. Now we’ve done a little bit of work at the International Centre for Tax and Development, we’re absolutely not the only ones who’ve done so, that have highlighted that that connection is really not that strong, that just
because you increase taxes does not necessarily mean smuggling goes up, and that that narrative under appreciates the role that the legal tobacco industry has also historically played in in tobacco smuggling, but I think it highlights that lobbying and industry influence on policymaking, especially when there’s a power imbalance between large multinational
companies and lower income countries administrations is is a real threat. And it’s something really concerning, I think it’s something that as the global cannabis market develops we’ll also have to watch out for.”

Naomi: Yeah, definitely because all experience tells us how markets always tend to organise themselves in terms of domination by the biggest, the most heavily capitalised players. And we know that tax justice and tax is a great tool to incentivise and disincentivise certain behaviours if governments want to do that. So do you have faith that governments, nations,
lower income nations in particular, can design a tax system that can do what no other nation has really done in the ways we’d like to see, not just in this economic sector, but, but in others?”

Max Gallien: “That’s a lot of faith you’re asking for! I think it’s, it is unlikely that what we’ll see in cannabis will be completely different from any other export crops from any other similar industries that we’ve seen. And I think seeing it develop completely different or seeing kind of these radically different models that we see in Malta or, or have been discussed in Mexico or other places becoming the global standard, I think that is unlikely.
However, where on that spectrum between a completely different approach and repeating some of the mistakes of of the past we lie, I think is really important and I think tax policy has a, has a big role to play in that. As you say, it can incentivise policies. It can play a central role in making sure you extract profits at the point where they’re accumulated and not
necessarily at the point where kind of smallholder farmers are engaging in traditional practices. It is also a way to shape markets. It’s a way to influence who gets to be involved in them. One of the things that we’ve seen in some countries that have really recently legalised is if the licensing fees for producing cannabis are really, really high, that often means that the
only producers that can pay these fees are already quite large organisations and that might crowd out other, other actors.

So I think all of this will be extremely difficult, but it will be helped if developing country policy makers can be part of a conversation quite early on where they can help identify what their goals In the legalisation process are, what their goals on a newly developing global legal market are. Is it around export? Is it around focusing on the domestic market? Is it
about focusing on smallholder farmers in, in a local context that already exist, or is it around expansion of production? what are their assumptions about an emerging international market? If they’re thinking about export, are they thinking about a regional export? Are they thinking about a more global scale? Are they thinking particularly about the kind of crop
itself or about processing and upgrading? So I think being very explicit about the goals, about the consequences of the goals, and then the policies that need to follow from that. It’s still an uphill struggle, but it gives you a bit of an advantage in a, in a very, very fast moving market.

I think that the writing is on the wall in terms of the creation of a global legalised market. I think it’s hard to imagine a future over the next few decades where that’s not increasingly becoming the norm and where these markets are not increasingly connected globally. So I think it’s also a question of positioning within that market, anticipating where it’s going to
go and thinking of what that means, especially for producers that have traditionally produced illegally. So, I think one of the motivations for me is really to think about from the perspective of places like Mexico, places like Malawi, places like Morocco, that are going to feel the changes of these changing global markets whether they change national policy or not, and
thinking how they can react to that and how they can anticipate that, I think, is, is really important.”

Karina Garcia-Reyes: “As a society, we have to accept that there’s no perfect solution.”

Naomi: “This is Criminology lecturer and writer Karina Garcia-Reyes of the University of the West of England. We heard from her in part one of drug war myths in the previous Taxcast.”

Karina Garcia-Reyes: “There’s no silver bullet here okay, and interestingly, we prefer a very violent strategy that is really damaging us instead of something more nuanced that actually minimises consequences, So, this is a very complex solution, I acknowledge this, but to me, legalising drugs is the first step, but we have to manage our expectations. Violence,
unfortunately, will always exist because even if we legalise drugs we have so many other markets in organised crime but at least from my perspective, in countries like Mexico, where most of this violence at the moment is linked to drug trafficking, to this market in particular, violence will be minimised considerably. And in a country with so many homicides and so
many disappearances, this is really something to consider because whereas the United Nations and the US and the UK dictate the global policy, we, countries like Mexico, Colombia, we are contributing with the deaths and disappearances. And that’s very, very painful.”

