UN calls on Ireland to ensure tax policies don’t harm children’s rights abroad

The Committee on the Rights of the Child has called on Ireland to make sure that its tax policies do not lead to corporate profit shifting which siphons resources away from low income countries and prevents them from having the resources necessary to protect and realise children’s rights.  

Ireland currently ranks 11th on the Corporate Tax Haven Index which assesses jurisdictions by their complicity in helping multinational corporations underpay corporate income tax. Ireland’s role as one of the world’s largest destinations for multinational profit shifting has been recognized by the European Commission, the US Congress, and several esteemed academic researchers.  

Corporate profit shifting allows multinational corporations to underpay tax by shifting the profits they make out of the countries where they genuinely have economic activity and into tax havens. This allows the corporation to under report its profit in the country where it does business (usually a low or middle income country) in order to pay less or no tax. 

In July 2020 a coalition of organisations from Ireland and Ghana, together with the Tax Justice Network, made a submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child demonstrating how Ireland fails to meet its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child due to its facilitation of cross-border tax abuse, particularly its role in enabling corporate profit shifting. In its own report, the Government of Ireland asserted that its tax policy does not contribute to tax abuse nor negatively affect the economies of low income countries. However, the same coalition submitted a new report in August 2022 refuting Ireland’s claims and providing updated analysis and evidence on Ireland’s leading role in corporate profit-shifting.  

In the Concluding Observations just released, the Committee on the Rights of the Child recommends that Ireland: “Ensure that [its] tax policies do not contribute to tax abuse by companies registered in the State party but operating in other countries, leading to a negative impact on the availability of resources for the realization of children’s rights in those countries.” 

10 targets every country’s beneficial ownership laws should meet (and how to meet them effectively)

After years of experience assessing countries’ frameworks on legal and beneficial ownership registration and working closely with authorities, experts and researchers, the Tax Justice Network is publishing its ‘Roadmap to Effective Beneficial Ownership Transparency’ (REBOT). The roadmap sets out a guiding north star for achieving a truly transparent beneficial ownership framework that can effectively address illicit financial flows, money laundering, corruption, tax abuse and other financial crimes.

Beneficial ownership transparency (ie the identification of the individuals made of flesh and blood who ultimately own, control or benefit from companies and other types of legal vehicles) has garnered significant momentum among policymakers and campaigners over the past two decades. Many countries have approved beneficial ownership frameworks in recent years, but almost all these frameworks remain incomplete in one way or another. What this has all meant is no country today has yet managed to make use of the full potential of beneficial ownership transparency to rein in financial secrecy and its harmful impacts.

The Tax Justice Network’s Roadmap to Effective Beneficial Ownership Transparency sets out 10 targets that governments should meet in their framework:

1. The types of legal vehicles that should be subject to ownership registration.

2. The persons who should be identified as legal owners.

3. The individuals who should be identified as beneficial owners.

4. The conditions that should trigger required ownership registration.

5. The identification details that legal and beneficial owners should be required to register.

6. How frequently legal and beneficial ownership registries should be updated.

7. Those who should have access to legal and beneficial ownership registries, and how registries should be accessed.

8. How beneficial ownership registries should verify the integrity of information submitted.

9. How sanctions should be used in cases of non-compliance with legal and beneficial ownership registration requirements.

10. Special cases that should be considered in determining legal and beneficial ownership registry frameworks.

For each target, the roadmap sets out different steps governments can take to reach either a minimum, a benchmarked or an effective level of transparency. Minimum transparency is the minimum level of laws and rules that should be applied for a country to be considered to be practicing beneficial ownership transparency. Benchmarked transparency is the most robust level of laws and rules that are already being used in at least one country. While these instances of better practice are more robust than the minimum transparency level exercised by most governments, they still fall short of effective transparency (for example, due to limited scope or to loopholes). Effective transparency is the iron-clad level of laws and rules that deliver caliber of transparency needed to effectively prevent and prosecute illicit financial activity, to ensure the rule of law, and eliminate secrecy loopholes and workarounds.

Example: Target 1 of the ‘Roadmap to Effective Beneficial Ownership Transparency’.

Only when a government reaches an effective level of transparency on all 10 targets will its beneficial ownership framework be effective at reining in financial secrecy, but the steps from minimum to effective transparency for each target are designed to set a clear and practical path for governments to steadily reach effective transparency. This provides governments with policy solutions that can be implemented in the short and mid-term as they work towards effective beneficial ownership transparency.

The roadmap will continually be updated as we learn of or develop new ways to improve the most transparent frameworks. If you would like to share any ideas on how to make beneficial ownership frameworks more effective, or if you know of an instance of “effective transparency” that is already being implemented by a country (and so should be categorised as “benchmarked transparency”), please contact Andres Knobel at [email protected].

View the ‘Roadmap to Effective Beneficial Ownership Transparency’.

Roadmap to Effective Beneficial Ownership Transparency (REBOT)

This roadmap presents the Tax Justice Network’s vision for beneficial ownership frameworks that achieve truly effective transparency. This version will be constantly updated based on new ideas or experiences to achieve the most ambitious transparency outcome.

We understand that political, technical and budget constraints may prevent countries from achieving this standard in the short or medium term. For this reason, the roadmap offers for each framework target the steps governments can take to reach three levels of transparency: minimum transparency (the minimum legal framework that should be applied), benchmarked transparency (more robust legal frameworks that are already being used in at least one country), and effective transparency (iron-clad legal frameworks that deliver the level of transparency needed to effectively prevent and prosecute illicit financial activity, to ensure the rule of law and eliminate secrecy loopholes and workarounds).

Context 

Beneficial ownership transparency (ie the identification of the individuals who ultimately own, control or benefit from companies and other types of legal vehicles) has garnered significant interest from both policymakers as well as the general public in recent decades. This interest has been closely tied to efforts to fight illicit financial flows, corruption, money laundering, tax abuse, the financing of terrorism and so on. Many countries have approved beneficial ownership frameworks in recent years, however, almost all these frameworks are incomplete and either fail to cover all relevant legal vehicles (eg covering companies but not trusts), or fall short in regulating systemic provisions on sanctions, verification or legal ownership.  

We present here the first version of the Tax Justice Network’s Roadmap to Effective Ownership Transparency, which sets out a series of steps governments can take to reach a robust beneficial ownership framework that meaningfully delivers transparency. The roadmap builds on more than 10 years of policy and research experience from the Tax Justice Network on beneficial ownership, particularly drawing from more than 140 country-specific assessments conducted by the Tax Justice Network for the biennially updated Financial Secrecy Index. 

Version 1.0

2 February 2023


1. Which types of legal vehicles should be subject to ownership registration? 

Any legal vehicle (ie any structure different from a natural person) should be subject to ownership registration. 

Why?

If a type of legal vehicle falls outside the scope of registration, anyone could abuse that type of legal vehicle to remain hidden from authorities.

All types of legal vehicles (companies, trusts, partnerships, foundations, Anstalts, etc), regardless of whether they are considered a legal person or possess separate legal personality, should have to register their legal and beneficial ownership information before they are allowed to operate in a country’s economy by owning assets, or providing or acquiring goods or services.

Exceptions to the scope of registration should not be allowed for any legal vehicle. Typically, most countries only cover legal persons, like companies, but not legal arrangements, like trusts. Some countries only cover a limited range of partnership types, or they exempt companies listed on the stock exchange or state-owned enterprises. 

Why is this relevant?

Entities that fall outside the scope of registration can be exploited for illicit financial flows. For instance, the UK started covering companies and limited liability partnerships (LLPs) for beneficial ownership registration but didn’t cover limited partnerships (LPs). It was only after finding out that limited partnerships (LPs) from Scotland were involved in major money laundering schemes that the UK extended its scope to cover Scottish LPs as well.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective
✔ All legal persons and trusts are subject to legal and beneficial ownership registration, with exceptions, eg:

   ✖ listed companies
   ✖ investment funds
   ✖ state-owned enterprises
   ✖ NGOs
   ✖ low risk entities
✔ All legal persons and trusts are subject to legal and beneficial ownership registration, including listed companies and investment funds, with some exceptions, eg:

   ✔ listed companies
   ✔ investment funds
   ✖ state-owned enterprises
   ✖ NGOs
   ✖ low risk entities
✔ All legal vehicles are subject to legal and beneficial ownership registration with no exceptions:

   ✔ listed companies
   ✔ investment funds
   ✔ state-owned enterprises
   ✔ NGOs
   ✔ low risk entities
2. Who should be identified as a legal owner? 

All who have a title or any direct interest in the legal vehicle are legal owners.

Why?

Without complete legal ownership information (eg information on all shareholders), beneficial ownership cannot be verified. If you don’t know who directly owns an entity, it’s impossible to confirm who owns it indirectly.

For corporate entities: every shareholder, member, or partner with any direct share, right, specific role, or title over the entity is a legal owner. 

For trusts and private foundations: legal and economic settlors or founders, protectors/enforcers, trustees/foundation council members and beneficiaries are all legal owners. Additionally, any other legal or natural person with effective control over or special role in the trust/foundation is also considered a legal owner.

Why is this relevant?

Beneficial ownership involves identifying the individuals who ultimately own, control or benefit from legal vehicles. Legal ownership involves identifying the first layer of ownership which beneficial owners can hide behind. Without identifying the first layer of ownership, it can be impossible to identify any further layers. For example, if shareholders with less than 5 percent shares are not required to register their information, it is impossible to determine whether these shareholders are serving as a front to hide another person’s ownership.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective
Companies and similar entities✔ All shareholders or members are registered as legal owners✔ All who have a title or any direct interest in the legal vehicle are defined as legal owners
Trusts and foundations✔ The settlor, trustee, protector and beneficiaries are registered as legal owners✔ All who have a title or any direct interest in the legal vehicle are defined as legal owners
3. Who should be identified as a beneficial owner? 

Any natural person who in any way owns, controls, or benefits from a legal vehicle should be considered a beneficial owner.  

Why?

Beneficial ownership is about identifying beforehand all the individuals who may be related to an entity in case this information becomes useful in the future and to detect undeclared relationships between entities and individuals (eg a beneficial owner of a company involved in money laundering also has a few shares, eg 0.1 per cent, in a procurement company).

For corporate entities: Every individual (natural person) who directly or indirectly has at least one share, one vote or any interest or right to dividends, profit or assets of a legal vehicle should be considered a beneficial owner, including if they have exposure to economic benefits based on financial instruments (eg convertible stock, put or call options, or contracts). Additionally, those with the right to appoint/remove at least one director should also be beneficial owners. Finally, those who exercise control via other means including influence or power of attorney to manage, administer, or represent the entity or any of its assets, or have influence or veto rights over the administration, disposition or use of income or assets, including the management of bank accounts, should be considered beneficial owners. 

For trusts and private foundations: All parties to the trust/foundation, including the legal and economic settlors or founders, protectors/enforcers, trustees/foundation council members and beneficiaries, and any natural persons with effective control over or special roles in the trust/foundation should be considered beneficial owners.

In the case of combined ownership structures, wherein any of the parties mentioned above is not a natural person (eg a trust company as the trustee), then the natural persons who directly or indirectly own or control (or benefit from) any of the (non-natural person) parties to the trust or private foundation should also be considered beneficial owners, regardless of the percentage interest in the legal arrangement they hold. 

Why is this relevant?

By having information beforehand regarding all individuals (or as many as possible) related to an entity, it is possible to determine who is responsible in case an entity is found to be involved in any wrongdoing. In addition, having information on many potential controllers or ultimate owners can reveal unknown relationships between individuals and between other entities.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective
Companies and similar entities✔ Natural person who passes a threshold should be a beneficial owner.✔ Natural person with at least one share or vote should be a beneficial owner.✔ Natural person who in any way owns or benefits from a legal vehicle, or who controls it (eg power of attorney, influence, convertible stock, financial instrument) should be a beneficial owner.
Trusts and foundations✔ All settlors, trustees, protectors, beneficiaries and any other individual with effective control over the trust or foundation should be beneficial owners.

✔ Minimum met

✔ Applying the relevant beneficial ownership laws to any party to the trust/foundation that is a legal person.

✔ Minimum met

✔ If the party to a trust/foundation is a legal person, identify the beneficial owners as indicated under “Effective” in above row (no thresholds).

4. What conditions should trigger required ownership registration? 

Legal vehicles should be required to register beneficial ownership if they seek to incorporate locally, possess local assets, conduct local operations or have a local participant (eg a local legal owner, beneficial owner, settlor, director, etc).

Why?

To ensure that there will always be transparency about all local or foreign legal vehicles, regardless of what other countries are doing.

A country should require legal and beneficial ownership registration if at least one of the following three conditions is present:

  • Place of incorporation or governing law: A domestic legal person (such as a company) is incorporated in the country, or a domestic trust is created in accordance with or governed by the laws of the country.  
  • Local assets or operations: A legal vehicles is not incorporated in the country (eg is incorporated in another country), but seeks to hold assets (eg real estate or a bank account) in the country or to operate in the country (eg provide goods and services in the country or to local residents, or earn income or collect data from local residents). 
  • Resident participant: A legal vehicle is not incorporated in the country, but a resident of the country is related to the vehicle (eg by being a shareholder, director, settlor, protector, trustee, beneficiary, etc). 

Why is this relevant?

  • By registering information on legal and beneficial owners of corporations incorporated within their own jurisdictions, countries can exercise responsible behaviour towards preventing illicit financial flows occurring locally as well as abroad.
  • Transparency about any foreign legal vehicle with assets or operations in the country helps protect the country against abuses of the foreign vehicle. Otherwise, the country may have no idea who’s behind the foreign legal vehicles that own significant quantities of real estate or land in the country.
  • In response to leaks like the Panama Papers and Pandora Papers, authorities wanted to find out which of the vehicles identified in the leaks were owned by local residents to make sure, for instance, those residents weren’t engaging in tax evasion or money laundering. By requiring registration from foreign legal vehicles that have a local (resident) participant, such as a director, shareholder, beneficial owner or settlor, authorities will be collecting the same information that would otherwise only be made available by leaks and whistle-blowers.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective
Legal person

Triggers for registration:

✔ Locally incorporated

Triggers for registration:

✔ Minimum met

✔ Having local assets above a determined value

✔ Conducting specific activities.

Triggers for registration:

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Having any asset or operation in the country

✔ Having a participant (eg legal owner, beneficial owner, director, etc) in the country.

Trusts and foundations

Triggers for registration:

✔ Having a local trustee

Triggers for registration:

✔ Minimum met

✔ Created according to local laws

✔ Holding real estate in the country

✔ Establishing business relations in the country

✔ Having a party resident in the country (eg as settlor, trustee, etc).

Triggers for registration:

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Having any type of asset or operation in the country

5. Which identification details should legal and beneficial owners be required to register?  

Legal vehicles should be required to provide all identification details (eg tax ID) about both legal and beneficial owners to ensure there is no confusion of identity and to allow for special checks (eg status as politically exposed person, aka PEP). They should also be required to disclose the full ownership or control chain (all intermediate layers) that illustrates how each beneficial owner benefits or has ownership or control over the legal vehicle.

Why?

There may be hundreds or thousands of individuals with the same name. It’s necessary to identify the correct individual. Sufficient details can help detect risks (eg presence of a politically-exposed person) or confirm the validity of information. For example, if only the first layer and last layer are disclosed, it may be impossible to see the structure why the beneficial owner has ownership or control.

Comprehensive identity details about all owners (legal and beneficial) and the type and nature of ownership for the full ownership chain should be recorded. This should include an owner’s name, address, national identification number, date of birth, tax identification number, and, in the case of legal entities, their Legal Entity Identifiers. Information on the type and nature of beneficial ownership should include how the individual owns, controls or benefits from the legal vehicle (for example, direct ownership, voting rights, the right to appoint a majority of the board of directors), the percentage of their ownership or control, the date they became an owner (legal and/or beneficial owner), and, if applicable, the legal chain or nominees through which a beneficial owner exercises control. 

Additional details such as PEP status or relationship, civil status, profession, and additional residencies or nationalities should be required in order to allow for sophisticated checks. It may be relevant to know, or at least to also consider, holdings by family members (to prevent a person from using family members to dilute their interests in a legal vehicle to be below thresholds, in case the definition still applies thresholds).

Why is this relevant?

To save time for investigations, it is necessary to have as many details as possible on owners to determine who they are, and not to confuse them with others who may share the same name, address or date of birth. Identification details based on numbers (eg passport numbers and tax IDs) are easier to determine, than names of persons or streets which could be written in many different ways (especially if they are based in another language). Some details are indicators of risk factors, such as an individual being a high-ranking official or someone with many residencies or nationalities. Disclosing the ownership chain can also expose complexity risks (eg too many layers compared to the industry average) and confirm how each beneficial owner owns, controls or benefits from the legal vehicle.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective

Owner details to register:

✔ Full name
✔ Address
✔ National identification number
✔ Tax identification number
✔ Date and place of birth
✔ Nature of legal and beneficial ownership

Owner details to register:

✔ Minimum met
✔ Full ownership chain
✔ Politically exposed person status
✔ Civil status

Owner details to register:

✔ Benchmark met
✔ All nationalities / residencies
✔ Updated legal entity identifier
✔ Identity of direct family members
6. How often should legal and beneficial ownership registries be updated? 

Legal and beneficial ownership registries should be updated annually, even if to confirm nil changes, as well as upon any change in the relevant information.

Why?

Outdated data may be obsolete. Annual filings ensure that no one “forgets” to report information. Annual filings may only reflect a snapshot in time. To prevent the beneficial owner from appointing a nominee every 30 December for filing purposes and regain control every 1 January, every change should be registered in a history of changes.

Changes to legal and beneficial ownership information should be required to be registered in order to take effect. In addition, legal vehicles should be required to annually submit an up to date list of legal and beneficial owners, including the history of changes.  

Ideally, updated information should identify from whom the legal vehicle was acquired in the case of a transfer of ownership or a change of ownership of another nature (eg the issuance of new shares, a merger, the appointment of a new beneficiary, etc). This information should also identify the family relation between the seller and purchaser, if applicable. For instance, it should be noted whether they are family members or unrelated. This would help identify or investigate cases in which persons transfer shares to their children or to unrelated individuals (who may be nominees) for the purposes of masking their ownership. Finally, to make sense of the information provided, the value of the transaction should be added. If it was a free transaction, such as a donation or an appointment of a new beneficiary, the reason for the transaction should be included. For instance, in a transaction between unrelated parties, recording the value ensures it will be possible to check whether the new acquirer has declared income or wealth to justify the purchase of shares. For another example, it may be logical for a parent to donate shares to a child (perhaps for succession planning), but the logic may be less clear when a person donates shares to an unrelated individual or appoints them as the beneficiary of a trust. 

Why is this relevant?

Beneficial ownership information is only relevant if up to date. Information on the identity of owners that was last updated 10 years ago may be of little use, because authorities would need to spend too many resources to contact that old owner and find out all the changes up to the current ones. In addition, given that annual returns usually refer to the “snapshot” as of one date, eg 31 December, it is necessary to report all past changes (or to report this upon every change). Updates are also a good opportunity to ask for context of the change: the value of the purchased shares or the reason for appointing a new beneficiary. These additional details could reveal secrecy schemes, such as the appointment of nominees who would have never been able to afford those shares to begin with. In this way, the updating of information would also help the verification of ownership data.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective
✔ Legal and beneficial ownership information should be updated annually

✔ Minimum met

✔ Changes to ownership should be updated within 15/30 days of change

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Updates on changes to ownership should include details on seller or nature of the transaction, relationship to the seller/issuer, and value of the transaction (or justification in case of free transaction)

7. Who should have access to legal and beneficial ownership registries, and how should registries be accessed? 

Legal and beneficial ownership data should be available to the public for free. Ownership registries should be available online in open data format. 

Why?

The more parties able to access information, the more stakeholders will benefit (eg investors and businessmen can better know who they are doing business with, local and foreign authorities and journalists can better investigate wrongdoing, etc). More access to information also means more opportunities for data verification (eg banks can report discrepancies, journalists and civil society organisations can report mistakes).

All ownership information should be accessible through a single central registry (or platform), available online for free to any local or foreign public. Information should be presented in open data format, or at least in copyable text and in a structured/tabular format. Eventually, all registries should be interconnected to allow for automated cross-checks. 

The online platform’s search capability should allow “free-text” searches (ie no requirements for exact match searches), Boolean searches (eg AND, OR, NOT, “”), for any data field (eg company name, beneficial owner name, etc) and offer advanced filters to select types of legal vehicle, residency of beneficial owners, incorporation dates and so on. 

Available data should include all identity details as well as the nature of the beneficial ownership (eg John has 80% of shares, Mary is the settlor, etc). All information should be downloadable and reusable. In the most transparent scenario, a history of all transactions, including the values of the transactions, their nature, and any relationships involved, should be accessible (eg John acquired 100 shares from Mary, an unrelated party, for $1000, or Paul appointed his son Mike as a beneficiary of the trust for succession planning). The full ownership chain should be readily available. If the country has a red flagging system, this should be available online to warn users (eg “this company has failed to update its information”). 

Any case to restrict access should be decided by an authority (eg a judge) on a case-by-case basis and should be reserved for extraordinary circumstances. 

Why is this relevant?

Beneficial ownership is relevant not just for authorities, but for many stakeholders including the private sector, financial institutions subject to customer due diligence obligations, civil society organisations and journalists. Facilitating open online access also frees resources for local authorities, who would otherwise need to spend time to respond to requests from foreign countries. As exemplified by Global Witness’s analysis of the UK beneficial ownership register, external parties can have a big role in verifying and improving the registered data. However, to make access useful, all barriers should be removed, allowing for online and free access, in machine readable format.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective
Access✔ Central, public online access✔ Minimum met
✔ Free in open data format (ie copyable text and tabular/structured)
✔ Benchmark met
✔ Full downloadable database of legal and beneficial owners and interconnection of registries
Search✔ Search by company name✔ Minimum met
✔ Search by beneficial and legal owner names
✔ Advanced filters
✔ Benchmark met
✔ Search by any field (type of company, name or address of beneficial owner, etc)
✔ Boolean searches
Data✔ Identification details
✔ Dates and nature of beneficial ownership
✔ Minimum met
✔ Full history of changes to beneficial ownership
✔ Benchmark met
✔ Full ownership chain
✔ Full history of transactions affecting the ownership chain (including parties involved, dates, values of transactions and reasons for each transaction)
✔ Red-flags
8. How should beneficial ownership registries verify the integrity of information submitted? 

Beneficial ownership registries should conduct automated analysis to check for consistency with other databases (eg to confirm that all registered beneficial owners are living persons). The online registry should introduce red flagging based on outliers and suspicious characteristics (eg a single person as a beneficial owner of thousands of companies). 

Why?

Wrong or outdated information is of little use and misleading.

