This year’s edition of the Financial
Secrecy Index 2020 – our biennial ranking of the world’s biggest supplies of
financial secrecy – has received more
news coverage and global support than any previous editions of the index.
With over 700 news articles and broadcast pieces published on the index in the
past two weeks across 80 countries, it is clear that tackling financial secrecy
has become an important issue to people around the world. More people are recognising
the harmful impact rampant tax abuse by the ultra-rich and powerful has on
their lives and want their governments to do something about it.
But perhaps, one of the best indicators of
the success of the Financial Secrecy Index is the increasing hostility it
receives from representatives of secrecy jurisdictions ranking high on the
index. The first edition of the Financial Secrecy Index was published in 2009
so we at the Tax Justice Network have become familiar with the boilerplate responses
from secrecy jurisdictions to our research. However, this year’s responses have
been particularly aggressive: Luxembourg’s Finance Ministry called the index “misleading,
if not often outright false”. We have been accused of making assumptions “without
providing enough clear and credible evidence to support [our] analysis.” Cayman’s
Ministry of Financial Services has said “TJN’s methodology remains flawed”. The
UK’s Financial Secretary to the Treasury has said our research is “bogus”,
except for the parts that criticise the legacy of the opposition party.
The most aggressive and coordinated attack
on the Financial Secrecy Index, however, has unsurprisingly come from the
Cayman government and Cayman Finance (the association of the financial services
industry of the Cayman Islands). On the same day that our Financial Secrecy
Index 2020 went live and ranked the British Overseas Territory, Cayman as the
world’s biggest supplier of financial secrecy, the EU blacklisted Cayman as a
non-cooperative jurisdiction. These two developments without a doubt have
raised serious concerns for the territory and more broadly the rest of the UK’s
network of secrecy jurisdictions (the UK spider’s
web), particularly in this post-Brexit era.
After publishing a statement saying “TJN purposefully uses outdated, inaccurate and irrelevant information to manipulate the results of its report”, Cayman Finance then chased journalists who had published articles about the index to persuade them of the supposed inaccuracy of our research, and when that failed to yield success, resorted to promoting their tweets about the index.
As before, however, the attacks and responses have not identified any actual inaccuracies in the research or the calculations behind the index, and most are in the form of sweeping accusations. But in light of the coordinated efforts we’ve seen this year to target journalists and our Twitter followers with misinformation, and to misdirect scrutiny away from secrecy jurisdictions, we’ve prepared this blog to debunk some of the common claims used by secrecy jurisdictions to excuse their ranking on the index.
Claim
1: The Financial Secrecy Index unfairly targets or penalises jurisdictions with
“successful” financial service industries.
The Financial Secrecy Index ranks
countries not on how secretive their financial laws are, but on how much
financial secrecy they supply to non-residents outside of the country looking
to hide their finances from the rule of law. This is done by grading each
country’s legal and financial system with a secrecy score out of 100 where a
zero out of 100 is full transparency and a 100 out of 100 is full secrecy. The
country’s secrecy score is then combined with the volume of financial activity
conducted in the country by non-residents to calculate how much financial
secrecy is supplied to the world by the country.
This means a highly secretive jurisdiction
that provides little to no financial services to non-residents, like Samoa
(ranked 86th), will rank below a moderately secretive jurisdiction that is a
major world player, like Japan (ranked 7th). The point is that a highly
secretive jurisdiction used by no one, does less damage than a moderately
secretive jurisdiction used by many people around the world.
Secrecy jurisdictions often twist this analysis on its head, claiming they are being treated unfairly for “successfully” attracting money from non-residents. Because they can sometimes have lower secrecy scores than some of the jurisdictions which they rank above, they claim the index purposefully ignores more secretive jurisdictions and targets jurisdictions with bigger financial services industries. Cayman Finance made this claim in their statement, saying “the TJN’s weighting system penalises countries with successful financial services industries.” The Cayman government then repeated this claim verbatim in subsequent responses.