Naomi: “Eric Gutierrez of the International Centre of Human Rights and Drug Policy.”

Eric Gutierrez: “I would say that legal regulation of drugs is a key option to consider. Law enforcement has not won the war on drugs, there has been, you know, wars on drugs for decades now, and, you know, if there will be some kind of clampdown on tax avoidance mechanisms, that may be a way to win that war without firing a shot and at the same time move the illegal, illicit drug trade to legal regulation where taxes can be raised and be used
to pay for the public good. If there will be reforms to prevent tax avoidance, then taxing through the legal regulation of drugs will also work.”

Naomi: “This is a complicated subject. But it is clear that prohibition and punitive drug policies and the so-called war on drugs have a) failed and b) are making inequalities between north and south even worse. New approaches that are health and human rights-based are urgently needed across the board, it’s a matter of life and death. We know tax justice can play a key role in a decriminalised environment. And of course, the starting point for nations like the UK and the US is to put their own houses in order and end financial secrecy. And instead of investing in militarisation, they should be investing in harm reduction programmes, not only domestically but also overseas in the producer countries – it’s part of the reparations they owe, their moral debt.”

Carbon tax for global justice: ‘cap and share’ as a progressive alternative for taxing fossil fuels

In mid June 2022, farmers across Pakistan gazed out across thriving fields of rice, maize and mung beans, looking forward to bringing in the harvest in a few months’ time. Then the floods began: nearly half of the country’s crops were washed away, obliterating the entire annual income of many farming families. Scientists assess that climate change made flooding of this scale significantly more likely, and that poverty could turn this weather event into a human disaster. 

What, if anything, does this have to do with the tax justice movement? Is there more that could be done with taxation to address international climate injustice of this kind? Until now, the tax justice and climate justice movements have tended to operate in isolation from each other, despite having many common goals and objectives. This is the second in a series of blogs by the Tax Justice Network examining issues at the intersection of these movements. (The first blog looked at beneficial ownership and fossil fuels, alongside a more detailed report on delivering climate justice using the principles of tax justice.)

In this piece we explore a radical new model known as ‘cap and share’ that Equal Right have developed alongside international collaborators. It bears little resemblance to ‘cap and trade’ – the emissions trading system used in the EU. In cap and trade, companies – rather than democratic bodies – set the carbon price, and money flows mainly between these companies, rather than to the people or to the Global South. Emphatically not ‘cap and trade’, the model cap and share instead centres around an international carbon tax on fossil fuel extraction. This tax is coupled with a fast-falling extraction cap and the revenues are used to fund global green investment and worldwide cash dividends. The system is designed with global and social justice at its core, and seeks to up-end the key problems inherent in many other carbon taxing and pricing proposals. 

The trouble with national carbon taxes: ‘polluter wins’

A defining feature of cap and share is that the tax revenues would land first in an international fund rather than in the national budgets of each country. This is key for climate justice and for global justice, as it would redistribute money from Global North to South and reverse the usual ‘polluter wins’ conundrum inherent in national carbon taxation. 

This conundrum arises because the most-polluting countries, by definition, have the biggest carbon tax base, so they secure billion dollar carbon tax revenues for national public spending. Low polluting nations – predominantly in the Global South – see the opposite impact: they would receive practically nothing from the same rate of carbon tax, in fact often being hardest hit by a carbon tax, even though they are often also suffering the worst effects of the climate emergency. 

