Welcome to the eighteenth edition of our monthly Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. (In Arabic below) Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة is produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and Osama Diab of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, also an investigative journalist. The programme is available for listeners to download and it’s also available for free to any radio stations who would like to broadcast it. You can also join the programme on Facebook and on Twitter.
Taxes Simply #18 – Palestine joins the tax race to the bottom
Welcome to the 18th edition of Taxes Simply. We start as always with our news summary which includes:
Tunisian Dinar devaluation leads to debt explosion
Egypt to pay half a billion dollars to Israel in arbitration case settlement
Inflation on the rise again in Egypt
Oman taxes tobacco and soft drinks
The United States receives more taxes from individuals and less from companies
Matteo Salvini threatens to resign if the EU does not agree to his tax cuts plan
In the second part of this month’s edition, Walid Ben Rhouma meets with Firas Jaber, a researcher at the Palestinian Social and Economic Policies Monitor to discuss the distorted Palestinian tax structure in light of the recent statement by the Palestinian Minister of Finance announcing the reduction of the corporate tax rate from 20% to 15%.
الجباية ببساطة #١٨ –
فلسطين تشارك في السباق الضريبي إلى القاع
أهلا بكم في العدد
الثامن عشر من الجباية ببساطة. نبدأ في القسم الأول بأخبارنا المتفرقة التي تشمل:
١) تخفيض قيمة الدينار التونسي تفجر الدين العمومي؛ ٢) مصر تصل لتسوية مع إسرائيل
قيمتها نصف مليار دولار في قضية تحكيم؛ ٣) زيادة التضخم في مصر من جديد؛ ٤) سلطنة
عمان تفرض ضرائب جديدة على التبغ والمشروبات الغازية؛ ٥) الولايات المتحدة تتلقى
ضرائب أكثر من الأفراد وأقل من الشركات؛ ٦) ماتيو سالفيني يهدد بالاستقالة إذا لم
يوافق الاتحاد الأوروبي على تخفيضاته الضريبية.
أما في القسم الثاني من عدد هذا الشهر، يلتقي وليد بن رحومة مع فراس جابر، الباحث المؤسس في مرصد السياسات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية الفلسطيني، ويحاوره بشأن هيكل الضرائب الفلسطينية المختل في ضوء التصريح الأخير لوزير المالية الفلسطيني عن تخفيض الشريحة العليا على ضريبة الشركات من ٢٠% إلى ١٥%.
The Tax Justice Network now speaks tax justice in five languages on radio stations and podcast platforms across the world, all with their own unique content and style – English, Spanish, French, Arabic and now Portuguese. So, welcome to our second monthly tax justice podcast/radio show in Portuguese.
Bem vindas e bem vindos ao É da sua conta, nosso
novo podcast em português, o podcast mensal da Tax Justice Network,
Rede de Justiça Fiscal. Veja abaixo os detalhes do programa em
português.
The economic effects: tax unfairness between national and multinational corporations
The social effects: financing capacity reduction to finance rights, as health and education
Solution: unitary taxation of multinationals
We discuss India’s push to force the G20 to agree sensible and fair international tax rules with Nick Shaxson of the Tax Justice Network and author of Treasure Islands and the Finance Curse
Podcast É da sua conta #2: Índice de paraíso fiscal corporativo – o que é, exemplo, efeitos e solução proposta
O download do programa é gratuito e a reprodução é livre para rádios.
No É da sua conta #2, de junho de 2019, você confere o Índice de paraíso fiscal corporativo
O que é e como foi elaborado
O chocante exemplo da Vale
Os efeitos econômicos: desigualdade na tributação de empresas nacionais e multinacionais
Os efeitos sociais: redução da capacidade de financiamento de direitos, como saúde e educação
Proposta de uma solução: tributação unitária de multinacionais
Coluna de Nick Shaxson, jornalista da Tax Justice Network: iniciativa da Índia e outros países para que todos os países participem da tomada de decisão sobre combate à sonegação fiscal
Participantes:
Fabricío Muriana, Instituto Feira Livre
Shanna Lima, pesquisadora da Tax Justice Network (TJN)
Marcelo Oliveira, diretor do Instituto de Justiça Fiscal (IJF)
Alessandra Cardoso, assessora política do Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (INESC)
In this month’s June 2019 podcast we look at the new Corporate Tax Haven Index released by the Tax Justice Network. What does it tell us about the global economy and the international tax system? And how can we fix it? We also look at how India is pushing the G20 into action on global tax rules – if they don’t act it will implement its own rules.
The Corporate Tax Haven Index provides one of those really rare glimpses of what actually happens underneath the bonnet of the global economy. It tells several disturbing stories…in what we can only describe as a full frontal assault on the national tax sovereignty of every country on the planet. That’s what they’re doing. They’re attacking the tax regimes of other countries. What it reveals is a really disturbing picture of international failure. We see the powerful European countries and especially Britain lying behind their clusters of tax havens and they have wrecked economies across the world and are now threatening social stability and democracy across the world.
But when countries like India say, no, that doesn’t work for us, we’re going our own way, then it gets very serious indeed. And the G20 simply cannot afford to ignore this any longer. So the road is open for the next steps. And of course the next steps are going to take us in the direction the Tax Justice Network has always been talking about. And that is in the direction of proper apportionment of profits to the countries where the profits are aligned with the economic substance. In other words, we’re moving towards unitary taxation and formula apportionment…And I think we should all welcome the opportunity now to create a framework for taxing multinational companies that suits the entire world, not just the most powerful countries in the world.
John Christensen, Tax Justice Network
I think it is important to point out that the term of tax haven has done us a big disservice for many decades now. That is used instead of claiming what we think is much more accurate nowadays, instead of claiming a spectrum of secrecy, a spectrum of tax haven-ness each country now embodies. We have to be more specific than just tax havens, there are so many dimensions to this and that is why we prefer to speak on the one hand about secrecy jurisdictions…and the other element that we need to complement this terminology is the corporate tax haven, which designates those places that play a more important role for multinationals in shifting their profits across borders. And this is why we have complemented the Financial Secrecy Index with the Corporate Tax Haven Index. [They] paint a different picture, much more nuanced where we can see that many countries nowadays have joined the bandwagon, and have joined the race to the bottom
Markus Meinzer, director of the Corporate Tax Haven Index and Financial Secrecy Index research teams
Presented and produced by Naomi Fowler of the Tax Justice Network
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Ten years ago the G20 countries committed to taking the global lead in combatting climate change. However, a new report tracking government subsidies to the fossil fuel industries reveals that despite the promises made in 2009, major G20 countries, including Japan which hosts the 2019 G20 meeting starting this coming Friday, continue to subsidise production and consumption of fossil fuels.
Despite coal being the most polluting fossil fuel, the new research shows that G20 countries are spending approximately US$64 billion annually on subsidising coal alone. To make matters worse, the G20 countries have neglected to define or document the full extent of their subsidies, making it harder for independent researchers to monitor their performance.
“Climate change can be life-threatening to all generations … We must take more robust actions and reduce the use of fossil fuels.”
Notwithstanding promises to phase out subsidies to coal, the report shows how G20 governments prolong subsidies while ostensibly supporting a market-led transition away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy sources. Subsidies to the coal sector take a variety of forms, and are applied at every phase from upstream exploration and production to downstream consumption.
The report reveals that while some governments have reduced subsidies to domestic coal fired production they continue to subsidise the construction of new coal fired power stations in other countries; a policy coherence failure that has been criticised by both politicians and campaigners.
Ahead of the 2019 G20 Meeting starting later this week campaigners are calling for:
the complete phasing-out of government direct and indirect subsidies to coal mining and coal-fired power;
comprehensive country-level peer review of coal and other fossil fuel subsidies within the coming 12 months;
agreement of country-level plans for ending government support to coal, implementation of measures to ensure that energy transition policies do not support coal production and consumption (especially in poorer countries);
and implementation of measures to ensure a ‘just transition’ for workers and communities, and target support at most vulnerable groups during the energy transition.
Fiscal support in the form of tax breaks are a significant part of the overall package of government support to coal producers, which also includes public financing of new coal fired facilities, and support for state owned coal industries. As renewable energy investment costs have tumbled in the past decade, coal-fired electricity production has become increasingly less profitable, and a large proportion of existing capacity is identified as being in high-level financial stress.