All registered data should be verified and confirmed by complying with the following steps: 

  • Require comprehensive data: All information, as recommended above in points six and seven (eg identity details, full ownership chain, value of transactions, relationships, etc) should be part of the registration. 
  • Ensure accessibility: Beneficial ownership registries should be as accessible and interconnected as possible to allow for more checks, especially from financial institutions, journalists, civil society organisations,20 researchers, businesswomen and investors.  
  • Automate verification (rather than rely solely on manual verification by humans): Verification should be automated to the extent possible to allow for speedy and extensive checks, to save resources, and to automate penalties (eg the system could automatically penalise or flag entities that failed to file an annual return on time, noting on the registry that the information is outdated). 
  • Perform consistency checks and plausibility/legality checks:
    • Consistency checks: The registered data (eg name, address, tax ID number) should be verified to confirm that it matches other government databases as well as data held by financial institutions and other entities obligated to perform customer due diligence. This information should also be checked against lists of people under sanctions. 
    • Plausibility and legality checks: Information should be verified to confirm that the registered person is still alive and is not a minor. The address should be verified as well to ensure it exists and corresponds to a building, rather than to a park, for example. 
  • Red flag concerns: Verification should involve an exploration of the data to determine what a typical company looks like in terms of layers, number of shareholders, etc. This should then be combined with additional government databases (eg declared income, credit card consumption, beneficiary of poverty pension, etc) to allow for red flagging based on the following: 
    • Outlier characteristics (eg a small company with little declared income having an ownership chain of 20 layers of companies from secrecy jurisdictions up to the beneficial owner). 
    • Suspicious characteristics (eg one beneficial owner appearing as the owner of thousands of companies, or an individual with no declared income appearing as the sole owner of a very profitable company, etc). 
  • Check foreigners on whom no local data is held: For cases of foreign beneficial owners on whom the country has no local data to cross-check against, zero-knowledge proof checks should take place with the foreign beneficial owner’s resident country. This would involve the enquiring country’s beneficial owner registry automatically querying the civil registry of the resident country about the data the individual has submitted to the enquiring country’s beneficial owner registry. If the data the individual submitted to the enquiring country’s beneficial ownership register perfectly matches the data held by the resident country’s civil registry, the civil registry would respond, “Yes, the individual’s declared name, address, birth date, and tax ID number match our records.” If the data does not perfectly match, the civil registry would respond “No, the data doesn’t match.” In either scenario, the resident country’s civil registry would not have to reveal the data it holds on the individual, allowing the civil registry to verify the accuracy of the information on its residents without having to hand over information. If this zero-knowledge proof check reveals a mismatch in the submitted information, the enquiring country’s beneficial ownership register should not allow the individual to register as a beneficial owner – and therefore not legalise the ownership the individual attempted to register and formalise. Countries willing to engage in zero-knowledge proof checks could establish a standard to define how these zero-knowledge proof queries could take place.

Why is this relevant?

Global Witness’s analysis of the UK beneficial ownership register shows that despite the risk of harsh penalties (eg imprisonment), there are many mistakes in registered data, both involuntary and deliberate. To be able to make use of information on the register, it should be accurate and up to date. Cross-checks by authorities, the private sector or the general public help find simpler mistakes. The more automated checks are, the more checks can be done, freeing beneficial ownership register staff for other tasks. For professional criminals that may be more careful (eg submitting consistent information), more sophisticated analysis for red-flagging is necessary.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective

✔ Public access to allow all to analyse the information

✔ Require financial institutions to also report discrepancies

✔ Minimum met

✔ Cross-checks against other government databases (eg tax administration, civil register, or pre-filling of forms based on registered data)

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Cross-checks and red-flagging based on all relevant local and foreign databases and zero-knowledge proof checks

✔ Exploration and profiling of a typical structure of beneficial ownership to determine outliers

9. How should sanctions be used in the case of non-compliance with legal and beneficial ownership registration requirements? 

In addition to any criminal and/or monetary sanctions, administrative sanctions should be applied to remove non-complying legal vehicles from the registry and to revoke any rights from non-complying beneficial owners (eg votes or dividends). 

Why?

Enforcement of the law is hard. It is much better if the legal system incentivises compliance by making rights dependent on registration.

Economic and criminal sanctions, if applied, should be: 

  • Robust criminal sanctions in the case of wilful misreporting (including late reporting after a grace period) 
  • Monetary fines proportionate to the legal vehicles’ assets or turnover, or a high fixed amount (whatever is higher). 

More importantly, administrative sanctions should apply in the following scenarios: 

  • Legal vehicles that failed to register all their legal and beneficial ownership information. These entities should not be allowed to incorporate or have any legal validity. Therefore, they would have no possibility to hold assets, enter contracts, etc. 
  • Existing legal vehicles that fail to comply or update their information. These entities should be suspended and ultimately removed from the registry. During the time of the suspension, financial institutions should not be allowed to open accounts for these entities or transfer money. Any contract entered should be considered void. 

The registry should have a “constitutive effect” wherein ownership rights come into effect upon registration and become void upon failure to comply with registration update requirements. An unregistered beneficial owner would have no rights to dividends or votes until they are registered. If the unregistered beneficial owner has a secret agreement with a nominee who is registered, the nominee will be considered the sole and absolute owner by the law. A resigned director would still be liable until their name is deregistered. 

Beneficial owners who fail to identify themselves to their legal vehicles should lose all their rights to the legal vehicle (eg right to vote, receive dividends, etc). 

To enforce these provisions, financial institutions and businesspersons should be required to check the beneficial ownership registry before engaging in any transaction with a legal vehicle to make sure that it is still considered “compliant” (at the beginning, this requirement may apply for say, any contract above $10,000). An alternative may be that, just as companies may need to show compliance certificates on health or other safety conditions, they should also show proof of “beneficial ownership registration” before they are entitled to engage in business, provide goods or services. 

Why is this relevant?

All countries have problems prosecuting crimes, no matter how harsh the consequences. For this reason, it’s better to complement typical sanctions with an incentive system, where rights only start to exist after compliance. In other words, if a company will exist regardless of filing beneficial ownership data and the only consequence for failing to register data is a fine, it may decide to pay the fine as a low cost to commit an illegal activity. Instead, if the company won’t even be incorporated (let alone allowed to open a bank account, make a payment or sign a contract), unless beneficial ownership data has been filed, individuals will have an incentive to comply.

Steps 

MinimumBenchmarkEffective

✔ Robust economic and criminal sanctions

✔ Suspension of local tax id (impossibility to operate locally)

✔ Minimum met

✔ Removal from the register

✔ Financial institutions are prohibited from operating with legal vehicles found non-compliant (including legal vehicles that failed to update their information on beneficial ownership registers or that filed inaccurate information)

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Any non-compliant vehicle is prevented from being incorporated. Pre-existing ones are suspended and then removed from the register. 

✔ “Constitutive effect” applied (rights exist only as of and following registration)

✔ Non-compliant legal vehicles are not allowed to exist, operate or hold any asset

✔ Any transaction with a non-compliant legal vehicle has no legal validity 

10. What special cases should be considered in determining a legal and beneficial ownership registry framework? 

Prohibit bearer shares, discretionary trusts and nominees, discourage complex ownership chains, cover state-owned companies as well as listed companies and investment funds by applying even lower thresholds, and interconnect beneficial ownership registries with each other and with asset registries.

Why?

Loopholes, such as bearer shares, nominees and exemptions for listed companies, create secrecy risks that can be exploited. The full potential of beneficial ownership transparency can only be reached when beneficial ownership of legal vehicles is combined with asset ownership information.

Bearer shares

Bearer shares should be prohibited. Any pre-existing bearer share that fails to be converted (even if no cases of bearer shares were found) should be considered cancelled (losing absolutely all rights, without any option to recover them or obtain compensation). The only alternative to cancellation should be immobilisation by a government authority (but not by a private custodian, like a lawyer or bank).

Why is this relevant?

Bearer shares make it impossible to determine the legal owner of a company and thus to confirm the beneficial owner. They serve no good purpose to society and should not exist.

Discretionary trusts

Discretionary trusts (trusts where on paper the trustee has discretion to choose whether or not to make a distribution in favour of beneficiaries, and if so when and how much to distribute) should be prohibited. Of course, a trust should be allowed to make changes, eg appoint or remove beneficiaries. However, changes to beneficiaries should work just like for companies. It is possible to change shareholders by registering the change in the commercial registry. Likewise, changes to beneficiaries should be registered before they are valid, rather than what currently happens where trustees may decide to appoint or remove beneficiaries without any authority being alerted.

Why is this relevant?

Discretionary trusts may be considered more secretive than bearer shares. In the case of bearer shares, it is very hard, but in theory possible to know the beneficial owner by knowing who has the paper bearer share at any given time. In the case of discretionary trusts, one would need to read the trustee’s mind to know who they plan to appoint as beneficiary or distribute money to. Discretionary trusts are widely used to shield assets against the rest of society, where the trustee refuses to distribute money to beneficiaries who have creditors or who owe taxes. In addition, discretionary trusts allow beneficiaries not to be registered as beneficial owners of the trust by claiming that they are merely “contingent” or “potential” beneficiaries, and their status as “beneficial owners” will depend on the trustee actually deciding to give them a distribution.

For more information on trusts see, the Tax Justice Network’s “Trust secrecy and other abuses” collection.

Nominees

Both professional and de facto (informal) nominees should be prohibited. To enforce this prohibition, countries should first establish the “constitutive effect”, meaning that rights exist from and during “registration”. According to the law, any registered individual would be the real owner of an asset and entitled to its use and benefits. In other words, as a disincentive against the use of nominees, the law would recognise the nominee’s rights over a legal vehicle or asset, allowing the nominee to defraud the real beneficial owner. Second, countries should implement robust verification mechanisms to help detect fraudulent nominees (eg individuals with low or no declared income or assets who appear as beneficial owners of big profitable companies), enabling the law to better target and enforce sanctions against fraudulent nominees and the real beneficial owners hiding behind them.

Why is this relevant?

Beneficial ownership transparency is about identifying the real individuals who ultimately and effectively own, control or benefit from a legal vehicle. Allowing people to offer their name to hide the real beneficial owner defeats the whole purpose of beneficial ownership transparency. It would be similar to, and in fact it may create the risk of, sending the wrong person to jail, for a crime committed by someone else.

Companies listed on the stock exchange and investment funds

Companies listed on the stock exchange and investment funds should be fully covered by the beneficial ownership registration framework. If the framework will keep thresholds for general companies, the thresholds for companies listed on the stock exchange and investment funds should be substantially lower (eg 0.1 per cent) or ideally based on an investment value (eg any person who invested, or has interest valued at, at least $1000 in the listed company). Filings to the stock exchange or financial regulator should not be considered a substitute for registering with the beneficial ownership register.

Why is this relevant?

Although no individual would be able to control a listed company or investment fund with merely 0.1 per cent of the shares, that tiny percentage may be worth millions of dollars. The person holding that investment may be engaging in tax evasion or money laundering, and an interest as small as 0.1 per cent can result in millions in tax going unpaid or in dirty money making its way into the economy. That’s why listed companies and investment funds should be covered with much lower thresholds.

For more information on companies listed on the stock exchange and investment funds, see the Tax Justice Network’s reports Beneficial ownership transparency for companies listed on the stock exchange and Beneficial ownership in the investment industry: A strategy to roll back anonymous capital.

State-owned enterprises

Although state-owned enterprises cannot have a beneficial owner (no natural person “owns” the State), they should not be exempted from beneficial ownership registration. Instead, special rules should apply such as disclosing all the public officials (eg ministers) who have authority over the state-owned enterprise, as well as any other official with power to administer its assets and bank accounts, or make decisions. In addition, all subsidiaries of the state-owned enterprise should be disclosed. Companies with mixed ownership, for example a company that is 51 per cent owned by the State, should apply these rules to the state-ownership. The 49 per cent which is privately held should be subject to the general beneficial ownership rules.

Why is this relevant?

First, state-owned enterprises can be exploited for domestic corruption (eg corrupt officials might diverge the state-owned enterprise’s funds) so it’s important to know who manages or has powers in the state-owned enterprise. For the same reason, it’s important to investigate any entity with which the state-owned enterprise engages in business with. Second, state-owned enterprises can be abused for illegal activity abroad, especially in the extractive sector, illegal fishing, or when sovereign wealth funds invest in foreign assets. To make it investigations possible, it is necessary to have as much information as possible about each state-owned enterprise (eg their country of incorporation, the officials in charge, its mandate, etc).

Complex ownership chains 

Complex ownership chains should be discouraged or directly prohibited. For instance, countries could require that local entities can only include in their ownership chains foreign entities which are created in countries with public beneficial ownership registries and where the local laws cover those types of entities. 

Why is this relevant?

Verification is a big challenge, even if only focusing on local entities and local individuals. If a local entity is part of a very complex ownership chain that has many layers up to the beneficial owner, including entities from different countries (especially from secrecy jurisdictions), and that uses sophisticated types of legal vehicles (eg discretionary trusts or Anstalts), verification is made exponentially more difficult, if not impossible. Fortunately, most companies have very simple structures. Complex ones should be prohibited or discouraged, and when proven necessary, they should be subject to sufficient conditions so that they reduce their structural secrecy risks.

For more information, see the Tax Justice Network’s Complex Ownership Structures: Addressing the Risks for Beneficial Ownership Transparency.

Asset beneficial ownership registries 

Asset beneficial ownership registries (eg real estate registries, registries of cars, ships and aircrafts, luxury freeports, etc) should be interconnected with beneficial ownership registries to allow the beneficial owners of assets to also be identified. For example, the land register would disclose that the house is owned by foreign company A. The beneficial ownership register would disclose that the beneficial owner of Company A is John. Thus, John is the beneficial owner of the house.

Why is this relevant?

Having beneficial ownership on relevant assets is essential to expose unjust enrichment (when a person cannot explain the origin of their wealth) which may be related to corruption or money laundering. It is also essential for carrying out asset recovery, enforcing sanctions against oligarchs, applying wealth taxes and simply measuring inequality.

For more information, see the Tax Justice Network’s blog Global Asset Registries: a game changer for the fight against inequality and illicit financial flows?.

Steps

MinimumBenchmarkEffective
Bearer shares✔ Immobilise bearer shares with a government authority (not a bank or lawyer)

✔ Prohibit new bearer shares and establish deadline for conversion of pre-existing bearer shares

✔ Unregistered bearer shares should lose all rights (not merely suspend rights until conversion)

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Prohibit bearer shares throughout the ownership chain. No local legal vehicle should be allowed to have in its ownership chain a legal vehicle that issued (or could issue) bearer shares

Discretionary trusts✔ Identify all discretionary beneficiaries, regardless of whether they receive a direct distribution or not

✔ Minimum met

✔ Identify those who receive indirect distributions (eg the trust pays for their credit card bills)

✔ Prohibit discretionary trusts

✔ For a person to be allowed to receive a direct or indirect distribution, the trust instrument must be amended and the person must be registered as a beneficial owner

Nominees✔ Prohibit nominees

✔ Minimum met

✔ Apply verification to detect fraudulent nominees (eg one person owns hundreds of companies)

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Apply “constitutive effect”(rights exist only as of and following registration)

✔ Utilise advanced analytics to detect fraudulent nominees (eg compare declared income, assets, credit card consumption)

Listed companies and investment funds✔ Cover and apply low thresholds on listed companies and investment funds

✔ Minimum met

✔ Instead of using “low” interest thresholds (eg 5%) which would fail to cover many investors, apply thresholds on the value of the investment (eg interest in listed company above USD $50,000)

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Increase coverage by applying no thresholds: anyone with at least one share or USD 1 should be identified as a beneficial owner

State-owned enterprises

✔ Require state-owned enterprises and their subsidiaries to file a nil return explaining why they are exempted

✔ Require beneficial ownership registration from the part of the enterprise that is not held by the State

✔ Minimum met

✔ Identify all representatives or officials (eg minister) who have control or decision-making power over the state-owned enterprise

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Identify the full ownership structure and all subsidiaries of the state-owned enterprise

Complex ownership structures

✔ Prohibit bearer shares in the ownership chain

✔ Analyse ownership structures (eg number of layers) to detect outliers

✔ Minimum met

✔ Prohibit the ownership structure to include foreign legal vehicles if (1) they are from countries without (public) legal and beneficial ownership registries, or (2) they are “exotic” vehicles (eg Anstalt, protected cell company, discretionary trust, etc) for which the local beneficial ownership legal framework has no specific provisions

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Disallow structures with more complexity than X layers (based on an understanding of the legitimate number of layers), unless the vehicle justifies a non-secrecy and non-tax commercial reason for such structure

Asset beneficial ownership registries

✔ Require legal ownership information to be collected and registered on all relevant assets (eg real estate, aircrafts, vessels, crypto, art, etc)

✔ Ensure the beneficial ownership register covers any foreign legal vehicle with assets in the country

✔ Have existing asset registries (eg real estate register) collect beneficial ownership data to cross-check data against the beneficial ownership register

✔ Benchmark met

✔ Connect asset registries and beneficial ownership registries to deduce and expose the beneficial ownership of assets, particularly for cases where assets are held by legal vehicles.

✔ Ensure the beneficial ownership definition is as comprehensive as possible (eg low thresholds, considers ownership, control or benefit, etc)

✔ Require value information to be included

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast #62: بولط تونس: تسريب معطيات نحو تل أبيب، تهرّب ضريبي وجرائم أخرى

Welcome to the 62nd edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available on most podcast apps. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can follow the programme on Facebook, on Twitter and on our website. All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.

في العدد #62 من الجباية ببساطة إستضاف وليد بن رحومة، الصحفية سناء عدوني، صاحبة البحث الإستقصائي “بولط تونس: غشّ ضرببي، تقويض للسوق ومعطيات شخصيّة لتونسيّين تُسرب إلى تل أبيب” في حوار تناول التجاوزات الخطيرة التي أقدمت عليها تطبيقة النقل منذ سنوات عدة، من تهرّب ضريبي، وتهريب أموال خارج البلاد، وتبييض أموال، وتسريب معطيات شخصية لمستعملي التطبيق من مواطنين نونسيّين إلى إسرائيل … في ظلّ صمت مُريب من السلطات التونسية.

بولط تونس: تسريب معطيات نحو تل أبيب، تهرّب ضريبي وجرائم أخرى

تابعونا على صفحتنا على الفايسبوك وتويتر https://www.facebook.com/ TaxesSimply Tweets by taxes_simply

The Making of Tax Haven Mauritius: the Tax Justice Network podcast, the Taxcast

Welcome to the latest episode of the Tax Justice Network’s monthly podcast, the Taxcast. You can subscribe either by emailing naomi [at] taxjustice.net or find us on your podcast app. All our podcasts are unique productions in five languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here.

In this extended special episode of the Taxcast, we look at the ‘Desai Papers’ leak – the story you probably never heard of: it goes back decades and looks at a key player in the making of a tax haven that’s been hurting Indians and Africans ever since.

We speak with a whistleblower and the journalist who broke the story. Is the Indian government investigating? What does the story tell us about the global economy?

Featuring:

Transcript is available here (some is automated)

~ The making of tax haven Mauritius

Further reading and information:

Image credit: “File:The Bank of Mauritius tower (in the centre).jpg” by Thierry is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0.

Here’s a summary of the Taxcast:

Naomi: “This month on the Taxcast – the making of the tax haven of Mauritius. Small islands are particularly well suited to become tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions. Because in small islands, elite groups of people are also small. And the financial and political engineering to set these things up almost always comes from outside, in partnership with these few island elites. What they do together may benefit them, but their actions have a disproportionate and harmful effect on millions of people across the world. That’s certainly the case with the island nation of Mauritius.

[Mauritian music]

Mauritius is far from a big global player in terms of financial secrecy compared to other jurisdictions like the United States, Switzerland, Britain and Singapore, for example. I mean, it’s ranked #51 in our Financial Secrecy Index – although don’t get me wrong, it definitely offers some high levels of secrecy. But it’s a much more significant global player in terms of helping multinationals underpay corporate income tax – it’s ranked 15th in our Corporate Tax Haven Index. It’s got tonnes of tax exemptions and almost non-existent transparency requirements for corporate reporting. The consequences really are deadly for ordinary people worldwide – particularly Indians and Africans.

[Mauritian music]

When you look at Mauritius, the state capture that’s usually a strong feature of small island nations that go down this route isn’t immediately obvious. I mean, Mauritius has long been praised for being Africa’s shining star when it comes to its economy and its democracy. The Economist’s Intelligence Unit has ranked Mauritius highly for years. This is youtube news channel the Rooster Report:”

After Mauritius gained independence from Britain in 1968, the situation there looked pretty dire. After all, it had been reliant on sugar for economic growth for most of the colonial period, and many predicted that along with overpopulation this would cause the country to fall into economic despair. For a while, these critics were right, as Mauritius was quite poor well into the 1980s. However, it was in the 1990s that Mauritius was able to pull off an economic miracle and become one of the wealthiest nations in Africa.”

Naomi: “Many put the Mauritian so-called ‘economic miracle’ down to two main things, early on. Free education for everyone from pre-school to university, obviously that’s always a good investment. And the establishing of special export processing zones:”

Rooster Report: “Almost no import duties, low energy costs, and the free repatriation of capital, profits and dividends to an investor’s country of origin. It is because of this that a tonne of foreign investment is continuously poured into Mauritius.”

Naomi: “Hmmm. But, as you’re going to hear – there’s a LOT more to the so-called Mauritian ‘economic miracle’ than that. Foreign investment is very often not what it seems, and can in fact be money laundering on a massive scale. The Mauritian tax havenry and financial secrecy model is really hurting Africans and Indians. That’s because it’s swallowing up billions in tax revenue. Here’s Tax Justice Network researcher Rachel Etter-Phoya in Malawi:”

Rachel: “It’s shocking! Mauritius inflicts an estimated two and a half billion dollars of lost taxes on other countries every single year. India is affected and so are so many African countries. And the irony here is that Mauritius markets itself as the gateway to Africa for investment. But really, I think we should be calling it the ‘getaway from Africa’ and for the amount of profits that are shifted out to the rest of the continent as a result of tax haven Mauritius. Of course, Mauritius is also losing out thanks to the setup of tax havens and plundered states that is our global financial system. Mauritius does get a taste of its own medicine. Mauritius is losing an estimated 450 million each year to tax havens.”

Naomi: “And at the Tax Justice Network we’ve seen many times – as the money flows start to rise through places like this, internal strains and conflicts are never far behind. What goes on in a small island democracy starts to become very important to other bigger outside actors. And the international harm the tax havenry model is inflicting on ordinary people elsewhere, can become self-harm. Back to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s rankings of Mauritius – here’s the Rooster Report again:”

Rooster Report: “In the past few years the country has been in a downwards spiral. While Mauritius does well on almost every indicator, it has faced some criticism in regards to political leadership, as almost every prime minister has come from one of a handful of elite families. The country has also passed a few questionable bills into law, widespread accusations of voter fraud and foreign influence in the 2019 elections, multiple suspensions of parliament and, quite recently, the deployment of military police on protestors who were peacefully protesting. Therefore, we think it’s fair to say that while Mauritius was a model for the African continent a year ago, if it doesn’t fix up some major issues, it may soon lose its full democracy status.”

Naomi: “To understand what’s happening in Mauritius, we need to go back in time a bit, and take a look at external events and actors. And fly about 5,000 kilometres to India:”

Whistleblower: “You know, we tend to believe that tax havens are actually made in tax havens. But the reality is that it’s actually the victim countries or the victim jurisdictions where these tax havens are really made. And it’s all the illegal stuff, all the sort of evil stuff actually happens in the victim countries to enable formation of these tax havens and to sort of enable the abuse of various treaties and various loopholes.”

Naomi: “This is a whistleblower in India who leaked data which exposed the underbelly of the Mauritian economic miracle, its swallowing up of the tax revenue of nations who can least afford it, and the key role played by Indian law firm Nishith Desai Associates, going back decades. Here’s the journalist who broke the story of the so-called ‘Desai Papers’, Mr J Gopikrishnan of the Pioneer newspaper:”

J Gopikrishnan: “It is just like the Panama Papers or something like that. A tax firm owned by one Nishith Desai, Nishith Desai’s firm was advising firms how to avoid the taxes from India by floating companies in London, Cayman island and Mauritius, and how to – telling a thief how to steal things! So we come out in July 2021, big front page coverage, we gave a title ‘India’s Panama Papers,’ ‘Desai Papers’. It’s a 1.5 GB documents of legal advises how to avoid taxes.”