This new concept of cap and share would allow us to tax fossil fuels at source, with the money going directly into an international fund, and the cost passed on automatically down supply chains, landing mostly with big fossil fuel consumers in wealthy nations. This would ensure that polluters pay, but it is the international community – in fact, the people of the world directly – that would benefit financially, rather than the polluting nations’ national governments.

Making carbon tax progressive

These direct financial benefits for the world’s people are key for generating this system’s progressive effects, both at the macro level to reduce inequality between Global North and South, and at the micro level to support households through the transition. 

The ‘share’ element of cap and share consists of two key components:

Both of these are of vital importance in making the impacts of this system progressive. 

(This proposal opens up multiple questions. Which body would collect international carbon taxes? How would they be enforced? How much would be raised? Does it need to be global, or could a few countries act together to get it started? And what would all of this do for the climate? We have ventured some answers to these questions in our discussion paper ‘Climate Justice Without Borders: Cap and share as a mitigation and climate finance solution’. However, this is only a beginning.)

Climate grants for the Global South (and for other most affected people and groups such as indigenous communities in higher income nations) could shift around a trillion dollars per year to lower-income nations, directly reducing global inequality. Further monetary transfers from Global North to South would also occur via the ‘national allowances’ element of the system. This is part of the ‘cap’ side of the equation. It  requires countries that exceed their fair per capita share of fossil fuels to negotiate for temporary use of low consuming countries’ spare national allowance. 

The economic effects of these two kinds of transfers would be substantial, bringing annual gains of nearly $600 per capita for lower-middle income countries, and $800 for low income countries. In some nations this is more than current per capita GNI, so these transfers would effectively double national wealth.

Meanwhile, cash dividends are essential for making the system progressive at a micro level. It is more or less inevitable that carbon taxation will increase the price of fossil fuels. As a result, the price of energy, transport and other goods will increase until renewables provide the bulk of the energy mix. Without dividends, people would have to cover these price increases from their own pockets, and as lower income households tend to spend a greater proportion of their incomes on necessities, the impacts of carbon taxes can become regressive.

Cash dividends are therefore key because they offset much or all of this extra spending. For low consuming households (most of whom are lower income households) the dividends substantially overshoot these extra costs, so providing a significant cash boost to their monthly household budgets. 

As shown in our modelling, the effects vary progressively according to income group. In the first year of the system, people on average incomes in high income countries would see some, but not all, of their extra energy costs offset. They would be down $50 per person per month with dividends, versus $81 down without dividends. People on low incomes in high income countries would see smaller losses of $13 with dividends, versus $44 without. 

These losses assume people continue to consume fossil fuels at the same rate as they do today – which may be unlikely once these price nudges come into play. Nevertheless, governments of high income countries should be pressed to act to support their low and middle income earners through this transition, with proposals such as free basic energy and free public transport potentially becoming important in securing standards of living once carbon taxes are in place. 

The picture looks different in the rest of the world, where fossil fuel use and therefore carbon tax spend is much lower, leading to net gains for most households from the cap and share system. 

In upper middle income countries, dividends would broadly offset people’s extra energy costs, with small $3 losses for those on average incomes, and $12 gains for those on low incomes. Lower middle income countries would see net gains for both average and low income earners, of $10 and $20 per month respectively for every adult and child. In low income countries, most people would see net gains of $23 to $27 per month, likely to be enough to raise everyone from their current consumption level to above the extreme poverty line ($66 per month).

International taxation: the next big thing in tax justice?

These progressive and global justice-supporting effects are only possible because the carbon tax at the heart of cap and share is international. Cap and share therefore represents a radical rethink in what might be possible in tax justice. To date, the movement has focused on taxation at the national level – and for good reason, as no infrastructure yet exists at the international level for collecting or redistributing tax. However the five R’s of tax justice currently also only happens within borders. Tax redistributes wealth inside countries but not between countries, and the international democratic process – including the UNFCCC process – remains sorely lacking in terms of grassroots representation.