King Coal is clearly dying but is being kept alive on life-support, much to the detriment of ecological survival. G20 countries must now meet their promises to entirely remove subsidies to coal.
New
publications in the US, the UK, Switzerland and Japan show that better statistics
on cross-border exchanges of financial information are possible and necessary
to hold governments and financial institutions accountable.
Large amounts of financial information are
now being shared automatically across borders, to allow countries to find out
where their (mostly wealthy) taxpayers have stashed their wealth and what
income they are earning, for tax purposes. This is a great improvement on the
situation just a few years ago, when wealthy folk could hide their money around
the globe with almost complete impunity, safe in the knowledge that their
secrets would be kept safe. This improvement is led by the OECD’s Common
Reporting Standard (CRS) for automatic exchange of banking information, set up
by the OECD, a club of rich countries.
It is still hard to know how well this
system is working, however. We have been asking for statistics on automatic
exchange of banking information since our first
report in 2014 (see loophole 27), after the OECD trumpeted the “end of
banking secrecy” but we showed that this was (and unfortunately still is) far
from being real.
Publishing aggregated statistics on banking
information shouldn’t be controversial. While banking information on specific
account holders is of course confidential (for example, “John has $10 million
in HSBC”), there is no legitimate reason why aggregate information – for
example, “All Germans hold $100 billion in country X” should be kept under
wraps. Aggregate numbers of this kind are already published by some countries’
central banks (such as those of the
United States or Switzerland)
and by the Bank for International
Settlements. Similarly, information on the total number of foreign bank accounts
that countries sent and received from each other (eg “Argentina received
information about 20,000 bank accounts from country X”) should not be
considered an existential threat either.
In essence, statistics on automatic
exchanges of banking information are necessary to:
1) allow a wide range of interested
stakeholders – citizens and governments in developing countries, academics, journalists,
civil society organisations, and so on – to obtain essential information about the
total holdings of their countries’ (wealthy) residents in financial centres.
This statistical information would help measure capital flight,
inequality and identify the most relevant financial centres chosen by a
country’s residents to hold money and investments. In addition, for authorities
in developing countries unable to join the automatic exchange system (to receive
the specific bank account details), this statistical information would help
cross-check information they receive from local taxpayers. For example, tax
authorities could cross-check the statistical data (“our residents have X
million in country Y”) against the data reported in the tax returns. Anti-corruption
agencies could do the same in relation to asset declarations from high-ranking
government officials.
2) hold to account banks and other enablers
of the offshore secrecy system, and at the same time make sure the automatic
exchange system is working
3) allow all interested stakeholders to hold
public authorities to account, for subjecting their wealthiest citizens to the
rule of law.
THE
DETAILS
1)
Basic information for developing countries
The CRS systematically shuts many developing
countries out, thus removing a key tool they could use to stop the looting of
their countries and the stashing of their national wealth offshore. The big
problem is the principle of ‘reciprocity’, where countries must send
information too. Many developing countries, especially the poorest and most
vulnerable, simply aren’t equipped or resourced to collect banking
information. So they aren’t allowed to
get anything back. (Tax havens, by contrast, are allowed to implement
non-reciprocity, albeit of a different kind: they can simply refuse to receive
information from abroad, under “voluntary
secrecy”.)
Statistics would provide at least basic
aggregate data for these developing countries (for instance, “all Zambians hold
$X million in Switzerland, $Y million in the United States, and so on.).
Statistics are important even if a countries’ authorities aren’t asking for it
– after all, they may have an interest in not receiving any information to
protect their own corrupt officials. However, statistics would also give journalists
and civic groups evidence to push their governments to investigate those
offshore holdings, and to act.
2)
Hold enablers to account and assess the exchange system’s effectiveness
The OECD’s CRS framework for automatic
exchange of banking information lacks teeth to enforce its provisions on
financial institutions, compared to the US domestic framework to exchange
banking information automatically (called FATCA) that imposes a 30% withholding
tax on non-compliant banks. However, even these high withholding taxes and
other penalties seem to be little deterrent for banks. For example, in 2018 the
US prosecuted an executive
of Loyal Bank for failing to comply with FATCA. The US found out about this
by using an undercover agent. Statistics comparing all banks with each other
would allow the identification of outliers (eg most big banks filed X reports,
but bank Z is saying they have no information to report). These statistics would
be a much more efficient way to find non-compliant banks, in terms of time and
resources.
As we described here
(pages 37-52), and here,
statistics are essential to identify avoidance schemes and to make sure that
they system is working, and that banks are correctly filing information.
Some real-world cases illustrate how this
can work.
Guernsey
After sending banking information to the US
(based on FATCA) and to other countries (based on the OECD’s CRS), the British
tax haven of Guernsey reported that it received notifications from those
countries indicating “record level
errors”, requiring Guernsey financial institutions to make relevant
corrections.
The UK
The Society of Trust and Estate
Practitioners (STEP) showed how the UK found out that banks are wrongly identifying
entities as beneficial owners:
“HMRC has identified the most common errors made by financial institutions (FIs) when filing their Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) returns… [including:] 5. The FI reports entities as controlling persons. Some FIs report entities as the controlling persons of entity accounts, resulting in trusts and companies being reported as controlling persons. However, entities cannot be controlling persons; under CRS and FATCA, ‘controlling persons’ means natural persons who exercise control over an entity.”
The US
Banks are also reporting wrong information
to the US. The US Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration reported that in 2017, out of the
8.7 million forms received with FATCA information, 4.3 million (roughly half)
didn’t have a tax identification number (TIN), including 3.2 million that had
an invalid TIN, such as “000000000,”
“111111111,” or “999999999,”.
If banks don’t report accurate information,
or don’t report any information at all, there’s little that authorities can do
to fight illicit financial flows, which takes us to the last point.
3) Hold
authorities to account and make sure they are properly equipped
In March 2019, during the OECD Integrity
Forum at a panel
on exchange of information, Norway described that they had a matching rate
of 90%, meaning that out of all the information received pursuant to automatic
exchange of information, they could identify the correspondent Norwegian
taxpayer in 90% of the cases.
However, based on the Government of
Accountability Office (GAO)’s report, we know that these
matching rates are rather low:
Without valid TINs on Forms 8966 submitted by FFIs, according to IRS officials, IRS faces significant hurdles in matching accounts reported by FFIs to those reported by individual tax filers on their Forms 8938. As a result, IRS must rely on information such as names, dates of birth, and addresses that the filers and/or FFIs may not consistently report. Without data that can be reliably matched between Forms 8938 and 8966, IRS’s ability to identify taxpayers not reporting accurate or complete information on specified foreign financial assets is hindered, interfering with its ability to enforce compliance with FATCA reporting requirements, and ensure taxpayers are paying taxes on income generated from such assets. [emphasis added]
Given that in some cases roughly 50% of
forms didn’t have a valid TIN (see point 2 above), it could be expected that
the US matching rate is less than 50%…
And, as described in our blog,
some EU countries didn’t even bother to open the data they received.
The staff of tax authorities shouldn’t automatically
be blamed, however: the buck stops with government, which often under-resource tax
authorities, sometimes based on political decisions not to intervene.
What
do tax authorities say when asked to publish statistics about automatic
exchange of banking information?
Tax authorities usually invoke
“confidentiality” to resist requests to share information. Of course, most of
the information they hold may indeed be confidential by law (this depends on
the country: some Scandinavian countries even make tax returns of regular
citizens available to the public). However, central banks routinely publish
aggregate data, while keeping specific bank account details confidential. By
the same token, aggregate statistical information doesn’t violate any taxpayer’s
confidentiality (no single taxpayer’s foreign banking information would be
disclosed, only the total of all residents). So, if it’s not about the
taxpayer, whose “rights” would tax authorities be breaching if they published
statistics such as “our residents hold $100 million in country A”? Apparently,
the rights of country A, as explained below.
