Uncovering hidden power in the UK’s PSC Register

A new report, authored by Maria Jofre (Open Ownership) and Andres Knobel (Tax Justice Network), provides an in-depth analysis of the United Kingdom (UK) People with Significant Control (PSC) register. The research identifies key trends in beneficial ownership (BO) structures, assesses the transparency of ownership data, and highlights potential risks in ownership networks. The findings aim to inform policy reforms, enhance enforcement actions, and strengthen the credibility of BO registries.

Research objectives

This research was driven by three main objectives:

1. Explore policy reform aspects related to beneficial ownership, focusing on ownership interests, disclosure thresholds, and the complexity of ownership networks.
2. Identify outliers and anomalous ownership patterns that may indicate potential risks or irregularities in ownership structures.
3. Develop a scalable and replicable analytical framework for examining ownership structures across different contexts and jurisdictions, offering a practical tool for researchers and authorities to assess ownership networks more effectively.

Key findings and insights

The analysis of the UK PSC register revealed valuable insights into ownership structures, particularly in terms of ownership concentration, transparency, and complexity. The dataset covers approximately 5.2 million individual beneficial owners, 6.1 million entities, and 6.5 million owner-entity relationships, comprising 14.2 million declared interests (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Visualisation of the UK PSC information

Key findings include the following:

1. Ownership interests and control

The research shows that shareholding and voting rights are the most frequently reported ownership interests, with most entities controlled by a single or small group of beneficial owners. Notably, 56% of reported interests fall within the 75–100% range for both shareholding and voting rights, indicating a high degree of concentrated control. When looking at combinations of interests, the most common configuration involves a single beneficial owner holding shares, voting rights, and board-appointment rights simultaneously (see Figure 2), further highlighting the concentration of power among a limited number of individuals.

2. Ownership complexity

While most entities in the dataset have relatively simple ownership structures, the study identified a subset with highly complex and opaque ownership chains involving multiple intermediary entities. Such complexity increases the risk of misuse by obscuring who ultimately controls an entity. In one exemplary case, an entity had listed 18 intermediary entities but no individual beneficial owners.

Figure 2: Top ten most common interest types and combinations

3. Identifying anomalous patterns

The research also identified several outliers that deviate from typical ownership patterns, including:

• Entities with no registered individual beneficial owners: Approximately 20% of entities in the UK PSC register have not declared any individual beneficial owners. This may reflect noncompliance, reporting gaps, or deliberate attempts to conceal ownership.
• Individuals linked to a large number of entities: Some individuals appear as beneficial owners in hundreds or even thousands of entities, suggesting extreme cases of concentrated ownership. For instance, one individual is listed as the beneficial owner of 1,296 entities, while another is linked to 1,064 entities. These cases raise concerns about the possible use of nominee arrangements or shell companies to obscure true ownership and control.
• Entities with multiple beneficial owners and multiple interests: Around 20% of entities have declared more than one beneficial owner, with at least one individual holding multiple types of interests. The most common setup involves two individual beneficial owners with equal ownership stakes, suggesting balanced control. However, some entities exhibit irregular patterns. In one case, a single entity listed 41 beneficial owners, each with board-appointment and voting rights in the 25–50% range, resulting in an implausible total voting share far exceeding 100%.

Conclusions

The findings from this analysis highlight the importance of comprehensive and structured BO data for improving transparency and detecting hidden control. Using lower disclosure thresholds and capturing precise ownership values can help authorities and researchers more effectively identify anomalies and assess risk.

The methodology developed in this study, including the use of a reproducible Python notebook, offers a scalable and adaptable framework for analysing ownership structures. It enables systematic assessments of ownership data across different countries and contexts, supporting better enforcement, policy design, and registry implementation.

By contributing new insights and practical tools, this research supports ongoing global efforts to strengthen beneficial ownership transparency and address the misuse of legal vehicles for illicit purposes.