The climate crisis should change everything. There are no borders in the atmosphere, and my pollution here can destroy your life over there. Furthermore, the relevance of money and tax in the climate emergency cannot be overstated: poverty makes one immensely more vulnerable to suffering when crisis strikes. So securing people’s incomes should be considered a top priority for climate action. This becomes yet more important when we consider the injustices which have created both poverty and climate change: extractivism, colonialism and exploitation, all perpetrated predominantly by the countries and corporations of the North against the nations and peoples of the South. If ever there were a time to accelerate our ambitions on tax justice, and consider taxation without borders, this is it. 

Building the movement: tax justice activists needed

The cap and share movement is being built by a global network of activists, working together via the Cap and Share Climate Alliance to explore the potential of these ideas and campaign for their introduction. As these partnerships expand worldwide, new priorities are incorporated into our cap and share proposals, co-creating a more holistic system for climate justice. 

The tax justice movement should become a key player in this development. With decades of experience in fighting for justice, and of winning real gains for the people of the world on the international stage, the movement has a huge amount to contribute in developing international carbon taxation and, more broadly, for cap and share. Winning this will be far from easy: many more shoulders are needed at the wheel, and the tax justice movement is likely to be one of the most important partners of all to help make this campaign succeed.

The time is now

Will it succeed? We can only try. Imagine, though, if it did. Cap and share is a system that could provide for us all, by taxing fossil fuel extractors and major consumers and redistributing that money worldwide. For the first time, it proposes a taxation system that operates beyond the nation-state, harnessing the power of tax to address global inequality and injustice directly, which is key for climate justice, and is in many other ways long overdue. 

As the tax justice movement knuckles down on the idea of carbon tax, cap and share is a call to think beyond borders. And it asks the difficult but essential questions: “If not now, then when?” and “If not us, then who?”

Equal Right is a global justice organisation working for economic justice without borders. Find out more at www.equalright.org 

New Tax Justice Network Data Portal gives unparalleled access to wealth of data on tax havens

Today marks 20 years of research and investigation by the Tax Justice Network into all things tax havens and financial secrecy. Providing reliable, consistent research on these issues has always been a core part of our mission and that research has empowered us, as well as others, to uncover and tell powerful stories that drive social change. Today, our data and research is trusted and used by governments, international bodies, journalists, academics and campaigners around the world.

Through the course of our work, we at the Tax Justice Network have gradually built one of the world’s richest databases on countries’ tax and financial transparency-related regulations. Knowledge and data we have gathered through various research efforts over the years have steadily been amalgamated into a single, searchable internal database containing over 400 variables covering up to 195 countries. This well of knowledge has become an invaluable asset in our own research, advocacy and day to day work. 

Today, we’re thrilled to announce that we’re launching the Tax Justice Network’s Data Portal. The new tool allows you to easily search, access and download from the wealth of information held in the Tax Justice Network’s database. The Data Portal also holds data on various other indicators of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions that we’ve curated from external data sources, including data from the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and academic sources, making the portal a one-stop-shop for all things tax and financial transparency. 

We’ve always recognised that our research can have a much bigger impact by making it available to everyone, everywhere, rather than by keeping our research to ourselves. That’s why it’s been our policy from day one to make our data and research transparent and accessible. As those of you familiar with using our research will already know, we regularly provide the data behind our research reports, usually in the form of tables, excel files and fact sheets. 

This works fine if you’re looking to learn more about or verify the data behind one of our research reports, but it’s less ideal if you’re looking for specific data to use in your own research.

For example until now, if you wanted to know which countries provide tax exemptions to the extractive sector, you’d have to (know to) look under Indicator 5 of our Corporate Tax Haven Index. And if you then wanted, say, data on countries’ tax losses to cross-border tax abuse – to see if there is a correlation between exemptions for extractive sectors and the scale of tax abuse – you’d have to (know to) download data from our State of Tax Justice reports. With the Data Portal, you can now just search for “tax exemption” and “tax loss” to quickly retrieve this data and download it in your preferred format.