Under the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard
(CRS,) it is the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) that determines the scope and process
for exchanging banking information. The MCAA states:
Section 5. Confidentiality and Data Safeguards
1. All information exchanged is subject to the confidentiality rules and other safeguards provided for in the Convention…
2. Such information shall in any case be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative or supervisory bodies) concerned with the assessment, collection or recovery of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to, taxes of that Party, or the oversight of the above. Only the persons or authorities mentioned above may use the information and then only for such purposes…
One could argue that the above provisions
seem to refer to a taxpayer’s information, not to statistics that involve
aggregate data on all taxpayers. However, the main argument against ‘publishing
statistics’ comes, in fact, from the Commentaries
to the Convention’s Article 22.2, which expand the meaning to include also not
disclosing information even if “not-taxpayer-specific”:
…Furthermore, the information received by the competent authority of a Party, whether taxpayer-specific or not, should not be disclosed to persons or authorities not mentioned in paragraph 2, regardless of domestic information disclosure laws such as freedom of information or other legislation that allows greater access to governmental documents. (emphasis added)
But this shouldn’t in fact be an obstacle.
Even in light of Article 22.2, countries should be free to publish statistics about
the information they received (“we received information about 1000 accounts
held by our taxpayers in country X”), because in this case they wouldn’t be
disclosing the “information received”: they would be disclosing the calculations
(aggregation) they made about the information they received.
Indeed, some countries are already publishing
statistics based on automatic exchange of information.
Switzerland’s statistics were published by Der
Bund (“Bank accounts abroad. In which foreign states, Bern taxpayers hold
the most bank accounts”):
The Swiss newspaper Blick
also reported on 4.744 requests for administrative assistance on tax matters
received by Switzerland from other countries. Leading the requests were
Ireland, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and India.
Argentina’s La
Nación published that in 2018 the country received information about 175.000
foreign accounts. The top financial centres used by Argentine taxpayers to hold
their accounts were Spain, Italy, Uruguay, the UK and Germany.
The UK published that in 2018 they
received information on 5.7 million accounts – compared to just 1.6 million
accounts in 2017 (1.3 million of those held by individuals). The jump is likely
to be because more countries joined automatic exchanges in 2018.
Even the OECD said they will publish
statistics: not about banking information, but about another type of
information that is shared among countries via automatic exchange of
information: country-by-country (CbC) reports on multinationals’ activities,
income employees, assets and taxes paid in each jurisdiction. Unlike banking
information, we at the Tax Justice Network believe that country-by-country reports
should be public and published online by every multinational. However, the
OECD established a complex framework for it to be exchanged automatically,
limiting the access and use that countries can give to these CbC reports. But
at least there will be statistics about these country-by-country reports, as
described by the OECD in its 2019
report to the G20:
In addition, the first aggregated and anonymised statistics prepared from data collected on CbC reports have now been prepared by OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework members and provided to the OECD for processing. The statistics are being provided for CbC reports relating to fiscal years beginning between 1 January 2016 and 1 July 2016, preserving the anonymity of MNE groups and the confidentiality of individual CbC reports. In total, there were 58 OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework members that had implemented CbC Reporting or had voluntary parent filing for the 2016 fiscal year, and it is estimated that only around 35 of those member jurisdictions received sufficient numbers of CbC reports to provide aggregated and anonymised statistics. Of those 35 jurisdictions, 26 jurisdictions have currently provided aggregated and anonymised statistics to the OECD covering around 4 100 CbC reports overall
How
to ensure that all countries publish statistics about automatic exchange of
information?
Some countries may disagree with our view
and consider instead that the Convention’s current text doesn’t even authorise
the publication of statistics. In relation to this, a few weeks ago we
published another blog
on automatic exchange of information, looking at why the international
protocols only allowed this information to be used for tax purposes, even
though many others (such as authorities fighting corruption and money
laundering) had a legitimate and often urgent need to access the information. We
recommended that countries sending the information sign a declaration
authorising recipients to use the data beyond tax collection, based on another
Article of the Convention. We believe the same could apply for publishing statistics.
The Convention does authorise these extra
uses (beyond tax purposes) and sharing of information (beyond tax authorities),
if a country’s domestic laws allow this extra use, and if the jurisdiction
sending the information authorises this too.
information received by a Party may be used for other purposes when such information may be used for such other purposes under the laws of the supplying Party and the competent authority of that Party authorises such use…
Countries could thus sign a declaration
stating something like “We declare in relation to the Convention’s Article 22.4
that, since our domestic laws allow the publication of statistics, we also authorise the recipient country to publish statistics on the information that we
sent them pursuant to the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard for automatic
exchange of information.”
A
silver bullet that circumvents the legal obstacles
Yet there is an even stronger solution allowing
countries to publish statistics without other countries’ authorisation.
As we noted here
and here,
statistics don’t need to be about the bank account information received
from other countries, but about bank accounts held by foreigners in each
country’s banks. In other words, the countries sending the information should
publish aggregate data (statistics) about the information they are about to
send. They hold the information in the first place, so they don’t need to ask
permission from any foreign country. This
is also better, because it is more comprehensive. Instead, statistics only on
information being exchanged exclude data from residents in developing
countries that aren’t able to join the system (because their information won’t be
exchanged yet).
In Point 1 about “basic information for
developing countries,” we were referring to statistics on the accounts held by
non-residents in each financial centre. We mentioned that the Bank for
International Settlements as well as the US and the Swiss central banks already
publish this kind of data. Even so, their data may still be misleading because
they refer to the “legal owners” who hold the accounts, but not to the
“beneficial owners” (the real individuals who ultimately own or benefit from
the accounts). For example, if an Argentine individual held an account in a
Swiss bank through a Panamanian company, the central bank’s statistics would show
that account as owned by Panama (the legal owner), but not Argentina (where the
beneficial owner resides).
On the other hand, information collected by
banks and sent to tax authorities for the purposes of automatic exchange of
banking information do contain details on the beneficial owners of the accounts.
Therefore, statistics on these data would be more relevant. Statistics
published by Switzerland’s tax authorities would show, in the above example, how
many accounts (and how much money) held in Swiss banks are owned by Argentine
individuals, even if they held them via Panamanian companies.
To grasp how useful statistics may be, look
for instance at these US
statistics published by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), based on American taxpayers who
self-declared their holdings, classified by the value of their holdings –
sometimes as high as more than USD 5 billion:
Imagine if we had the same information but
about non-residents holding assets in US banks. Illicit financial flows and
inequality would then be much easier to measure and combat.
Conclusion
Tax authorities should publish statistics on banking data received from local
financial institutions for the purposes of automatic exchange of information.
These statistics would enable developing countries, civil society organisations
and journalists to know how much money is held in each financial centre by the
residents of each country. This statistical information would help
measure capital flight, inequality, identify the most relevant financial
centres chosen by a country’s residents, and also allow authorities in
developing countries unable to join the automatic exchange system to do basic
cross-checks against information reported by local taxpayers. Statistics would
also allow authorities to hold financial institutions to account and make sure
that they are complying with the system. If the statistics also covered
information being exchanged, they would also show whether authorities can use
and are using the information they received from other countries.
Climate breakdown represents an existential threat to the future of humanity. Unless governments around the world take urgent action to reduce carbon emissions to net zero, it seems likely that the very best-case scenario is that many of the global development achievements of the last few decades will be wiped out. The fight for climate justice is inextricably linked to the struggle for tax justice around the world, not least because the transition to zero carbon will require a root-and-branch restructuring of the global economic system.
There
are many ways in which tax reform can support the transition to a zero-carbon
global economy. Broadly speaking, well-designed tax systems can generate additional
revenues, redistribute resources and reprice carbon-intensive activities to
enable (and, in the latter case, incentivise) a quicker and more complete
transition.
The Tax Justice Network is not currently working on climate issues, but we recognise the scale and urgency of the climate crisis, and hence the importance of taking action now. We also recognise that a number of initiatives around climate and tax are already underway, with others planned. We are therefore commissioning a scoping report to look at the opportunities for building on our expertise and networks to take on specific areas of work around climate and tax justice where we might be able to make a contribution in the coming years.
We are seeking a consultant to scope out the existing range of activities and initiatives around climate and tax, to undertake a gap analysis, and to develop and propose implementable options for the Tax Justice Network, acting alone or in partnership with others, to contribute in the short and medium term to the ongoing effort to reshape the global economy to enable a just transition to zero carbon, whether through the undertaking or commissioning of original research, the development of policy proposals, advocacy work, and/or communications activities.
Interested parties should submit a proposal by 15 July. We anticipate that the assignment will require 20 days of work in August and September, with a report due in early October.