The UK’s Financial Secretary to the Treasury similarly argued that the reason the UK ranks so high on the index despite having a lower secrecy score than countries like Brunei and Liberia is due to a “fudge factor”. He argues, “In its list of 133 jurisdictions, we [the UK] supposedly come 12th in terms of offensiveness, yet near the bottom we see Brunei, Vanuatu and Liberia. Is anyone seriously suggesting that this country is a less robust and effectively transparent tax jurisdiction than those?”
These claims miss the central purpose of the
Financial Secrecy Index’s ranking of countries by their supply of financial
secrecy as opposed to the secrecy of their financial laws: All countries have a
responsibility to safeguard against financial secrecy. The more financial
activity a country seeks to pull in from other countries’ residents, the
greater the responsibility that country has to make sure its financial sector
is not abused by people to evade or avoid tax in other countries or to launder
money they’ve obtained elsewhere through illegal means.
To illustrate the point, imagine if Samoa,
which is ranked 86th and has a secrecy score of 75, and Luxembourg,
which is ranked 6th and has a secrecy score of 55, became fully transparent.
Which country’s change in secrecy would make a much bigger impact on the world?
Hint: only one of these countries has had a global financial scandal named
after them.
And anyway, if Luxembourg actually becomes
fully transparent, it would get a secrecy score of zero, which would rank it at
the bottom of our index, no matter how big its financial centre is. So the size
of a financial centre is neither good nor bad, but when combined with the
secrecy score, its level of responsibility for illicit financial flows and
other global ills is well reflected.We want to see reforms in the big financial
centres like Switzerland, Cayman, the US, Luxembourg, Singapore and Hong Kong: only
if they became more transparent, there would be a significant impact in the
fight against crime and illicit financial flows.
To answer the UK’s Financial Secretary to
the Treasury directly: no, we are not ‘suggesting’ that the UK is less
transparent than Vanuatu. In fact, the objectively verifiable criteria of the
secrecy score provide powerful evidence that the UK is more transparent
than Vanuatu – on which, well done. But the UK’s global importance means that
its moderate secrecy poses a much, much higher risk to the world of
facilitating tax abuse and other corruption. We would welcome improvements in
Vanuatu’s secrecy; but the UK’s scale of activity brings with it great
responsibility. And that is why the UK’s backsliding has seen it move up to 12th
in the index, as a jurisdiction of very substantial concern.
Claim
2: We are complying with global standards on transparency.
Secrecy jurisdictions often claim in
response to their ranking on the Financial Secrecy Index that they are
complying with, or have committed to comply in the future with, international
standards on transparency and are therefore transparent. In some cases, secrecy
jurisdictions claim that the index does not take these standards into account. In
other cases, secrecy jurisdictions, claim that their compliance with
international standards is proof that the Financial Secrecy Index does not
provide an accurate assessment.
For example, Luxembourg has claimed “…the
analysis (and concomitant ranking) fails to take into account the fact that
regulators and institutions of the Luxembourg financial centre are applying all
the relevant EU and international standards. Luxembourg…has implemented and put
in practice all applicable OECD and EU rules”. Gibraltar has similarly argued
that it “complies with all global standards” and is “at the forefront of
transparency and global standards in this field”. The Cayman government
argued, “The Cayman Islands’s standards of transparency are based upon
recognised global standards. Unfortunately, the TJN’s methodology remains
flawed, as does their definition of regulatory standards, which are not
recognised by any global standard setting body.”
The Financial Secrecy Index grades each country’s financial and legal system against 100 datapoints, which includes compliance with various international standards, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) anti-money laundering recommendations, the Common Reporting Standard and the OECD’s Global Forum standard on access to banking information. However, many existing international standards are widely recognised as being far too weak to effectively safeguard against financial secrecy. As a result, complying with international standards is often not enough to ensure effective financial transparency in practice. The is one of the primary reasons why the OECD has been working recently on proposals to reform the century-old international tax system in place today.
Under current international tax rules, multinational corporations have been able to dodge an estimated $500 billion in tax every year and offshore jurisdictions have accrued huge concentrations of untaxed private wealth. So we often set a higher bar that reflects what truly effective safeguarding against financial secrecy looks like in practice.