Data as a strategic asset for change

Data is increasingly being seen as a strategic asset, sitting at the heart of our modern societies.

It lets us identify trends, patterns, outliers, anomalies and norms, and allows us to assess – objectively – where risks lie, and where we should focus our collective efforts. And while individual pieces of data are useful, they become infinitely more valuable when they are woven together into a cohesive, holistic narrative.

With ever-increasing volumes of data being collected and collated, the potential value of data as a strategic tool is growing exponentially. But with that comes a multitude of challenges: finding data, storing it, making sense of it, and using it to tell compelling accounts about the world we live in. 

At the same time, the Tax Justice Network has consistently advocated for data transparency, through our work on eg country by country reporting, beneficial ownership and the automatic exchange of information between countries. We believe that our financial systems in general, and tax systems in particular, can only function properly in a climate of transparency. To truly give effect to this, data should not only be available publicly, but should be available in a format that makes it easy to digest and understand. 

It is against this background that work began to develop a Tax Justice Network Data Portal.

Data transparency sits at the heart of what we do

As part of marking our 20 year anniversary, we commissioned On Think Thanks to conduct a review of our activities over the past two decades. Their findings draw attention to the impact of our role as a knowledge producer, and how using data to make compelling arguments sits at the heart of what we do. According to On Think Tanks, this has seen the Tax Justice Network acting as a catalyst for the global tax justice movement and changing narratives about tax. As a result of our commitment to evidence-based outputs and advocacy, On Think Thanks concludes that we have become a go-to resource for media outlets, development organisations and government institutions to explain, substantiate and assess arguments in the tax justice space – with many of our researchers being extensively cited in policy reports, investigative journalist work, and academic papers. 

The Data Portal is an important next step in this work, making data increasingly more accessible to researchers and campaigners across the globe. Making our data more accessible is particularly important for those based in the Global South, which continues to suffer disproportionately from the impacts of abusive tax practices, and where – as the On Think Tanks review also highlights – there is still room for improvement for the Tax Justice Network to support local researchers and campaigners with evidence-based outputs.

What the Data Portal is

The Data Portal collates both source data and outputs from our existing tools and products, such as the Financial Secrecy Index, the Corporate Tax Haven Index, and the State of Tax Justice series, as well as from external data sources, like the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and academic sources.

And while it includes data for some obvious variables (like what the beneficial ownership reporting thresholds are and who has access to beneficial ownership information), it also incorporates some more unusual data sets, like whether there is a cash limit for large transactions; whether unilateral cross-border tax rulings are available; whether civil court proceedings are open to the public; what tax exemptions are granted to farmers; to what extent financial institutions are subject to due diligence regulations, and some 400 other such variables.  

Our Data Portal makes all this data available through an “online marketplace”, a bit like shopping online but for variables and datasets. Access to the Data Portal is of course free for non-commercial use by journalists, academic researchers, civil society, and the general public. For commercial use (eg risk models used by private banks), a paid subscription licence is required.

Navigation of the Data Portal is easy, allowing you to either explore by theme (eg tax havens) or by product (eg Financial Secrecy Index, the Corporate Tax Haven Index, and the State of Tax Justice series).

After signing in, simply choose the variables you would like to download, click the Download button in the top right corner, and choose the format you’d prefer (comma-separated values, Excel spreadsheets, or JSONdata). More advanced users can also use our handy code snippets for Stata, R, Python, or Java, which let you work with the data directly in your preferred statistical software.

An ongoing process 

Data collection is a continuous and ongoing effort for us at the Tax Justice Network, and ever more data sets are constantly being developed, refined and analysed. So, while we are proud to launch this beta version of the Data Portal, it will continuously be refined, and updated with new features and data.

How will you use it?