We’re hiring again! Details of the new Data Scientist role below, and job information pack to download here.
Key facts
Application closing date: Sunday 21 July 2019
Start date: September or October 2019
Reports to: Chief Executive
Contract: Permanent
Hours: Full-time (37.5 hours per week)
Salary: £42,000, plus 12% employer pension contribution
Location: Home-based (anywhere in the world, subject to contracting requirements)
Organisation
The Tax Justice Network (TJN) is an independent
international network, launched in 2003. It is dedicated to high-level
research, analysis and advocacy in
the area of international tax and financial regulation, including the role of
tax havens. TJN maps, analyses and explains the harmful impacts of tax evasion,
tax avoidance and tax competition; and supports the engagement of citizens,
civil society organisations and policymakers with the aim of a more just tax
system. TJN pursues systemic changes that address the international inequality
in the distribution of taxing rights between countries; the national
inequalities – including gender inequalities – that arise from poor tax
policies; and the national and international obstacles to progressive national
tax policies and effective financial regulation.
Supported by a major five-year grant from the Ford Foundation, and grants
from other funders including Norad and the Adessium Foundation, TJN is in a
period of growth and transition, with a focus on institutional strengthening –
building systems and capabilities to enable and support growth and impact
through our ambitious five-year strategic programme. TJN is a virtual
organisation, with staff working from home across multiple countries and
continents, although its legal base (and that of many employees) is in the UK.
Role description
The Data Scientist is a new post, created to build on the increasing
range of TJN projects and products that generate and analyse data, including
the Financial Secrecy Index and the newly launched Corporate Tax Haven Index,
as well as our work on the scale of tax injustice, human rights and the race to
the bottom. Most of our work is data-intensive, and we need to be able to
communicate technical data to a wider audience as part of our work to change
narratives around the global tax and financial system. The Data Scientist will
help us to do this by curating, using and presenting data in a more systematic,
ambitious and user-friendly way.
The role will focus on creating baseline structures for our data use and
dissemination, connecting and curating new databases and data visualisations to
support future reports, undertaking rapid analyses of data produced by partners
or covered in the news, providing original research and data support to the
four TJN workstreams, working with internal and external stakeholders to ensure
data integrity and compatibility, and undertaking other original (and often
peer-reviewed) research.
We are looking for an experienced and capable data professional with
strong technical skills, who combines attention to detail and a commitment to
excellence with the ability to produce results quickly and with minimal
support. The right candidate will have strong interpersonal and team-working
skills, as well as a can-do attitude and the willingness to work remotely and
with limited supervision. We are flexible about where in the world the
postholder is located (and in which time zone), subject to the need to find a
contracting arrangement that meets all applicable compliance requirements.
Responsibilities
Creating baseline (infra)structure for TJN’s
data use and dissemination while maintaining integrity of, and engaging with,
existing databases (for example, to enable the development of an online data
portal on the risk exposure of a range of countries to illicit financial flows)
Creating databases and related data
visualisations to support new reports and outputs (for example, a ‘state of the
world’ report on tax justice, with indices and estimates of revenue loss and so
on)
Undertaking reactive work based on reports
and research published by other organisations (for example, running quick
analyses and producing databases and visualisations using datasets or indices
published by financial journalists or by other economic justice research and
advocacy organisations)
Providing data support and original research
for the four TJN workstreams (financial secrecy, scale of tax
injustice, tax justice and human rights, and the race to the bottom)
Undertaking
other original research and taking it through the process of peer review and
publication
Person specification
Skills
Data / You will need to be comfortable working with and
manipulating large datasets
IT / You will need to be very comfortable working with
advanced statistical software
Communications
/ You will need to be able to tell
compelling and accessible stories using data, as well as communicating effectively
and succinctly with colleagues and partners in person and in writing
Delivery / You will need to be able to cope with a large,
complicated and varied workload, working quickly and efficiently without
sacrificing the quality of the results
Management / You will need to be able to engage with a wide
range of stakeholders and to manage projects run by specialist external IT
firms or contractors
Attributes
Commitment / To be focused on achieving high standards in pursuit
of TJN’s objectives
Adaptability /To find
ways of dealing with unexpected opportunities and challenges
Resourcefulness
/ To achieve results with limited
financial and human resources
Collaboration
/ To work supportively and
effectively as part of a team
Integrity / To choose the right course of action when the
alternative might be easier
How to apply
Please upload a CV and answer a series of questions (addressing the skills listed in the person specification as well as your motivation) at www.taxjustice.net/ds by Sunday 21 July 2019 at 23.59 GMT. You do not need to address the attributes; these will be explored at interview. We anticipate that first round interviews will be held between in early- or mid-August, by remote video link (Zoom). For an informal discussion about the role, contact Alex Cobham, Chief Executive, on alex AT taxjustice DOT net.
Should we at the Tax Justice Network be doing more to engage with organisations in the global south? Should we be focusing more on high-level advocacy or talking more about progressive taxes instead of tax avoidance? These questions and more were put to us at our organisational retreat this spring by sector peers, network members and funders.
Each year, the Tax Justice Network invites a range of stakeholders to present us with a “challenge” to our current work and goals to discuss at our team retreat. The aim is to help us consider our work from different perspectives, to identify new avenues we could be exploring or to emphasise the importance of continuing work on specific issues. All in all, it helps keep us on our toes.
The “challenges” presented to us this year were:
The Tax Justice Network should do more to engage with organisations in the global south, made by Latindadd
The Tax Justice Network should do more to shape the next generation international tax system, by analysing more ‘second best’ solutions and thus increasing our influence on OECD and other global processes, made by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)
The Tax Justice Network should do more northern high-level advocacy on our key policy asks, made by the Ford Foundation and the FACT Coalition
The Tax Justice Network should develop credible and high-quality research to help guide tax justice campaigns, made by Sol Picciotto, emeritus professor of law at Lancaster University, coordinator of the BEPS Monitoring Group and Tax Justice Network senior adviser
The Tax Justice Network should contribute to rethinking financial accounting and audit, and how it relates to financial secrecy and tax injustice, made by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)
The Tax Justice Network should stop focusing primarily on tackling tax avoidance and evasion and make a broad case for progressive taxes, for example smarter taxes on wealth, made by Tax Justice UK
For each challenge made at our retreat, we broke out into smaller teams to discuss and write down both ‘for’ and ‘against’ arguments. The teams then came together to discuss and craft a unified response. You can read our responses here. We welcome all comments on these challenges and our responses to them.
Thank you to our sector peers, network members and funders for presenting us with these helpful, thought-provoking challenges.
How have former colonial powers
maintained their stranglehold on African economies? The UK with its spider’s web
of satellite jurisdictions and France are complicit in undermining the ability
of African governments to tax multinational companies. Other corporate tax
havens also put African countries at risk.
The Corporate
Tax Haven Index,
published last month by the Tax Justice Network, reveals how the UK and a
handful of other OECD countries are most responsible for the breakdown in the
global corporate tax system. Globally, $500 billion in corporate tax is
dodged each year. In
Africa, estimates suggest that as much as $50
billion is lost annually through illicit financial flows. Across
the African continent, multinational companies are extracting resources,
selling products and using labour, but often they’re paying far too little tax.
Global
corrosive corporate tax havenry
The new Corporate Tax Haven
Index identifies the most corrosive corporate tax havens in the world as the
UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The UK with its network of overseas
territories and crown dependencies is responsible for over a third of
corporate tax avoidance risks.
These corporate tax
havens ruthlessly undermine the ability of governments to tax
multinational companies. This means ordinary African citizens have to pay more
taxes on personal income, on basic food items and on services since the most
vulnerable in society end up shouldering the biggest burden of taxation.
African nations may also be forced to borrow money or rely on aid from some of
the very same corporate tax havens that are lining their pockets as a result of
tax avoidance.
France and the UK are identified in
the Corporate Tax Haven Index as the most aggressive OECD countries towards
low-income and lower-middle income countries. France secured some of the
largest reductions in withholding tax with its former colonies Burkina Faso,
Niger and Togo. Withholding tax allows countries to
deduct tax on royalties, dividends, interest or other payments made by
subsidiaries to companies or individuals outside the country.
Over one-third of inward foreign direct investment in African countries is in partnership with the top 10 countries in the Corporate Tax Haven Index, those same countries that have done the most to proliferate corporate tax avoidance and break down the global corporate tax system.