Naomi: “The 1.5GB of leaked data reveals tax-related correspondence between Nishith Desai Associates and 33 of India’s biggest corporations and several high-net-worth individuals. Nishith Desai Associates deny that they, or their clients, have ever broken any laws. The whistleblower worked as a software engineer. He says he leaked the data in the public interest:”

Whistleblower: “Sometime back I had worked on some software solutions to detect money laundering and financial fraud, right? Especially like you know, with the aim to identify terror cells and other sort of money laundering fraud activities that happen, especially across jurisdictions. So, you know, I had started understanding what goes on. These documents really basically show what goes behind the curtains. Because these documents clearly provide advice to the clients that, you know, do this, do that, you know, that way the tax authority will not know that you’ve got a permanent establishment in India. Create a structure over there, you know, have these kind of board members over there, dummy board members in Mauritius. Don’t give that person the signing authorities, you know, make the key people in India as your advisors, but not the general partners, right? Then sort of create more structures in Cayman Islands or like other jurisdictions where you will have holding companies or the beneficial owners would be over there, right? Even like how to sort of issue press releases, you know, what should be the wordings of the press releases? What should you put on the business cards? How long should your personnel stay in one office in India, you know, how to keep shifting places, you know, all that stuff.”

Naomi: “This whistleblower, his lawyers and journalists claim these leaked files contain incriminating evidence of tax abuse. Again, Nishith Desai Associates deny any illegality in their, or their client’s actions, although I’m sure they certainly wouldn’t deny how central they are in terms of business that uses Mauritius. And, all of this goes far beyond what’s demonstrably legal or not. The so-called ‘Mauritius route’ is causing serious tax losses to many nations. The whistleblower and his lawyer made this data available to the enforcement directorate at the central board of direct taxes in India, and later to the Black Money Commission.”

Whistleblower: “Uh, nothing happened because you know the statutory authorities as well as the government, they are very reluctant to investigate these things or to take any action. Then my house was raided and all my devices were taken away, and I’m a software engineer. Even during the covid times when you know, we were working from home and we were pretty much having a digital existence, you know, I did not have access to devices, which were very, very critical for my profession. Their intention was, you know, possibly to intimidate me, but also they wanted to recover all the evidence which would be in my possession. And perhaps also to figure out if I have sort of approached authorities or who I have shared this thing with.”

Naomi: “According to him, during the raid on his house, armed police were accompanied by personnel from Nishith Desai Associates, as well as from the big accountancy firm PwC. Now I find that interesting because a number of years ago now, in Luxembourg, staff from PwC were also present during a police raid on another whistleblower’s house, their own employee during the now infamous Luxleaks scandal. That was Raphaël Halet, who spent years in Luxembourg courts defending his right to have leaked in the public interest. With this raid in India, the court ordered that all the expenses of the raid be paid by Nishith Desai Associates, including the Court Commissioner and his assistant. Now according to the whistleblower, the court commissioner was a friend of Nishith Desai. Nishith Desai Associates accuse the whistleblower of accessing this data illegally and their civil case against him is ongoing and so he’s unable to speak specifically about the case:”

Whistleblower: “The public in India needs to know the scale at which this fraud is happening, and how it’s happening. The evil consequences of tax avoidance, you know results in a substantial loss of revenue. It results in creation of a lot of black money, right? It sort of shifts the burden of taxation to law abiding, you know, simple citizens. And people with artful advisors are able to escape taxation, it results in a lot of inequality, injustice, right? It also results in a perpetual war waged between the tax avoider and his expert team of advisors, lawyers, and accountants on the side, and the tax gatherer and his perhaps not so skillful advisors on the other side. You know, we are hoping that the authorities take some action because there is a wealth of data available to them now.”

Naomi: “There’s no sign of that happening, yet. And this wasn’t journalist Mr Gopikrishnan’s first time writing about Mauritius and its financial services:”

J Gopikrishnan: “Some 15 years ago, also, I wrote an article looking, going to the Mauritius registry. There are two, three buildings in Mauritius where hundreds of companies have the same address at same office, and same cubicle. And these are pretended or covered in the garb of foreign direct investments into the country, but actually are India’s own black money coming back to make it as a white money through these small small countries. Nothing is happening there, just money laundering and money parking and money diverting through just a address. There is no staffers, nothing. I always say these tax havens are the red streets in the cities.”

Naomi: “They’re the what, sorry?”

J Gopikrishnan: “You know, what is Red Streets? Red Street is in every city, red street means there’s a prostitution street is there.”

Naomi: “Ah, right. Yeah. Like red zones.”

J Gopikrishnan: “Uh, you go, you go to particular street and do the prostitution and other things, activities don’t come to these areas. You do that area, where police will not come. So these tax havens are the red streets in cities, in this world. I think all nations and the United Nations should come together and come out against these tax havens and finish these tax havens, for the betterment of the entire world. If they simply cancel all these things, the matter is over.”

Naomi: “When it comes to the making of Mauritius as a tax haven, we need to go back to some pivotal moments in that journey. Here’s the whistleblower again:”

Whistleblower: “The Indo-Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Treaty, it was actually signed in 1982. At that time the Prime Minister of India was Mrs. Indira Ghandi, and the finance minister was Mr Pranab Mukherjee. So, they were visiting Mauritius in 1982. And they signed this agreement with Mauritius, and it was finally notified by the government of India in 1983. This was a purely an executive action. This was never tabled before the parliament. This had never been debated by the legislature. It has not been passed by the legislature. It has for the last several decades, it has stayed like an executive action. This treaty was pretty dormant till, I would say, early nineties. And the reasons were twofold. One was that the Indian economy till ‘91, was highly regulated and a closed economy. Similarly, like Mauritius, was also a very sleepy economy. So there was very little trade, or very little investment that could have happened between the two countries. But that started changing towards the late eighties, 1980s. In 1989, Mauritius attempted to become an offshore banking centre, was not very successful, but it tried to sort of become an offshore banking centre. In 1991 in India there were economic reforms, which were initiated in 1991, and the Indian economy was liberalised. It became an open economy and the Indian government started encouraging foreign investment into India. So right after that, right after these reforms and liberalisation, Mr. Nishith Desai, who’s the founder of Nishith Desai Associates, a boutique international taxation law firm in India, he somehow stumbled upon this Indo-Mauritius double taxation agreement, and he reached out to the Mauritius government. He actually went to Mauritius. He spent some time in Mauritius. He became close to the government of Mauritius, and he helped them become an offshore tax haven.”

Naomi: “We’ll get back to the forward-thinking Mr Nishith Desai who spotted the potential of this Double Tax Avoidance treaty. Around the same time India’s economy was liberalised, Mauritius enacted the Mauritius Offshore Business Activity Act.”

Whistleblower: “Mauritius Offshore Business Activity Act, or like MOBAA that actually made it into a tax haven. In 1992, Mauritius actually became a tax haven. And as part of this MOBAA act, Mauritius allowed foreign entities, foreign players who were not even citizens or residents of Mauritius, to set up entities in Mauritius, which would basically provide them Mauritius Tax Residency Certificate. You know, so by setting up what was known as a GBC1 company, you could actually become a Mauritius tax resident. And these shell companies did not attract any kind of taxation, you know, even if there was some taxation, it was nominal.”

Naomi: “By layering your GBC1 company with a GBC2 company and shifting your profits between them you could virtually arrive at a zero taxation rate. So, the Double Tax Avoidance treaty, combined with the Mauritius Offshore Business Activity Act, made double trouble for the tax revenues of other nations. The Mauritius Offshore Business Activity Act meant foreign entities could incorporate companies with limited public disclosure – so, some quite high levels of secrecy. And also there were some quite high levels of asset protection promised. The door was opened to all kinds of potential illicit activities and abuses.”

Whistleblower: “And this became like the most popular route to invest in India for the foreign investment. This became like the route that all the foreign investors in the West were using to enter India. So these were like, you know, public market funds, private equity funds, VC funds, corporates, high net worth individuals, right?”

Naomi: “As you can imagine, these are big players. And bigger and bigger players piled in on the action:”

Whistleblower: “The investment in India was definitely growing at that point of time, I mean, from virtually zero, it was now several billion dollars of investment every year, which was coming into India, but it was also resulting in a big loss of tax revenue to the Indian exchequer because, you know, all the sort of capital gains and everything that was, getting generated through these investments were not being taxed in India. And very soon, some Indians also started using this Mauritius route to roundtrip their funds.”

Naomi: “Round-tripping, as the name suggests, is a circular activity, and for no good reason! Here’s the Tax Justice Network’s Rachel Etter-Phoya:”

Rachel: “Round tripping! Sounds like a dance, doesn’t it? I like to think of it as more of a disguise. So you take your money out of India to another country, in this case Mauritius, then you bring it back into India and now it’s suddenly dressed up as foreign money, foreign investment. What’s the point of this disguise? Well, many countries try to attract foreign investment by providing all sorts of special incentives, tax breaks, tax holidays, and these aren’t offered to local investors. So domestic investors get away with dodging tax and exploiting rules that are not meant for them. And eventually this ends up harming the very government systems and public infrastructure that they are relying on to make their money and do business. And of course, another reason for the disguise is the good old fashioned money laundering, trying to clean dirty money.”

Whistleblower: “All these structures, or all these investments that were flowing into India through the Mauritius route were actually structured by Nishith Desai associates. Almost like, you know, I would say 99% of these investments were structured by Mr Nishith Desai and his firm Nishith Desai Associates.”

Naomi: “In a statement responding to the data leak, Nishith Desai Associates say there are good, practical reasons why firms use a jurisdiction like Mauritius. Quote:

‘They need a neutral jurisdiction for pooling vehicles which provides flexibility in terms of enforceability of contracts, simplified corporate laws, robust bilateral investment protection treaty with India, etc. There is absolutely no illegality in anything we or our clients have done.’

Now I’ve not seen this leaked data. The Indian authorities are the ones who should be looking at that. But let’s take a look at Mr Nishith Desai, because his role is really interesting in the development of this business around Mauritius. His legal and tax consulting firm Nishith Desai Associates has offices now in Mumbai, Singapore, Munich, New York and elsewhere. They’ve definitely hit the big time, over decades. Meanwhile, Mr Desai seems very admired in the business world. Here’s entrepreneur Lakshmi Pratury introducing him for her interview series, the Lakshmi Leadership Lounge:”

Lakshmi Pratury: “Today with us we have Nishith Desai. Nishith’s interest spans many things way beyond law. He’s someone who thinks about the strategy, the future trends. He’s a writer, he’s a lecturer, he’s a researcher and most importantly he’s a constant learner. Nishith himself is regarded as the father of international tax in India and as a true pioneer in the field of international tax law. Soon after India opened its economy in 1991, that’s when he really kind of pioneered the roots of asset management industry in India. He has assisted the governments of Mauritius and India in launching their offshore financial centres and much much more, and today you’ll see the pivotal role he’s playing in defining the future of finance.”

Naomi: “And here’s the man himself, Nishith Desai, speaking to Lakshmi Pratury:”

Nishith Desai: “I learned that actually I have to change the model to put in a place a principle – must do highest quality work in shortest possible time with least amount of people – always anticipate, prepare and deliver. The best thing is to look to the future, and prepare and visualise future strategic legal tax or ethical issues today, and try to find solutions okay? So for example every new technology, every new business model, every new social political economic development brings along with it a new strategic legal tax or ethical issue. The future may be uncertain but it’s not unthinkable. If I start doing research on the subject that are going to come in the future, then we have not only understood the technology, we have understood the business models which could be, so we started looking at what will the future technologies that will appear next five, ten, fifteen, twenty, thirty years as well.”

Naomi: “Nishith Desai. Investigative journalist J Gopikrishnan, who broke the Desai papers story for the Pioneer newspaper has a very different take on Nishith Desai and his firm doing business through Mauritius:”

J Gopikrishnan: “He is a key player, mixed with his legal background as a lawyer and his accounting firm, but he’s not a big lawyer in India at all. Legally, he’s nothing in India, but he’s only doing this legal plus tax activities, helping out, because all the corporate players want somebody to operate these things. So he’s doing as the service agent, like Panama Papers, that legal firm, he was doing this because he was not a legal firm in strictly big legal firm or something, and he himself is not a man seen in the courts or other things but he was doing all these things.”

Naomi: “There have been various attempts during previous government administrations in India to tackle the so-called ‘Mauritius route’ because of worries about the damage it was doing to Indian tax revenues, not to mention the money laundering risks. Here’s the whistleblower again:”

Whistleblower: “It boils down to the fact that the economic interest kind of dominates the political interest or the social interest. The government of India obviously doesn’t want to take any action against the large corporations, large sort of financial institutions, high net worth individuals who are actually benefiting because of this tax treaty or these offshore structures. And of course, people like Mr. Nishith Desai and other people who have now come into this industry, they have excellent relationships with both the government of India as well as the tax department, right? So, for example, Mr. Nishith Desai was very, very close to the previous government from 2004 to 2014. So he had very, very close connections over there. He obviously has like very good connections with the tax department. In fact it’s quite common to see some of like very senior tax officers socialising with Mr. Nishith Desai quite openly, right? So, you know, so that way the government itself is not very serious about prosecution.

Now what happens is that every now and then, there was a whisper that the government of India would want to renegotiate this agreement with Mauritius, may repeal it. But the moment any such whisper would be made public, there would be like a lot of pressure, very stiff opposition from government of Mauritius and the Mauritius route lobby. And, you know, the stock market would crash the very next day, the investors would threaten a pull out, and you know, immediately the government would come out with a clarification that they were not thinking of renegotiating or making any amendments to this tax treaty.

Now, another question is – is this Mauritius route legal as per the Indian law, right? And the answer to that is it’s not, so I’m not talking about the legality of the treaty, but I’m talking about the legality of this Mauritius route through which the majority of the investment into India was flowing in. In 1985, there was a landmark judgment by a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court of India which had five judges. And in that judgment, the Supreme Court of India had taken a very dim view of sham transactions which are done for the sole purpose of avoiding tax. The judgment make it very clear that as per the Indian law, what was happening through this Mauritius tax treaty was actually not permissible. Any structure or any transaction which is done, the sole purpose of avoiding tax is illegal and has to be struck down because if the person is a resident of India, then obviously all the income, all the capital gains accruing in India will be taxed in India, you will not be able to avail the benefits of the double taxation agreement. In case the person is deemed to be resident of both Mauritius and India, the place where you have effective management and the place of effective management will determine where this person is going to be the resident of. And most of these investments or these funds, or these businesses who were investing in India, they were actually operating out of India. Their key managements were professionals were in India. Their decision making was happening in India. All the management decisions were being taken in India, so their place of effective management was India. The government of India has been turning a blind eye to the treaty abuse. This is not something that we can blame just the Mauritius government, you know, the Indian government. The Indian sort of corporate lobby, the economic interest – they have been the driving force behind such a route to have been created and have prospered.”

Naomi: “Interestingly, the Indian-Mauritius Double Tax Avoidance Agreement formed the template for extraction from many African countries, as the whistleblower explains:”

Whistleblower: “Right after the Mauritius route became the most popular route for investing into India, several countries in Africa, they also signed a double taxation avoidance agreement with Mauritius. And these agreements were identical to what was signed by the Indian government. The only thing that was different was the government of India was replaced by a different country. That’s it. But you know, the terms, the language, everything of these agreements that were signed with the multiple African countries was identical to what was signed with India.”

Naomi: “Mauritius has signed double tax avoidance agreements with at least 46 states worldwide, 18 of them African. Imagine the money flows! Here’s Rachel Etter-Phoya again:”

Rachel: “A third of African countries, more or less have signed double tax agreements with Mauritius. And if that wasn’t bad enough, another third are negotiating or awaiting ratification. We’ve seen some really interesting action taken by civil society allies and governments across the continent in the face of these highly problematic treaties. Tax Justice Network Africa took the tax treaty that had been signed between the Kenyan and Mauritian government to the Kenyan high court because of risks the treaty posed, they said to the Kenya’s revenue and, and for procedural reasons. So it was amazing, because in 2019 the court actually ruled in their favour that the government hadn’t followed the correct procedure of tabling in parliament, so the double tax duty was voided and declared unconstitutional. What was a bit disappointing though, was that the court dismissed the substantive argument that the treaty would cause colossal damage and lost to the Kenyan economy or revenue. But, just a year later in 2020, both Senegal and Zambia tore up their treaties with Mauritius, and Senegal said that the treaty had caused the country to lose over 250 million US dollars over 17 years. And Zambia said the move was necessary because the treaty wasn’t balanced or fair. And according to one tax official that spoke with the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists, companies were just using the treaty to reduce taxes paid in Zambia, and they didn’t actually have any commercial activity in Mauritius.”

Naomi: “If you’re wondering why the so called Desai Papers leak didn’t make a bigger splash, even in India, I asked Pioneer newspaper journalist Mr Gopikrishnan who broke the story why he thinks that is:”

J Gopikrishnan: “None of the Indian media take it up or followed it up. Why? Because it was a report against the tax evasion of biggest companies in India who is advertising in every media. No media took it up. So this is the power of the corporates, power of the tax evaders, that’s it. But the sad part of this is government is not jumping into this, agencies are not jumping into this, this thing because these 33 files is a good document for the income tax and enforcement directorate to launch a prosecution and that’s the saddest part happening in India. The government has not cracked down. I published the report in 2020 on the government sitting on the whistleblower’s data, more than two years. But nothing happened. The company is still there. They’re still on this job because there’s no action came against them. Normally after our publication of this huge data, next day onwards income tax and enforcement directors who should have jumped into the company and interrogate and other things, that has not happened.”

Naomi: “Are you surprised?”

J Gopikrishnan: “I’m not surprised but I know this is how these big activities are going on when it comes to big, big companies, these things will happen. And even if the legal cases somewhere it goes to arbitration, legal arbitration is also some sort of settlement and arbitration means we decided to sit over a coffee or drinks. So there will be a compromise, just saying that you pay such and such, or I pay you such and such, you pay such and such, the issue is settled. This is how the financial crimes are settled.”

Naomi: “Time’s moving on and the Indian authorities have not yet taken any action that we know about on this leaked data. So far, the only legal action has been a civil case against the whistleblower, by Nishith Desai Associates. That case itself has some oddities about it, according to the defending lawyers involved. But, whether the so-called Desai Papers leak does demonstrate tax abuse or not, we already know that business transacted through Mauritius is resulting in serious tax losses to nations who can least afford it. We already know as well that Mauritius is exposing many nations to money laundering risks.

As Taxcasters will know, for the last 60 years, it’s been the OECD that’s been setting international tax rules, largely in the interests of their member states. Those same member states tend to be the nations sucking the most out of what are often former colonies.

As you heard earlier, some nations have now torn up their tax agreements with Mauritius, like Senegal and Zambia. And now it’s going to take some superhuman efforts by countries like these, united, in the United Nations to reform the global rules that are allowing all this extraction. Rachel Etter-Phoya again:”

Rachel: “It’s a bit like whack-a-mole. One tax haven reins in its ways, becomes more transparent and offers less corrosive tax deals. But then what do you know? Another one springs up. That’s why it’s so important that decisions on international tax take place at the United Nations, and why we’re still celebrating what happened last year when the African group put forward a resolution to start negotiations on international tax at the UN, and it was adopted by consensus, although of course there were efforts by some of the richest nations to thwart the resolution in its path. And up until then and for the last 60 years, the international tax system was decided by the Club of the Rich at the OECD. And you could tell because it worked for them and it worked in their favour and they protected tax havens in their midst. No African country had a seat at the table and neither did India, and now they do at the UN.”

Naomi: “The extent to which the most affected nations can remain united in the forum of the UN is critical now. And the financial secrecy space is being squeezed, slowly. But the role of whistleblowers continues to be critical because it brings what’s happening in the shadows into the sunlight. That’s why people like this whistleblower we’ve been speaking to, and the media willing to report on them need our support, and they do need strong public interest legal protections.

Just as I was about to release this podcast, a fresh scandal involving Mauritius has been exposed by Hindenburg Research – they do forensic financial research to aid investment decision-making – their own, and that of others. They’ve spent the last two years looking at Indian conglomerate Adani Group’s – quote – ‘brazen stock manipulation and accounting fraud scheme over the course of decades.’ By downloading and cataloguing the entire Mauritius corporate registry, Hindenburg Research claims to have uncovered all sorts of stuff about the Adani Group.

Adani family members dominate the business, apparently with a vast network of offshore shell entities in all sorts of jurisdictions with, Hindenburg says – quote: ‘no obvious signs of operations, including no reported employees, no independent addresses or phone numbers and no meaningful online presence. Despite this, they have collectively moved billions of dollars into Indian Adani publicly listed and private entities, often without required disclosure of the related party nature of the deals.’ Hindenburg Research says they’ve found funds – quote – ‘intentionally structured to conceal their ultimate beneficial ownership’ and – quote – ‘obvious accounting irregularities and sketchy dealings seem to be enabled by virtually non-existent financial controls.’

Now this is big because the Adani Group founder and chair Gautam Adani is Asia’s richest person. Now I have no idea whether Nishith Desai Associates has ever worked with the Adani Group, but they’re both like planets that have turned around the same Mauritian sun. Like Nishith Desai, Gautam Adani is also from Gujarat. Many Adani companies were incorporated decades ago when Nishith Desai Associates had a near monopoly on the so-called ‘Mauritius route’. Lots of these Adani structures look to be GBC1 entities, which enjoy low or no taxation through the Indian-Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. And, whether any of these business transactions have been illegal or not, whether or not there’s ever been a working relationship between the Adani Group and Nishith Desai Associates, these two stories confirm just how deeply offshore opacity has become embedded in the Indian economy, like so many others. And that’s a threat to people, and to societies.

[Music from Mauritius]

So, Mauritius has now become infamous. Businesses that choose to use it really should think about the reputational risks. The Adani Group had more than $50bn wiped off its stock market value in the days following the Hindenburg Research report and its allegations. The Adani Group wrote a 400 page response, claiming it’s been in compliance with all laws. Hindenburg Research says the Adani Group hasn’t addressed – quote – “a single substantive issue we had raised”.

I’ll leave you with this final quote from Hindenburg Research – quote – ‘We believe the Adani Group has been able to operate a large fraud in broad daylight in large part because investors, journalists, citizens and even politicians have been afraid to speak out for fear of reprisal.’

Colômbia: esperança de justiça para todes #45:the Tax Justice Network Portuguese podcast

Welcome to our monthly podcast in Portuguese, É da sua conta (‘it’s your business’) produced and hosted by Grazielle David and Daniela Stefano. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages – EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. Here’s the latest episode:

A reforma tributária mais significativa dos últimos tempos está sendo implementada na Colômbia. Isto porque em meio a um mundo focado na austeridade, o objetivo maior da nova lei tributária colombiana é promover justiça fiscal e social.

Aprovada em fins de 2022, a nova lei tributária já está em vigor e faz com que quem tem mais contribua mais, aumenta a arrecadação sem onerar as pessoas de baixa renda e permite que estes recursos voltem para a população em forma de políticas públicas, como saúde, educação e proteção ambiental.

Ou seja: é possível construir uma reforma tributária justa! Saiba como no episódio 45 do É da Sua Conta.