Our higher standards have, over the years,
helped drive better international standards. We have, since our founding,
advocated a number of positions – such as automatic
information exchange, country-by-country
reporting, and beneficial
ownership transparency – which were all called unrealistic
and utopian when we first proposed them. Nonetheless, all of these have become emerging
international standards in the past few years. Moreover, many countries and
corporations are now voluntarily complying with our more robust transparency
standards that have not become international standards yet, such as online
public access to registries of beneficial ownership and local filing of country
by country reports whenever the country cannot obtain it via automatic exchange
of information.
Claim
3: Misquoting what the Financial Secrecy Index scores the country on
The Financial Secrecy Index evaluates
countries against 20 indicators, each consisting of several sub-indicators,
totaling over a hundred datapoints against which each country is scored. This
data is made public on the Financial Secrecy Index website and is available to
download in excel files. This data is also sent to each ranked jurisdiction
ahead of the launch of the index to provide jurisdictions the opportunity to
identify any inaccuracies in our research in advance.
Nonetheless, some secrecy jurisdiction do
not engage with this data at all and falsely claim that the index has evaluated
them on something completely different. In some cases, secrecy jurisdictions
misquote our press releases. More often, secrecy jurisdictions quote the
historical summaries that we provide on some countries’ financial sectors
alongside our evaluation and ranking of those countries’ financial and legal
system. These historical summaries are independent pieces which are not
factored into countries’ ranking – they’re purely additional information we
provide on the history and of the secrecy jurisdiction. Perplexingly, some
secrecy jurisdictions ignore the index’s latest evaluation of their financial
and legal systems and instead lambast our summary of their history for being
“outdated”.
For example, Cayman Finance claims that
both the 2018 and 2020 edition of the Financial Secrecy Index “cite a report by
the U.S. Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation to support an allegation that
U.S. corporate “foreign earnings and profits” are shifted out of other
countries and into Cayman. The report was published in 2010, making the
information within it eight years old when TJN included it within the 2018 FSI
and ten years old.” Neither edition of the index used this report to evaluate
Cayman’s ranking. The report was mentioned in the historical summary we
provided in 2018 on the jurisdiction, and since history doesn’t change, the
report was mentioned in the historical summary in 2020.
A similar claim is made by Luxembourg in a
Delano article on the Financial Secrecy Index 2020:
Luxembourg’s finance ministry said in a statement to Delano on 19 February: “…The research methodology, for its part, on which it is based seems to be flawed, as it fails to reflect the major progress that has been achieved over the last 5 years in the field of transparency in Luxembourg.”
Indeed, the TJN report cited Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s prime minister until 2013, 13 times, but only mentioned Xavier Bettel, PM for the past 6 years, twice.
All of these references to prime ministers
were made in our historical summary of Luxembourg. These references have
nothing to do with Luxembourg’s ranking on the index. Not surprisingly, Luxembourg’s
response to the index did not mention any of the data on which the country was
actually evaluated and ranked.
One last claim made by the Cayman
government, and on the face of it more specific, is this: “The Cayman Islands
does not permit shell companies, bearer shares or anonymously numbered bank
accounts that conceal ownership.” But this is again, a misdirection. The index
does not claim that Cayman permits bearer shares or anonymous numbered bank
accounts: see points 172, 157 and 158 on our interactive database
(click on Cayman). Our secrecy scores are made up of 20 indicators, so
achieving low secrecy in one doesn’t make the whole jurisdiction secrecy-free. And
while there is no precise definition of a ‘shell company’, this is typically
taken to relate to anonymous ownership and the Index shows that Cayman has much
to improve in respect of legal ownership registration for companies.