The Corporate Tax Haven Index
meticulously evaluates the tax system of each country by looking at its laws,
regulations and documented administrative practices. The twenty haven indicators are spread across five categories:
the lowest available corporate income tax offered, loopholes and gaps in a
country’s tax system, such as tax exemptions and tax holidays, transparency in
corporate reporting, tax rulings and avoidance schemes, anti-avoidance measures
in place and the aggressiveness of double tax treaties.
Based on the haven indicators, the
index gives each country a score on how much its tax system enables corporate
tax avoidance and then combines that score with the amount of corporate
activity taking place in the country in order to determine how much corporate
activity is being put at risk of tax avoidance. The greater the share of the
world’s corporate activity jeopardised by the country’s tax system, the higher the
country ranks on the index.
Of the 64 countries included in the
index, nine are African countries, and the world’s most well-known corporate tax havens and major financial centres.
For all countries, a detailed scorecard is available on each of the 20 haven
indicators: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa and Tanzania.
Aggressive
tax treaties
Even though no African countries
feature in the top 10, we still need to watch out for the race to the bottom in
tax rates between African countries. Mauritius, for example, exposes many
African countries to corporate tax avoidance through double tax agreements with
its lowest available corporate income tax of 0%. The agreement signed between
Senegal and Mauritius is one of the most aggressive – no withholding tax on
dividends, interest or royalty payments.
The chart below demonstrates how the former colonial powers France and the UK continue to negotiate aggressive double tax treaties with African nations. Yet even they are surpassed by the United Arab Emirates and Mauritius, which have negotiated the greatest withholding tax reductions with African countries.
Normalised scores of most aggressive double taxation treaty partners towards African countries
Despite evidence that the tax treaties signed by
African nations result in revenue loss rather than additional investment,
African governments continue to put pen to paper and lock their citizens into
destructive deals.
On the launch of the Corporate Tax Haven Index, Alvin Mosioma, Executive Director of the Tax Justice Network Africa, has once again questioned the Kenyan government’s decision to re-sign a tax treaty with Mauritius. President Uhuru Kenyatta signed the agreement with Mauritius in April 2019 just after a court ruled that an earlier agreement was invalid, following Tax Justice Network Africa’s petition:
It is unacceptable that the Kenyan government is shifting the burden of taxation to the ordinary citizen, while deliberately opening doors for the wealthy elite and unscrupulous MNCs [multinational corporations] to evade and avoid taxes through DTAAs [Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement] with secretive tax havens.
The individual policy categories and
indicators in the Corporate Tax Haven Index reveal concrete policies and steps
African nations could take at home in order to address tax avoidance across all
sectors.
Comparison of five corporate tax haven categories for Africa, the EU and OECD and dependencies
As the chart above shows, in comparison with countries and their dependencies in the OECD and the European Union, African nations have less aggressive treaty networks, have protected higher corporate income tax rates and have fewer loopholes and gaps in their taxation systems that encourage profit-shifting activity and the race to the bottom in corporate taxation. Nevertheless, African countries show a high presence of tax exemptions and holidays and in the categories of anti-avoidance and transparency, African countries have room to improve.
Anti-avoidance measures can also be
improved to reduce the risk of base erosion and profit shifting. Robust controlled foreign company
rules and withholding taxes on outbound
dividends can act as
a barrier to shifting untaxed profits to secrecy jurisdictions and zero corporate
tax havens. Deduction limitation rules could be introduced or strengthened to
prevent multinationals from deducting interest, royalties and certain service payments from their tax base if paid to other subsidiaries
of the same multinational. Any upcoming trade agreement on the African
continent should ensure that such defensive measures remain compatible with the
trade regime and regulations. The Rwandan example of limiting the deduction of
outbound royalties is a case that warrants close examination by African peers.
At the same time, African nations should withstand the temptation and false
lure of introducing patent box regimes themselves and consider appropriate
reactions to countries that do, including Botswana, the Seychelles and
Mauritius.
A key area of improvement in the loopholes
and gaps category in the Corporate Tax Haven Index can be achieved by
addressing tax incentives. African governments have granted many sectoral
exemptions and tax holidays. These profit-based incentives are costly and,
contrary to popular opinion, they usually fail to attract additional desirable
direct investment as shown in the Tax Justice Network’s study of incentives in Ghana, Kenya,
Liberia, Tanzania and South Africa.
Governments would be far better off raising taxes to pay for better roads and
energy provision, since enabling conditions like good infrastructure, the rule
of law and macroeconomic stability are more decisive for investors than tax
incentives and a prerequisite for ensuring investment
schemes are effective.
This is shown time and again in investment climate surveys for low income countries.
Uniting
behind the unitary approach
Corporate tax avoidance is a global
problem that requires global solutions and action. Domestic reform will only go
so far since the Corporate Tax Haven Index suggests that so far Africa is less
engaged in the ruinous race to the bottom in corporate taxation than countries
in the OECD and the European Union. The overarching solution that has gained some ground recently with the
International Monetary Fund
and the Tax Justice Network has been advocating for years is the unitary
tax approach.
The unitary approach treats a
multinational corporate group as a single entity. This means that total global
profits would be allocated – or apportioned – to the countries where the
company does business in proportion to genuine economic activity carried out by
each subsidiary. In this way, corporate tax havens where there is little or no
genuine economic activity would be cut out. Instead countries where the
resources are extracted or where significant staff are employed, for example,
will be able to tax the share of global profits. This approach would allow
African countries to raise the taxes that are rightly theirs to achieve the sustainable
development goals, reduce reliance on aid and address inequality.
During the OECD’s consultations on the best way to tax in the digital
economy, unitary taxation with formulary apportionment has become the leading
alternative to the arm’s length approach. African nations along with other
lower to middle income regions need to remain alert and resolute in these
discussions because they will have ramifications for taxation in all sectors,
and hopefully lead to greater taxing rights and revenue. A good performance on
the indicators of the Corporate Tax Haven Index helps in ensuring that a broad
tax base is supported in any future shift towards unitary taxation, such as by
including capital gains and investment income in the tax base, and by constraining tax loss carry backward
or forward provisions.
Take a look at the Corporate Tax Haven Index to identify how your country’s revenue and resources are exposed to corporate tax avoidance.
Welcome to this month’s latest podcast and radio programme in Spanish
with Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez, free to download and broadcast on
radio networks across Latin America and Spain. ¡Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a nuestro podcast y programa radiofónica! (abajo en Castellano.
Tax Justice Network acaba de publicar un nuevo índice de guaridas fiscales de las corporaciones. Encabezan el ranking las Islas Virgenes Británicas, las Bermudas y las islas Caiman. Y es muy interesante que una cosa que tienen en común estas tres jurisdicciones, además de ser guaridas fiscales, es que pertenecen a las llamadas dependencias de ultramar del Reino Unido. ¿Qué son las dependencias de ultramar del Reino Unido? Son uno de esos engendros jurídico-políticos de los británicos para mantener la soberanía final del territorio, pero alegando, cuando es conveniente, que no tienen potestad sobre lo que pasa allí. En definitiva, es mío, pero no soy responsable.
The UN this month published a document titled ‘Practices and Working Methods for the Committee Of Experts On International Cooperation In Tax Matters’. For those who believe that the UN should play a stronger role in the governance of international tax, this is a welcome development. The document further deepens the institutionalisation of the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters (henceforth UN tax committee) by developing new working methods and making several clarifications. Some of these are welcome while others are problematic. Overall, it is clarified that the working methods must be read in conjunction with the rules of procedure of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and in the case of inconsistency, the ECOSOC rules are to prevail.
Role of Observers
The most important aspect of the new working methods concerns the
observers. Observers include both official delegations sent to represent
a country as well as non-state actors such as business, academics and
civil society. Observers play an influential role in the UN tax
committee. One must only examine the composition of any of the
sub-committees of the UN tax committee to see the large number of
observers, especially from business and industry. As an example, the
composition of the sub-committee on extractive industries can be seen here.
It consists of two co-coordinators and has four member countries as
participants, meaning six countries represented. However, it has thirty
observers, with thirteen (nearly half) representing business. Observers
influence the committee by arguing their case and are often invited by
sub-committee coordinators to present papers and guidance notes. These
documents play an agenda-setting role and even make their way into final
policy documents such as model conventions, handbooks and guidebooks.