No É da sua conta #45:

Transcrição do episódio

“Os estudos sobre a tributação que permitiram uma pedagogia com a sociedade, mostraram que o nosso sistema tributário não era progressivo, e que mudanças urgentes eram necessárias, especialmente na forma como os benefícios fiscais vinham sendo gerados para pessoas e empresas. ”
~ Mariana Matamoros, De Justicia

“Com a  reforma tributária não se muda a estrutura do país de um dia para outro mas estamos dandos os passos na direção correta. O ponto importante é que ficou nítido que esta é uma reforma para por fim à dívida social.”
~ Diego Guevara, vice ministro colombiano da Fazenda

“Estamos implementando um enfoque de gênero e de economia do cuidado para atender as necessidades das trabalhadoras e trabalhadores que têm responsabilidades em casa e que requerem flexibilidade, como por exemplo o trabalho remoto, o teletrabalho para simultaneamente cumprir o trabalho como funcionário e as responsabilidades em casa.”
~ Luis Carlos Reyes, diretor de Impostos e Aduanas Nacionais da Colômbia – DIAN

“Vivemos um momento oportuno para insistir na necessidade de uma tributação que mobilize recursos suficientes para garantir os direitos dos povos na América Latina. ”
~ Sergio Chaparro, Tax Justice Network

Participantes:

~ Colômbia: esperança de justiça para todes #45

Saiba Mais:

Episódios relacionados:

É da sua conta é o podcast mensal em português da Tax Justice Network. Coordenação: Naomi Fowler. Produção e apresentação: Daniela Stefano e Grazielle David. Dublagem: Cecília Figueiredo,  Pedro Philippe, e Zema Ribeiro. Download gratuito. Reprodução livre para rádios.

The Santiago Declaration on Public Services

From 29th November to 2nd December over a thousand representatives from over one hundred countries, from grassroots movements, advocacy, human rights and development organisations, feminist movements, trade unions, and other civil society organisations, met in Santiago, Chile, and virtually, to discuss the critical role of public services for our future.

Following the ‘Our Future is Public’ conference, the Santiago Declaration on Public Services was adopted by a drafting group representing all sectors, and including Tax Justice Network, on the basis of the notes and discussions during the four days. The full text of the Santiago Declaration is reproduced below.

We are at a critical juncture. At a time when the world faces a series of crises, from the environmental emergency to hunger and deepening inequalities, increasing armed conflicts, pandemics, rising extremism, and escalating inflation, a collective response is growing. A large movement is building and concrete solutions are emerging to counter the dominant paradigm of growth, privatisation and commodification. 

The Santiago Declaration launch video

Hundreds of organisations across socio-economic justice and public services sectors, from education and health services, to care, energy, food, housing, water, transportation and social protection, are coming together to address the harmful effects of commercialising public services, to reclaim democratic public control, and to reimagine a truly equal and human rights oriented economy that works for people and the planet. We demand universal access to quality, gender-transformative and equitable public services as the foundation of a fair and just society.

The common political framing of coloniality helps us to recognise the structures and mindsets that have historically constructed and continue to drive economic inequality, injustice and austerity –  that have left public services chronically under-funded for decades. The neoliberal economy, magnified by the current pattern of hyper-globalisation, is defined by perpetuating extraction, control, dependence, subjugation, patriarchy and the current global division of labour, disproportionately impacting the Global South.  


Tax Cooperation and Human Rights: How to Mobilise Resources for a Green and Gender-Inclusive Transition in Latin America. Summary video of a side event organised by TJN, together with ICRICT, DeJusticia, the Global Initiative on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Human Rights Principles in Fiscal Policy project at the Our Future is Public conference.

The commercialisation and privatisation of public services and the commodification of all aspects of life have driven growing inequalities and entrenched power disparities, giving prominence to profit and corruption over people’s rights and ecological and social well-being. It adversely affects workers, service users, and communities, with the costs and damages falling disproportionately on those who have historically been exploited. 

The devaluation of public service workers’ social status, the worsening of their working conditions, and attacks against their unions are some of the most worrying regressions of our times and a threat to our collective spaces. This is deeply linked with the patriarchal organisation of society, where women as workers and carers are undervalued and absorb social and economic shocks. They are the first to suffer from public sector cuts, losing access to services and opportunities for decent work, and facing a rising burden of unpaid care work.

Austerity cuts in public sector budgets and wage bills are driven by an ideological mindset entrenched in the International Monetary Fund and many Ministries of Finance that serve the interests of corporations over people, perpetuating dependencies and unsustainable debts. Unfair tax rules, nationally and internationally, enable vast inequalities in the accumulation and concentration of income, wealth and power within and between countries. The financialisation of a wide range of public actions and decisions hands over power to shareholders and undermines democracy.

This gathering in Chile follows years of growing mobilisation around the world. It builds on the 2019 international conference in Amsterdam and the resulting book The Future is Public: Towards Democratic Ownership of Public Services, as well as a series of groundbreaking events that brought together thousands of people online, and the adoption in 2021 of the Global Manifesto for Public Services and the related Manifesto on Rebuilding  the Social Organisation of Care

Our Future is Public

We commit to continue building an intersectional movement for a Future that is Public. One where our rights are guaranteed, not based on our ability to pay, or on whether a system produces profit, but on whether it enables all of us to live well together in peace and equality: our buen vivir

A Future that is Public is one where neither women, nor Indigenous Peoples, nor persons with disabilities, nor the working class or migrants, nor racialised, ethnic or sexual minorities, bear an unfair and unequal burden in our societies. It is a future where the continued legacy of colonialism is broken through meaningful reparations, debt cancellation and a complete overhaul of our global economic system, including through reducing material and energy use by wealthy economies. 

Who owns our resources and our services is fundamental. A public future means ensuring that everything essential to dignified lives is out of private control, and under decolonial forms of collective, transparent and democratic control. In some contexts this means decisive local, regional and/or national interventions by the state. In other contexts this means strengthening people’s organisations, including trade unions, and expanding spaces of self-government, commons, collective and community control of resources. We value public-public or public-common partnerships, but we resist the public-private partnerships that only serve to extract resources from the public for private interests.

A Future that is Public also means creating the conditions for enabling alternative production systems, including the prioritisation of agroecology as an essential component of food sovereignty. To that end we need to take back control of decision making processes and institutions from the current forms of corporate capture to be able to decide for what, for whom and how we provide, manage and collectively own resources and public services.

The public future will not be possible without taking bold collective national action for ambitious, gender-transformative and progressive fiscal and economic reforms, to massively expand financing of universal public services. These reforms must be complemented by major shifts in the international public finance architecture, including transformations in tax, debt and trade governance. We need to seize the momentum generated by the recent successes of African and other Global South countries towards creating a UN intergovernmental framework on tax and the 4th Financing for Development Conference. 

Democratising economic governance towards truly multilateral processes is critical to overhaul the power of dominant neoliberal organisations and reorient national and international financial institutions away from the racial, patriarchal and colonial patterns of capitalism and towards socio-economic justice, ecological sustainability, human rights, and public services. It is equally essential to enforce the climate and ecological debt of the Global North, to carry-out an expedited reduction of energy and material resource use by wealthy economies, to hold big polluters liable for their generations-long infractions, to accelerate the phasing-out of fossil fuels, and to prioritise finance system change.

A Future that is Public recognises the urgent need for international solidarity and globally systemic but contextually differentiated, solutions. It is an essential element of a just, feminist and decolonial transition, that places public service users and workers at the centre, and will enable us to rebuild a sustainable social pact for the 21st century. 

We will take action

We will join forces across sectors, regions and movements to formulate and carry out common strategies and new alliances towards joint proposals for a just, feminist and decolonial transition in the face of the climate and environmental crises. We will work to  transform our systems, valuing human rights and ecological sustainability over GDP growth and narrowly defined economic gains.

Working in solidarity with grassroots groups everywhere, including Indigenous Peoples, youth, older persons, and persons with disabilities, we will: 

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast #61: الفاتورة الإلكترونية بين رفض المهنيين وإصرار مصلحة الضرائب

Welcome to the 61st edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available on most podcast apps. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can follow the programme on Facebook, on Twitter and on our website.

All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages: EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. Here’s the latest episode:

في العدد #61 للجباية ببساطة عدنا على أهم الأحداث الإقتصادية لسنة 2022 بدءا بتبعات الصراع الروسي الأكراني وتأثيراته على أسعار الطاقة والمواد الأولية وصولا إلى أزمة الغذاء في العالم وإنعكسات كل هذا على مستويات التضخم القياسية وترفيع نسب الفائدة المرجعية في العالم.في الجزء الثاني من الحلقة، يستضيف وليد بن رحومة، المحاسب القانوني محمد مصطفى للحديث عن الفاتورة الإلكترونية التي أقرتها مصلحة الضرائب المصرية ولاقت رفضا واسعا لدى أصحاب المهن الحرة والشركات الصغرى في مصر.

الفاتورة الإلكترونية بين رفض المهنيين وإصرار مصلحة الضرائب

تابعونا على صفحتنا على الفايسبوك وتويتر https://www.facebook.com/ TaxesSimply Tweets by taxes_simply

Imperial Inequalities: Workshop on Colonial Taxation and National Welfare across European Empires

We’re pleased to share this blog post written by Gurminder K Bhambra and Julia McClure on the upcoming workshop on Colonial Taxation and National Welfare across European Empires, Friday 27th January, 2023, 2-4pm, University of Sussex (also livestreamed on zoom, please sign up here – a recording will also be made available after the event). UPDATE: recording now available here (it’s not great quality but it’s possible to follow most of the speakers)


Taxation tends to be seen as central to the development of the ‘imagined community’ of the nation, clarifying its limits and its boundaries. The assumed national boundaries of the modern state are called into question, however, once we recognize the forms of colonial taxation in place across European empires and the asymmetry of relations between those from whom taxes were collected and those who were the beneficiaries of its distributed returns through welfare.

How did European empires establish taxation regimes that laid the historical foundations for today´s inequalities? How were discourses of welfare used to justify colonial taxation regimes? How have tax structures cemented global inequalities into the post-colonial era? These are some of the questions addressed in the new volume, Imperial Inequalities: The Politics of Economic Governance across European Empires (Manchester University Press, 2022), co-edited by Gurminder K. Bhambra (Professor of Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies, University of Sussex) and Julia McClure (Senior Lecturer in Late Medieval and Early Modern Global History, University of Glasgow).

Imperial Inequalities is a landmark volume that is an open call to arms to focus upon the active role that taxation regimes have played, and continued to play, in creating inequalities both within and between nations. This volume comes out of critical conversations between academics and practitioners in tax justice that were facilitated by an event hosted by the Tax Justice Network in December 2020. The resulting contributions speak to the ongoing significance of deeper understanding of the connections between taxation regimes and inequality. During this event we will hear from members of the Tax Justice Network about the relevance of this volume for current tax justice campaigns and also from some of the contributors to the volume.

The volume draws together scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds (including history, sociology, international relations) and with different regional specialisms (including Africa, Asia, Latin America) to offer insightful case studies of the political discourses and economic objectives that gave rise to certain taxation policies and the long-term impacts of these at both the local and global levels. It offers a critical long-durée perspective of the mechanics of imperialism, stretching from Spanish colonialism in the Americas in the sixteenth century and English colonialism in Ireland in the seventeenth century, to French, British, and Dutch colonialism in Africa, the Caribbean, India, and Indonesia, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also covers the period of decolonization, and the emergence of tax havens.

The impressive temporal and geographic range of these case studies work together to offer new understandings of the political economy of European empires. They explain the fiscal innovations in colonial and post-colonial economic policies that engineered economic policies and their racial dimensions. They shed light on the moral-political discourses that have been used both to create and to justify these inequalities. These moral-political discourses have variously incorporated themes of charity, philanthropy, justice, and citizenship, and point to the complicated relationships between nations and empires.

Attendees will have the opportunity to ask questions to any of the panelists about their specialist research and contributions to the volume and to participate in the broader conversations around how colonial and postcolonial taxation regimes have created, and continue to create, different forms of inequality, and what policies we need to address these.

Contributors at the workshop:

[Image credit: British Empire map – The India and Colonial Exhibition, London (1886) – BL.jpg” is marked with CC0 1.0.]

Five key trends in 2023: Financial transparency, tax justice and inequality

We’re pleased to share this very useful look ahead to 2023 from our friends and colleagues at the Financial Transparency Coalition, originally posted here and written by FTC’s Executive Director Matti Kohonen.

Financial transparency and tax justice: Five key trends in 2023

The year 2023 is going to be crucial for financial transparency and tax justice, as countries around the world desperately seek funds amid multiple crises, whist grappling with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many global South countries face sovereign debt defaults that will lead them to apply for International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan programmes which are often linked to austerity policies.

Progressive fiscal policy shifts and further advancing financial transparency are absolutely crucial to generate enough resources to reduce the impact of the multiple crises especially among the poor who are often women and minority groups. If we do not tackle financial transparency, kleptocrats and actors engaged in natural resource crimes will not be caught, and billions of dollars in hidden funds will continue to be stolen. But progress is tremendously slow in these areas, and advances that we make are easily lost amid endless legal challenges.

So what are the five main trends to look ahead in 2023 which could help countries face the multiple current funding crises they are facing? Let us take a look:

Fighting growing austerity

In 2023 more than ever before we are told that we have run out of money, and that the only way to restore public finances is by cutting public spending and raising consumption-related taxes. In total, 94 nations in the global South are due to cut public spending in 2023, while 85% of the world population will live with public spending cuts and other austerity measures.

Meanwhile COVID-19 recovery spending in the global South only reached 2.4% of GDP, a fifth of what was recommended by the UN, and much of the money did not go to those most impacted by the pandemic. As we revealed in the “Recovery at a Crossroads” report launched in September 2022 at the #EndAusterity Festival, only 4% of the funds spent in global South countries went to informal workers, who often represents the majority of the workforce and is largely made up of female workers, whilst 38% went to big corporations. Only 38% of funds went to vital social protection programmes that are key to reduce growing gender and economic inequalities.

In contrast, global North countries spent upwards of 10% of GDP in COVID recovery, and many have long-term recovery spending plans including the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility worth over €800bn focusing on green and digital Recovery which will continue into 2026. Meanwhile the US has its Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) spending worth $739bn going until 2032.  In the global South, only Chile is likely to continue long-term support policies into 2023 and beyond with a fiscal reform package to tax large corporates and the wealthy. So the big question is whether other global South countries will follow Chile’s path. Yet, there are barriers from this taking place, such as the IMF policy advice, which is often part of loan conditions, recommending to maintain tight fiscal policies due to increasing inflation.

In 2023 we at the FTC will closely monitor initiatives to redress this imbalance especially in the global South, such as the Fiscal Pact for Latin America and the Caribbean proposed by the governments of Colombia and Chile where a key meeting is expected this year to tackle illicit financial flows, and tax abuses in Latin America, pushing also for global solutions. In the Caribbean region, the Bridgetown Initiative led by Prime Minister Mia Mottley of Barbados will seek to reform the World Bank and the IMF to provide more international financing without austerity conditionalities.

International tax deals and the UN

In November 2022, the UN took a historical step to start negotiations on the UN role on tax governance that could possibly lead to a UN Tax Commission. It builds on the ECA declaration of African finance ministers in May 2022, calling for the start of negotiations on a UN tax convention. This step is important as ongoing negotiations at the OECD have not led to significant gains for global South countries in mobilising more revenue by taxing the profits of large multinational companies. These countries including Argentina, Brazil, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia may even end up losing revenue if they forego existing digital taxes that have a wider scope and a clearer basis for allocating revenue to them, so a lot is at play.

In December 2022, a budget for the tax resolution was recommended to be approved, paving the way then for UN Secretary-General António Guterres to produce a report detailing the options moving ahead. Mr Guterres has already pledged his office’s support to this process, and so by the next General Assembly we can expect an evaluation of the main options and modalities for negotiations to begin.

The resolution was sponsored by the Africa Group in the UN, the wider G77 group of global South countries, and the signatories of the LAC Fiscal Pact may wish to widen its scope. Civil society will make its impact by creating widened support for this initiative, highlighting how little revenue is collected in the global South and will monitor the negotiations at each stage to defend the interests of the global South.

Public beneficial ownership registries and corporate transparency in Europe

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling invalidated public access to beneficial ownership registries in December 2022 which represented a major step backwards in the fight against Illicit Financial Flows. Some EU countries have already closed public access to beneficial ownership registries, while others may keep their registries open with the support of national legislation. The European Commission recognises that journalists and civil society have legitimate interests to access this information, and are likely to propose an amendment to the 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD6) in January 2023.

We find this judgement misguided since it is based on a narrow understanding of the uses of public access to registries, with the rationale only covering existing money laundering and terrorist financing offences. Public access to BO registries plays a key role in the fight against environmental crimes, tax abuse, human rights abuses, and labour market abuses – but none of these were considered by the court as valid reasons for public access to BO data. It is likely that there will be on-request public access for civil society and journalists, but that requires to know already what one is looking for rather than find red flags.

Another important development to keep an eye for in 2023 is the key EU directive on corporate tax transparency, namely public country-by-country reporting (CBCR). This will move towards implementation in September 2023 as it is transposed and becomes part of national law in the 27 EU member states by June 2023, with reporting obligations to start by June 2024. EU member states will be able to make a more ambitious national transposition than what the directive sets as a minimum threshold.

The trouble with the directive is that it is not comprehensive as multinational corporations (MNCs) only report on activities in the EU and some jurisdictions on the highly problematic EU tax havens black and grey lists. If the rules were in force today, companies would not publish information on more than 75% of countries worldwide.

The EU, once a leader in tax transparency, will possibly be overshadowed by the Australian government promise to implement country-by-country reporting of all large multinationals operating there. Also there is a possibility of a knock-on effect in the US and elsewhere in opening the tax practices of large MNCs if the full CBCR information is included.

Also the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accepted that public information on CBCR is a material issue for investors to demand company boards to implement, and shareholder resolutions have followed at AmazonMicrosoft, Cisco and other large multinational companies.  In 2023, we will see more shareholder resolutions in the AGM season from April onwards concerning public CBCR, making the case for regulatory moves given that many investors find this information as being highly desirable especially when tax scandals are damaging to companies that work in public contracts.

We at FTC will make a renewed case for public access to BO registries and public country-by-country reporting in the EU and elsewhere based on the need to tackle environmental crimes that are not detected and reported on without the involvement of the public, journalists, and civil society as key users of BO data. Similarly, corporate secrecy of lack of tax reporting harms the enjoyment of human rights to health and education, as secretive private sector service providers in the care economy have been found to conceal their tax affairs.

Fighting environmental crimes through financial transparency

In 2023 we will seek to feed into developments towards a vessel transparency initiative, likely to be discussed both at the FAO Committee on Fisheries or the OECD Committee on Fisheries.  Such a transparency initiative is necessary to implement the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreed ban on subsidies to companies engaged in IUU fishing.

We will also look to develop proposals towards identifying IUU fishing as a natural resource crime both at FATF, as well as at UNODC which are custodians with UNCTAD of the UN SDG indicator on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs).  In Africa, we will seek recognition of IUU fishing as an Illicit Financial Flow at the African High-Level Panel on IFFs.  FATF should define the scope of environmental crimes in a new report.

We already saw some progress in 2022 with the US sanctioning the beneficial owners of one of the top companies engaged in IUU fishing, Pingtan Maritime Enterprise Ltd. which we identified in our “Fishy Networks” report launched in October 2022 as one of the main companies involved in IUU fishing.. Importantly, the company was also delisted from the NASDAQ, the US based stock exchange. Yet, Europe, as mentioned above, took a step backwards with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) deeming public access to beneficial ownership registries as being invalid on the basis that privacy of ownership was more important.

Targeting oligarchs and a Global Asset Registry

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to multiple countries sanctioning assets of Russian oligarchs including real estate, private bank accounts, yachts and luxury cars. Yet very little of the over US$1 trillion in assets laundered out of Russia in the last three decades has been found so far as much of such assets are hidden under the secrecy of shell companies. The FTC and ICRICT support the idea floated by Mario Draghi to create a registry of all assets, but this Global Asset Registry should not be limited to assets of Russian oligarchs.

The KleptoCapture Task Force was set up on 2 March 2022 in the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion in Ukraine. But thus far, and based on public knowledge, they have identified mostly yachts, aircraft, sports cars and other high-profile assets belonging to sanctioned Russian oligarchs, which represent just a small part of the shady assets held by these wealthy individuals. This is partly since it largely relies on information that public interest groups, and investigative journalists have aggregated from best available public sources of information which is limited. If the beneficial owners of all assets were public, one would not need such a task force to hunt hidden assets.

In Europe, we see proposals towards registering assets that are not currently covered by the proposed 6th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Positively, the EU has sought to scope an EU Asset Registry but there is no proposal for to implement this yet.

Wealth tax campaigners in Latin America have also successfully put this issue in the agenda of countries like Argentina and Bolivia, by emphasising the importance of taxing wealth. Colombia for example included a wealth tax in its tax reform bill in late 2022, and also raised corporate taxes on mining, coal and oil companies in order to avoid austerity.

In 2023, we expect Chile to implement a wealth tax for those with assets over US$4.9 million, making only the very wealthiest to pay such a tax. But all this hinges on having a global asset registry. If assets were on a public registry, it would be much easier to design effective and progressive wealth taxes that would generate much-needed revenue to tackle the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and to avert austerity and cuts from being made. 2023 will tell how this fight will end.

Matti Kohonen is the executive director of the Financial Transparency Coalition, a group of 11 international civil society organisations including the Tax Justice Network. Before joining the Financial Transparency Coalition, Dr Kohonen worked at Christian Aid’s Economic Justice Lead Advisor, Oxfam’s Essential Services and Development Finance Advisor and project co-ordinator at Tax Justice Network. 

[Image: “DAWN” by M.RICHI is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.]

Remunicipalización: el poder municipal: January 2023 Spanish language tax justice podcast, Justicia ImPositiva

Welcome to our Spanish language podcast and radio programme Justicia ImPositiva with Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez, free to download and broadcast on radio networks across Latin America and Spain. ¡Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a nuestro podcast y programa radiofónico! Escuche por su app de podcast.

En este programa con Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez:

Invitados:

~Remunicipalización: el poder municipal

MÁS INFORMACIÓN:

Nuestro Futuro Es Público: https://www.derechosypoliticafiscal.org/es/noticias/142-nuestro-futuro-es-publico

https://publicservices.international/resources/videos/nuestro-futuro-es-pblico—da-1-espaol?id=13519&amp%3Blang=es

[Imagen: “Torino 2013 Contro la privatizzazione dell’acqua” by Ithmus is licensed under CC BY 2.0.]

2022: developments, successes and looking forward to 2023

As 2022 comes to an end, we would like share our reflections on the Tax Justice highlights of 2022 – a year of shifting power dynamics and increasing momentum. We’ll begin with our CEO Alex Cobham:

Organisationally, this has been a key year with the first major refresh of the board for some years. This high level, globally diverse group is now helping to steer the development of our new strategic framework, and have already contributed in significant areas of our international advocacy and partnership.

A significant milestone for our internationally dispersed team was the first in-person retreat since before the pandemic, reinvigorating relationships and energising us all. The retreat also allowed us to engage with important strategic discussions of the sort that virtual interactions, however well managed, simply cannot provide.  