We believe that data is only as valuable as the story it tells. At the Tax Justice Network, we have used this data to expose where financial secrecy is concentrated, how tax havens are proliferating, and how much tax abuse countries suffer. But we know that there are a multitude of other insights and compelling narratives that can be unearthed using this new Data Portal – we’d love to hear what you learn from it, and what you do with it! 

Joint statement: Organisations applaud UN Committee’s work on net wealth taxes

The upcoming 27th Session of the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, hosted in Geneva, is poised to continue a crucial discussion on net wealth taxes. This United Nations body, comprising specialists from diverse countries, will examine a report that elucidates the design and implementation mechanisms of these taxes.  

In this significant moment, the Tax Justice Network, in collaboration with partner organisations including ActionAid International, Financial Transparency Coalition, Oxfam, and Patriotic Millionaires, is pleased to release a joint statement. Together, we acknowledge the Committee’s dedication to formulating practical guidance on wealth taxation policies, particularly with regard to net wealth taxes. 

Our statement underscores the alarming reality of widening disparities, both between nations and within them. It highlights the intersections of multifaceted inequalities spanning gender, race, religion, disability and socio-economic class, emphasising the pressing need for structural reforms. The exponential surge of concentrated private wealth, shielded from equitable taxation by opaque financial systems, requires bold and effective responses. 

The joint statement advocates for the implementation of a net wealth tax as a potent tool in the fight against inequality and the promotion of social justice, aligning perfectly with the Sustainable Development Goals. The revenue generated from taxing wealth can be vital for low income countries, strengthening fiscal capacity and enabling the provision of vital public services. We extend our commendations to the Subcommittee on Wealth and Solidarity Taxes for their efforts in providing guidance on a range of wealth taxation options. We call for the approval of the subcommittee’s recommendations on wealth taxes and urge the provision of additional guidance, including the formulation of model wealth tax legislation, to establish a unified approach worldwide, thus curbing tax avoidance

In addition, we stress the importance of expanding the international framework for the exchange of information, essential for the efficient administration of wealth taxes. Recognising that net wealth taxes primarily target the wealthiest segments of society, we propose the establishment of a global asset registry. This would ensure comprehensive transparency regarding all relevant assets, thwarting attempts to conceal wealth offshore. 

This pivotal report could mark a substantial step towards global equity. We encourage nations to work together and implement comprehensive wealth taxation policies, edging us closer to a more equitable future. The journey to tax justice is ongoing, and every stride in the right direction brings us nearer to a fairer world. 

You can read the full joint statement here.  

La ONU y la justicia fiscal: October 2023 Spanish language tax justice podcast, Justicia ImPositiva

Welcome to our Spanish language podcast and radio programme Justicia ImPositiva with Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez, free to download and broadcast on radio networks across Latin America and Spain. ¡Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a nuestro podcast y programa radiofónico! Escuche por su app de podcast. (All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.)

En este programa con Marcelo Justo y Marta Nuñez:

INVITADXS

~ La ONU y la justicia fiscal

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast #70: كيف نهب رياض سلامة أموال اللبنانيّين؟

Welcome to the 70th edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available on most podcast apps. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can follow the programme on Facebook, on Twitter and on our website. All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.

في العدد #70 من بودكاست “الجباية ببساطة” يستضيف وليد بن رحومة الباحث في العلوم السياسية ومدير منتدى البدائل العربي محمد العجاتي للحديث عن إجتماعات البنك الدولي وصندوق النقد في مراكش بالمملكة المغربية، ومدى تأثيرها في مآل عدد من القضايا الإقتصادية والإجتماعية التي تهم المنطقة العربية.

In episode #70 of the “Taxes Simply” podcast, Walid Ben Rhouma hosts social scientist and director of the Arab Forum for Alternatives, Mohammed El Agaty, where they discuss the upcoming World Bank and IMF meetings in Marrakech and their potential impact on the future of the major economic and social issues in the Arab region.

تابعونا على صفحتنا على الفايسبوك وتويتر  https://www.facebook.com/ TaxesSimply Tweets by taxes_simply