This can at times be problematic because the coordinator can succumb to
vested interests and call only certain organizations such as big
business or oil and gas majors to present guidance notes and in this way
prepare policy in their interest. The working methods have several
provisions regarding the role of observers and given their importance
these require careful scrutiny.
Throughout the working methods, great care has been taken to ensure
that observers are involved and are given due voice. This is rather
problematic and a double-edged sword. In the present context, the UN tax
committee is possibly the sole global tax institution in which
developing countries are in a majority (albeit wafer-thin) and can
freely express themselves. In theory it is possible that observers will
include a mix of interests, but a cursory examination of the existing
observers in the sub-committees makes it clear that many of them
represent developed country interests . Apart from the aforementioned
example of the sub-committee on extractives, one can also refer to the
composition of the sub-committee on transfer pricing, which as of this
writing has nineteen observers, of which nine represent business and one
represents the OECD. In such a context, excessively involving developed
country voices through the route of ‘observers’ amounts to a
browbeating of developing country voices. Nevertheless, it is welcome
that now at least some rules have been developed where none earlier
existed, enabling some checks and balances on abuse of power. They are
examined as follows.
Part III of the working methods deal with closed consultations.
Observers are allowed to take part in these and point 9 even clarifies
that closed consultations ‘should not impede obtaining relevant input
from Observers’! Point 12 further clarifies that scheduling of these
closed consultations should account for the attendance of observers. It
is not mentioned as to how precisely it will be decided which observers
to involve in such a consultation and why.
Part V deals with conduct of business and point 23 states that ‘input
or information from Observers or other stakeholders should be given
appropriate consideration in the work of the Committee, especially where
comments have been requested by the Committee.’ It is not clarified who
in the Committee can request this information, why and whether it can
be challenged or opposed. Point 24 adds that even if inputs have not
been requested from Observers, these can still be forwarded to the
Committee if the Secretariat and Chairperson deem it necessary. This
gives the Chairperson significant power in agenda-setting. Points 48
allows for an Observer State participant to be a co-coordinator of a
subcommittee. Thus, even non-members of the UN tax committee can now be
co-coordinators, though this can take place only on an ‘exceptional
basis’. Point 49 clarifies that observers can be sub-committee members,
institutionalising a long-followed practice.
On the positive side, it has been clarified that observers do not get to vote, and that the committee may decide to limit participation in a sub-committee only to members or to members and observer states. This is welcome. Even more welcome is point 54 which states, ‘the composition of Subcommittees should include a majority of Members and State Observers unless, on a recommendation from the Coordinator of a particular Subcommittee, the Committee agrees to a different composition of the particular Subcommittee.’ Presently in many of the subcommittees the members are outnumbered by observers. As mentioned, observers usually represent developed country interests and limiting their participation will reduce the ‘drowning out’ of developing country voices. This is buttressed by point 20 which addresses this issue and seeks to rectify it by stating that members should speak first before the floor is given to observers. Point 55 adds that sub-committees should try and ensure regional diversity and developing country representation.
2. Role of Sub-Committees and Coordinators
After observers, the next most important aspect of the working
methods relates to sub-committees and coordinators. A large chunk of the
UN tax committee’s work is carried out through the sub-committees.
These working methods for the first time spell out some rules that will
now govern their functioning. Point 42 clarifies the relationship
between subcommittees and the committee by stating that subcommittees
make recommendations, but the final decision is to be taken by the
committee. Point 43 specifies that any Member can propose the creation
or abolition of a sub-committee though it is not specified whether its
creation requires consensus or majority support. The working methods
only mention ‘sufficient support’ which is ambiguous. The possibility
for creating more ad-hoc bodies has been potentially increased by
allowing for mandate-driven subcommittees. This is welcome as it
potentially enables the UN tax committee to deal with a much broader
range of issues. The coordinator plays a powerful role as s/he will
determine which observers can participate in a subcommittee, though this
has to be approved by the Committee. As per point 58, members can now
oppose the addition or removal of an observer. This is welcome and
allows for checks on unwelcome ‘stacking’ of subcommittees. Point 62
allows coordinators to involve ad hoc observers in a meeting, though
there is no provision to put a check on this. This needs to be monitored
as it is liable to abuse.
Points 64 and 65 importantly encourage conference calls and electronic means of communication to maximise participation while keeping a convenient time in mind. Travelling all the way to the UN is often expensive for developing country participants and this provision eases things.
3. Additional working methods
The Secretariat and the Chairperson have been given the power to
determine the provisional agenda which has to be subsequently approved
by the Committee. The Chairperson’s powers have been increased to
summarise the conclusions reached by the Committee and alter timelines
for certain decisions. Point 21 clarifies that one member has one vote
and that only members can vote, adding that ‘consensus is desirable’.
This probably will be ignored because in the committee voting is
necessary to break the deadlocks that arise. Point 22 says that the
Committee can take decisions even when not in session and lays out the
procedure for doing so. This can increase its productivity given that it
has only two sessions in a year. The working methods contain some other
details on procedures for approving documents.
Conclusion
The working methods are a boost to the UN tax committee’s overall
functioning as it clarifies the powers and functions of various actors
and creates new procedures to streamline and increase the committee’s
efficiency. The new rules are largely beneficial and can limit the undue
influence of outside actors such as observers, increase productivity by
allowing decision making outside sessions and create ad-hoc committees
to deal with a wider range of issues.
There are several unanswered questions, however. It needs to be clarified:
(1) how will it be decided which observers to invite for closed consultations,
(2) who in the Committee can request inputs from observers and whether there is any option to block such a request,
(3) whether Committee members can override the Chairperson if s/he
decides to invite inputs from observers which are deemed unnecessary or
unwarranted,
(4) what exactly the ‘exceptional basis’ is on which observers can be made sub-committee co-coordinators,
(5) what extent of support is needed for a Member’s proposal to create or abolish a sub-committee and
(6) whether it is possible to regulate the involvement of ad-hoc observers in sub-committee meetings.
It is hoped that future rules will fill these gaps. Such refinement
of institutional rules will continue to strengthen the UN tax committee
on its journey towards being a genuinely representative global tax
authority.
We’re hiring again! Details of the new Operations Associate role below, and job information pack to download here.
Key facts:
Application closing date: Sunday 7 July 2019 Start date: Monday 2 September 2019 Reports to: Director of Operations Contract: Permanent Hours: Between 15 and 22 hours per week (spread over three to five days per week) Salary: £26,000 pro rata (£10,400 to £15,600 per annum, based on hours worked) Location: Home-based (anywhere in the world, subject to contracting requirements)
Role description
Supported by a major five-year grant from the Ford Foundation, and grants from other funders including Norad and the Adessium Foundation, the Tax Justice Network is in a period of growth and transition, with a focus on institutional strengthening – building systems and capabilities to enable and support growth and impact through our ambitious five-year strategic programme. TJN is a virtual organisation, with staff working from home across multiple countries and continents, although its legal base (and that of many employees) is in the UK.
The Operations Associate is a new post, created to support this
institutional strengthening process by working with the Director of Operations
to build, manage and run a set of key systems and processes covering a range of
organisational capabilities, including IT, HR, grant management, events,
finance and monitoring, evaluation and learning. The post will also provide some
administrative support to TJN’s Chief Executive.
We are looking for someone who is genuinely enthusiastic about building
systems and processes to make a brilliant organisation even more effective and
efficient. This is an amazing opportunity for someone with excellent IT skills,
motivation and organisation, as well as very strong interpersonal and team
skills, to help a small but rapidly growing organisation, which already punches
well above its weight on the global stage, to get to the next stage in its growth.
This is not primarily an ‘administrative’ role, although there is some
administration involved; it is, above all, about identifying and exploiting
opportunities to make improvements to the ways in which we work together so
that we can make the best use of our limited resources.
We are flexible about where in the world the postholder is located (and
in which time zone), subject to the need to find a contracting arrangement that
meets all applicable compliance requirements. We are also flexible about time
commitments; we are looking for someone who can work for between 15 and 22
hours per week (between 40% and 60%), as long as the hours worked are spread
over at least three days per week (ideally not consecutive days).