In our global advocacy, we have seen dramatic progress in the fruits of a long-term commitment made by the Tax Justice Network and our allies at the Global Alliance for Tax Justice. At a key strategic gathering hosted by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Berlin, in 2017, the two organisations committed to jointly prioritise the creation of a globally inclusive intergovernmental tax framework under UN auspices. Such an aspiration is included in foundational policy documents such as ‘Tax Us If You Can’ (2005), but had not been actively pursued to the same extent as other key elements. With multi-year core funding (from the Ford Foundation in particular), it was possible to make such a long-term commitment to what many – even sympathisers within the broader movement – had thought to be an impossible aim, because of the committed blocking of G77 attempts by OECD member countries. Impossible no more!

This year saw a major breakthrough achieved. After momentum building through a range of UN and other processes, including the High Level FACTI Panel report in 2021, the pivotal leadership came from the May 2022 declaration of African finance ministers at the Economic Commission for Africa summit. This underpinned Nigeria’s shepherding of an Africa Group resolution through the General Assembly, with the result that the Secretary-General has been mandated to produce a report on the options; intergovernmental discussions have been given the go-ahead to start next year; and the 78th General Assembly will debate the issue and consider the formal commencement of negotiations.

International tax abuse costs the world – in our conservative estimates – US$483 billion, the best part of half a trillion dollars in lost revenues each year. While OECD countries lose the majority of that sum, it is lower-income countries that lose the greatest share of their tax revenues – and for whom that translates most directly into foregone public services upon which people crucially depend. But the OECD has failed to deliver tax reforms that are effective even for its members; and failed to allow meaningful representation for non-members. And as we wrote in an open letter to the G20, the OECD has also failed in its stewardship of a key global public good, in the form of data that is critical for countries to understand and combat tax abuse.

It is no surprise, in this context, that the Africa Group resolution was adopted by unanimous consensus. Some OECD members have signalled they may still be obstructive in the discussions to come, but everyone – including their own citizens – knows full well that the answer lies in a genuinely global process, under UN auspices. You can read more about the resolution here and listen to our podcast here, which breaks down and analyses the power plays in that historic meeting.

In 2023, we will work with allies around the world to support governments in preparing national and regional positions for the intergovernmental discussions, and in holding governments to account to ensure that they take progressive, open perspectives with a focus on curbing tax abuse – not protecting the anachronistic power structure of the OECD.

Tax Justice and Human Rights – Liz Nelson

Austerity has followed quickly on the heels of the pandemic and the related dual crises of inequalities and climate have sharpened our work on human rights. Across all our work human rights resonate.  Whether in forging partnerships in advocacy, developing policy solutions, building upon jurisprudence or collaborating on research, overlapping inequalities and human rights failures are our concern. The links to tax justice provide the critical narrative that have guided our successes over the last twelve months and will continue in our new work.

In March 2022 we made a joint submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (Fourth Cycle). Our focus was the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland (UK & NI) and the issues raised centred on the UK & NI’s poor record on implementation on financial transparency, including in its crown dependencies and oversea territories. Working in collaboration with the Government Revenue and Development Estimation tool (GRADE) at St. Andrews University and our data on tax abuse (2021) we were able to highlight the human rights impact of cross border tax abuse illustrating that  the additional revenue lost to tax abuse “would be associated with 36 million people accessing their right to basic sanitation, 18 million accessing their rights to basic drinking water, and almost 7 million children attending school for an extra year. Additionally, this increased access to rights would be associated with over 600,000 children and nearly 80,000 mothers surviving over ten years.

In November we presented, to the UN CEDAW Committee (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) a follow up report to our collaboration in 2016 on the impact of financial secrecy and cross border tax abuse facilitated by Switzerland. The Committee recognised the continued failure to address the  financial secrecy that keeps Switzerland ranked number 2 at the top of our Financial Secrecy Index.

Our advocacy and research strengthened a valuable collaboration with the Tax Ed Alliance. The Alliance which has a three target country focus and multiple national, regional and international partners, analyses the impact of tax abuse on the right to education. Our research has supported advocacy and provided graphic illustrations, including for the Heads of State Transforming Education Summit, on the how the financing of free public education is negatively impacted by tax abuse.

Our Future is Public (#OFiP22) Conference in November gathered social movements and civil society organisations from all over the world in Santiago, Chile for a 4-day Conference. We contributed to discussions across many sectoral sessions and plenaries aimed at developing strategies and narratives to strengthen public services for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights and tackle the effects of climate change.(see link here to read the Santiago Declaration).

We continue to work in research collaborations with Government Revenue and Development Estimation tool (GRADE) at St. Andrews University, exploring and illustrating the pervasive impact of tax abuse on rights to health, education and on climate justice.

In September we began our work as a contributing partner to the Demo Trans Research Consortium. Over the next three years will be working with researchers from the universities of Leuven, Charles (Prague), Bergen and Utrecht. The research will explore the interactions between governments and corporations and their impact accountability and on human rights. Demo Trans is funded by the European Commission in its Horizon Europe Framework.

In 2022 we have been successful in attracting funding to bolster our human rights evidence building, and have secured additional funding to explore how tax justice can provide policy solutions for the dual crisises of inequalities and climate justice through an international perspective.

Beneficial Ownership – Andres Knobel

The State of Play of Beneficial Ownership Registration report, based on the Financial Secrecy Index edition published in 2022 shows that almost 100 jurisdictions already have laws establishing beneficial ownership registration, where companies, trusts or other types of legal vehicles must file information to a government authority on their beneficial owners (the natural persons who ultimately own or control them). Mainstream implementation of beneficial ownership registries will also be promoted by the 2022 Reform of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 24 on beneficial ownership of legal persons in relation to the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

While beneficial ownership registration has been improved and expanded, the Reform of Recommendation 24 fell short of requiring public access to beneficial ownership information. 

An even harsher blow to public access was struck on 22 November 2022 by the EU Court of Justice which invalidated public access to beneficial ownership information in a ruling that caused outrage in the financial transparency movement. While the Court clarified that the media and civil society organisations involved in the fight against money laundering have a legitimate interest to access beneficial ownership information, implementing this type of access has already created many challenges and some EU countries have already closed access, affecting calls and improvements for public access in non-EU countries, including many British Overseas territories. On the bright side, the ruling has woken up civil society actors and regroupings and strategising have already begun to counter the ruling’s effects.

Secrecy – Moran Harari

Financial Secrecy Index: Global financial secrecy has shrunk:

In May, we published the 2022 edition of the Financial Secrecy Index. The results show that the supply of financial secrecy services, like those utilised by Russian oligarchs, tax evaders and corrupt politicians, has continued to decrease globally due to various transparency reforms. However, five G7 countries alone – the US, UK, Japan, Germany and Italy – were responsible for cutting global progress against financial secrecy by more than half. When excluding the increases in financial secrecy from these five countries, the Financial Secrecy Index 2022 finds that global financial secrecy was reduced by 5 per cent.

Public Country by Country reporting: 

In October 2022, Australian government showed global leadership in its announcement on a new requirement for multinational corporations to publicly disclose their country by country reporting, a type of reporting method designed to expose and deter multinational corporations from shifting their profits to tax havens. The new requirement was part of Australia’s federal budget for 2022-2023 and the legislation is expected to be implemented by 1st July 2023. The Australian initiative appears to be far broader than the recent EU directive on public country by country reporting -which requires multinationals to publicly report on on activities that multinationals have in Member States as well as in jurisdictions included in the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions.

Automatic Information Exchange:

In light of the rapid growth of the Crypto-Asset market, and following a public consultation meeting on 23 May 2022, in which our Andres Knobel participated, the OECD published in October 2022, the Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF), which constitutes a further improvement to the automatic exchange of information set out by the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). The Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework will require jurisdictions to report on tax information on transactions in Crypto-Assets, with a view to automatically exchanging such information with the jurisdictions of residence of taxpayers on an annual basis. In light of the Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework, the OECD has also made changes to the Common Reporting Standard for it to cover also indirect investments in Crypto-Assets through derivatives and investment vehicles.

Data – Miroslav Palansky

During 2022, the Tax Justice Network made a lot of progress in the area of data collection and infrastructure. The first half of 2022 was dominated by work on the Financial Secrecy Index 2022, which was released in May. The index provides a treasure trove of detailed information on financial secrecy offered by 141 jurisdictions around the world, which is unprecedented in terms of both scope and coverage. All the underlying data is available on the revamped website of the Financial Secrecy Index.

Throughout the year, we have been working on developing a new data portal, which will allow researchers, journalists, or anyone else interested in tax justice to explore, download, and use data collected by us, as well as other relevant variables from various sources. With the data portal, we aim to provide a one-stop-shop for anyone interested in working with indicators of tax havens and financial secrecy. We expect to launch the data portal for public use in early 2023.

Another significant area of data-intensive work was on estimating the scale of illicit financial flows (IFFs) and on identifying the actors responsible for these. We have been developing a bilateral gravity model of financial flows in which we are able to disentangle licit and illicit financial flows by including indicators of financial secrecy and tax havenry. This new approach allows to estimate the scale of IFFs across several different channels and across most countries of the world.

Lastly, we have been busy working with government authorities around the world on analysing microeconomic data (at the firm- or transaction-level) to identify Illicit Financial Flows in order to effectively design policies that mitigate these flows. For example, in Nigeria, we worked with the tax authority to identify companies that most likely engage in profit shifting, and we estimated the semi-elasticity of profits reported by multinationals in Nigeria. We are at various stages of work in several other countries, such as Ecuador, Uganda, and Ghana. We aim to strengthen this area of work further to bring the most possible impact of our work on actual reductions in the scale of IFFs and the resulting tax revenue losses.

The Tax Justice Network reaching people, Communications and media

The Tax Justice Network continued to bring tax justice issues to more people through our media and online work in 2022. Our research and commentary was featured in over 4,600 media and press articles in over 140 countries. Over 344,000 sessions occurred on the Tax Justice Network website in 2022 and our social media posts on Twitter, Facebook and Linkedin had a combined reach of over 1,024,298.

Our podcasts continue to go from strength to strength, each of them unique productions in five different languages, released each month and available for any radio station to broadcast in EnglishSpanishArabicFrench and Portuguese. They’re all available here {where you can also subscribe} and you can find them on most podcast apps. We hope to be adding an exciting new regional podcast to our output in 2023…

In 2022 the podcasts have covered many of the developments and tax justice advances mentioned above, along with their significance in each region. We leave you with our English language podcast the Taxcast’s take on the day global power shifted, which gives you a fly on the wall look at the historic UN meeting and vote marking the beginning of the end of the OECD’s sixty-year reign as the world’s leading rule maker on global tax, an encouraging way to end 2022 and look ahead to 2023:


Heróis invisíveis e em extinção #44: the Tax Justice Network Portuguese podcast

Welcome to our monthly podcast in Portuguese, É da sua conta (‘it’s your business’) produced and hosted by Grazielle David and Daniela Stefano. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages – EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here. Here’s the latest episode:

Para promover políticas públicas que garantem direitos à toda população, é preciso investir na administração tributária, que é o órgão que arrecada os recursos para financiar a realização de políticas.

O episódio #44 do É da Sua Conta analisa a destruição das administrações tributárias no Brasil, Europa e Estados Unidos, ressalta a importância de investir nesse órgão fundamental para a realização de políticas, bem como na necessidade de contratação e valorização de herois e heroínas invisíveis e que, neste momento, estão em extinção: auditores fiscais.

No É da sua conta #44:

“O que é mais urgente na receita federal é tampar certos ralos de dinheiro público; a receita federal precisa se equipar de pessoas, auditores fiscais motivados com o trabalho.” ~ Isac Falcão, Sindifisco Nacional

“Devemos comemorar os cobradores de impostos. Muitos deles são heróis. Em alguns países, eles são mortos por tentarem cobrar impostos de pessoas poderosas.” ~ Nick Shaxson, Tax Justice Network

“A quantidade de operações que visam elidir as pessoas do pagamento de tributos se torna sempre cada vez mais sofisticada, com cada vez mais estruturas que dão suporte às empresas pra fugirem da tributação. Nesse cenário em que a gente vê investimentos em bancas de profissionais assessorando grandes grupos internacionais favorecendo o planejamento tributário, a Receita Federal do Brasil, vem sendo sucateada.” ~ Patricia Gomes, auditora fiscal

“Administradores tributários servem para corrigir injustiças sociais profundas, para conseguir recolher o dinheiro de grandes bilionários, grandes empresas, grandes criminosos que escondem dinheiro. ” ~ Gabriel Casnati, Internacional do Serviço Público

“A falta de investimento na receita federal é lastimável, principalmente porque afeta a questão da fiscalização. O sistema tem que estar atualizado pra cada vez mais atender a população. Na medida em que há sucateamento da tecnologia integrada, que os sistemas não são atualizados e que não tem investimento isso tudo vai repercutir na vida e no cotidiano das pessoas.” ~ Telma Dantas, Fenadados

Participantes:

~ Heróis invisíveis e em extinção #44

Saiba Mais:

Episódios relacionados:

Conecte-se com a gente!

É da sua conta é o podcast mensal em português da Tax Justice Network. Coordenação: Naomi Fowler. Produção e apresentação: Daniela Stefano e Grazielle David. Agradecimentos: BandTV e Jack Mochila. Download gratuito. Reprodução livre para rádios.

Tax Justice Network’s French podcast: Pas de Justice Fiscale sans une vraie justice climatique #46

Welcome to our monthly podcast in French, Impôts et Justice Sociale with Idriss Linge of the Tax Justice Network. All our podcasts are unique productions in five different languages every month in EnglishSpanishArabicFrenchPortuguese. They’re all available here and on most podcast apps. Here’s our latest episode:

Pour cette nouvelle édition de votre podcast en français sur la justice fiscale et la justice sociale dans le monde, nous revenons sur la rencontre virtuelle d’experts organisée conjointement par Tax Justice Network et Tax Justice Network Africa pour échanger sur la connexion entre la Justice Fiscale et la Justice climatique. Les participants ont répondu aux questions de savoir pourquoi la justice fiscale et la justice climatique devraient être rapprochées et surtout comment financer les deux ambitions.

L’autre thématique du jour parle de l’accès au public des bénéficiaires effectifs en Europe. La Cour de Justice Européenne a estimé que cette possibilité qui existait jusque là pouvait violer d’autres et rendu l’accès à ces registres à condition de montrer un intérêt légitime. Pour de nombreux pays africains, c’est l’opportunité d’une meilleure transparence qui s’efface et cela l’est davantage pour la République Démocratique du Congo, riche pays d’Afrique, mais dont plus de la moitié des 90 millions d’habitants vivent en dessous du seuil de pauvreté. Nous avons posé la question à quelques citoyens de ce pays sur le point de savoir s’ils connaissaient les propriétaires effectifs de leurs mines

Interviennent dans ce sujet:

~ Pas de Justice Fiscale sans une vraie justice climatique #46

Vous pouvez suivre le Podcast sur:

[Image: “Skull-in-earth” by mlaaker is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.]

CEDAW chimes differently to ECJ ruling on human rights and financial transparency

With the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling ringing in our ears – invalidating public access to beneficial ownership registries – it now seems timely to elevate the recent concerns expressed by the CEDAW Committee (Commission on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) in their Concluding Observations on Switzerland’s financial secrecy laws. The Financial Transparency Coalition documents how the ECJ ruling:
“reversed much of the progress [we] have made in a decade in the fight against corruption, economic and natural resource crimes, tax abuses and other forms of illicit financial flows across the world.”

The perverseness of the ruling illustrates the dangerous
environment in which the tax justice movement operates. Moreover, it perhaps illustrates the enormous chasm in understanding of the linkages between financial transparency and economic, social and cultural rights. The ruling places an emphasis on the right to private life, while it fails to consider the importance of public access to company ownership data for purposes of fighting corruption and tax abuses.

The ruling suggests deliberate indifference to the cross-border consequences of financial secrecy on the human rights, such as the foreign ownership of companies and trusts to hide vast amounts of wealth in tax havens like Switzerland. Even if this ruling by the ECJ doesn’t apply to Switzerland, it will make it less likely that the upcoming centralised beneficial ownership registry, which includes also foreign ownership of companies and trusts, are made publicly accessible by Switzerland.

The ruling represents a travesty and a pernicious retrogression. It reminds us that private wealth can, when it chooses, turn legal channels into a weapon to surmount the rights and interests of citizens.

Meanwhile and in parallel, seemingly ‘softer’ law, such as CEDAW, reiterated its concern in the lack of progress that Switzerland has made since 2016 and in addressing previous concluding observations
(CEDAW/C/CH/CO/4-5, para. 41 (a)) on Switzerland and the systemic financial secrecy and the threat to rights. The CEDAW Committee comes to this conclusion using evidence from our joint submission with Alliance-Sud and CESR. The Financial Secrecy Index 2022 also corroborates this view in ranking Switzerland number 2 at the top of the Index.

Last month CEDAW published its draft Concluding Observations on their October 2022 review of Switzerland including the recommendation:

“that the State party undertake independent, participatory and periodic impact assessments of the extraterritorial effects of its financial secrecy and corporate tax policies on women’s rights and substantive equality, ensuring that such assessments are conducted impartially, with public disclosure of the methodology and findings.” (CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/6., 2022. Para.22)

Financial secrecy has a profound impact on economic and social rights, and not only on the rights for women and girls. Financial secrecy corrupts democracies, and thus reduces the enjoyment of civil and political rights in a meaningful democratic dialogue. Also, the clandestine influence of wealth and the illicit flow of finance at the bidding of financial crime and wealthy elites, denies opportunities for citizens to determine progressive economic and social policies that work to address inequalities and provide public services for all such as free public education, health and decent housing.

The ECJ ruling resting “on a narrow interpretation of beneficial ownership” and CEDAW’s emphasising of Switzerland’s notoriety as proponents of financial secrecy, underline the retrogression of public scrutiny and government accountability. The ruling should also steel the tax justice, climate justice, human rights movements for an intense and unwavering drive for the establishment of a United Nations intergovernmental framework on tax with the now accepted remit to provide both the design and governance for international taxing rules, transparency and accountability. Such a convention should also address the question of how tax and financial transparency advance the enjoyment of human rights in a broader sense,  recognising the impact on economic, social and cultural rights.

We should hold dear ‘soft’ deliberations and recommendations of the UN Treaty Bodies such as CEDAW. They can and arguably should make bold linkages to the nascent UN framework on tax rules in their purpose to provide accountability for economic and social rights, and equality. The basis of well-used and well-regarded ‘softer’ UN instruments is a perfect platform to move towards a ‘hard’ framework that would require commitments to transparency and the genuinely inclusive negotiation of international tax rules.

Co-authored by Liz Nelson, Director, Tax Justice & Human Rights, Tax Justice Network and Dr Matti Kohonen, Executive Director, Financial Transparency Coalition.

See also UN committee hears evidence of harms of Swiss financial secrecy on women’s rights

The day global power shifted: the Tax Justice Network podcast, the Taxcast

Welcome to the latest episode of the Tax Justice Network’s monthly podcast, the Taxcast. You can subscribe either by emailing naomi [at] taxjustice.net or find us on your podcast app.

There’s been a shift in global power, a tax justice milestone, and the most powerful nations couldn’t stop it…

In this episode, Taxcast host Naomi Fowler gives you a fly-on-the-wall take on what happened at the United Nations on November 24th 2022. We look at the power plays around a fundamental global power shift – the beginning of the end of the OECD’s 60 year reign as the world’s leading rule-maker on global tax. Featuring:

A transcript is available here (some is automated)

~ The Day Global Power Shifted

“It was absolutely incredible to watch the proceedings at the UN to see what was like a boxing match where Nigeria, alongside all other countries that have really been cut out of international tax discussions, stood up and said, ‘this is the time to change the rules of the game’.” ~ Rachel Etter-Phoya

“The resolution really is a kind of watershed moment. The OECD has lobbied its absolute hardest to try to get this blocked. And yet the resolution in the end went through unanimously by consensus.” ~ Alex Cobham

“We look forward to taking further steps as urgently as possible. We have only eight years to realise our ambitious 2030 agenda. We will not achieve it unless we step up the pace of our efforts to reshape multilateralism for the 21st century.” ~ UN Representative for Nigeria

Further reading and information:

WATCH this historic UN meeting here (starts about 20 minutes in): https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1b/k1bummpe5z 

Here’s a summary of the Taxcast:

In this month’s Taxcast – it may not sound like it, but this is history being made at the United Nations:

UN Chair: “The committee will now take action on draft resolution L11 rev 1. May I take it that the committee wishes to adopt draft resolution L11 rev 1? I hear no objection. Draft resolution L 11 REV 1 is adopted.” [Bangs gavel]

Naomi: “We’re going to give you our fly-on-the-wall take on what happened at the UN on November 24th 2022. We’re going to look at the power plays around what really is the beginning of the end of the OECD’s 60 year reign as the world’s leading rule-maker on global tax:”

UN Chair: “I call to order the 25th plenary meeting of the second committee at the 77th session of the general assembly.”

Naomi: “OK so usually a meeting with a title like that would make my eyes glaze over. And a vote on a resolution called ‘L11 Rev 1’ wouldn’t exactly set me on fire either BUT, honestly, it’s a fascinating meeting. It’s all the more interesting because of the power dynamics. Because in many ways, we’re witnessing a shift in power. I’ll put a link to the video in the show notes, it kicks off at about 20 minutes in, it’s worth a look. But let’s start by understanding what this resolution is and what nations have just voted for. Here’s Alex Cobham of the Tax Justice Network:”

Alex: “Look, this is a great resolution, and yet it is much less than it could have been, much less than the original proposal from the Africa Group. I think we should say, first of all, what a just fantastic job the Nigerian delegation have done to get this through. I think without Nigeria’s leadership, it’s not clear who else would’ve stood up, and that’s been vital in, in getting this, this really unprecedented success. So even in the state that it went through, the resolution really is a kind of watershed moment. There’s three main elements to it. So first of all, um, most concretely, it calls for the Secretary General Antonio Gutierrez to produce a report on the options for a framework at the UN for intergovernmental discussions and decisions on tax rules. Um, so looking at the options and over the next six months or so, delivering a, a report to the UN.

Secondly, it calls for the beginning of intergovernmental discussions, not negotiations – that got watered down to discussions – but this is still significant. Um, and that we’ll see countries and regions, uh, coming together and starting to formulate their positions on these questions: to what extent do they want to see, uh, a full intergovernmental body on tax under UN auspices? What do they want it to cover? What issues, what aspects from, uh, transparency measures through to rule setting and so on? And what form do they think that should take? So it will effectively begin informally the process of negotiations.

And then thirdly, the resolution calls for and establishes a session in the next general assembly, so from September, 2023 to discuss the Secretary General’s report and to consider decisions, and that’s where you’d expect to see a resolution of the form that this one originally took. That basically fires the starting pistol on formal negotiations, sets out a timetable for those meetings and a budget to support that negotiation process. So that’s been delayed in a sense to next year, but what we’ve already got in place is very significant.”

Naomi: “And the Nigerian representative makes it really clear at this UN meeting about the interference and attempts to water all this down, let’s listen here:”

Nigeria rep: “Nigeria is happy to be taking this historic first step, but we are also troubled that this resolution could not be more ambitious. Most countries find it difficult to accept the legitimacy of international norms of forums that they have no effective voice in shaping. We also have not had a single globally inclusive forum on international tax cooperation. Unfortunately, the enormous pressure put on sovereign countries by the secretariat of another less inclusive international organisation is regrettable, but something we hope we can all move past as we forge ahead together.”

Naomi: “She’s talking here about the OECD, when she’s mentioning pressure put on countries by ‘another less inclusive international organisation’! The OECD does seem to have seen this vote as a paradigm shift that threatens their dominance in the area of international tax, or they wouldn’t have tried so hard to stop, or weaken this resolution, right?”