Miscellaneous
claims
Cayman Finance: “The TJN’s assessment criteria are geared toward countries with direct taxation systems. Our public revenue is collected upon transactions, principally on goods, but the TJN’s methodology doesn’t account for this. For example, one of its Key Financial Secrecy Indicators (KFSI) isn’t applied to jurisdictions with indirect taxation, and so TJN arbitrarily ascribes a full secrecy score to Cayman”
The index assesses more than 130
jurisdictions and is definitely not ‘geared’ specifically towards countries
with direct taxation systems. However, a lack of direct taxation is relevant
for the index, mostly because it all but guarantees lower transparency.
Countries that don’t have income taxes have little interest in information to keep
track of taxpayers.
Like United Arab Emirates, Bahamas, and other jurisdictions we assess, Cayman does not have a direct taxation system which means Cayman does not collect information on taxpayers like other countries do. For instance, Cayman doesn’t issue tax identification numbers (TINs) which is what most countries use to identify a specific taxpayer or company. This affects Cayman’s ability to fight against corruption and money laundering.
The absence of direct income tax is also
reflected in the key
indicator (KFSI9) that measures the
publication of cross-border unilateral tax rulings. Since Cayman does not have
a direct income tax, it does not issue unilateral tax rulings, which can be
abused as a form of financial secrecy (and the LuxLeaks scandal revealed
how extremely harmful these rulings can be).. Cayman claims that since it does
not issue unilateral tax rulings, it should not be scored as fully secretive on
this indicator. However, Cayman not issuing unilateral tax rulings does not
mean that Cayman has opted for transparency, but rather that it is offering a
more simple form of secrecy: the outright refusal to collect any tax
information.
What is more, with the OECD’s Common
Reporting Standard (CRS) for automatic exchange of information (See Annex A)
Cayman has taken the “voluntary
secrecy” option. That means that while Cayman
does send information to other
countries about many non-residents, it declines to receive information from abroad on its own residents. This gives
a strong secrecy signal to individuals who pay a token investment (and fees) to
become a Cayman-resident “Person of Independent Means”. This often referred to
as a “Golden Visa”, which gives individuals a fake residency in a country which
they can use to open bank accounts in the country. When information is
collected on the accounts of golden-visa holders by more transparent countries,
the information is sent to the individual’s fake resident country instead of
their true country of residency, where they really should be paying
taxes. For golden-visa holders “resident” in Cayman, the jurisdiction under
voluntary secrecy, declines to receive the information sent by more transparent
countries.
Another key indicator which reflects the
absence of direct income tax is KFSI 14 on “tax court secrecy.” Cayman argues
it should not have received ‘not applicable’ (equal to 100% secrecy score in
this case) only because it has no direct income tax and therefore does not have
these types of tax court proceedings. Naturally,
no one needs to go to a tax court to ask for a reduction of taxes owed, if they
don’t pay tax anyway but this is definitely not an indication for being
transparent. As we explained above, a lack of direct taxation guarantees lower
financial transparency, and this is exactly what our index attempts to measure.
The key point, as discussed under ‘Claim
1’ above, is that jurisdictions have a responsibility for the impact of their
secrecy on the tax abuse and other forms of corruption that they facilitate in
other countries. For Cayman to claim that it does not need a certain measure
because of its own tax system is irrelevant, if the effect of that system is to
promote abuse elsewhere. Cayman remains responsible for the secrecy it sells.
Despite the hostility directed by
representatives of secrecy jurisdictions towards the Financial Secrecy Index
2020, they have been unable to muster any factually-based criticisms of the
index. Instead, their responses have mostly fallen under the three types of
claims debunked above. Perhaps this in itself is most revealing of all.
The Financial Secrecy Index 2020 has, as of the time of writing this, enjoyed media coverage in outlets with a combined audience of more than 2 billion people. The claims put out in response by secrecy jurisdictions have reached far fewer people and likely convinced even fewer (the responses to the promoted tweets of Cayman Finance are a joyous read, for example). Nonetheless, as public pressure continues to grown on governments to clamp down on financial secrecy, some secrecy jurisdictions will become even more desperate in their attempts to misdirect scrutiny and spread misinformation. Let’s make it clear that we’re on to their act.
Featured image: “General Election – Lies & Truth – Keep the Faith!” by Diego Sideburns is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0