Responsibilities
Keep cloud-based IT systems up to date, order IT equipment and deal
with basic IT support requests
Organise staff meetings, board meetings and other internal events
Provide administrative support for events and travel, e.g.
venue/flight/accommodation bookings
Provide project management support across the team, including covering
temporary capacity gaps
Support the Chief Executive
with travel and diary management
Support the Director of Operations in building, developing and managing
new cloud-based IT systems
Support the Director of Operations in managing software subscriptions
and IT assets
Support the Director of Operations in preparing contracts for employees
and consultants
Support the Director of Operations in managing day-to-day HR and risk
management processes
Support the Director of Operations in meeting funders’ contractual and
reporting requirements
Support the Director of Operations in recording contact management
system data from across the team
Support the Director of Operations in recording monitoring and
evaluation data from across the TJN team
Support the Finance Manager in processing invoices, getting purchase
approvals and preparing payments
Person specification
Skills
IT / You will need to be very comfortable with advanced cloud
software, including databases and website content management systems, as well
as being fully proficient with standard office software.
Numeracy / You will need to be comfortable working with and
manipulating numbers, for example in working with quantitative monitoring data
and financial management systems.
Communications
/ You will need to be able to
communicate effectively, accurately and succinctly, both in person and in
writing.
Delivery / You will need to be able to cope with a large,
complicated and varied workload, working quickly and efficiently without
sacrificing the quality of the results.
Attributes
Commitment / To be focused on achieving high standards in pursuit
of TJN’s objectives
Adaptability /To find
ways of dealing with unexpected opportunities and challenges
Resourcefulness
/ To achieve results with limited
financial and human resources
Collaboration
/ To work supportively and
effectively as part of a team
Integrity / To choose the right course of action when the
alternative might be easier
How to apply
Please upload a CV and answer a series of questions (addressing the skills listed in the person specification as well as your motivation) at www.taxjustice.net/oa by Sunday 7 July 2019 at 23.59 GMT. You do not need to address the attributes; these will be explored at interview. We anticipate that first round interviews will be held between 11 and 19 July, by remote video link (Zoom). For an informal discussion about the role, contact Will Snell, Director of Operations, on will AT taxjustice.net.
The Finance Curse is a concept first developed by the Tax Justice Network. It is a relatively simple idea — and also an original and powerful multi-level critique of the modern global economy.
The core message is “too much finance can make a country poorer,” and this article explains why this is so, by framing the issue in simple terms. (It complements this page showing over 20 academic studies which support the proposition that “too much finance can make you poorer.”)
All this has geographical, racial, gender, and disability-based implications, as laid out here.
We’ve written many times about Swiss whistleblower Rudolf Elmer’s long legal battles against Swiss banking secrecy here, here, herehere and here. He’s endured 48 prosecutorial interrogations, 6 months in solitary confinement and 70 court rulings. Of one thing you can be sure – if the Swiss bank he worked for and the Swiss authorities thought it’d be easy to defend banking secrecy and the terrible harm it does, they picked the wrong person to fight. There are those who would have you believe that Swiss banking secrecy is over, but we can assure you that’s far from the case. Switzerland is still ranked number one in our Financial Secrecy Index. Let’s see how it does in our next assessment, due in 2020.
We wrote about the latest court case here. We’re now able to share with you below a detailed legal commentary on this 14-year judicial and media scandal, but that wasn’t possible until Rudolf Elmer had received (in February 2019) the 46-page verdict from the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on its decision of October 10th 2018, where after a public hearing before judges (lasting 150 minutes – without the parties present) the criminal chamber of the Federal Court delivered a groundbreaking judgment in the case of Rudolf Elmer regarding violation of bank secrecy, and other matters by 3 votes to 2. Most importantly, the charge of violation of Swiss bank secrecy alleged against Elmer brought by the Higher Prosecution Office of the Canton of Zurich was rejected by the Federal court and the acquittal of Rudolf Elmer by the High Court of the Canton of Zurich was confirmed.
The Federal Court also upheld the
complaint by Rudolf Elmer concerning the imposition of an advance
payment for the release of confiscated data and documents as well as the
modalities for the return of the personal data of the Elmer family. His
complaint against the imposition of three-quarters of the costs of the
case, including the investigation costs, in the amount of CHF 320,000,
and against the penalty for convictions for document forgery and
threatening behaviour, were rejected by the Federal court.
Aspects of the case will continue to the European Court of Human Rights but in the meantime here’s an essay by Swiss law professor Dr Werner Kallenberger, written here in German and also translated into English and available here. He writes that:
“The internationally known, disparaged trial with irresponsibly high material and immaterial completely unnecessary costs could and should have been avoided if the public prosecutor’s offices and courts concerned of the state of Zurich…had correctly adhered to governing laws, doctrine and jurisdiction.
If the public prosecutor’s office in charge of this case and the courts of Zürich had, from the first day of the investigation July 27, 2005, not acted irresponsibly, but had correctly adhered to the governing laws, doctrine and jurisdiction, much of the costs could have been avoided.”
Welcome to the seventeenth edition of our monthly Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. (In Arabic below) Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة is produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and Osama Diab of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, also an investigative journalist. The programme is available for listeners to download and it’s also available for free to any radio stations who would like to broadcast it. You can also join the programme on Facebook and on Twitter.
Taxes Simply #17 – The New Corporate Tax Haven Index. Plus, we analyse the Moroccan National Dialogue on Taxes
In this edition, we begin with our news roundup of the most important tax news from the region and the world, including: 1) the postponing of the publication of official income and expenditure data in Egypt because its results contradict what the state considers to be its economic achievements 2) BAT shifts $1 billion from low and middle income countries to its office in the United Kingdom 3) The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement comes into force 4) Kuwait discusses imposing a 5% tax on foreign workers remittances
In the second part, Walid Ben Rhouma interviews the Moroccan economist Najib Akesbi on the 3rd Moroccan National Dialogue on Taxation that took place on the 4th and 5th of May, 2019
In the third and last section, Ben Rhouma and Osama Diab discuss the Corporate Tax Haven Index which was just published by the Tax Justice Network. Their new index ranks countries by their complicity in global corporate tax havenry and their contribution to tax havenry worldwide. It identifies four countries which it describes as the “avoidance axis” which contribute the most to global corporate tax avoidance. The index complements its Financial Secrecy Index which ranks countries by their contribution to global financial secrecy focusing on individuals rather than multinational companies.
الجباية ببساطة #١٧ – مؤشر جديد للملاذات الضريبية وتحليل المناظرة الوطنية حول الجبايات في المغرب
أهلا بكم في العدد السابع عشر من الجباية ببساطة. نبدأ العدد كالعادة بأهم أخبار الضرائب والاقتصاد في شهر مايو/آيار من المنطقة والعالم. تضم أخبارنا المتفرقة: ١) تأجيل نشر بحث الدخل والإنفاق الرسمي في مصر لعدم توافقه مع ما تعتبره الدولة إنجازات؛ ٢) بريتش أمريكان توباكو تحول نحو مليار دولار من دول منخفضة ومتوسطة الدخل لمكتبها في المملكة المتحدة؛ ٣) اتفاقية التجارة الحرة القارية الأفريقية تدخل حيز التنفيذ؛ ٤) الكويت تناقش فرض ضرائب بنسبة ٥% على تحويلات العاملين الأجانب.
أما في الجزء الثاني، قام وليد بن رحومة بمحاورة الاقتصادي المغربي نجيب أقصبي حول المناظرة الوطنية الثالثة حول الجبايات في المغرب التي تهدف لإصلاح النظام الضريبي المغربي ليصبح أداة تدعم العدالة الإجتماعية.
في الجزء الثالث والأخير من البرنامج، يلقي وليد بن رحومة وأسامة دياب الضوء على مؤشر الملاذات الضريبية للشركات الصادر حديثا عن شبكة العدالة الضريبية، والذي يصنف الدول حسب مساهمتهم في مخاطر التجنب الضريبي على مستوى العالم. حدد المؤشر أربع دول تزيد مساهمتهم في تعزيز أنظمة التجنب الضريبي على مستوى العالم، وهم الدول التي يصفها المؤشر ب”محور التجنب”.