Alex: “Yeah, it’s funny to hear the Nigerian statements referring to the very significant extent to which, although they don’t name it, the OECD has lobbied its absolute hardest to try to get this blocked. And yet the resolution in the end went through unanimously by consensus. That’s quite a condemnation of the OECD. Uh, in fact, their lobbying was thought by some to be so extreme that it actually put people off voting against this resolution who might otherwise have been more sympathetic.”

Naomi: “So it backfired! Even though the resolution did get passed, afterwards a load of countries, (largely OECD members) then complained about how they weren’t happy about it after all!”

Alex: “Yes I think, you know, from the OECD’s point of view, they’d be pretty disappointed that although these countries are so unhappy, none of them was willing to actually go the whole way and object.”

Naomi: “Ha, no, interestingly they weren’t willing! Joining us to analyse the vote on this historic UN resolution is the Tax Justice Network’s Rachel Etter-Phoya in Malawi. Rachel, what did you make of this UN meeting?”

Rachel: “Naomi, it was absolutely incredible to watch the proceedings at the UN to see what was like a boxing match where the underdog Nigeria, representing the Africa group at the UN, alongside all other countries that have really been cut out of the international tax discussions to stand up and say, ‘this is the time to change the rules of the game, to start negotiations on international tax’. It was so incredible because it is so different from how we’ve seen international tax negotiations over the last few years. The OECD, so the club of the richest nations, former imperial powers, they’ve been setting the rules for the last 60 years. They’ve had their banquet and they’ve been eating at it. They did in the last couple of years try to bring in a few more, but it wasn’t to the banquet table, it was really around it, catching the scraps. And in this so-called inclusive framework, countries were pressured to sign up to things that they maybe wouldn’t have signed up to otherwise. And the African Tax Administration Forum called out political pressure and coercion of members in these negotiations.”

Naomi: “Yes. What’s really striking to me straight away, just visually when you watch this UN meeting is that nations are all there, seated in alphabetical order, so you get Cameroon sitting next to Canada, Nepal sitting next to the Netherlands and New Zealand. Because if you compare that to the OECD, that’s not the case at all for, let’s say, Malawi is it?”

Rachel: “Malawi doesn’t have a seat at this banquet table. It’s not even in the room getting scraps. And there are other countries like this, so you cannot talk about inclusivity if you are not talking about the entire world. And you have to look at the power dynamics in the room and who actually is calling the shots. And even though there are challenges with the UN system, at least every country is sitting side by side.”

Naomi: “Yes! And the African Group of nations have really led the way throughout the process, all the way to the successful passing of this resolution:”

Rachel: “Sorting out the international tax system is really important for everyone and it’s really important for Africa. Africa is a net creditor to the world because of illicit financial flows, flows of money that flow out of the continent illicitly. You might assume that the greatest flows are from criminal and corrupt activity, but actually the high level panel report from a few years back that assessed the scale of illicit financial flows by the African Union saw that 60% of the illicit flows out of the continent are actually through trade. And unless we sort out the international tax system, this is not going to change. Countries have already committed to curbing illicit financial flows, which requires a change in the international tax rules in signing up to the 2030 agenda for development, known as the sustainable development goals. And part of the Addis Ababa action really explicitly states that we need to curb illicit financial flows if we’re gonna be able to finance the development that we need across the world. And this is also really explicit in Africa’s own continental blueprint for development, the Africa we want, which is the Africa Union 2063 agenda. And delegates mention this as a reason for the resolution – that we need to change the tax system to tackle illicit flows. So that’s why it’s so important to hear South Africa reminding all the other UN members in the room that they have an obligation to implement the Addis Ababa action agenda on financing the development goals. And part of that is tackling illicit financial flows, which requires a shake up to the international tax rules because multinational companies are at the moment able to exploit the rules so that they can shift the profits out of the countries where they’re actually doing business, where they’re employing people, where they have the most customers, where they’re extracting resources.”

Naomi: “Yes, and for particularly the smaller, less economically powerful nations, plundered nations, the OECD really hasn’t delivered. Just one example is with the minimum global corporate tax rate of 15% – a while back we saw countries like Nigeria rejecting that for many reasons – not least that it actually undercut their corporate income tax rate of 30%! Here’s the South African representative making a statement strongly supporting Nigeria’s tabling of this UN resolution:”

South Africa rep: “South Africa supports the resolution tabled by Nigeria on behalf of the African Group entitled ‘Promotion of Inclusive and Effective International Tax Cooperation at the UN.’ It is now seven years since the world adopted the first ever target to reduce illicit financial flows including corporate tax abuse following the report of the high level panel on illicit financial flows out of Africa, chaired by South Africa’s former President Thabo Mbeki. This remains of critical importance for global efforts in support of sustainable development goals. Developing countries have for many years been calling for a global intergovernmental process to deal effectively with tax matters. Paragraph 29 of the Addis Ababa action agenda emphasises that member states will increase the engagement on tax matters with a view of enhancing intergovernmental consideration of tax issues. We therefore believe that the time is now to realise one of the important aspect of the Addis Ababa action agenda with a huge potential for scaling up domestic public resources. By supporting the adoption of the resolution before us, member states are indicating their support for an equitable and just world and expressing support for the right to development for all states. A UN tax convention will set global standards and create the mechanism for transparency and accountability to address illicit financial flows and corporate tax abuse amongst others. The UN is the most appropriate venue for this discussion due to its universal membership and all-inclusive character. We therefore call on all member states to support this resolution, thereby recommitting to strengthened international development cooperation. I thank you.”

Naomi: “That’s the South African representative there. In this UN meeting we’re hearing so many representatives saying what a great process the OECD has for achieving better global tax rules for all nations, and how inclusive it’s been!”

Alex: “Yeah, in the debate we are, we are hearing a lot from the core OECD member countries about how the OECD process is perfect and we don’t need anything else, but they’re arguing from a very weak position. You know, clearly the OECD process is not inclusive. The OECD is, you know, in its own articles of association, is required to prioritise the economic interests of its own members, but also the inclusive framework process itself has been widely criticised by pretty much all of the non-OECD member countries in it, because it doesn’t give them a vote, it doesn’t give them an effective voice, they’re really almost just there to, to sign on the dotted line and that’s become increasingly clear. But it isn’t just that the OECD process hasn’t been inclusive, it also hasn’t been effective, so it hasn’t delivered on its own timetable. So, even for the OECD members, I think they themselves know it’s quite a stretch to say that the OECD process has done anything other than really slowly fail and take up lots of people’s time and resources.”

Naomi: “And even though this resolution gets passed unanimously in the end, look what happens here – I mean, the United States makes a last ditch attempt to water it down even further by putting forward an amendment to the resolution for a vote. Here’s the UN chair:”

UN Chair: “An amendment to operative paragraph two of draft resolution L 11 rev one was submitted by the United States of America and circulated in document A/C2/77CRP2. In accordance with rule 130 of the rules of procedure of the general assembly, the committee will take first a decision on the proposed amendment.”

Naomi: “Check this out…”

UN Chair: “I now give the floor to the representative of the United States to introduce the draft amendment.”

Naomi: “And now we get the vaguest explanation of this amendment from the US representative, I think they know it’s going to fail and they’re wasting their time:”

US rep: “Thank you Madame Chair and thank you to the facilitator of this resolution and fellow delegates. I will be brief. Hopefully all have had the opportunity to review the amendment we’ve put forward. Operative paragraph two calls for intergovernmental discussions at the United Nations in the spirit of undertaking a truly inclusive process to strengthen international tax cooperation. For this reason, the United States strongly feels that it is not in the spirit of beginning an inclusive process to prejudge the outcomes of these discussions – in this paragraph, our edit does not preclude any option from the discussions. It simply does not limit the conversation. We hope you’ll consider our amendment. Thank you.”

Naomi: “Erm, Alex, what’s the US trying to do here?”

Alex: “This amendment was really very weak. What it tried to do was to water down the content of the intergovernmental discussions that will follow to make them so vague as to be almost meaningless, so it was sort of a pure wrecking amendment. Word on the grapevine, and, you know, you hear lots of things, so perhaps shouldn’t put too much weight on this, but the word on the grapevine in New York was that the US had been very heavily lobbied by corporate lobbyists. And so they put this amendment down, you know, because they thought they, they should but then didn’t push other countries as hard as the US sometimes does, but I think it’s also there is an absolute clarity a very large majority of UN member states that want this to go ahead.”

Naomi: “So they’re going through the motions without conviction, that is what it sounded like! Er, let’s listen to this – so all the country representatives are now voting on whether or not to accept this US amendment to Nigeria’s resolution:”

UN Chair: “The committee will now commence the process of voting on the amendment on draft resolution L11 rev 1 contained in CRP2. Those in favour of the proposed amendments to draft resolution L11 rev 1 please signify. Can we have the voting screen up? Yep. Perfect. So those in favour please signify, those against, and abstentions.”

UN Secretary: “The committee is now voting on the proposed amendment draft resolution L 11 rev 1 entitled ‘Promotion of Inclusive and Effective International Tax Cooperation at the United Nations contained in document CRP2. Will all delegations confirm that their votes are correctly reflected on the screen? The voting has been completed. Please lock the machine.”

UN Chair: “I thank the secretary. The result of the vote is as follows: in favour 55, against 97, abstentions 13. The proposed amendment to operative paragraph two of draft resolution L11 rev 1 is rejected.”

Naomi: “Ha ha ha, now THAT is something the US is probably not used to – they got voted down!”

Alex: “Yes, I’m sure the US is, is really not used to not getting its own way, including at the UN! It’s also a quite significant sign, just how few countries were willing to back that.”

Naomi: “Hmm. And now that’s out of the way, before Nigeria’s resolution gets voted on, a number of nations are wanting to make statements. Here’s Singapore having its say:”

Singapore rep: “In the current climate, when the UN is expected to address ever more complex and evolving challenges, it is imperative especially for delegations from small states that we avoid duplication of efforts as far as possible and maximise the limited resources available to us. We are also mindful of the important work on this topic already being done at other forum such as the OECD G20 inclusive framework on base erosion and profit shifting and its two pillar solution. It is in this spirit that Singapore engaged in the negotiations in good faith and worked with like-minded delegations to put forward compromise proposals that reflect a delicate balance and diversity of views on this matter.”

Naomi: “Alex, Singapore isn’t an OECD member, why do they seem so against a more inclusive UN forum for deciding global tax rules?”

Alex: “Singapore is a funny one. I mean, it’s kind of long been known that within the G77 group, which is 134, I think, countries of mainly with lower per capita incomes, former colonies and so on, Singapore has very often been the one that stood out on tax issues in particular, and tried to block unanimity. And the G77 operates by unanimity. What we’ve heard, although this hasn’t been publicly confirmed, is that in this case, the OECD actively sought out high level policy makers in Singapore and asked them to prevent a G77 position in favour of the resolution. Now, with Singapore being by far the biggest corporate tax haven even within the G77, perhaps that’s canny politics by the OECD, but it seems pretty destructive and, and really kind of puts the lie to any claim that they’re fighting this because they care about ending tax abuse. You know, you choose your friends and your allies in this game, and they seem to have done that here.”

Naomi: “Interesting! And now the UK’s wanting to speak ahead of the vote on the final resolution. Let’s listen:”

UK rep: “In recent years, we’ve collectively made significant progress at the OECD.”

Naomi: “Er who’s ‘we’?!”

UK rep: “The global forum on tax transparency, the inclusive framework on base erosion and profit sharing and the OECD’s two pillar solution are all significant steps in building a fairer international tax system for all, including developing countries. These initiatives are open to all. Non-OECD members, participate in them on an equal footing.”

Naomi: “Er…I don’t think so! And now the UK representative’s making it clear they voted in support of the US’s amendment, that’s the one that just got voted down:”

UK rep: “On the present resolution, we voted in favour of the amendment because the original language prejudges new initiatives at the United Nations which could duplicate and potentially undermine existing OECD work.”

Naomi: “A lot of nations use this word ‘duplicate’ over and over throughout the session, which is quite interesting. Time for the vote now, the actual vote on the actual resolution…”

UN Chair: “The committee will now take action on draft resolution L11 rev 1. May I take it that the committee wishes to adopt draft resolution L11 rev 1? I hear no objection. Draft resolution L 11 REV 1 is adopted.” [Bangs gavel]

Naomi: “Now, you’d think that would be that right? This historic resolution is passed, it’s passed by consensus, so it’s unanimous. But then there are quite a lot of sulky, antagonistic statements from some countries which, after all, have just agreed to pass the resolution, right Rachel?”

Rachel: “So what I found fascinating at the proceedings was that after the US’s blow didn’t really land and didn’t wipe out the strong resolution, and then all the nations by consensus passed the resolution that is going to pave the way for tax negotiations to happen at the UN, there was a series of speeches given like additional blows, as if the match hadn’t ended. It was quite incredible, countries were laying their cards on the table. So we saw OECD member states talk a lot about duplication of efforts because they say that through their programme BEPS, which is base erosion and profit shifting, that they’ve been working on this and that the UN shouldn’t duplicate the efforts, but as we know, these, these efforts at the OECD have not been inclusive. So you have countries that enable the most financial secrecy according to the Financial Secrecy Index, I mean the notorious tax havens like Singapore, the US, Luxembourg, coming out after the resolution has passed to sort of throw punches in the air and say, ‘we don’t like this because it might duplicate efforts’ or ‘it’s gonna cost a lot of money’ and still trying to defend their banquet table as inclusive, as effective. And you have to imagine the other delegates in the room who are not at that banquet table or maybe just around the edge of that table in the inclusive framework who are shaking their heads inside.”

Naomi: “Yeah, we saw one nation after the other, overwhelmingly OECD member states, using this UN forum to kind of parrot very similarly worded objections about a resolution they all just reluctantly passed, it was like they were all reading from the same page!”

Alex: “This point we are hearing about, you know, the potential duplication of the OECD process, about the scarcity of resources. I mean, this is really, it’s not a question for UN member states, it’s a question for the G20 to consider. It gave this mandate to the OECD to set these rules in 2019, even after the OECD had effectively failed in the first attempt from 2013 to 2015. The G20 countries have given the OECD an enormous amount of resources to do this, while at the same time, the core members of the OECD have repeatedly starved the UN system, including the UN tax committee of any resources to do its job. Oh, and let’s not forget the inclusive framework member countries have been required to pay the OECD for their membership at a table where they don’t have an effective voice or vote. Um, you know, so we should be thinking about their scarce resources, and we should very much be encouraging them to allocate those scarce resources to a process where they do have the chance of an effective voice and effective vote. And that’s only gonna happen, uh, at the UN. So this isn’t an argument that that really holds any water at all.”

Naomi: “No. And after the resolution is passed, the US representative gives a pretty strong and disappointed statement, listen to this:”

US rep: “The United States joins consensus, but wishes to clarify its position on critical issues related to this resolution. We disagree with the notion implied by this resolution that there is not presently a highly inclusive forum working to strengthen international cooperation on tax. A United Nations intergovernmental process proposes a process that will tear down much of the progress that has been made in international tax cooperation since the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis and will undermine the inclusive framework at the OECD through which so much progress is being made. For that reason, the United States must dissociate itself.”

Naomi: “Ouch! Sore losers! Remember that part of the resolution calls for the UN Secretary General to make a report on the next steps to enhance tax rule setting leadership at the UN, something the Secretary General has supported. The US doesn’t like that:”

US rep: “We feel calls for a new report by the Secretary General at this time are inappropriate. Establishing a UN-headquartered open-ended ad hoc intergovernmental committee to recommend new actions will undermine efforts both to stabilise the international tax system and help it become fit for purpose for the 21st century. Thank you.”

Naomi: “Hmmm. And as for what the Liechtenstein representative says, I really can’t take this seriously:”

Liechtenstein rep: “Madame Chair, the strengthening of international corporation on taxation matters has been a longstanding priority for Lichtenstein. As a member of the global forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes as well as the OECD G20 inclusive framework on base erosion and profit shifting, Lichtenstein is committed to international collaboration to tackle tax avoidance, ensure a more transparent tax environment and strengthen the rule of law.”

Alex: [Laughs] “Yeah, Liechtenstein, I mean, Liechtenstein has for a long time at the UN, been very much at the forefront of European jurisdictions fighting any kind of tax or transparency progress. To hear them say, you know, ‘we are against this because we are really strongly with the OECD’s efforts against tax abuse,’ you know, really confirms just how far jurisdictions like that, that are so heavily involved in facilitating tax abuse see the OECD process as being on their side, you know, the rest of us can draw our own conclusions!”

Naomi: “And Rachel, your personal favourite – or I should really say unfavourite statement after the resolution was passed is from South Korea?”

Rachel: “I found it quite astonishing to hear South Korea in quite a patronising manner, say that the Africa group had not followed the correct process in drafting the resolution. They even explicitly stated, this delegate from South Korea, that they do not agree that an inclusive discussion can take place only at the UN. I mean that’s convenient to say when you’re sitting at the OECD’s banquet table, isn’t it?!”

Naomi: “Ha, exactly! Let’s hear what the representative of the Republic of Korea has to say on the drafting of the resolution:”

Korea rep: “It was deeply unfortunate to see in the first place a draft simply tabled to establish a new legally binding mechanism without any preparatory work to accommodate different views and identify common ground. The draft, which was supposed to serve as a basis of the negotiations only referred to unrealistic promises to create a new mechanism and ignored all relevant achievements, efforts and progress accumulated over a very long time. This year’s process should not constitute the precedent for our future process and must not ever be repeated again. The Republic of Korea agrees on the need for ensuring more inclusiveness and effectiveness in international tax cooperation. My country, however, does not agree that an inclusive discussion can take place only at the UN. The discussion should be guided by a pragmatic and effective approach instead of a political and simplistic one. We may have to ask ourselves if such a rush to launch of the UN consultations could promote and advance the relevance of the UN and ensure genuine inclusiveness. It might be convenient and easy to rely only on binary views like developed and developing when we see the world, but especially for tax matters, with such an approach we are certain that we’ll not be able to reach any meaningful outcome.”

Naomi: “Wow, she’s being quite rude there in saying the African Group of nations brought this process forward in a rush, and in a simplistic way, they’ve been working on this for years!”

Rachel: “And some explicitly say that ‘actually what you’re saying isn’t correct.’ I mean, the Eritrean representative speaking on behalf of the Africa Group says that we need a space that has equal footing for tax negotiations, clearly meaning that the OECD’s process and inclusive framework is not that.”

Naomi: “Right, here’s the Eritrean representative:”

Eritrea rep: “Tax-related illicit financial flows inclusive including tax evasion and avoidance are global problems and require global solutions and global cooperation, and no other multilateral fora is better than the United Nations to address such challenges and provide inclusive solutions. Effective international tax cooperation remains neglected in the global economic governance and needs concerted joint efforts to bridge that gap through a comprehensive United Nations framework on tax. Developing and developed countries need to join forces in pursuit of just, global UN-led solutions. The African group stresses the need to promote tax cooperation and the establishment of a governance structure where all member states can participate on an equal footing, contrary to the structures that we have today. The group stress the need to reinforce the global fight against illicit financial flows, including tax avoidance and evasion by increasing transparency and cooperation between governments and by creating more coherent and less complex global tax rules, standards and structures that fully take into consideration the interests, concerns and needs of developing countries. This resolution is a milestone toward ensuring a high standard of transparency. The resolution aims to ensure cooperation among all member states to establish one coherent global system designed to work for all countries, and not just a few.”

Rachel: “And I guess at the end of it all, after all is said and done, Nigeria’s representative speaks so powerfully about how historic the resolution is and what it means to the sovereignty of African nations and other nations who finally have a place at an inclusive table.”

Nigeria rep: “Madam Chair, Nigeria’s presidency of the 74th General Assembly had jointly convened with Norway as President of Economic and Social Council, the high level panel on financial accountability, transparency and integrity for achieving the 2030 agenda. One of the recommendations made over a year ago was a need for a fully inclusive and effective international tax cooperation at the United Nations. Madam Chair, African ministers publicly have stated their desire for a United Nations tax convention six months ago. We look forward to taking further steps as urgently as possible. We have only eight years to realise our ambitious 2030 agenda. We will not achieve it unless we step up the pace of our efforts to reshape multilateralism for the 21st century. I thank you.”

Naomi: “That’s the Nigerian representative. Alex, will this resolution really help African and other nations do that? I mean we can hear in this session from the US and many others, that although this resolution was unanimously passed by consensus, things seem far from consensus, some of the world’s most powerful countries don’t like this at all – what are the battles ahead now, hopes and challenges?”

Alex: “This is such an important question. Again, I want to reiterate what a great job Nigeria has done with the full backing of the Africa group. And they’re really right to say there’s only eight years left, almost, you know, eight going on seven. The sustainable development goals were inaugurated in 2015 and included the first ever commitment to curb illicit financial flows, including from the panel chaired by Thabo Mbeki, the high level panel on illicit financial flows out of Africa, they’re dominated by corporate tax abuse. So it’s really crucial that we get policy progress in that area. We also have within the sustainable development goals, tax identified as the primary means of implementation. So, everything that the world has committed to in terms of the 2030 agenda really depends on effective progress against the international tax abuse that drains the world of perhaps half a trillion dollars in revenues every year and forces inequalities systematically higher.

The point I think now going into the discussions is whether in good heart, the EU, the US, the UK, Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, you know, whether this set of countries wants to carry on blocking to try to keep their disproportionate power at the OECD intact at the expense of making effective progress against tax abuse, they have to really decide and come out and say it. Do they want to keep a bit more power, power that they can’t make effective? Or do they want to become part of a bigger and genuinely inclusive process that has the potential to finally deliver effectively against international tax abuse, against illicit financial flows? And for the 2030 agenda that they’ve all signed up to, we’re starting to get to the point that countries have to make their positions clear and be judged accordingly. There’s no more room to hide in the opacity of the OECD process.”

Naomi: “You’ve been listening to the Taxcast from the Tax Justice Network. That’s it for now, thanks for listening. We’ll be back with you next month.”

UN resolution for an intergovernmental tax framework: What does it mean, and what’s next?

Following the momentous passing of the resolution to begin intergovernmental discussions on a globally inclusive UN tax framework, our chief executive Alex Cobham spoke to the German Tax Justice Network, Netzwerk Steuergerechtigkeit, about why the resolution passed, what it means and what happens next. (The original German post is here).

1. Last Wednesday, the second committee of the UN General Assembly paved the way for a reform of global tax governance. The representatives of the UN member states adopted by consensus a draft resolution from African countries, which was tabled by Nigeria. What does this resolution contain and what does it mean for the future of global tax governance?

The unanimous adoption of this resolution by all UN member states is a pivotal moment in the development of the international tax architecture, and reflects the collective leadership of African countries. It’s a hundred years since the League of Nations – the group of imperial powers – gave itself the lead role on international tax matters. It’s nearly eighty years since the creation of the United Nations, which was supposed to be the successor to the League, but now including all the newly independent former colonies on an equal basis. And it’s sixty years since the western European and North American countries decided that they didn’t want the UN to set tax rules, and created the OECD in part to keep that job within their own club. There have been serious proposals for a global tax body since the 1990s at least, but every time the G77 countries or others have brought forward proposals, the original OECD members have quashed it.

And so this is a historic moment, because the resolution does two main things. First, it initiates intergovernmental discussions in New York on the architecture for international tax cooperation, including the proposal for a UN tax convention to be negotiated. That convention has the potential to set inclusive standards for tax transparency and cooperation – moving beyond the OECD arrangements that systemically exclude lower-income countries – and to create a genuinely inclusive intergovernmental tax body, to set the rules for the future. Second, the resolution mandates the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, to produce a report detailing the possibilities here. The Secretary-General has already pledged his office’s support to this process, and so by the next General Assembly we can expect an evaluation of the main options and modalities for negotiations to begin.