We’re pleased to share the fourth edition of the Tax Justice Network’s new monthly podcast/radio show for francophone Africa by finance journalist Idriss Linge in Cameroon. The podcast is called Impôts et Justice Sociale, ‘tax and social justice.’ It’s available for anyone who wants to listen to it, and, as is the case with all our monthly podcasts, (Spanish, Arabic, English and Portuguese), it’s free to broadcast for any radio station that wishes to broadcast it. Our French language podcast aims to contribute to ideas and debates on tax justice and social justice in the region. Details of this month’s episode are below.
Nous sommes heureux de partager avec vous cette 4ème émission radio / podcast du Réseau Tax Justice, Tax Justice Network produite en Afrique francophone par le journaliste financier Idriss Linge basé au Cameroun. Le podcast s’appelle Impôts et Justice Sociale. Il est disponible pour tous ceux qui veulent l’écouter et, comme tous nos podcasts mensuels (espagnol, arabe, portugais et anglais), il est gratuit à diffuser pour toute station de radio qui souhaite le diffuser. Ce podcast en langue française vise à susciter des idées et des débats sur la justice fiscale et la justice sociale à de nouveaux publics. Nous partageons ci-dessous le tout premier épisode de ce mois-ci, suivi d’un communiqué de presse avec tous les détails sur le suivi de l’émission et où le trouver.
Cette 4ème édition du podcast francophone du réseau pour la justice fiscale (Tax Justice Network) aborde deux sujets essentiels:
Le premier est celui de la justice fiscale et du genre. A travers des échanges menés avec des femmes vendeuses dans des marchés et des femmes leaders présentes au Cameroun (Afrique Centrale), nous avons confirmé les hypothèses de plusieurs études publiées par International Center on Tax and Development
Le deuxième thème concerne la publication par Tax Justice Network de son Corporate Tax Haven Index, l’indice de paradis fiscale pour les entreprises. Nous y avons découvert des résultats assez surprenants, et nous confirmons surtout que les gouvernements de France et de Grande Bretagne, sont les plus agressif en matière de fiscalité avantageuse au profit de leurs entreprises, mais au détriment des pays qui sont leurs partenaires commerciaux.
“Même si le Royaume-Uni est au 13ème poste du ranking, quatre dépendances et territoires britanniques sont en tête d’index : Jersey, Bermuda, les Iles Cayman, et les Iles Vierges Britanniques. Même si ces territoires dépendent légalement du Royaume Uni, ce dernier à toujours refusé d’imposer des changements définitifs dans ces paradis fiscaux, qui sont en quelque sorte une extension de la finance du Royaume Uni”
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The Tax Justice Network now speaks tax justice in five languages on radio stations and podcast platforms across the world, all with their own unique content and style – English, Spanish, French, Arabic and now Portuguese. So, welcome to our brand new monthly tax justice podcast/radio show in Portuguese. Bem vindas e bem vindos ao É da sua conta, nosso novo podcast em português, o podcast mensal da Tax Justice Network, Rede de Justiça Fiscal. Veja abaixo os detalhes do programa em português.
O download do programa é gratuito e a reprodução é livre para rádios no Brasil e em todos os países lusófonos ou em qualquer parte do mundo e quer entender a relação entre justiça fiscal e o seu dia a dia.
No É da sua conta #1, de maio de 2019, você confere:
O impactante aumento da pobreza no Brasil e no mundo
Como a tributação e o uso dos recursos públicos podem ampliar ou ajudar a reduzir a pobreza
Coluna de Nick Shaxson da Tax Justice Network: os 4 Rs para a tributação: Você sabia que o imposto é muito mais do que aumentar a receita?
Press Release – UAE and Mauritius are the most corrosive corporate tax havens against African countries – Tax Justice Network Africa
Study reveals capture of tax rights in low income countries
Nairobi May 29, 2019, The Corporate Tax Haven Index (CTHI) by Tax Justice Network launched yesterday shows how the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Mauritius are among the most corrosive corporate tax havens against African countries. Kenya and Mauritius signed a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) in May 2012 which Tax Justice Network Africa (TJNA) successfully challenged in the Kenyan high court. The CTHI reinforces the importance of the Kenya High Court rulingthat declared the Kenya-Mauritius treaty null and void by demonstrating the dangers of DTAA signed with tax havens such as Mauritius and UAE in facilitating aggressive tax avoidance resulting to significant revenue loss for many African countries.
The study reveals the nature of secretive tax havens behind failure of the global corporate tax system. CTHI identifies a global network of countries whose jurisdictions are most responsible for aggressively undermining the ability of governments across the world to meaningfully tax multinational corporations (MNC). An estimated $500 billion in corporate tax is dodged each year globally by multinational corporations.
The CTHI shows an aggressive dispossession of low-income countries’ tax rights spearheaded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the UK and France who take advantage of minimal if not non-existent transparency, systemic loopholes and non-implementation of anti-avoidance mechanisms. Of the 64 countries examined from around the world 9 African countries namely; Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa and Tanzania, the CTHI revealed weak tax systems that are constantly exploited resulting to illicit financial flows (IFFs). Specific to Africa, the UAE and Mauritius, are the continent’s most aggressive countries in terms of driving down the withholding tax rates of countries’ through treaties. Many African countries are increasingly opening themselves to such exploitation. For instance, in April 2019 President Uhuru Kenyatta re-signed a DTAA with Mauritius creating a legal conundrum over the treaty, soon after the court ruling invalidated an earlier agreement following TJNA’s petition.
Mr Alvin Mosioma the Executive Director of TJNA said:
It is unacceptable that the Kenyan government is shifting the burden of taxation to the ordinary citizen, while deliberately opening doors for the wealthy elite and unscrupulous MNCs to evade and avoid taxes through DTAAs with secretive tax havens. As confirmed by the recent IMF study and contrary to popular claims, DTAAs signed by African countries with tax havens do not lead to increased investments.
Similar to the High Court ruling, this study underscores the position that DTAAs are often abused and provide loopholes for tax avoidance practices taking away revenues these countries direly need to finance their government programmes.
TJNA affirms its demand that the Government of Kenya and other African Governments should review the old and outdated DTAAs particularly with tax havens including those with UAE, Netherlands, and Mauritius and ensure that those currently under negotiation do not undermine domestic resource mobilisation efforts.
Efforts by African countries to address poverty and achieve sustainable development goals will remain a mirage if these countries do not stem Illicit financial flows and invest in building equitable tax systems
said Mr Mosioma
For more information please contact Cynthia Umurungi on [email protected]
In this special extended edition of the May 2019 Taxcast we go to Preston in the North of England to see the Preston Model in action and how they’re transforming their local economy and democratising wealth. Also:
we discuss dark money and the European elections – the elite interests aligning with the far right.
And we ask: why doesn’t Britain have its own Huawei?
“We needed a new economic model. It was obvious that we needed something new and different and radical, based upon the economic crash of 2008 which affected us quite badly. That wealth extraction, that straight-jacket that we’re in, we want to tackle by offering an alternative…So, you’re getting that virtual cycle of keeping wealth in the community and democratising the wealth as well, and democratising the economy. We are actually bringing that democracy back. And let’s compete with the big banks. If people get educated I think we could create some kind of really strong movement.”
Presented and produced by Naomi Fowler of the Tax Justice Network
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Please find the research and resources below. All content, resources and information provided and linked to on this page are strictly embargoed for 18:00 CEST 28 May 2019.
The original version was published at Financial Times Alphaville here. This version was updated on Sept 5th, 2019, responding to media comments. Scroll down to the bottom to see the new material.
Update: Taxwatch in the UK has written a useful follow-up article entitled “Is Tax Avoidance legal?,” with the same conslusion, drawing on overlapping but often different arguments.
This quote is from an experienced African tax official, recently told to the Tax Justice Network. The interview was given on condition of anonymity.
Officials from the African tax authority became aware that the Big Four accounting firms had been telling multinationals operating in the country that the revenue authority was “completely unapproachable.” But when they made contact directly, not mediated through the Big Four firm, the picture changed:
When we all got around the table they realised we weren’t monsters. They told us, ‘we didn’t think that you people actually listen.’
Once we went straight to the MNE, [Multinational Enterprise] it went much faster. The person causing the problem was the intermediary. They are trying to position themselves as the broker to business, as if they don’t have an interest.”
It’s hardly a surprise. Just saying. And it’s certainly happening in rich countries too.
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