The resolution follows the ECA declaration of African finance ministers in May this year, calling for negotiations on a UN tax convention to begin. That in turn follows from the critical work of the AU/ECA High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows out of Africa, chaired by former South African president Thabo Mbeki. The panel’s recommendations for the fight against illicit flows, including commercial tax abuse as the largest component, were adopted as the collective decisions of heads of state at the African Union in 2015 and have underpinned African leadership in this space ever since. A major step forward was the adoption of the first global target to curb illicit financial flows, as part of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This resolution reflects that continuing leadership, and sets the path for the overhaul of the international tax architecture which is necessary to win the fight against tax abuse. Countries in other regions around the world now have the opportunity to develop their own individual and collective positions, to engage fully in the intergovernmental discussions in New York, and to contribute to the creation of a global tax governance that is fit for the twenty-first century.

2. This was preceded by tough negotiations and attempts by some industrialised countries to stop the initiative. At the last minute, the USA introduced an amendment that would have watered down the resolution. Eventually, the amendment was rejected by 55 votes in favour, 79 against and 13 abstentions. How did the African countries manage to get their way this time?

There are two elements to the answer. Most immediately, it seems that the amendment failed because the US was itself not fully convinced. It has been suggested that the amendment reflected heavy corporate lobbying rather than a committed position of the Biden administration, which seems consistent with the decision not to spend significant US political capital in forcing support. In addition, the amendment itself was not very motivating. Rather than propose a positive alternative approach, it sought to make the intergovernmental discussions so vague as to risk becoming meaningless.

But the second reason the amendment failed, and the full resolution passed with complete consensus, is the deeper, and more important explanation. The OECD put enormous efforts into fighting the resolution. Although they have refused to share the information publicly or respond to media requests on this point, we know from multiple sources that the OECD took a range of steps. These include unusually blunt communications with country ambassadors in Paris, telling them to tell their national missions in New York to oppose the resolution, in language that calls into question whether the UN is even fit to play the role envisaged. The OECD also sent senior representatives to New York to lobby directly the permanent representatives of member states, in advance of the vote, and may even have worked with Singapore, a major corporate tax haven, to seek to divide the G77 group.

The extremity of the efforts, including unprecedented, undiplomatic language about a fellow international institution, surprised many observers and caused no little disquiet within the UN itself. But it shows that the OECD shared the assessment that this resolution marks a pivotal moment, shifting the momentum powerfully towards the prospect of globally inclusive, intergovernmental tax rule-setting.

For the OECD’s efforts to fail so completely – with the amendment rejected and the resolution adopted by unanimous consensus – is highly significant. We believe this reflects two main dynamics. On the one hand is the depth of anger that has developed through the broken promises of the OECD ‘Inclusive Framework’. Countries outside the OECD were told that they could become full participants in the rule-setting process if they accepted in full the results of the first BEPS process (2013-2015), over which they had no say, and paid fees to the OECD. The Inclusive Framework agreed its workplan for the new process in early 2019, setting out three proposals including a comprehensive reform developed by the G-24 group of countries, to be evaluated by the OECD secretariat. That evaluation never took place, because the United States and France began to negotiate bilaterally. The secretariat took the results of that negotiation – between their host country and their largest member – and came back to the Inclusive Framework just six months later with a ‘unified proposal’ which dropped any element of the G-24 proposal. The loss of trust was profound, and subsequent events confirmed repeatedly the lack of weight given to views of Inclusive Framework members outside even of the G7 group of countries. These tensions spilled repeatedly into public, for example with open requests for an end to the ‘coercion’ of non-OECD members. Overall, the experience has clarified for many that there is no possibility of inclusive rule-setting within the rich countries’ club at the OECD – and so the commitment to make progress at the UN.

The other dynamic underpinning the OECD’s failure to block the resolution is that it has lost much support among its own members. The ‘two pillar solution’, intended to be delivered by 2020, remains a work in progress, and the schedule continues to slide. The ambition of both pillars is far short of the original aims. Pillar One was supposed to go ‘beyond the arm’s length principle’, introducing a unitary taxation approach to ensure the profits of multinationals can be taxed where they arise. As it stands, the OECD proposal would achieve this for just a small fraction of the profits of perhaps 80 large multinationals. The rest of their profits, and all profits of all other multinationals, would remain subject to arm’s length approaches – despite these being widely recognised as no longer fit for purpose. Pillar Two was supposed to introduced a global minimum effective tax rate for multinationals, of a floated 21% or even 25%. This has been weakened to just 15%, and then even further by the introduction of carveouts that make it likely a rate below 10% could be achieved in full compliance. Worse, the current proposals would privilege headquarters countries of multinationals, leaving their countries of operation elsewhere exposed to much the same risks of profit shifting.

For these reasons, neither the US or EU seems likely to legislate for Pillar One – making any possible benefit for other countries diminishingly small, while they would still be required to give up significant freedom to pursue unilateral measures to protect their revenues. Legislation for Pillar Two seems almost certain not to pass in the US, and remains in question for the EU. It seems certain that there will be a rapid return to highly imperfect measures such as Digital Services Taxes, which had been a key driver for the G20 mandating the OECD to start negotiations again in 2019. In this context, it seems likely that even the core members of the OECD found it difficult to generate much enthusiasm for the organisation to continue with an effective monopoly over tax rule-setting.

If the OECD were proving itself either inclusive or effective, the historic pattern of blocking UN progress would very likely have continued. That the OECD is seen to be both ineffective and exclusionary at this stage ultimately explains the unanimous consensus to begin intergovernmental discussions. A number of OECD members used their statements after the resolution to express residual concern, and it will be important to continue to engage with these in the discussions to come. Civil society in countries like Germany, and across the EU and beyond, should be asking their governments about their positions, and the process by which they may develop negotiating positions to take into those discussions.

3. Critics of the UN process claim that the OECD has been extremely successful in agreeing a global minimum tax for over 130 jurisdictions. Furthermore, they argue, that negotiations with so many countries necessarily mean that you need to agree on a compromise and do not achieve 100% of what you desire. How would you answer this?

We should be clear that at present, nothing has been agreed at the OECD. The purely political statements of 2021 have not been followed by binding commitments of any form. The OECD has yet to bring forward the text of a multilateral agreement, or any evaluation of country-level revenue impacts, so there is a long way before informed national discussions could lead to signatures. The major supporters of the current proposals, in the US and EU, appear themselves to be unable or unwilling to legislate on the lines of the OECD proposal – which makes it harder to imagine that they will continue to twist the arms of others. So after four years of what was intended to be a two year process – and in reality, after ten years of the first BEPS process beginning in 2013 – we have nothing more than unfinished proposals with questionable support, even from the most empowered participants.

To be clear, while Pillar One has little to offer, it would be valuable for the core OECD members to introduce a meaningful minimum effective tax rate. Pillar Two is too flawed to be that, but it would still be better than nothing, for these countries. But that does not imply that any other country should follow. The space is now open to design much more effective and less complex minimum taxes, and this should be a feature of countries’ national and regional talks as they prepare for intergovernmental discussions at the UN.

It’s true, evidently, that negotiations with many countries are difficult, and require compromise. But that does not mean that any failure is a good failure. The world has already created an organisation designed specifically to provide the forum for complex intergovernmental negotiations, involving all countries of the world and where they may have multiple, competing interests. This is the United Nations. It’s perhaps unfair to ask an organisation like the OECD, established explicitly to promote the economic interests of its members, to understand and take on this much broader and more complex role. The UN has learnt over time that key elements include broad transparency, so that governments can be held accountable by their own citizens and to one another. This can contribute to a dynamic where even reluctant governments eventually take more ambitious positions – as seen recently at the UNFCCC negotiations on the climate crisis, for example.

A former head of tax at the OECD once told me, on a public platform, that transparency would kill any hope of progress in tax discussions. But the world has seen that allowing private influence – both of major member states and of corporate interests – makes inclusive progress impossible. The absence of voting in the Inclusive Framework exacerbates this dynamic, and has fomented a culture of obtaining individual consent through bilateral threats and pressure. The UN is not free of the same underlying power dynamics between countries of course, and these tactics are not entirely absent. But the public nature of discussions, and the full transparency of positions presented and decisions taken, provide a counterbalancing accountability among states and to citizens. The absence of that accountability in OECD discussions is ultimately responsible for proposals that fail to align with the stated ambition of countries, and lack support even among the most committed members.

We would be foolish to believe that simply moving the setting to the UN will guarantee success. But we would be much more foolish, after ten years of accumulated evidence, to persist with the flawed process of the OECD.

4. Does a stronger role for the UN in international tax coordination mean that the OECD’s time is coming to an end? Or are there possibilities to integrate the existing OECD process into a future UN process?

For now, we can be certain that the OECD will continue to fight for its pre-eminent role – even at the expense of broader progress. There will be an added desperation in the efforts to deliver a two-pillar solution that can actually be adopted by at least some of its own members, which seems unlikely to support more ambitious outcomes. It seems unthinkable that the G20 countries would give the organisation any further mandate on tax, but with the dominance of OECD members in the group, it can’t be ruled out.

Looking to the UN process, however, there are options for the OECD. Many of its members would support it having a role. There’s no question that the OECD has a depth of technical expertise on tax that is unrivalled, simply because its funding is many multiples of all other organisations in this space, including the UN tax committee. The question would be how that expertise could be tapped, without also bringing the major disadvantages – from the patterns of member country and corporate influence, to the tradition of opacity in decision-making.

One possibility would be for the OECD to become a technical resource for those members that wished it, supporting their position in intergovernmental discussions at the UN. That would stop short of a formal role in the UN system, where the OECD’s behaviour has created significant bad feeling. Not all OECD members would necessarily wish to participate, of course, since many are already members of their own groupings which provide technical and political support – from the G77 to the EU.

A more ambitious aim for the OECD tax unit could be to seek permission to convert itself wholesale into a UN secretariat for tax discussions, and in doing so overcome the exclusionary nature of the current arrangements. There would be a high barrier of mistrust to overcome, however, for such a move to be feasible. The management of the Inclusive Framework, and the OECD’s aggressive lobbying against the UN resolution, would not be easily forgotten. Nonetheless, a UN framework convention that could throw an umbrella over range of UN and OECD instruments and activities, with the aim of ensuring a coherent architecture for international tax cooperation, is one of the options that has been discussed.

An important question relates to the OECD’s questionable stewardship of global public goods such as the standards and data on automatic exchange of financial account information and on the country by country reporting of multinationals, on which we have written to the G20 to raise concerns. These seem too important to be managed in the exclusionary and ineffective way that they currently are, and this supports the proposal to create a Centre for Monitoring Taxing Rights, or similar, under UN auspices to deliver on this and the important statistical requirements of the Sustainable Development Goals target on illicit financial flows. Again, the OECD could make a case to begin carrying out this work in a new UN framework; again, there would be a question of trust to address first.

5. What three concrete measures could the German government take to support a stronger role of the UN in international tax matters?

The German government has been a leading participant in the OECD process, but has also played an active role in supporting countries’ efforts to fight illicit financial flows (the Tax Justice Network receives some funding in this regard, details of which are publicly available in our annual accounts). Within the coalition government, the SPD has committed to support a UN instrument on tax – although as far as we understand, this has not yet translated into full support for the current process.

The first concrete measure would be for the government to address the issue publicly, explain its support for the consensus adoption of the resolution, and commit to engage constructively in the intergovernmental discussions in New York.

Second, the German government could provide a model for other EU members. A public consultation process to inform the German position would be most welcome, along with the convening of cross-EU discussions to support a broader, constructive engagement.

And third, the German government could offer to provide financial support to the process. Budgetary resolutions at the UN are always hard fought, and the related allocation of funds here will be no less contested – so a clear German commitment would ease the way significantly, and ensure that the process is not held up for lack of resources.

Beneficial ownership registration in 2022: developing countries lead the way

The Tax Justice Network published today the 2022 update of its beneficial ownership registration report (previous editions are from 2020 and 2018). Based on the findings of the Financial Secrecy Index assessments of 2022 that covered 141 jurisdictions, the report shows that the world is galloping towards beneficial ownership transparency. Information on the “beneficial owners” (the natural persons who ultimately own, control or benefit from companies, trusts and other types of legal vehicles) must be “registered” (filed with a government authority) in close to 100 jurisdictions as shown by the next map.

Although the Financial Secrecy Index usually shows a dire picture of the state of play of global secrecy (truth be told, there is still a lot to improve and many loopholes to close), this report uses the same information but to look at the bright side of things. The half-full glass perspective shows that there is plenty to celebrate. Beneficial ownership transparency used to be one of the “boring” indicators of the Financial Secrecy Index back in 2015 because no country had made any progress. By 2022 beneficial ownership transparency has become so mainstream that it’s even featured in a comic by Infolaft’s Mario Hernando Orozco in which Santa Claus refuses to give a present to a kid until the kid declares who will be the beneficial owner of the present.

Even when considering just the 112 jurisdictions that were covered by the Financial Secrecy Index in 2018 (so, not considering the new 40 jurisdictions covered by 2022), the situation has completely reversed. As the next figure illustrates, by 2018 only 34 jurisdictions (in blue) had beneficial ownership registration laws compared to 78 countries (in red) that didn’t. By 2022 the situation is flipped: 79 had beneficial ownership registration laws and 33 didn’t.

The report showcases the global diversity in beneficial ownership frameworks, such as which authorities in charge of registration (eg the tax administration, the commercial register or a special beneficial ownership register among many other options) and what situations trigger registration (eg incorporation, being subject to tax, having a real estate, etc). Yet, there is one area that prompts particular celebration: the beneficial ownership definition.

As the next figure shows, many countries, especially developing ones, are moving away from the arbitrary and easily circumvented high threshold of “more than 25% of ownership” towards lower thresholds (including no threshold at all, represented by the “0” in the X axis). Some countries’ beneficial ownership definitions also add the element of “right to benefits” (eg dividends) as well as the power to appoint directors (in the figure below, 0 threshold= any director; 50= the majority of the board).

Facts to counter myths

a) Widespread of registration

Another goal of the report is to prove myths wrong. Although many of us celebrated back in March 2022 when the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in charge of anti-money laundering recommendations finally reformed Recommendation 24 (on beneficial ownership transparency for legal persons) to require beneficial ownership registration, one could hardly consider this a radical move. As our report shows, by 2022 close to 100 jurisdictions had laws requiring beneficial ownership registration. The reform of Recommendation 24 didn’t go far enough either, and even left the door wide open for countries not to set up beneficial ownership registries but rather “alternative mechanisms”.

In the case of trusts, the reform of Recommendation 25 (on beneficial ownership transparency for trusts and other legal arrangements) is currently being discussed. It appears it will be less ambitious (if that’s even possible) because it won’t require registration, despite the fact that more than 120 jurisdictions already require some trusts to register (including 65 with beneficial ownership registration). This proves that most countries already have the legal infrastructure for trusts to register.

b) Public access

The report breaks another myth. Although public access is not required by either the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or by the OECD’s Global Forum, many countries have set up public beneficial ownership registries, including for trusts, especially in the EU (as shown in blue in the next figure). After the cut-off date for the data collection for this report and the charts below, in November 2022 an EU Court of Justice ruling invalidated public access to beneficial ownership information for local legal persons in the EU in relation to the fight against money laundering. Although the ruling was a serious blow to growing momentum on public access, there are some silver linings. First, not all EU countries decided to close public access to their beneficial ownership registries, explaining that public access served uses beyond anti-money laundering. Second, the ruling explicitly recognised that the media and civil society organisations related to the fight against money laundering have a legitimate interest to access beneficial ownership information. However, many countries (the big sea of “red” countries in the figure below) still oppose public access in the case of beneficial ownership.

The best argument, or rather fact, against this opposition to public access is illustrated by the next figure. Many of the countries that fiercely oppose public access to beneficial ownership in the general framework, already give (or committed to giving) public access to beneficial ownership information for at least some types of companies, such as those involved in procurement or extractives:

For instance, the US opposed providing public access to beneficial ownership information for most companies under the Corporate Transparency Act of 2021, but it does require public access in case of some procurement companies. What’s more, it is widely known that the US hardly registers even legal ownership information. However, some US states show that another way is also possible. In Alaska, Connecticut and Kansas, it is possible to find online free public information on natural person shareholders owning more than 5 per cent of LLCs as the next figure illustrates.

Conclusion

By 2022 the world is, at least when looking at the letter of most countries’ laws, a much more transparent place. This transparency movement should ensure that no one is left behind, especially major financial centres and countries that are still in red (eg Switzerland, Canada, China, Russia, Australia or New Zealand). At the same time, the Tax Justice Network will keep analysing via the Financial Secrecy Index the effectiveness of these laws. At the end of the day, approving a law to establish a beneficial ownership register is a very important first step. However, it is also important to ensure loopholes won’t be left for criminals and others to exploit. Effective enforcement is a challenge even for perfect laws. For imperfect ones, even more so.

‘No, the proposals are not enough’: our response to FATF consultation on Recommendation 25

The Tax Justice Network’s proposed amendments to the open consultation on FATF Recommendations 25 on beneficial ownership for legal arrangements published in full below.


The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in charge of the Recommendations on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) has opened a consultation on the reform of Recommendation 25 on beneficial ownership for legal arrangements such as trusts.

We have sent written submissions and participated in calls on Recommendation 24 and more recently on Recommendation 25 (on beneficial ownership for trusts and other legal arrangements). Now, the FATF is inviting feedback on their proposed amendments to the text of Recommendation 25.

The primary question the FATF is asking in its consultation is, “Are FATF proposals adequate to mitigate the risk of misuse of legal arrangements and to ensure access to BO information?”

To which we unfortunately answer, “No”.

The FATF reformed Recommendation 24 in March 2022 to require beneficial ownership registration from legal persons because the old requirements, which allowed, among others, a company to collect and keep beneficial ownership information to itself and only make the information available to authorities on request, were found to not be sufficient. In a dangerous undermining of its own conclusions, the FATF is now suggesting that when it comes to trusts, it is sufficient to ask the trust (or rather the trustee) to keep this information and only make it available on request. In other words, a transparency system that failed for companies is now being endorsed for trusts, which are even more secretive and complex than companies.

To answer the FATF’s third question, “What is the expected impact of the proposals on legitimate activity? In particular, what are the challenges for implementation?”, the answer is “Fortunately, there should be little technical challenge. Only political opposition.”

The only adequate measure is to establish central registries of beneficial ownership and to make information publicly available. As our paper on Trust Registration around the World shows, more than 120 countries already require registration for some types of trusts, proving that most countries already have the legal and technical infrastructure to require trusts to register.

You may find below our proposals to reform Recommendation 25. And further below, you may find our proposed amendments to incorporate these proposals into the text of the Recommendation. If you have any comments or feedback, please write to Andres Knobel at [email protected]

Proposals to reform Recommendation 25

1) Trusts should be required to register their beneficial owners with a government authority, just as legal persons are required to do so under Recommendation 24.

At the very least, the changes introduced by the March 2022 Reform to Recommendation 24 on beneficial ownership transparency for legal persons should also apply to trusts, especially the requirement to file beneficial ownership information with a government authority.

The main argument in favour of this equal treatment for any type of legal vehicle, be it a legal person or a trust, is two-fold. First, trusts are a type of complex legal vehicle subject to many types of abuses (as most recently highlighted in the Pandora Papers leak).Trusts should be subject to even more transparency (or at least as much transparency) as legal persons, not less. Second, private foundations share the same control structure and goals as trusts, and since they are considered legal persons, they are already subject to Recommendation 24, so there’s no reason why trusts should be considered special or different.

As described in our report on Trust Registration around the World, more than 120 jurisdictions already require some types of trusts to register with government authorities, including 65 jurisdictions which already require beneficial ownership information to be registered for some types of trusts. This proves that most countries already have the legal infrastructure to require trusts to register and to file beneficial ownership information.

Source: Knobel, A., & Lorenzo, F. (2022). Trust Registration Around the World, https://taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Trusts-FATF-R-25-1.pdf

While countries should be allowed to have as many local registries as they need (eg for federal purposes) all information should be centralised in a digital platform. This central platform should contain information on beneficial ownership and for all types of legal vehicles, and ideally also legal ownership information to avoid inconsistency problems. This way, it will be possible to know all the legal vehicles related to a beneficial owner, no matter which district or province a vehicle was incorporated in. Likewise, by having information on all legal vehicles as well as on legal and beneficial ownership in the same place, it will be possible to ensure consistency. For example, to prevent cases where the beneficial ownership register states that company A is owned by company B which in turn is owned by John, but the shareholder register states that company A is owned by trust X.

2) The beneficial ownership definition of trusts should include all parties, including protectors, purposes and indirect beneficiaries

Recommendation 25 only requires the identification of the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries. The Interpretative Note extends this to the protector and classes of beneficiaries, as well as “discretionary beneficiaries” (called object of a power) as well as any other individual with effective control over the trust.

The definition should be expanded to cover also:

Trusts involve very complex structures so all parties to the trust should be identified before they are allowed to control or benefit from the trust:

Source: elaborated by author

3) When legal persons are parties to the trust, no threshold should apply

The FATF imposes no thresholds on the beneficial ownership definition when it comes to trusts. However, the proposed reform would make it explicit that when a legal person is a party to the trust, then the beneficial owner of the legal person should be identified as a beneficial owner of the trust. Given that thresholds are applied for identifying the beneficial owners of legal persons, this allows individuals to artificially add thresholds into the beneficial ownership definition of trusts by interposing legal entities as parties to the trust. The result of this is that individuals with interests in the legal person below a threshold may remain hidden and unidentified, despite the fact that in the case of trusts all parties should be identified. This is illustrated by the next figure.

Source: Knobel, A., “Transparency of asset and beneficial ownership information”, UN FACTI Panel, Background Paper 4, July 2019.

The solution is to require that, when a party to the trust is a legal person, then the beneficial owners of the legal person should be identified without applying any thresholds. (This should ideally apply to all legal persons, but especially when a legal person is a party to a trust).

4) Require beneficial ownership registration for trusts in any country where the trust has a link

Just as Recommendation 24 requires all locally incorporated legal persons to register their beneficial owners, so should Recommendation 25 cover all trusts created according to or governed by the laws of a jurisdiction.

While triggering registration (or availability of information) whenever a trustee is resident in the jurisdiction is important, this should be expanded to trigger registration whenever any party is resident in the jurisdiction as required by countries such as Argentina or France.

Lastly, registration (or at least availability of information) should apply to any trust with operations or assets in the jurisdiction.

5) Prohibit discretionary trusts

Discretionary trusts allow individuals to pretend on paper not to own, benefit or control assets in order to avoid creditors, asset recovery or transparency. As described by the paper “Beneficial Ownership Registration for Trusts – Gaps and Loopholes” from the Network of Experts on Beneficial Ownership Transparency (NEBOT):

“Trusts focusing on asset protection usually involve a discretionary component, where the trustee is given discretion (on paper) to decide on trust distributions. This means that the trustee may be able to choose when a distribution will be made, how much will be given, but more importantly, if a distribution will be made at all.

“Asset protection trusts use trustee’s discretion, rather than establishing distributions beforehand e.g. “distribute 50% each year to each of the two beneficiaries” to exploit circumstances…To avoid paying such tax, the beneficiary may choose to postpone distributions until a year with reported losses which could be offset, so as not to pay any personal income tax. An even more extreme is a situation where an insolvent beneficiary owes money to creditors… To prevent this, discretionary trusts usually include provisions to prevent distributions to indebted beneficiaries.

“Discretionary trusts also create secrecy. Being the beneficiary of a discretionary trust, a beneficiary could claim not to be a beneficial owner because they are merely ‘potential’ beneficiaries and may end up not receiving anything at all…”

The FATF should prohibit discretionary trusts or at least consider them to be high risk for secrecy, sanction avoidance and prevention of asset recovery.

6) Provide public access

Public access to legal and beneficial ownership information should become the norm. As described by our report on Trust Registration around the World, public access to trusts’ beneficial owners is available in 12 EU countries as well as in Ecuador. Other countries including Dominican Republic, Panama, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore and the US offer access public access to some trust information in certain circumstances.

Ecuador

Panama

Singapore

The US

Proposals to amend the Glossary

Given that the consultation also includes a proposal to amend the Glossary with the definition of beneficial owner, proposed changes should include:

7) Include all elements in the beneficial ownership definition

As we have proposed in the Roadmap to Effective Beneficial Ownership Transparency (REBOT) or explained in this blog, the beneficial ownership definition should include all elements: ownership, control or benefits. As described by the State of Play of Beneficial Ownership Registration in 2022 many countries are already establishing all three elements in the beneficial ownership definition in their laws, including with no threshold or low thresholds.

8) Measures against complex ownership structures

As we have explained in our report on Complex ownership structures, the more complex a structure (eg many layers up to the beneficial owner, foreign entities from tax havens, etc), the harder it will be for authorities to identify or to verify the beneficial owner. In most cases, creating complexity  comes at little cost for the individual while transferring the burden and the cost to authorities. It is necessary to revert the formula, regulating or even prohibiting complex ownership structures.

Proposed amendments to FATF Recommendation 25 and the Glossary

Here are our proposed amendments to the Recommendation’s text to incorporate the above proposals.

The text that appears below in red are changes the FATF is proposing to make. Text that appears in bold are changes that we are proposing should be made. Text that is striked-through is text that is proposed for deletion.

Recommendation 25. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements

Countries should assess the risks of take measures to prevent the misuse of legal arrangements for money laundering or terrorist financing and take measures to prevent their misuse. In particular, countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and up-to-date timely information on express trusts and other similar legal arrangements, including information on all the parties to the trust the settlor(s), trustee(s) and beneficiary(ies), that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion efficiently and in a timely manner by competent authorities. Countries should consider measures to facilitateing access to beneficial ownership and control information by financial institutions and DNFBPs undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendations 10 and 22.

Interpretive Note to Recommendation 25 (Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Arrangements)

1. Countries should require trustees of any express trust governed under their law, and persons holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement, that are residents in their country or that administer any express trusts or similar legal arrangements in their country, to obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current up-to-date beneficial ownership information[1] regarding the trust or other similar legal arrangements. This should include information on the identity of: (i) the economic and legal settlor(s); (ii), the trustee(s); (iii), the protector(s) (if any); (iv), the each direct or indirect beneficiaryies or, where applicable, the class of beneficiaries[2] or objects of a power; (v) purposes (if any), and (vi), any  other natural person(s) exercising ultimate effective control over or benefitting from the assets or income of the trust. For a similar legal arrangement, this should include persons holding equivalent positions.

Where the parties to the trusts or other similar legal arrangements are legal persons or arrangements, countries should require trustees and persons holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement to also obtain and hold adequate, accurate, and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information of the legal persons or arrangements without applying thresholds. Countries should also require trustees and persons holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement that are residents in their country or of trusts administered in their country of any trust governed under their law to hold basic information on other regulated agents of, and service providers to, the trust and similar legal arrangements, including investment advisors or managers, accountants, and tax advisors.

1*. Countries with express trusts and other similar legal arrangements governed under their law should have mechanisms that:

(a) identify the different types, forms and basic features of express trusts and/or other similar legal arrangements.
(b) identify and describe the processes for: (i) the setting up of those legal arrangements; and (ii) the obtaining of basic[3] and beneficial ownership information;
(c) make the above information referred to in (a) and (b) publicly available.

1**. Countries should establish public access via central registries as well as other sources described below to beneficial ownership information of assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with different types of trusts and other similar legal arrangements:

(a) governed under their law;
(b) which are administered in their country or for which the trustee or equivalent resides in their country;

(c) which have a trust party, e.g. settlor, protector, beneficiary or purpose located in the country,
(d) which have registrable or other relevant assets (e.g. real estate, bank accounts, vehicles, etc) or operations (e.g. provision of goods or services) in the country, and
(e) types of foreign legal arrangements that have sufficient links[4] with their country

and take appropriate steps to manage and mitigate the risks that they identify .

2.    All cCountries should take measures to ensure that trustees or persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements disclose their status to financial institutions and DNFBPs when, in their function, as a trustee, forming a business relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction above the threshold. Trustees or persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements should cooperate to the fullest extent possible with, and not be prevented by law or enforceable means from providing, competent authorities with any necessary information relating to the trust or other similar legal arrangements[6]. Countries should also ensure that trustees or persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements should not be prevented by law or enforceable means from; or from providing financial institutions and DNFBPs, upon request, with information on the beneficial ownership and the assets of the trust or legal arrangement to be held or managed under the terms of the business relationship.

3. In order to ensure that adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on the basic and beneficial ownership of the trustsor other similar legal arrangements, trustees and trust assets, is accessible efficiently and in a timely manner by competent authorities, other than trustees or persons holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement, on the basis of risk, context and materiality, countries should consider use ing any all of the following Countries are encouraged to ensure that other relevant authorities, persons and entities hold information on all trusts with which they have a relationship. Potential sources of information as necessary on trusts, trustees, and trust assets are:

(a) Registries (e.g. a central registry of trusts or trust assets), or asset registries for land, property, vehicles, shares or other assets
(a) A public authority or body holding information on the beneficial ownership of trusts
or other similar arrangements (e.g. in a central registry of trusts; or in asset registries for land, property, vehicles, shares or other assets that hold information on the beneficial ownership of trusts and other similar legal arrangements which own such assets). Information need not be held by a single body only.[7]

(b) Other competent authorities that hold or obtain information on trusts/similar legal arrangements and trustees/their equivalents (e.g. tax authorities which collect information on assets and income relating to trusts and other similar legal arrangements).
(c) Other agents andor service providers including trust and company service providers, to the trust, including investment advisors or managers, accountants, or lawyers, or financial institutions, or trust and company service providers.

3* Countries should have mechanisms that ensure that information on trusts and other similar legal arrangements, including information provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, is adequate, accurate and up-to-date[8]. In the context of legal arrangements:

Adequate information is information that is sufficient to identify the natural persons who are the beneficial owner(s), and their role in the trust[9] .

Accurate information is information, which has been verified to confirm its accuracy by verifying the identity and status of the beneficial owner using reliable documents, data or information. The extent of verification measures may vary according to the specific level of risk.

Up-to-date information is information which is as current and up-to-date as possible, and is updated within a reasonable period following any change.

4. Countries should ensure that Ccompetent authorities, and in particular law enforcement authorities and FIUs, should have all the powers necessary to obtain timely access to the information held by trustees, persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements, and other parties, in particular information held by financial institutions and DNFBPs on: (a) the basic and beneficial ownership of the legal arrangement; (b) the residence of the trustees and their equivalents; and (c) any assets held or managed by the financial institution or DNFBP, in relation to any trustees or their equivalents with which they have a business relationship, or for which they undertake an occasional transaction.

5. Professional tTrustees and persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements should be required to maintain the information referred to in paragraph 1 for at least five years after their involvement with the trust or similar legal arrangement ceases. Countries are encouraged to require non-professional trustees and the other authorities, persons and entities mentioned in paragraph 3 above to maintain the information for at least five years.

6. Countries should require that any information held pursuant to paragraph 1 above should be kept accurate and be as current andup-to-date as possible, and the information should be updated within a reasonable period following any change. No direct or indirect distribution should be made unless the beneficiary and its beneficial owners has already been registered in the central registry.

7. Countries should consider establish measures to facilitate ensure access to any trust information on trusts that is held by the other authorities, persons and entities referred to in paragraph 3, by financial institutions and DNFBPs undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendations 10 and 22 as well as by civil society organisations, investigative journalists and the public in general.

8. In the context of the Recommendation, countries are not required to give legal recognition to trusts but should prohibit discretionary trusts and disregard any provision which gives discretion to a trustee or any other party on who is to be considered a beneficiary or receive a direct or indirect distribution. Countries need not include the requirements of paragraphs 1, 2, 5, and 6 and 11 in legislation, provided that appropriate obligations to such effect exist for trustees (e.g. through common law or case law).

[Other Legal Arrangements

9. As regards other types of legal arrangement with a similar structure or function, countries should take similar measures to those required for trusts, with a view to achieving similar levels of transparency. At a minimum, countries should ensure that information similar to that specified above in respect of trust should be recorded and kept accurate and current, and that such information is accessible in a timely way by competent authorities.] 

International Cooperation

10. Countries should rapidly, constructively and effectively provide international cooperation in relation to information, including beneficial ownership information, on trusts and other legal arrangements on the basis set out in Recommendations 37 and 40. This should include (a) facilitating access by foreign competent authorities to any information held by registries or other domestic authorities; (b) exchanging domestically available information on the trusts or other legal arrangement; and (c) using their competent authorities’ powers, in accordance with domestic law, in order to obtain beneficial ownership information on behalf of foreign counterparts. Consistent with Recommendations 37 and 40, countries should not place unduly restrictive conditions on the exchange of information or assistance e.g., refuse a request on the grounds that it involves a fiscal, including tax, matters, bank secrecy, etc. In order to facilitate rapid, constructive and effective international cooperation, where possible, countries should designate and make publicly known the agency(ies) responsible for responding to all international requests for BO information, consistent with countries’ approach to access to beneficial ownership information. To this end, countries should consider keeping information held or obtained for the purpose of identifying beneficial ownership in a readily accessible manner.

Liability and Sanctions

11. Countries should ensure that there are clear responsibilities to comply with the requirements in this Interpretative Note; and that trustees or persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements are either legally liable for any failure to perform the duties relevant to meeting the obligations in paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6 and (where applicable) 5; or that there are effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, for failing to comply.[10] Countries should ensure that there are effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, for failing to grant to competent authorities timely access to information regarding the trust referred to in paragraphs 1 and 5.

Recommendation 25. Glossary

Amendments to the Glossary here: Glossary – Proposals to reform Recommendation 25.


[1]Beneficial ownership information for legal arrangements is the information referred to in the interpretive note to Recommendation 10, paragraph 5(b)(ii).
[2] Where there are no ascertainable beneficiaries at the time of setting up the trust, the trustee should obtain and hold information on the class of beneficiaries and its characteristics, or object of a power. Following a risk-based approach, countries may decide that it is not necessary to identify the individual beneficiaries of certain charitable or statutory permitted non-charitable trusts.
[3] In relation to a legal arrangement, basic information means the identifier of the legal arrangement trust (e.g. the name, the unique identifier such as a tax identification number or equivalent, where this exists), the trust deed (or equivalent), the residence of the trustee/equivalent or of the place from where the legal arrangement is administered.
[4] Countries may determine what is considered a sufficient link on the basis of risk. Examples of sufficiency tests may include, but are not limited to, when the trust/similar legal arrangement or a trustee or a person holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement has significant and ongoing business relations with financial institutions or DNFBPs, has significant real estate/other local investment, or is a tax resident, in the country.
[5] This could be done through national and/or supranational measures. These could include requiring beneficial ownership information on some types of foreign legal arrangements to be held as set out under paragraph 3.

[6] Domestic competent authorities or the relevant competent authorities of another country pursuant to an appropriate international cooperation request.
[7] A body could record beneficial ownership information alongside other information (e.g. tax information), or the source of information could take the form of multiple registries (e.g. for provinces or districts, for sectors, or for specific types of legal arrangements), or of a private body entrusted with this task by the public authority.
[8] For beneficiary(ies) of trusts/similar legal arrangement that are designated by characteristics or by class, trustees/equivalent are not expected to obtain adequate and accurate information until the person becomes entitled as beneficiary at the time of the payout or when the beneficiary intends to exercise vested rights.

[9] Economic and legal Settlor(s), trustee(s), protector(s) (if any), direct or indirect beneficiary(ies) or class of beneficiaries, purposes and any other person exercising ultimate effective control over the trusts or who benefits or could benefit from any of the trust assets or income. For a similar legal arrangement, this should include persons holding equivalent positions. Where the trustee and any other party to the legal arrangement is a legal person, the beneficial owner of that legal person should be identified.
[10] This does not affect the requirements for effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for failure to comply with requirements elsewhere in the Recommendations.

‘Strong on risks, loose on solutions’: our response to FATF consultation on Recommendation 24

The Tax Justice Network’s submission to the Financial Action Task Force’s open consultation on Guidance on Recommendation 24 on beneficial ownership transparency for legal persons is published in full below.


The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in charge of the Recommendations on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) has opened a consultation on the Guidance to Recommendation 24 on beneficial ownership transparency for legal persons.

We have sent written submissions and participated in calls on the reform of Recommendation 24 and recently on Recommendation 25 (on beneficial ownership for trusts and other legal arrangements). Now, the FATF is inviting feedback on their proposed Guidance to Recommendation 24.

Our view

In a nutshell, the proposed guidance looks comprehensive on the risks, but rather loose on the solutions. It resembles the Bible, where every possible ‘sin’ (risk) is mentioned, but the solutions must first be sought out throughout its many pages and even then, may be subject to interpretation. So many “could”-s or “may”-s, all with equal weighing, would hardly put the fear of god-‘bad’ ratings into national governments. Instead, much clearer and to-the-point lists, similar to the “10 Commandments”, should be included. Section 10.1 on “Example features– Public authority or body holding beneficial ownership information” is an excellent example of what is needed. It deserves much more prominence in the guidance. Just like the 10 Commandments, it could become a pretty good summary of “the path of Good”.

Some major issues that require improvements:

Proposals to reform the Guidance

1) Expand the scope to cover any foreign legal person with a local participant or holding any type of registrable asset

Section 2.2 proposes examples of “sufficient links” that a foreign legal person may have in relation to a country in order to require beneficial ownership registration.

First, the list should not be subject to each country’s discretion (ie “could” choose) but it should be a clear set of conditions that must trigger beneficial ownership registration.

The criteria mentioned between a) and e) are fine, but point d) should also cover holding any registrable asset, while the “significance” condition should only apply to assets not subject to registration, such as works of art. Our proposed amendments in bold:

d) Has significant real estate or other investment in the country, including any asset subject to registration, such as ownership of high value commercial or residential real estate, securities market investment or other assets. For assets not subject to registration (eg art works), they should be subject to registration if they have significant value. Significant here could be determined with reference to the average price of the real estate/corresponding asset market in the country, or the quantity of real estate held;

The list should also include having any local participant who is resident in the country:

f) Has a local participant, including a shareholder, beneficial owner, director, founder, protector, beneficiary, individual with a power of attorney, etc.

2) Risk assessment should include exploratory analysis and the assessment of the Financial Secrecy Index

Section 2.3 on Risk assessment includes paragraph 18 with a very good list of steps. The only problem is that it is again discretionary rather than a requirement.

Step a) could be improved to require statistics and exploratory analysis, similar to what we did analysing UK companies’ structures, so that countries are able to determine normal vs outlier company structures considering the number of layers, type of legal vehicles of each layer, number and nationality of legal vehicles and beneficial owners, as well as distribution of interests, votes or shareholdings, eg is it 50-50%, or 99-1%? Our proposed amendments in bold:

a) Collect and analyse registration statistics (e.g. incorporation volumes and trends) on all types of legal persons that can be created under their national laws as well as statistics on the structure of legal persons (e.g. number of layers, nationality and type of legal vehicle of each layer; number and nationality of beneficial owners as well as their nature and distribution, such as 50-50% or 99-1%, etc).

Paragraph 19 proposes countries to consider risks of foreign persons by looking at FATF blacklists or UN sanctions lists. The paragraph should also include the Financial Secrecy Index, which offers a list of loopholes in the legal framework of more than 140 jurisdictions in relation to legal and beneficial ownership registration of companies, partnerships, trusts and foundations. Most of the findings are summarised by the State of Play of Beneficial Ownership Registration paper.

3) Require disclosure of the full ownership chain to address complexity risks

Section 2.5 reflects on the risks of complex ownership structures. We have published a report with many ideas on how to address complexity, from requiring justification to outright prohibition above certain risk factors (eg involvement of tax haven structures, bearer shares in the ownership chain, etc). At the very least, the Guidance should impose on countries the requirement to disclose the full ownership chain up to the beneficial owners.

4) The beneficial ownership definition and the criteria to determine who is a beneficial owner

Section 4 deals with the beneficial ownership definition. As we have expressed many times, based on the very same FATF Glossary, the definition is not based exclusively on “control” but also on ownership. This means that ownership should not refer only to “controlling” ownership.

As the State of Play of Beneficial Ownership Registration report shows, many countries are using three elements (ownership, control or benefits) rather than only “control”.

Source: Knobel, A., Lorenzo, F, “The state of play of beneficial ownership registration”, Tax Justice Network [upcoming publication]

As for thresholds, although it is welcome that Section 4.2 considers establishing thresholds lower than 25 per cent, the mere consideration of that is not sufficient. As the chart above shows, some countries are already implementing no thresholds at all (expressed by the threshold “zero”). In addition, as described by the paper “The Beneficial Ownership Definition for Companies – Challenges and Opportunities”, NEBOT Paper 4, 2022, there is no additional cost in determining the beneficial owner when establishing no thresholds.

As illustrated by the next figure, even if a country establishes a definition using the 25 per cent threshold, the only way to determine who has more than 25 per cent of the shares is to know who has at least one share, so that all shareholdings are aggregated in order to confirm who passes the threshold. In the following figure, the available information is insufficient to register Mary and to decide not to register John. Though Mary already holds at least 40 per cent of the shares, laws require the specification of the precise number of shares, so it will still be necessary to determine the owners of Companies D and F to confirm whether Mary has more indirect shares over Company A. By the same token, the only way to discard John as a beneficial owner is to know exactly who owns Companies D and F. In other words, regardless of the threshold, as long as the definition covers direct or indirect ownership, it is necessary to identify all individuals who hold at least one share.

Source: Hexner, A., Knobel, A., Taymans, A., “The Beneficial Ownership Definition for Companies – Challenges and Opportunities”, NEBOT Paper 4, 2022

Although some could argue that the second test of the definition (control via other means) would cover individuals who are (deliberately) below the thresholds, common practice suggests that most companies (and financial institutions) identify beneficial owners based only on the first test of thresholds, without checking for control via other means, which may be hard to prove or discover. Given that any threshold can be circumvented, and there are cases of circumventing even 5 per cent by creating 21 companies (each with less than 5 per cent), the only real solution is not to apply thresholds for ownership or voting rights.

In addition, consistent with Section 4.1 and 4.3 (paragraphs 35 and 44), “interests” or “ownership” and “control” should not be limited to direct holdings of shares or membership, but should also include exposure or possibility to influence via convertible stock, call or put options as well as other financial instruments. This is a broader interpretation of “interest” which is established by the US beneficial ownership registration law, the Corporate Transparency Act.

5) More verification mechanisms: alert beneficial owners, zero-knowledge proof for non-resident beneficial owners and refocus discrepancy reporting

Section 7 explains many of the challenges and mentions some general frameworks for verification, but is too flexible on measures that must be implemented. Our 2019 paper on Beneficial ownership verification is still applicable. Two of our proposals should become mandatory:

At the same time, for discrepancy reporting to be useful, rather than focusing it on typos or minimal mistakes, the beneficial ownership register should provide all reliable information on the full ownership chain, and the financial institution should alert on discrepancies not based on what the customer declared, but on what the financial institution determines. For instance, the financial institution may have information on the real residence of the beneficial owner (eg if they visited them at their house or if they know where the beneficial owner’s children go to school) or they could be aware of who has a power of attorney over the bank account or who withdraws money. This information is much more relevant than the name being spelled in different ways.

6) Interconnection or one central register for all types of legal vehicles and levels of ownership

As regards Section 10 (paragraph 79), the FATF should require that information on all legal vehicles (companies, trusts, partnerships) and levels of ownership (legal ownership, beneficial ownership) should be held by the same central register (or by a unified platform that interconnects and centralises information from all other registries) to prevent inconsistent information.

7) Public access, especially by journalists and civil society organisations

It is welcome that the Guidance (paragraphs 86 and 107) invites countries to consider public access, though this should become an obligation. The EU Court of Justice recognised in November 2022 that journalists and civil society organisations, as well as persons doing business with firms, have a legitimate interest to access beneficial ownership information. These stakeholders should have access to beneficial ownership information in all countries.

As for access by foreign authorities (paragraph 166), online registries should disclose the full ownership chain and allow searches not only by name of the company or the beneficial owner, but also by residence (or at least address) of the beneficial owner, so that foreign authorities may easily obtain information on all of their residents holding interests in the respective country.

Tax Justice Network Arabic podcast #60: كأس العالم: الجانب المُظلم من قطر

Welcome to the 60th edition of our Arabic podcast/radio show Taxes Simply الجباية ببساطة contributing to tax justice public debate around the world. It’s produced and presented by Walid Ben Rhouma and is available on most podcast apps. Any radio station is welcome to broadcast it for free and websites are also welcome to share it. You can follow the programme on Facebook, on Twitter and on our website.

في العدد #60 من بودكاست الجباية ببساطة سلطنا الضوء على خفايا تتظيم قطر لكأس العالم لكرة القدم فيفا 2022 وتأثيره على نظامها الضريبي في ظل تعالي أصوات تنادي بالمقاطعة بسبب انتهاك حقوق العمالة الأجنبية. في هذا العدد نتحدث عن فضيحة إختلاس 2.5 مليار دولار من مصلحة الضرائب العراقية والمنحة الامريكية لدعم الموازنة الأردنية وتضرر قطاع بيع السيارات في مصر جراء إنخفاض قيمة الجنيه المصري مقابل الدولار.

The World Cup 2022 and the dark side of Qatar:
In episdode #60 of Taxes Simply, we shed light on the subtleties of Qatar’s organisation of the FIFA World Cup 2022 and the impact on its tax system, in light of the voices calling for a boycott as a result of violations of the rights of migrant workers. We also look at the embezzlement scandal of 2.5 billion dollars from the Iraqi Tax Authority, the recent US grant to support the Jordanian budget, and the damage to Egypt’s car sales sector due to the depreciation of the Egyptian pound against the dollar.

كأس العالم: الجانب المُظلم من قطر

تابعونا على صفحتنا على الفايسبوك وتويتر https://www.facebook.com/ TaxesSimply Tweets by taxes_simply

[Image thanks to: “Zinedine Zidane, Marco Materazzi” by Doha Stadium Plus is licensed under CC BY 2.0.]

Hoja de ruta para un cambio en toda América Latina: December 2022 Spanish language tax justice podcast, Justicia ImPositiva

Welcome to our Spanish language podcast and radio programme Justicia ImPositiva with Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez, free to download and broadcast on radio networks across Latin America and Spain. ¡Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a nuestro podcast y programa radiofónico! Escuche por su app de podcast.

En este programa con Marcelo Justo and Marta Nuñez:

INVITADOS

~Hoja de ruta para un cambio en toda América Latina

MÁS INFORMACIÓN:

Nuestro Futuro Es Público: